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This thesis examines the Scottish Conservative party between 1832 and 1868. It 
focuses on the party’s organisation, structure, leadership, and attitudes. It begins by 
examining the social, occupational, educational, and religious background of its 
MPs, candidates, and peers. This reveals that the party’s composition, while 
predominantly aristocratic, nevertheless boasted a range of distinctive and often 
competing interests. The thesis then explores the make-up, organisation and activity 
of the party on a local constituency level. This illustrates that the party was more 
inclusive and heterogeneous than might be assumed, and was very active in 
promoting itself through a wide variety of methods. The party thus had a notable 
impact on the wider social and cultural life of Scotland throughout the mid-
nineteenth century. Following this, the structure and leadership of the Scottish party 
on a national level is examined. These could be a source of innovation and 
accomplishment, and their subsequent decline had a marked effect on the party’s 
overall performance. Above this level, the party’s role in parliament, governance, 
and in a British context is explored. It is demonstrated that the Scottish party 
maintained a modicum of distinctiveness even at Westminster. Moreover, its 
multifaceted role in Scottish governance gave it significant influence over Scottish 
society. Finally, the positions of the Scottish party on important political issues are 
examined, as are the underlying attitudes which determined these positions. The 
Scottish party contained many competing and overlapping factions, which held a 
hitherto unsuspected diversity of outlooks. Overall, this thesis illustrates that the 
Scottish Conservative party had a pronounced effect on many different facets of 
Scottish politics and wider society, and was itself more complex and more popular 
than is reflected in the existing historiography. It therefore counters the assumption 
that Scotland was almost hegemonically Liberal – a finding which has potential 
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In quotations, grammar and spelling have been modernised, capitalisations altered, 
and abbreviations lengthened, except where doing so would have materially altered 
the meaning or import of the content in question. In particular, the capitalisation of 
party and factional labels has been left entirely unaltered, even where this may seem 
incongruous.  Within the text itself, capitalised labels (e.g. Conservative) pertain to 
parties and their de facto members, while lower-case labels (e.g. 
conservative/conservatism) refer to broader sets of beliefs and their adherents. The 





The central question of nineteenth-century Scottish politics was ‘Why is Scotland 
Liberal?’.1 This thesis interrogates the underlying assumptions of that hypothesis, 
seeking to problematise the simplistic but enduring ‘myth’ of liberal Scotland. 
Certainly, the majority of MPs sent by Scotland to parliament between the First and 
Second Reform Acts were not Conservative. This, however, is only a small part of a 
much broader story; the operation of Scotland’s electoral system concealed a 
multitude of complexities in its wider politics and society. Moreover, the fluid and 
contingent state of partisan high politics in parliament itself makes it unwise to draw 
clear lines of demarcation between ‘Liberal’ and ‘Conservative’. Indeed, given the 
moderate nature of Scotland’s Liberal MPs, Scotland’s political representatives were, 
in many cases, more whiggish than monolithically ‘liberal’ in the mid-nineteenth 
century.2 When a spectrum running from grassroots Scottish society to the corridors 
of Westminster is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that Scotland and its 
politics were far more conservatively inclined than has been assumed. This thesis 
will demonstrate that this was primarily due to the character and efforts of the 
Scottish Conservative party. 
The Conservatives were not the most popular party in Scotland. They were, 
in fact, less popular than in England and Ireland. As such, this thesis will also 
explore why the Scottish Conservative party was, nevertheless, unable to reverse the 
                                                          
1 ‘Why is Scotland Liberal?’, Westminster Review, 130 (Nov. 1888).  
2 John Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party, 1857–1868 (London, 1966), 48–9. 
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political domination of the Liberals, Whigs, and radicals. As such, it will consider 
why Scotland was not more conservative.  
The pre-Reform Tory party dominated Scotland’s representation before 1832, 
primarily due to the exceptionally oligarchic (though not entirely closed) nature of its 
electoral system.3 Given a national electorate which had grown to only 4,239 by the 
last pre-Reform election, the party was able to construct an efficient vote-
management apparatus. This was headed by successive members of the Dundas 
family, supported by their allies in the gentry and Faculty of Advocates.4 Their 
authoritarian hold over Scotland’s representation and governance, however, 
engendered deep hostility among the wider population. The party was thus 
unpopular, to an even greater extent than in England. Because of this, the Reform 
agitation was particularly heated in Scotland, especially as Scottish Tories were 
particularly vigorous in their attempts to stymie reformist efforts.5  
They were punished for their obstructionism at the polls in 1832. The passing 
of Reform did, however, mark the beginning of the newly christened Conservative 
party in Scotland. The party quickly acquired a new leader, and the relative influence 
of internal factions shifted dramatically. It acquired new organisational machinery, 
both local and national, which engaged in novel activities within a transformed 
electoral system. In parliament, Scottish representatives in both the Commons and 
Lords participated in the wider changes which were taking place in the UK 
Conservative party. These changes had a positive impact on the party’s electoral 
performance, but there were clear limits to this. The Scottish party gradually 
                                                          
3 See Ronald M. Sunter, Patronage and Politics in Scotland, 1707–1832 (Edinburgh, 1986). 
4 See Michael Fry, The Dundas Despotism (Edinburgh, 1992). 




improved its performance in successive elections up to a peak in 1841, but 
nevertheless failed to achieve many pluralities and thus win seats in urban Scotland. 
The Scottish party was damaged, both internally and externally, by the Scottish 
Church crisis which culminated in the 1843 Disruption of the Established Church of 
Scotland.  
After the UK party’s 1846 schism over the issue of Corn Law repeal, the 
Scottish Conservatives followed their colleagues by splitting into Peelite and 
Protectionist groups. Neither of these, however, were able to develop an appealing 
Scottish platform, despite strenuous and occasionally innovative efforts. Thus, the 
party continued its gradual electoral decline. By the election of 1865, the party was 
reduced to a mere ten MPs out of fifty-three seats, and won only six seats in the 
election of 1868.6 The party therefore ended the period in a worse electoral position 
than it had started in. Nevertheless, 1867–8 marked a new chapter in its history, with 
the formation of the first new national organisation since the 1830s – the Scottish 
National Constitutional Association. This body was intended to promote the party’s 
prospects in an electoral system which had been again transformed. In the later 
nineteenth century, it would go on to significantly improve its electoral performance. 
Indeed, the Conservative party has been a periodically powerful force in Scotland up 
to the present day. Significant aspects of this force stem from its formative phase, 
between 1832 and 1868.  
 
 
                                                          




Methodology and Select Historiography 
 
The period between the First and Second Reform Acts was an eventful one in 
Scottish and British political terms, generating much fruitful scholarly inquiry.7 
However, the wide-ranging works on broader Scottish politics by I.G.C. Hutchison, 
Michael Fry, and Michael Dyer, while invaluable, do not offer a dedicated 
examination of the Scottish Conservative party after 1832.8 The party from the 1880s 
onwards, as it gradually improved its electoral performance, has been the subject of 
more thorough attention.9 Nineteenth-century Scottish politics in general has, 
however, until recently been a relatively neglected field. As recently as 1994, 
historians could comment upon the lack of a coherent history of nineteenth-century 
Scotland, especially a political history.10  
The study of modern Scottish history from the 1960s onwards was generally 
dominated by economic and social themes, along the lines of T.C. Smout’s History 
of the Scottish People.11 As such, ‘politics’ and ‘people’ were framed as somewhat 
separate and distinct. The more politically oriented narrative offered by the likes of 
                                                          
7 For the sake of brevity and clarity, more in-depth engagement with the historiographical landscape 
pertaining to the individual chapters of this thesis is generally contained within the chapters 
themselves.  
8 I.G.C. Hutchison, A Political History of Scotland 1832–1924: Parties, Elections, Issues (Edinburgh, 
1986); Michael Fry, Patronage and Principle: A Political History of Modern Scotland (Aberdeen, 
1987); Michael Dyer, Men of Property and Intelligence: The Scottish Electoral System prior to 1884 
(Aberdeen, 1996). 
9 See Basil L. Crapster, ‘Scotland and the Conservative Party in 1876’, Journal of Modern History, 29 
(1957), 355–60; Derek Urwin, ‘The Development of the Conservative Party Organisation in Scotland 
until 1912’, SHR, 44 (1965), 89–111; Ewen Cameron, Impaled Upon a Thistle: Scotland since 1880 
(Edinburgh, 2010), Chapter 3. 
10 R.J. Morris and Graeme Morton, ‘Where Was Nineteenth-Century Scotland?’, SHR, 73 (1994), 89. 
11 See, for instance, T.C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People, 1560–1830 (London, 1969).  
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William Ferguson was out of step with then-prevailing trends.12 The neglect of 
political history can even (arguably) be partly traced back to attitudes originating in 
the Victorian period itself. During this time, Scotland’s political history ceased to be 
of great concern to Scottish contemporaries, who preferred to focus on the more 
romantic and obscurantist elements of the nation’s history.13 Michael Fry has 
attributed this to the overwhelming pre-eminence of an aggressive brand of 
intellectually assimilationist liberalism after 1832.14 As this thesis will demonstrate, 
however, this pre-eminence was not nearly as overwhelming as has been assumed; 
therefore, twentieth-century post-war historiographical trends are primarily 
responsible for this neglect. 
Work on the Scottish Conservatives during this time is almost entirely non-
existent. A relatively recent article has demonstrated that the Scottish Peelites had 
faded away in parliament by 1857, but nevertheless retained some limited influence 
on a local level up to the end of the decade.15 The useful works of J.I. Brash explore 
Scottish Conservative activities on a constituency level, illustrating the extent and 
variety of the party’s endeavours.16 However, they rely almost exclusively on a 
collection of papers from a single manuscript source, and discuss only the electoral 
side of party activity. Even this activity, moreover, is restricted to isolated Scottish 
                                                          
12 See, for instance, William Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the Present (Edinburgh, 1968).  
13 See Marinell Ash, The Strange Death of Scottish History (Edinburgh, 1980); Colin Kidd, ‘“The 
Strange Death of Scottish History” Revisited: Constructions of the Past in Scotland, c. 1790–1914’, 
SHR, 76 (1997), 86–102. 
14 Michael Fry, ‘The Whig Interpretation of Scottish History’, in Ian Donnachie and Christopher 
Whatley (eds), The Manufacture of Scottish History (Edinburgh, 1992), 75. 
15 Gordon F. Millar, ‘The Conservative Split in the Scottish Counties, 1846–1857’, SHR, 80 (2001), 
250. 
16 J.I. Brash, Papers on Scottish Electoral Politics, 1832–1854 (Edinburgh, 1974); J.I. Brash, ‘The 
Conservatives in the Haddington District of Burghs, 1832–52’, Transactions of the East Lothian 
Antiquarian and Field Naturalists’ Society, 11 (1968), 37–70. 
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regions. Slightly more attention has been paid to the mid-nineteenth century 
Conservative party in the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom. A 
monograph on the Irish Conservative party has recently been published, focusing on 
a time when the Irish party enjoyed an ‘Indian summer’ after 1852, as opposed to its 
Scottish counterpart’s continued stagnation.17 This work largely restricts itself to an 
examination of party responses to issues such as land reform and the position of the 
Church of Ireland. It does, however, provide a very useful analysis of the social 
composition of the Irish parliamentary party, facilitating fruitful comparisons with 
the Scottish Conservative contingent. 
Scholarly works on the development of the Conservative party in general are 
also much more abundant.18 Conservative party organisation in the ‘Age of Peel’ is 
an area which has received sustained attention. An emphasis on the local nature of 
party development has provided insights into the local and national political 
environments in which parties operated, during the ‘golden age of the private 
clubs’.19 Norman Gash greatly expanded on this topic in later articles, which 
examined both the parliamentary and electoral organisation of the party. He 
demonstrated that both parts were mutually dependent, yet also possessed 
considerable scope for independent action in their own spheres.20 More recent 
                                                          
17 Andrew Shields, The Irish Conservative Party, 1852–1868: Land, Politics and Religion (Dublin, 
2007), 207. 
18 Older and/or more general works on this subject include George Kitson-Clark, Peel and the 
Conservative Party: A Study in Party Politics, 1832–41 (London, 1964); Bruce Coleman, 
Conservatism and the Conservative party in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 1988); Paul 
Adelman, Peel and the Conservative Party, 1830–1850 (London, 1989). 
19 Norman Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel: A Study in the Technique of Parliamentary 
Representation, 1830–1850 (London, 1953), 393. 
20 Norman Gash, ‘The Organization of the Conservative Party, 1832–1846, Part I: The Parliamentary 
Organization’, Parliamentary History, 1 (1982), 137–59; Norman Gash, ‘The Organization of the 




research has examined the party’s organisation in the chaotic period after the Corn 
Law split in the 1850s, illustrating that it helped to stabilise the party and stave off 
disintegration.21 Moreover, Matthew Cragoe has rightly questioned the contention 
that local partisan loyalties in favour of national parties did not take proper root 
before the 1860s.22 By examining the effects of Conservative Associations in the 
quiet periods between elections in the 1830s, it becomes clear that such bodies had 
an appreciable effect on broader beliefs. This, however, tended to be a one-way 
affair; though Associations instilled broader party loyalties downwards, they had 
little to no concomitant upward effect on parliamentary politics. 
With regards to conservative ideology, it is intriguing to note that more has 
been written on working-class conservatism in Scotland than on elite worldviews, 
perhaps in keeping with the economic and social focus of post-war Scottish 
scholarship. This has illustrated that the party’s aspirations did, to an extent, enjoy 
popular support, and led to the creation of formal working-class organisations.23 
Further, recent research has reemphasised that working-class conservatism in Britain 
more generally cannot be dismissed by academics merely as ‘a form of political 
deviancy’.24 Popular liberalism, by contrast, has never been dismissed as such, which 
largely explains why there a more in-depth work has been produced on the 
                                                          
21 Edwin Jaggard, ‘Managers and Agents: Conservative Party Organisation in the 1850s’, 
Parliamentary History, 27 (2008), 18. 
22 Matthew Cragoe, ‘The Great Reform Act and the Modernization of British Politics: The Impact of 
Conservative Associations, 1835–1841’, JBS, 47 (2008), 583. 
23 J.T. Ward, ‘Some Aspects of Working-Class Conservatism in the Nineteenth Century’, in John Butt 
and J.T. Ward (eds), Scottish Themes, Essays in Honour of Professor S.G.E. Lythe (Edinburgh, 1976), 
141–58. 




nineteenth-century Scottish Liberal party.25 Gordon Millar’s PhD thesis makes great 
efforts to corral the numerous strands of mid-nineteenth century Scottish liberalism 
and overlay them onto a confusing and complex electoral landscape – one in which 
different brands of Scottish Liberal frequently challenged each other in elections.26 It 
illustrates that liberalism in Scotland, as in the UK more broadly, contained a very 
complex and diverse set of factions. Some recent efforts have illustrated that the 
Scottish Conservative party also contained different brands of conservatism.27 
However, it was still a great deal more ideologically cohesive than its numerous 
opponents. This makes it a great deal easier to identify a relatively distinct 
Conservative party both in parliament and in Scotland after 1832. 
There are many different points at which historians have suggested that this 
Conservative (or Tory) party began, ranging from the time of Charles I to that of Pitt, 
Peel, and Disraeli.28 While these differing start-points each have their merits, it will 
be shown (in Scotland at least) that it was during the 1830s that the party truly 
coalesced. Given this timeline, Robert Stewart’s Foundation of the Conservative 
Party remains the most useful modern scholarly work on the party, with other works 
periodically adding to our understanding of the party in this crucial formative 
phase.29 Stewart’s book remains the most comprehensive because it examines the 
party both in and out of parliament, its leadership, its backbenchers, and the 
                                                          
25 See, for instance, James Kellas, ‘The Liberal Party in Scotland, 1885–1895’, PhD thesis, University 
of London, 1961. 
26 Gordon, F. Millar, ‘The Liberal party in Scotland, 1843–1868: Electoral Politics and Party 
Development’, PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1994. 
27 See J.E. Cookson, ‘The Edinburgh and Glasgow Duke of Wellington Statues: Early Nineteenth-
Century Unionist Nationalism as a Tory Project’, SHR, 83 (2004), 23–40; Alex Tyrrell, ‘The Earl of 
Eglinton, Scottish Conservatism, and the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights’, 
Historical Journal, 53 (2010), 87–107. 
28 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London, 1997), Chapter 1. 
29 Robert Stewart, The Foundation of the Conservative Party, 1830–1867 (London, 1978); John 
Ramsden, An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830 (London, 1999). 
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underlying worldviews which served to both unite and, on occasion, divide them. On 
the whole, there is a substantial amount of scholarship which examines various 
aspects of the UK Conservative party. While these scholarly efforts tend to 
somewhat underplay the distinctiveness of the different nations comprising the 
United Kingdom, they do point out several useful areas of inquiry and some 
constructive methods for doing so.  
Many of these works privilege a particular definition of ‘party’, be it 
parliamentary, electoral, ideological, or fluctuating combinations of these categories 
and others. It is also, moreover, important to acknowledge that parties must be 
understood in terms of their function, within the constitutional context of the age. In 
the period in question, this was determined by the doctrine of ‘parliamentary 
government’.30 In sum, the term ‘party’ is a flexible one, dependent upon the specific 
context in which it is used. It is necessary to situate the actions of parties within a 
broader popular political culture; here broadly defined as the various concepts and 
practices within the wider society existing outside of the exclusively elite political 
sphere. Studies of popular political culture can shed light on the political thoughts 
and practices of the population at large, complementing studies focusing on these 
themes in the arena of elite politics. As Jon Lawrence has observed, works on ‘high 
politics’ and ‘popular politics’ need not be separate. He suggests that one specific 
starting-point for reintegrating political history is to foreground the sites at which the 
worlds of popular and elite politics meet, such as public meetings.31 On a wider 
                                                          
30 Angus Hawkins, ‘“Parliamentary Government” and Victorian Political Parties, c. 1830–c. 1880’, 
EHR, 104 (1989), 640. 
31 Jon Lawrence, ‘Political History’, in Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner, and Kevin Passmore (eds), 
Writing History: Theory and Practice (New York, 2003), 192–9. 
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scale, this thesis suggests that a broadly defined ‘party’ serves to bring together these 
worlds, in a vast array of different contexts. Concurrently, just as important are the 
links which were limited, or decayed, or unexpectedly absent. A party could be 
integral to the worlds which surrounded it, but only if it was willing and/or able to 
make itself so – and if the surrounding worlds in question were also willing to 
interact. 
This thesis is not a standalone examination of the Scottish Conservative 
party’s electoral apparatus, or of its electoral activities. Similarly, it is not restricted 
to examining activity in Westminster. Rather, it seeks to examine multiple aspects, 
and the ways in which these were historically significant (or notably insignificant) in 
their own individual contexts. As such, the Scottish Conservative party between the 
Reform Acts is treated as a disparate, but nevertheless discrete and holistic entity. 
This work makes use of a diverse range of source materials, most prominently the 
surviving private correspondence and papers of the figures who comprised the party. 
A substantial number of manuscript collections in a large number of archives have 
been consulted. This includes a spectrum ranging from papers pertaining to great 
magnates and national leaders to those of county solicitors and ordinary electors. 
These materials reveal the high levels of interconnectedness between the different 
but overlapping sections of the party, illustrating that this broadly conceived entity 
was vast and far-reaching.32  
Public sources have also been utilised; these include the speeches, memoirs, 
and diaries of relevant figures, parliamentary papers, Hansard, selected pamphlets, 
                                                          
32 This interconnectedness is further highlighted within this thesis by the numerous footnotes which 
themselves direct the reader back and forth across chapters. 
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and articles contained in newspapers and periodicals. These primarily highlight the 
interconnections between the party and broader society, in Scotland and the wider 
United Kingdom. Conversely, this also serves to highlight the gaps between the 
internal world of party figures and the external worlds which they increasingly failed 
to understand, and thus win over. Scotland experienced transformative change during 
this period, which many Scottish Conservatives were unable to adapt to. The use of 
private source material has been emphasised in this thesis for this reason; Scottish 
Conservatives were anxious to keep their internal affairs insulated from public view, 
and were particularly (though not entirely) successful in doing so. As such, by 
consulting a broad range of sources in depth, a particularly clear picture of the party 
and its significance can be rendered. 
This thesis also adopts a deliberately broad definition of what constituted 
‘Scotland’. In addition to being a geographic and legal entity, it was also, among 
other things, a unique society and culture which generated distinctive ideas. As such, 
it is not merely a study of the Conservative party in Scotland; people and ideas 
moved freely across borders in both directions, making the Scottish party (or 
elements of it) felt in the wider United Kingdom, and vice versa. This thesis 
illustrates that ‘party’ reached into almost every aspect and level of Scottish society, 
politics, and culture. Moreover, ‘Scotland’ itself, through the channel of the Scottish 
Conservatives, exerted a limited and opaque influence over these aspects in the wider 
United Kingdom. Though it is not possible to explore comprehensively the ways in 
which this reach affected Scotland and the UK in the detail it deserves, it does point 
towards several areas of potential further inquiry.  
12 
 
That is not to say, however, that each strand of the Scottish party was equal. 
The electoral parts of the party, for instance, were viewed and treated as a 
subordinate and somewhat disreputable arm by the party in parliament. It is clear that 
the party’s essential function was to ‘protect parliamentary sovereignty from both the 
prerogative and the populace’.33 Although it had a distinct but limited presence in 
Westminster, the Scottish Conservative party was an inherently subordinate entity 
because its main areas of strength, influence, and activity were largely outside of 
parliament. Even taking into account a broad definition of ‘Scotland’, the Scottish 
Conservative party was more bottom-heavy than the UK party as a whole. The 
importance of each element, however, depends on how that importance is defined. 
The electorate may have had only limited influence over the political manoeuvrings 
which took place within parliament. Yet, this does not mean that the electorate was 
entirely inconsequential. Apart from electors’ restricted influence on politics, they 
were, after all, undeniably impacted by the results of such parliamentary 
manoeuvring (as were non-electors). It is necessary to analyse the interconnected 
facets of the party in order to fully understand its overall impact. 
Chapter One begins by examining the diverse and vigorous electoral 
activities undertaken by party figures embedded in Scottish society, with an 
evaluation of their successes and failures. In Chapter Two, the changing leadership 
of the Scottish party is explored, uncovering the figures who led the party, and their 
variable success and influence in doing so. It reveals a critical, though variable and 
contingent, level of the party, which provided a crucial link between its constituency 
and parliamentary sections. Moving further towards the realm of high politics, 
                                                          
33 Hawkins, ‘Parliamentary Government’, 642. 
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Chapter Three explores the extent to which the Scottish Conservatives were 
distinctive in a parliamentary context, and the party’s role in governing Scotland on 
national and local levels. Chapter Four explores Scottish conservatism until the 
party’s 1846 split. It considers the ways in which different factions evolved within 
the bounds of the party, and how this affected its reactions to the pivotal issues of the 
day. Finally, Chapter Five explores Scottish conservatism after the Corn Law split, 
placing a greater emphasis on its efforts to lead and react to wider changes taking 
place in Scottish society. 
In the 1960s, scholars of nineteenth-century Scotland could confidently claim 
that liberalism provided the ‘political expression of this homogenous society’.34 The 
mass of work undertaken since then has, however, amply demonstrated that this 
society was anything but simplistically homogenous. Yet, the politics and political 
culture which reflected and itself influenced society has not been problematised to 
nearly the same extent. When reminiscing in 1896, a former Editor of the Scotsman 
neatly summarised the contradictions inherent in Scotland’s nature: ‘The Scottish 
people … are conservative in their customs, in their institutions, in the Radicalism of 
their politics’.35 Through exploring the Scottish Conservative party between 1832 
and 1868, a more nuanced picture of Scotland can be drawn. 
                                                          
34 Ian Budge and Derek W. Urwin, Scottish Political Behaviour: A Case Study in British Homogeneity 
(London, 1966), 4. 





























CHAPTER ONE: ELECTORAL ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITY 
 
The electoral organisation of the Scottish Conservative party was conducted by a 
large and diverse body of people, ranging from tenant farmers to powerful magnates. 
Though the party was disproportionately aristocratic in nature, this attribute did not 
exclusively define it.1 Interconnected groups of party adherents organised a vast 
range of activities, conducted within the electoral framework created by the Scottish 
Reform Act of 1832. Norman Gash has emphasised that the wider British electoral 
system retained many of the corrupt features of the pre-Reform era, but nevertheless 
acknowledged the extent to which 1832 was more particularly revolutionary for the 
Scottish electoral system, representing ‘not so much Reform as enfranchisement’.2 
This system was undoubtedly transformed, though some traditional influences and 
aspects reasserted themselves after the 1830s.  
This landscape is further confused by the disparate nature of the fifty-one 
constituencies which comprised Scotland’s representation at Westminster. The 
effects of the redistribution of Scottish seats on the new electoral system were also 
significant. Work on this has illustrated that Reform served to partially homogenise 
the British electoral system, but nevertheless preserved (and in some cases further 
entrenched) divergent Scottish characteristics.3 Consequently, it was necessary for 
                                                          
1 See Appendix G. 
2 Gash, Age of Peel, 35. 
3 See Dyer, Property and Intelligence, 42–5; Michael Dyer, ‘Burgh Districts and the Representation of 
Scotland, 1707–1983’, Parliamentary History, 15 (1996), 287–307; Michael Dyer, ‘“Mere Detail and 
Machinery”: The Great Reform Act and the Effects of Redistribution on Scottish Representation, 
1832–68’, SHR, 62 (1983), 17–34. 
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the electoral organisation of the party to be flexible and specifically adapted to 
Scottish conditions.  
The massive expansion of the electorate in Scotland, from 4,239 to c. 65,000, 
led to the creation of an extensive and complex electoral organisation.4 Local (and to 
a far lesser extent, central) organisation was now needed to win over the new 
electorate, whose members were themselves an integral part of a transformed 
political culture.5 It was increasingly necessary to conduct political activity out of 
doors, though the formation and dissolution of governments were still in large part 
dependent on manoeuvres within Westminster, within the context of ‘parliamentary 
government’.6 Though the parliamentary and electoral organisation(s) which made 
up the Conservative party were both parts of the same overarching entity, they did 
not always operate harmoniously. Nor were they, by any means, equal in influencing 
the party’s overall direction.7 Throughout the period between 1832 and 1868, though 
less so after Peel’s downfall, the electoral organisation was generally considered to 
be the junior section of the party. Especially before the 1870s, it is necessary to 
appreciate the ambiguous nature of ‘party’ outside of Westminster, and therefore to 
                                                          
4 William Ferguson, ‘The Reform Act (Scotland) of 1832: Intention and Effect’, SHR, 45 (1966), 105. 
5 Local case-studies of Scottish politics do exist, but most predate (or neglect) recent developments in 
the field of political culture. See Michael Dyer, ‘The Politics of Kincardineshire’, PhD thesis, 
University of Aberdeen, 1975; I.G.C. Hutchison, ‘Politics and Society in Mid-Victorian Glasgow, 
1846–86’, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1974; Fiona A. Montgomery, ‘Glasgow Radicalism, 
1830–48’, PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1974; David Teviotdale, ‘The Glasgow Parliamentary 
Constituency, 1832–46’, MLitt thesis, University of Glasgow. 1963; J.C. Williams, ‘Edinburgh 
Politics, 1832–52’, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1972; Edith C. Broun-Lindsay, 
‘Electioneering in East Lothian, 1836–7’, Transactions of the East Lothian Antiquarian and Field 
Naturalists' Society, 8 (1966), 46–60; W. Hamish Fraser, ‘Politics before 1918’, in W. Hamish Fraser 
and Clive H. Lee (eds), Aberdeen 1800–2000: A New History (East Linton, 2003), 176–203; John 
McCaffrey, ‘Political Issues and Developments’, in W. Hamish Fraser and Irene Maver (eds), 
Glasgow. Volume II, 1820–1912 (Manchester, 1996), 186–226; Ian Cockburn, ‘The Management and 
Government of Scottish Society as Reflected in Clackmannanshire: ‘The sma’burgh 1832–1870’, PhD 
thesis, Strathclyde University, 2008.  
6 Hawkins, ‘Parliamentary Government’, 640.  
7 Gash, ‘Electoral Organization’, 131; T.A. Jenkins, ‘The Whips in the early Victorian House of 
Commons’, Parliamentary History, 19 (2000), 286. 
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avoid anachronistic assumptions regarding its nature and purpose.8 The electoral side 
of the party was considered by many contemporary party leaders to be a slightly 
disreputable means to an end, rather than something to be actively promoted. 
Moreover, whereas Westminster business was by and large continuous, the need for 
expensive electoral activity was sporadic, which discouraged the systematisation of 
electoral apparatus on local (still less central) levels.  
There were Scottish elements present in all parts of the party, but this was 
least pronounced in parliament, an avowedly British (and imperial) institution based 
outside of Scotland. The electoral component of the Scottish Conservative party was 
hence the most distinctly ‘Scottish’, as its functions necessarily took place almost 
exclusively within a Scotland that possessed unique laws, institutions, and culture. 
These three factors also influenced the character of the broader electoral system – 
different types of constituency, electoral qualifications, and polling customs 
combined to make Scottish political culture distinctive. Philip Salmon has argued 
that the legislative features of the English Reform Act (particularly registration) 
themselves played a central role in encouraging the development of partisan loyalties 
– as will be shown, Scotland was affected in similar but distinctive ways by its own 
Act.9 This distinctiveness waxed and waned as the century progressed; approaching 
the topic from a postmodern perspective, James Vernon has asserted that Reform in 
fact served to exclude ordinary people from the public political arena in England. As 
will be demonstrated though, while the Scottish Conservatives did promote this 
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tendency in a limited fashion, the overall political culture in which the party operated 
was broadly moving in the opposite direction.10  
There were, of course, strong links to the English party, and many British 
factors affected its electoral activities.11 Nevertheless, the Scottish party was not a 
mere branch office – quite apart from anything else, the decentralised nature of 
electoral management meant that there were no parts of the UK party that could be 
described as such. However, it was most definitely not ‘independent’. The best word, 
therefore, to describe the Conservative party in Scotland is autonomous. Both 
Liberals and Conservatives at times possessed separate national organisations from 
those in England, though these were of an informal nature for much of the period.12 
They existed in tandem with numerous local organisations, which themselves 
enjoyed significant, though varying degrees of autonomy.  
This chapter will explore a number of the attributes and activities of this 
autonomous party on a local level. It will begin by examining the expansion of local 
Conservative Associations, and the gentlemen and agents who carried out party 
business at a local level. The next sections analyse the role of magnates and of the 
party’s parliamentary candidates. The second half of the chapter will then explore the 
various activities which these groups and organisations undertook, including 
electioneering, the promotion of sympathetic newspapers, attending to the 
                                                          
10 See James Vernon, Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture, c.1815–1867 
(Cambridge, 1993). 
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contexts, but none which focus on Scottish seats. See, for instance, Sarah Richardson, ‘Independence 
and Deference: A Study of the West Riding Electorate, 1832–1841’, PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 
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registration of voters, and the manufacture of fictitious votes. Activity also extended 
to the application of influence and coercion on sections of the new electorate. 
Overall, it will be demonstrated that a diverse and active assortment of groups and 
organisations orchestrated a truly extraordinary variety of activities, all of which 





Partisan feeling in the Scottish localities was considerable after 1832. However, the 
party was not stable or tightly structured at this local level. While definite moves 
were made in this direction, reverses were also frequent, especially after 1843 and 
1846. In some areas, local organisations were not novel innovations – various local 
committees had assisted in the election of individual candidates, and some 
Conservative Associations were founded before Peel’s ministry of 1834–5.13 
Nevertheless, the development of Conservative Associations in Scotland was 
significant, in that it encouraged the politicisation of electors during the quiet periods 
in-between elections. Moreover, by the late 1830s, these bodies had done much to 
integrate grassroots Conservatives into a national political culture which transcended 
local issues and rivalries.14  
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It has been suggested that, in Scotland by 1841, ‘less headway’ had been 
made in the formation of Conservative Associations than in England.15 As will be 
shown however, the development of Conservative Associations in Scotland was in 
fact advanced, and often occurred in unexpected places. In England, it was the 
traditionalist ultras in the localities who led in the formation of Associations. The 
Scottish ultras of the old Melville interest played a similar role – it may well be that 
their relative importance north of the border in the immediate aftermath of Reform 
accelerated this growth.16 Having been routed in 1832, it was evident that the party 
would have to work very hard to regain its footing.17 The Associations were, in many 
cases, the vehicles through which they sought to do so. 
Although no formal record of Conservative Associations was ever compiled, 
a great many were formed in England and Ireland during the 1830s.18 Many have left 
little evidence of their existence or activities. This was partly deliberate – 
Conservative activists in particular valued their privacy, as they were often 
unpopular among non-electors. Associations were proposed and formed across a 
variety of constituencies during the 1830s, including rural Fifeshire and industrial 
Greenock.19 While the majority of Associations were formed in the 1830s and many 
faded away after the elections of 1841 and 1847, they never entirely disappeared – 
for instance, it was proposed before the 1852 contest to form one in Ayrshire after 
the election had concluded. Even the relatively safe seat of Aberdeenshire possessed 
                                                          
15 Gash, ‘Electoral Organization’, 145. 
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a Conservative Society by 1868.20 By 1874, only forty-four of the eighty-two English 
counties possessed Conservative Associations.21 As such, it is fair to say that 
Scotland was at least as active in this area, if not more so. This was (at least in part) 
an attempt to compensate for the more unfavourable electoral landscape.  
In England, Associations were to be found in traditional towns and new 
industrial centres. In Scotland, however, this was complicated by the existence of 
non-contiguous and often widely dispersed burgh districts. Due to their close 
relationship with the surrounding countryside, some county organisations took 
charge of burgh district affairs in addition to their own. This was true of the St 
Andrews Burghs, in which ‘there was a county committee formed who take 
charge’.22 These were often ad hoc committees formed around the candidate of the 
day. Nevertheless, by the later 1830s the districts increasingly possessed their own 
Associations, even in the landowner-dominated Haddington Burghs.23 Single burghs, 
such as Aberdeen, also merited their own separate machinery.24  
Burgh efforts were of mixed effectiveness; the party won few elections in 
these constituencies. In Kilmarnock District, a lack of funds was complained of by 
the local party, but Sir James Graham’s assertion that their candidate was ‘quite safe 
at Kilmarnock’ were justified.25 However, the MP then lost the next election in 1841, 
partly because organisational shortcomings had not been addressed: ‘Kilmarnock 
                                                          
20 J.D. Boswell to Charles Dalrymple Gairdner, 7 Jul. 1852, Eglinton MSS, GD3/5/1347/111; Duke of 
Richmond and Gordon to Disraeli, 12 Oct. 1868, Hughenden MSS, 101/2, ff. 31–2. 
21 Stewart, Foundation of the Conservative Party, 131. 
22 Gash, ‘Electoral Organization’, 144; Horne, ‘Private notes of Scotch Return’, 3 Nov. 1839, 
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23 Dyer, Property and Intelligence, 50; Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 11. 
24 Aberdeen to John Hope, 16 Jun. 1841, Aberdeen MSS, 43327, ff. 278–82. 
25 Lord Douglas to Francis Drummond, 20 Feb. 1837, Drummond of Hawthornden MSS, 
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[had] been mismanaged’.26 Though their efforts went largely unrewarded, 
Conservative organisations made a strong contribution to the politicisation of urban 
Scotland. They built up a minority body of Conservative electors, and, more broadly, 
provided a credible opposition against which robust Liberal identities could be 
formed.  
Parties in the UK, and Scotland in particular, had long made use of dinners to 
promote their aims, both among party adherents and the wider populace.27 The scale 
of political dinners in the UK from 1835 to 1838 was, however, unprecedented, and 
closely connected to the burgeoning Conservative Associations.28 This explosion of 
activity was also evident in Scotland, as apart from Peel’s famous Glasgow dinner in 
1837, dinners were held in numerous locales throughout the period. They did much 
to increase Conservative support in Scotland, and to reinforce organisational 
cohesion. They occurred frequently in constituencies that were not contested. As 
such, they played a major role in maintaining a modicum of party solidarity in areas 
where they were not well-organised or electorally successful. Though they declined 
in significance after 1840, dinners were still used to mobilise local opinion and 
bolster local party unity, in places such as Kirkwall in 1853.29  
The structure of these Associations was similar throughout the UK, often 
comprising a general committee of a few dozen prominent locals, alongside a smaller 
finance or subscription committee.30 These arrangements were duplicated in different 
                                                          
26 Graham to Bonham, 29 Jul. 1841, Peel MSS, 40616, ff. 214–15. 
27 See Trent Orme, ‘The Scottish Whig Party, c. 1801–20’, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2013, 
151–89; Keisuke Masaki, ‘The Development of Provincial Toryism in the British Urban Context, 
c.1815–1832’, PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016, 79–140. 
28 Cragoe, ‘Conservative Associations’, 593. 
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30 Brash, Scottish Electoral Politics, xlvii; ‘Minutes of the Conservative Committee at Forfar’, 28 Jul. 
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constituencies throughout period.31 These were largely inspired by Archibald 
Alison’s second 1835 article in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine. Alison, a 
prominent intellectual, bestselling historian, and Sheriff of Lanarkshire, was 
effectively the Scottish party’s leading thinker. His first article was a call to arms, 
urging party figures to retake the initiative through press activity and increased party 
organisation, while the second provided a broad plan of action for local leaders to 
follow in achieving this.32 Thus, the organisational structure adopted by much of the 
wider UK Conservative party was rooted in practices and experiences originating in 
Scotland. 
These similarities highlight that constituency organisations did not exist in a 
vacuum. There were important links between different constituencies, nearby cities, 
and London. This reflected the cross-county and cross-national nature of many social 
circles, and political links with parliamentary-level politics. Hence, in 1832 there 
were sufficient numbers to make up an entire ‘committee of those Roxburgh 
gentlemen who reside in Edinburgh’ to assist with the canvass in that county, and it 
was felt that a personal canvass of them by the Roxburghshire candidate, in 
Edinburgh, was necessary.33 Stretching the geographical nature of ‘local’ 
organisation to its limits was the proposed formation of a London committee 
composed of Inverness-shire gentlemen residing in the capital, to fund battles in the 
county registration courts.34  
                                                          
31 See, for instance, Sir G.H.A. Douglas to (?) Rolson, 1868, Small Collections MSS, GD1/631/1/15. 
32 Archibald Alison, ‘Change of Ministry’, BEM, 38 (May 1835); Alison, ‘Conservative 
Associations’, 11. 
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Scottish Conservatives progressed from loose, informal arrangements in 1832 
towards a more formalised style of organisation by the later 1830s, and, in doing so, 
managed to partially overcome the problems thrown up by a hostile political 
environment. They often organised or funded electioneering activities such as 
canvassing, treating, transporting electors, and printing handbills. They also, in many 
cases, played a prominent role in such inter-election activities as the registration of 
electors. In other areas of activity, such as the management of electoral influence, 
and the promotion of partisan newspapers, they were peripheral. The organisation of 
Associations occasionally took the form of unstructured meetings and 
correspondence between those in overlapping social networks. More often, they were 
made up of ad hoc committees and formally constituted local groups. However, no 
party after 1832 had either the expertise or desire to organise the registration of new 
voters on a comprehensive or systematic national basis. As such, the effectiveness of 
the various local organisations was dictated by their individual local context.35  
 
 
II. Gentlemen and Agents 
 
All local Associations were dependent on the goodwill and energy of volunteers. 
Consequently, the actions and effectiveness of the party organisation was largely 
dictated by its composition. Moreover, local Associations and committees were not 
merely the tools of local magnates. Their very function and the collective nature of 
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their work were indicative of increased grassroots involvement in politics.36 This was 
more so in the case of Scotland, as the oligarchic nature of the electoral landscape 
before 1832 meant that the change was more pronounced.  
As one Conservative squire wrote in 1832, ‘It is now or never that those who 
have property to lose or rank to maintain must exert themselves’.37 This group 
included wealthy territorial magnates, but also a large and fairly diverse body of 
property-owners and wealthy tenant farmers. Moreover, it also encompassed those 
without land but with close connections to the propertied and landed interests. Some 
of these groups were, however, of greater prominence than others. Prospective 
candidates such as George Hope felt that it would be no use contesting seats ‘unless I 
can get the support of county gentlemen … or whoever may be sounded out as 
carrying weight in the county’.38 The party in the localities was dominated by those 
who owned land, and/or resided within the bounds of the traditional elite.  
Relative social homogeneity, buttressed by ties of marriage, experience, and 
interest, offered several advantages, including ample material resources.39 It also, 
however, brought disadvantages. Some outside of traditional groupings took a keen 
interest in party matters, but were very rarely incorporated into its inner circles, at 
least in rural areas. This hindered party efforts, as there were simply too few 
gentlemen willing to undertake party business. The 1835 defeat of the 
Edinburghshire candidate was attributed to the ‘inactivity of the gentry’, while an 
                                                          
36 Salmon, Electoral Reform, 63; Cragoe, ‘Conservative Associations’, 587. 
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1836 party meeting in that county ‘had only Eight instead of twenty-four 
summoned’.40 The passing of time does not appear to have prompted a broadening of 
their social base; even by 1854 in Edinburghshire, ‘county politics was still the 
preserve of a small group of interested gentlemen’.41 This situation prevailed in many 
Scottish counties up to and beyond the Second Reform Acts, and contributed to their 
lacklustre electoral performance.  
Many of the inactive Conservative gentlemen were reluctant to contribute to 
party finances. The majority of proprietors exhibited a general reluctance to 
contribute, despite their political beliefs. Edinburghshire was a prominent example of 
this.42 Similarly, in Roxburghshire, Donald Horne complained that ‘it is truly 
surprising to find, that in so rich and extensive a county, there should be so few 
proprietors, from whom to expect considerable subscriptions’.43 Though a small 
number of county gentlemen directed party activity, much of the funding came from 
major magnates. This was in large part why these magnates exerted a 
disproportionate influence over some local party organisations.  
In some other seats, the wealthier aristocracy did not direct the party at all, 
the expense and effort being the preserve of a larger group of minor lairds. Party 
funds were drawn from a broad base in Ayrshire, Fifeshire, Lanarkshire, 
Stirlingshire, and Forfarshire. Conservative organisational deficiencies were, 
moreover, trifling in comparison to the Liberals – in Roxburghshire, the Earl of 
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Minto’s brother thought that it was ‘high time that the [Whig] gentry of the county 
should be told that their hands ought to be in their pockets’.44 Though the 
Conservatives did not enjoy unlimited funds, they were nevertheless by far the most 
generously and efficiently financed of the parties in Scotland.  
In the subordinate local committees, Conservative activity was not entirely in 
the hands of leading gentlemen. Even as early as 1835, it was recognised by the 
‘executive officers’ that party success was dependent on the ‘keenness and goodwill 
of many of the minor proprietors’.45 These did not necessarily hail from the 
traditional elite; many of these proprietors were more farmers than gentry. In 
Edinburghshire, they were the best represented group on committees after larger 
proprietors.46 In some cases, an even wider social group was evident, as in 
Forfarshire where District Officers were instructed to include in their local 
committees ‘such tenants or proprietors in their respective districts, as may be useful, 
and willing to give their assistance’.47 Below the level of central committees 
therefore, the grassroots personnel of the Conservative party were far from 
exclusively aristocratic, or even propertied. Rather, the party drew on the efforts of 
the broadly constituted ‘agricultural interest’. In some urban areas, it went beyond 
even this – in West Kilbride (Ayrshire) for instance, the 120-strong Conservative 
Association was open to all. Its committee of eighteen contained only seven or eight 
members of the gentry.48  
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Local Conservative party organisations cannot be described as popular – but 
then, neither can most Liberal organisations. Nevertheless, Conservative bodies did 
contain considerable (though subordinate) popular elements. The efforts of these 
bodies were, however, not enough on their own. One of Buccleuch’s Factors in 
Roxburghshire summed up the situation succinctly: ‘I think it would be impossible to 
conduct an election in such a county as this, without some agents. There are very few 
gentlemen in our county who will work on such occasions’.49 In the UK more 
broadly, Conservatives were more willing to recruit paid workers than the Liberals – 
this was also the case in Scotland. Some of the senior agents were also a part of the 
committee members’ social world – one, the Edinburghshire Agent James Hope, was 
the son of the Lord President, brother of the Dean of Faculty, and son-in-law of the 
Lord Justice Clerk.50 Paid agents were not a novel development, but the formalised 
organisations which they interacted with were. After Hope’s dismissal in 1836, it 
was intended that his successor would take closer instructions from the committee. 
Hope was let go because he was considered to be too independent and opinionated, 
and was not a good canvasser.51 After 1832, principal agents became more 
responsible to the wider party, rather than to the candidate or landed patron. 
There was one glaring exception to this trend – Donald Horne of Langwell. 
Horne was the single most important Conservative Agent in Scotland after 1832, 
though his work has been virtually unacknowledged. A Writer to the Signet, he took 
over the agency of Roxburghshire in 1833.52 When he took on the concurrent agency 
in neighbouring Selkirkshire, it was recognised by his opponents that he was a 
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formidable operator: ‘Donald Horne (I think) is appointed political agent for 
Selkirkshire … [he] will not fail for want of activity’.53 In addition to his Lowland 
responsibilities, he was also a member of the Caithness-shire Constitutional 
Association.54 As a Highland landowner in addition to a WS, Horne personified both 
the professional and social roles of party figures. Nevertheless, he found it necessary 
to sell the Langwell estate for £90,000 in 1857, indicating that his legal work was a 
necessary addition to his income.55 Rural lawyers were often landed proprietors as 
well, and ‘formed an essential support to an oligarchic power structure’.56 As the 
most senior agent in Scotland, directly assisting his patron Buccleuch in political 
matters across the country, he had a great deal of autonomy and authority.  
At a lower level, party activities were generally undertaken by members of 
local law firms. The quality of these agents could vary, such as in Edinburghshire, 
where Harry Inglis, Horne’s chosen successor to Hope as Agent, complained to 
Horne that ‘he has slow coaches to work with’.57 Committee members and their 
agents often had considerable latitude in executing their day-to-day business. For 
instance, one Roxburghshire committee-member and agent wrote to another that: ‘as 
we (that is our chairman and myself) disapprove of the present address I intend very 
much to use my discretion as to circulating it’.58 He thus indicated that he would 
quietly downplay the address of his candidate, and moreover, implicitly suggested 
that the local District Agent follow his lead. It would hence be too simplistic to 
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describe Scottish Conservative party in the localities as a top-down hierarchical 
structure. Personnel on the ground possessed considerable de facto independence of 
action.  
Agents were not tasked with undertaking all party activities, partly because of 
the ruinous expense of doing so. Buccleuch was all too well aware of this problem – 
in Roxburghshire, after the incumbent candidate’s withdrawal in 1847, he told Lord 
Polwarth that he could ‘be party to no contest for the sake of a contest … no one 
would gain by it except the Writers’.59 Nevertheless, they were an even more 
uncommon feature of Liberal organisation, as Minto complained that their 
reintroduction into the party’s management would ‘again rally round … all the 
harpies of his profession whom we have with so much difficulty shaken off ’.60 
Throughout the period, complaints that their bills were ‘very extravagant, and very 
objectionable, and much overcharged’ were fairly common.61 Though both parties 
disliked the expense, the Conservatives made more extensive use of agents, which 
had a marked effect on the character and efficacy of the party’s activities.  
The relative lifelessness of electoral politics (in the Scottish localities at least) 
from the middle 1850s onwards was both caused and exacerbated by the decline in 
party organisations. Many of the greater magnates followed Peel on Free Trade, 
leaving the Protectionist county gentlemen more in control of the party than before. 
The apparent decline in Scottish activity after 1846 was at least partly deliberate: ‘It 
is scarcely necessary for me to add … it is more than ever essential that all our 
communications should continue to be strictly private, and the knowledge of what is 
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going on confined exclusively to members of committee’.62 The close-knit social 
circles which had been broadly Conservative were now split between Protectionists 
and Free Traders, and, crucially, there was no clear line of demarcation between the 
two groups. Combined with the fact that they continued to inhabit the same 
overlapping social circles, maintaining the privacy of party business became a much 
more difficult task. This may well be why Conservative newspapers, such as the 
Edinburgh Advertiser and Edinburgh Courant, were far less informative about their 
party’s activities, than the Liberal newspapers were of theirs.63 The need for 
confidentiality served to restrain the activities of Conservative organisations, and to 
conceal their extent from subsequent scholarly inquiry. 
The tentative revival of electoral activities from the early 1860s onwards was 
partly due to revived links between local and national politicians, as a result of 
renewed interest in constitutional reform. As late as 1864, however, Scottish pre-
election activities still involved ‘earnestly, but quietly preparing – I say, quietly 
because the plan,– a very mistaken one in my mind,– was to establish a Conservative 
Club for the sake of concocting and forwarding over a years or half years dinner!’.64 
The apparent decline in formal Conservative organisation from the middle of the 
century onwards was, in the opinion of Lord Home, a deliberately pursued strategy. 
Though formal electoral organisations were somewhat less disreputable by this time, 
the fact remained that bustling activity could provoke Liberal mobilisation in safe or 
marginally Conservative seats. Moreover, Conservative action in seats held by 
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moderate Liberals might encourage radical forces to challenge the Whig dominance 
in many Scottish burghs. Angus Hawkins has observed that the parliamentary-
focused strategy of Derby throughout this period involved ‘masterly inactivity’.65 It 
may well be that local party figures were following his lead, in adapting a variant of 
this strategy to their own local electoral contexts. Given the hostile electoral 
landscape and hotly contested battles for dominance within the Liberal party, this 
may have been the most effective strategy open to the party in the localities.  
Scottish Conservative party members were a varied and complex grouping. 
Though the main directors of party activities were members of the rural gentry, this 
broadly defined group embraced very wealthy landowners and relatively minor 
proprietors. Tenant farmers and even some people outside of the vast ‘agricultural 
interest’ also played a limited role. On the professional side, personnel ranged from 
members of the landed class to ordinary Writers. Ultimately, the voluntary and 
participatory nature of parties on a local level meant that strict hierarchical authority 
was a practical impossibility. Hence, this diverse range of people, from a diverse 
range of backgrounds, had significant effects on both the activities and the efficacy 
of the party. While there is strong evidence of change, however, it remains the case 
that, as in England, organisational growth after 1832 did not entirely transform the 
traditional landscape of county politics.66 Though far from powerless, the party and 
its personnel were still generally subordinate to the great territorial magnates, such as 
Buccleuch and the Earl of Aberdeen.  
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Most English Conservative organisations were founded with the support of local 
magnates, who often thought of constituencies as de facto personal fiefdoms. In pre-
Reform Scotland, larger proprietors had also exercised influence over county 
politics, though this was complicated in many areas by the existence of the electoral 
management system operated by the Melville interest. The Scottish Reform Act 
destroyed the limited national coherence fostered by the Melville interest, leaving a 
patchwork of local influences.67 As has been shown, party organisations possessed 
far more autonomy than has previously been assumed. Nevertheless, the opinions 
and decisions of local magnates created and defined the basic framework within 
which party activists exercised that autonomy.68  
Magnates often held honorary positions in party organisations, though it was 
very rare for them to undertake any actual electoral-related work.69 In Scotland, their 
position was not unlike that of non-executive board members and chairmen. Even 
this negligible degree of party connection was a step too far for some, ‘Lord Lothian 
having … expressed doubt whether it would be proper for a peer to place himself at 
the head of a political association as the party had uniformly discountenanced such 
an act’.70 Lord Melville, the former leader of the old Scottish Tory party, asserted 
that with regard to party business in Edinburghshire, he could not ‘consent to be 
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mixed up as a committee-man in these matters. I have never interfered in that 
capacity’.71 Melville, however, did play a sort of diplomatic role, acting as a 
mediator between the gentry-dominated committee and the county peers.72  
Some counties were almost entirely controlled by single powerful magnates. 
Although some of these magnates, notably the Duke of Buccleuch, possessed 
influence over several seats, most peers were confined to influencing the local party 
in single constituencies.73 They guarded their position, often resisting outside 
interference.  
This resistance could even lead to pacts between county families to divide 
spheres of influence. The Conservative Duff family, Earls of Fife, and the Liberal 
Seafield family both possessed influence in Elginshire and Banffshire. Harry Inglis, 
Agent for Edinburghshire, acted on the behalf of the Fife interest and negotiated a 
truce – the Seafield interest thus dominated Banffshire, and the Duffs held sway in 
Elginshire.74 Though it is unclear how long after 1846 this pact remained in place, it 
is notable that each county was held by the same parties until after 1868.  
This cooperation was, however, something of an exception to the rule – 
unless landowners had an overwhelming influence over a seat, the general pattern 
was one of conflict – occasionally between Liberal and Conservative landowners, but 
more often internal disagreement between Conservative magnates. This was true of 
Lord Selkirk and Lord Galloway in Kirkcudbrightshire. Hence, Sir James Graham 
was well aware that, in meddling with local politics, ‘care must be taken in managing 
these two peers, where interests in the Stewartry have long been rival; and our 
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success depends [on] this entire bona fide function’.75 Similarly, in Ayrshire, Graham 
thought that ‘Lord Ailsa, Lord Eglinton, and Lord Belhaven should, if possible, act 
together; but I suppose as usual, mutual jealousies and hatred will supersede any 
other consideration’.76  
Magnates also maintained their authority over local parties by financing 
them. This state of affairs continued up to and beyond 1868; the list of contributors 
to the 1868 election fund in North Ayrshire was topped by Lord Eglinton, followed 
by Lords Ailsa, Portland, and Bute.77 These peers (or their predecessors) had been 
listed in 1853 as the principal holders of influence in the county.78 This reliance on 
rural proprietors partially explains the lack of party activity in the burghs – magnates 
were unwilling to fund contests outside of their spheres of influence. One aspiring 
candidate for St Andrews Burghs was in fact unable to ‘afford the expense of a 
contest’ – though he was willing to stand, ‘in short friends are required’.79  
The Duke of Buccleuch made by far the most important financial 
contributions to the party. Before the 1847 election, he contributed generously to 
contests across Scotland. This made him a crucial figure, as local organisations 
generally refused to fund contests outside their own immediate area, even for 
promising seats. As early as 1832, Buccleuch informed one recipient of his largesse 
with regret that ‘numerous calls upon me both in England and Scotland prevent me 
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making it a larger sum’.80 Although there was a shadowy central electioneering fund 
in London after around 1835, it would appear that none of its funds were dispensed 
in Scotland.81 Rather, Buccleuch appears to have personally acted as a central 
Conservative financier. It is notable that such a mammoth undertaking, by a single 
very wealthy individual, took place in no other part of the United Kingdom. Indeed, 
he was thought to have spent £20,000 on the 1837 election alone, ‘besides having 
stood various contests’.82 By 1840, however, he was growing increasingly tired of 
the constant demands on his purse.83  
After the Corn Law split, his Scotland-wide contributions ended, though he 
continued to maintain his influence in counties where he had significant 
landholdings. This was perhaps the most significant practical factor in ending 
offensive operations in marginally Liberal seats, as he had been the most significant 
source of Conservative funds for non-county contests. More broadly, the 
disproportionate number of wealthier magnates who followed Peel meant that their 
funding of the party declined steeply after 1846.84  
Despite the fluidity of proprietorial influence over Scottish counties, the 
predominant pattern was one of continuity – Lord Elcho continued to be returned for 
Haddingtonshire, for instance, though he was ‘very unpopular in East Lothian and is 
becoming more so every day, but his family connection in the county is very 
powerful’.85 This connection was so strong that he was able to continue representing 
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the county until 1883, when his son succeeded him as MP.86 However, many lairds 
were uninterested in politics – this, combined with internal dissension, meant that 
their relationship with the party was not one of outright dominance. Their actions 





Although in most cases they needed the support, or at least the acquiescence, of local 
magnates, the candidates themselves exerted a significant influence over the party at 
a local level. Unlike the Liberals, who possessed an overabundance of candidates, 
Conservative candidates were in short supply. The wealthy social strata from which 
the party recruited their candidates did not contain enough personnel who fitted the 
ideal (or at least the Conservative ideal) of an MP.87 Indeed, when Sir James Graham 
informed Francis Bonham, Peel’s chief electoral specialist, that in Dunbartonshire, ‘a 
difficulty had arisen not from the want of candidates but from the rival claims of 
more than one’, the situation was noteworthy for its exceptionality.88  
Their extremely unpopular position in 1832 led to the party to put forward 
perhaps the least suitable candidate of the post-Reform era Scottish party. James 
Cruickshank, a local Forfarshire landowner, managed to convince the Duke of 
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Buccleuch to offer £300 in support of his election efforts in that county, by using the 
names of mutual acquaintances in correspondence without their permission.89 Upon 
further inquiry however, Buccleuch discovered that he was ‘quite out of the question 
as a candidate’, and ‘by no means, I understand, well looked upon in the county’.90 
Thwarted, Cruickshank offered to stand for ‘the Conservative party in Scotland’ in 
the Ayr Burghs if Buccleuch would induce Lord Eglinton to support him.91 Eglinton 
would go on to become leader of the Scottish party after 1846. Buccleuch instead 
informed Eglinton that Cruickshank was ‘a man of no property or influence and I am 
informed inclined to be dissipated and has run through almost everything he had’ – 
he went on to warn that Cruickshank had ‘less chance and is a less fit person than 
almost any conservative that could be started’.92 Despite this, Eglinton informed 
Buccleuch that ‘as he is the only person who really has come forward, it appears to 
me I have no choice left but to support him’.93 This was a sign of how desperate the 
party was for candidates, especially in burgh seats. Cruickshank did go to the poll but 
came in at a distant last place, garnering only thirty-three out of 572 votes cast.  
The pre-eminent position of local magnates in constituency affairs often 
resulted in the heirs of peers standing for election. Over-reliance on this group 
hobbled the party’s long-term fortunes in Scotland, as otherwise talented members 
moved from the Commons to the Lords on their accession to the peerage. The 
biggest factor which shrunk the pool of viable candidates, however, was the expense 
of contesting a seat. Already-sitting members might avoid this expense, such as Sir 
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George Clerk, Peel’s sometime chief whip and a longstanding MP for 
Edinburghshire. Though he was re-elected for the county in 1835, Clerk was 
‘cramped in money matters, his estate being entailed’, resulting in the local party 
stepping in.94 His defeat in the next election of 1837, however, suggests that only 
those MPs so popular as to pre-empt contestation could make do without substantial 
personal resources.  
The proportion of expenses that a candidate was expected to pay was a hotly 
contested matter throughout the period. In Edinburghshire, the candidate in 1841, 
William Ramsay Ramsay, thought that ‘he should not be called upon to pay more 
than one half of the expenses as the Conservative candidate, and that in no 
circumstances should the call upon him exceed £1,500’.95 In 1839, Lord John Scott 
thought it advisable that ‘it would be better not to mix up registration with the 
question of candidate, and election expenses’, as there would be a better chance of 
forming a permanent committee if the issue was avoided.96 This fudging of the issue 
continued throughout the period, with the burden on individual candidates increasing 
as time progressed. Sir James Fergusson, for instance, contested Ayrshire in 1857 
and 1859, both contests costing him ‘almost £6,000 … he only got £1,000 to assist in 
the first, and … he has not received any assistance whatever towards the expense of 
the last’.97 He won the seat, holding it from 1859 to 1868. His tenacity was, however, 
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exceptional; the increased financial burden on candidates was thus a further 
disincentive after the party split.  
Apart from possessing sufficient wealth, it was a definite advantage for 
Conservatives to be local, or to have strong local connections. In contrast to a large 
number of English Liberal MPs sitting for Scottish seats, Scottish Conservatives 
were all Scottish. Indeed, of the party’s seventy-seven MPs to sit during the period, 
only Lord Lincoln and William Howard can be counted as authentic carpetbaggers.98 
When Thomas Gladstone considered standing for Orkney, his father was advised by 
a local Conservative landowner, through his brother William, that ‘the people of 
Orkney would not like to return one unconnected with them’, and that ‘it was very 
singular for a person not having property in the county to come forward for it’.99 This 
was a prerequisite that disproportionately harmed Conservatives – many Scottish 
Liberal MPs were not local, or not Scottish. Partly, this reflected their dominance in 
burgh districts, which were less discerning when it came to the provenance of 
candidates.  
The party hindered its own chances in neglecting a type of candidate which 
the Melville interest had assiduously cultivated – competent professionals. This was 
perhaps a result of the shifting balance of power in the party, from the Faculty of 
Advocates and Melville to the various local magnates in the counties. Interestingly, 
Thomas Mackenzie of Applecross, minor landowner and MP for Ross and Cromarty, 
was also a WS. He thus had the singular experience of arguing in the registration 
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courts over who qualified to vote in parliamentary elections, in which he himself was 
the incumbent candidate.100  
Quite apart from the above considerations, it was necessary for candidates in 
burghs and burgh districts to possess additional qualities. It was felt in 1832 that the 
party needed to find ‘proper candidates for such places as Leith, Perth, Dundee and 
these large naval and commercial towns who are now to return members for the first 
time’, and that the best candidates would be ‘mercantile men in London of great 
wealth and extensive connections, men of known standing and weight in the 
commercial world, – or young men of high rank, and good talents and fortune’.101 
The writer was correct in assuming that these types would stand a good chance in 
these places – he was incorrect in assuming, though, that these candidates could be 
Conservative.  
While James Ewing, successful candidate in Glasgow in 1832, was not a 
Conservative per se (Michael Dyer describes him as ‘a kind of Conservative’), he 
was able to win his seat through his strong local reputation as a Lord Provost. 
Though he had supported Reform, he only did so along strictly constitutional lines, 
and as an extremely rich former West India trader, he had a great deal of sympathy 
for Peel’s economic policies.102 Later unsuccessful Conservative candidates for 
Glasgow also drew their wealth from outside the landed interest, including Robert 
Monteith, whose fortune came from the Glasgow textile trade.103 Hence, the charge 
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that the Scottish Conservative party was singularly unprepared for the changing 
economic and ideological currents of the Victorian age is somewhat unfounded. The 
party was entirely willing to put up candidates representing and embodying the new 
interests which had been enfranchised by the Reform Acts. Indeed, the old and the 
new could stand for the party side by side, as in 1835, when William Learmouth, ‘an 
opulent citizen of Edinburgh (a bookmaker) … was candidate with Lord Ramsay to 
represent the city’.104  
Circumstances in the single burghs could, however, negate the party’s 
enthusiasm for such candidates. Aberdeen Conservatives twice put up landowners 
from the surrounding county.105 In Greenock, the unpopularity of the sitting Liberal, 
Robert Wallace, led one of his party activists to state that ‘many of the Liberals will 
not again submit to Bobby’s quackery, and unless we move, some influential 
mercantile Tory will be invited to stand, and probably would sit’.106 Horne also noted 
that ‘all screws are loose with Wallace’, and that ‘It is the opinion of the best 
informed that a merchant of note with some connection with the trade of the port 
would carry the seat’.107 Yet, by the 1841 election the best candidate available was 
Sir Thomas Cochrane, an admiral who unsuccessfully sought to curry the favour of 
electors by asserting that the town had been ‘for centuries the abode of his 
ancestors’.108  
In the absence of someone who could appeal to present economic ties, 
Conservatives were forced to rely on a candidate with tenuous ancestral ones. 
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Though Conservatives were more than willing to put up candidates representing the 
‘new’ economic interests, these were, on occasion, hard to come by. This stands in 
stark contrast to municipal politics, in which candidates of less elevated social status 
contested wards across Scotland, though again this met with mixed success. In 1837, 
for instance, a manufacturer, grocer, and lime burner comprised three of the five 
defeated Conservative municipal candidates at Stirling.109 Moreover, after the Corn 
Law split, Free Traders of varying stripes were the only viable candidates for non-
county constituencies.110 Conservatives did have limited urban support – in 
Kilmarnock for instance, though an attempt on the burghs was thought ‘hopeless’, 
Lord Eglinton was sure that ‘a Conservative would have a majority at Port 
Glasgow’.111  
Some candidates were unwilling to undertake the vigorous electioneering 
involved in winning a post-Reform electoral contest. Sir George Clerk was thought 
to have lost Edinburghshire because of ‘his own want of personal attention to his 
constituents’, while Sir Hugh Hume Campbell was ‘himself his greatest enemy’, 
being ‘very unpopular, – and does not visit people enough or appear to care whether 
they vote for him or not’.112 In addition to vigour, many candidates also needed to 
possess patience. The need to contest some seats repeatedly without immediate hope 
of success discouraged many. As can be seen in Appendix A, candidates such as Sir 
James Fergusson and Alexander Smollett undertook this onerous task, but they were 
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exceptional. The most determined was William Forbes in Stirlingshire. He polled a 
mere 465 voters to 995 for his opponent in 1832, yet topped the poll by twenty in 
1835. He then won by a single vote in 1837 and was unseated on petition, but stood 
again and won by 124 votes in 1841. Thereafter unopposed, he held the seat until his 
death in 1854. Derby was informed on his passing by the former MP for Peeblesshire 
that ‘no one will [have] … so sure a hold of it as he had’, and that ‘a Whig told me 
once that even if the Tories were to be annihilated, the ten pounders would return 
Forbes’. He ended by lamenting that Forbes’s seat ‘never would have been meddled 
with again. We had not many like him’.113  
One other such case of cultivation was that of Sir John Hope in 
Edinburghshire. He was, by the 1850s, so impoverished and unwell that he was 
obliged to reside on the continent. He was also, as he himself admitted, ‘deaf and 
seventy’.114 Because he was a long-standing and popular MP, it was felt that ‘he 
would again be returned without opposition’.115 Though he was indeed elected 
unopposed, the combination of the Corn Law split, the after effects of the Disruption, 
and general attrition meant that MPs such as Hope were increasingly rare as time 
progressed.  
The candidates put forward by the Conservative party varied depending on 
the characteristics of individual constituencies. County seats tended to select those 
closely connected with local magnates or the traditional elite. In burghs and burgh 
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districts, however, there was an intermingling of this group with others, who more 
closely reflected mercantile and industrial Scotland. This applied to some individual 
candidates who had a foot in both camps, illustrating that there was (and is) no 
simple contrast to be made between ‘traditional’ and ‘progressive’ Scotland in the 
mid-nineteenth century. What was always necessary, in some form, was property or 
capital, and a local connection. These were, however, not quite so necessary for 





Local elites, agents, magnates, and candidates were the main driving force behind the 
party’s electoral efforts. They often carried out party activities and jockeyed for 
power within the framework of local Conservative Associations. The relative 
prominence of each of these groups depended on the type of organisation, nature of 
the constituency, character and power of the magnate(s), and the attributes of the 
candidate at each particular election. Activities directly related to elections included 
canvassing, treating, public speaking, and transporting electors to the poll. 
Electioneering activities in Scotland were broadly comparable to other parts of the 
UK. However, the different relationship of Scottish parties to these customs and 
processes was very much determined by Scottish distinctiveness.  
It has been asserted that the canvass was the ‘defining institution’ of county 
electoral politics, rather than the poll. Indeed, this was the main activity of candidates 
and party activists in the run-up to elections, both in pursuing new votes and in 
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reviving dormant ones.116 As the success or failure of a canvass could often pre-empt 
a contest, both sides canvassed creatively and competitively. It was a ‘highly 
ritualised custom, providing an almost ceremonial form of contact between voter and 
candidate’.117 As such, it was the main site at which the parties interacted with the 
wider electorate on a personal level, bridging elite and popular politics. 
In the Lowland counties, whether a personal canvass of each elector was 
undertaken depended on the size of the constituency in question – in the 1832 
Berwickshire contest for instance, the Conservative candidate thought it his ‘duty to 
take the earliest opportunity of waiting upon you in person’.118 This, however, 
became less common as the nineteenth century progressed. During an 1840 by-
election, the candidate for Perthshire, one of Scotland’s most populous rural seats, 
pleaded in a handbill that it was ‘impossible to accomplish a personal canvass of all 
the voters in so extensive a county’.119 Nevertheless, a personal canvass was often 
expected by electors, especially in small seats.120 Of particular interest is the unique 
nature of Highland constituencies – they were geographically vast, but tended to 
have small and dispersed electorates. Despite this, MPs who sat for Highland seats 
were expected to personally visit electors. Given their vast size and poor transport 
infrastructure, this irritated the MP for Inverness-shire: ‘I am obliged to go off to 
Scotland to visit my people in Skye, who I am told are disposed to be rebellious, 
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because I have not visited or taken notice of them!’.121 Even the Highland burgh 
seats presented their representatives with similar problems – Wick Burgh District, for 
instance, was non-contiguous, and comprised the towns of Cromarty, Dingwall, 
Dornoch, Kirkwall, Tain and Wick. Canvassing these burghs involved traversing 
distances across land and sea of over 150 miles.122  
Personal canvassing was perhaps more desirable in Scotland because the 
structure of the electoral system meant that it could be conducted with greater 
accuracy. In contrast to England’s largely multi-member electoral landscape, 
Scotland’s constituencies were almost all single member seats.123 The ensuing 
straightforward party contests, without the possibility of compromise, served to 
increase partisan feeling. Although Michael Dyer has noted that the counties in 
particular were characterised by two-party rivalry, these amplified sentiments were 
not reflected in the rates of county and burgh contestation, which remained 
significantly lower than England’s throughout the mid-nineteenth century.124 The 
canvass agitated local passions and served to further disguise the heated nature of 
Scottish politics by ensuring that candidates could accurately predict the outcome of 
a poll. This was neatly illustrated by the Conservative party’s efforts in double-
member Glasgow. Despite a very costly series of defeats after 1832, the local party 
repeatedly went to poll because they nursed hopes that divisions between whig and 
radical electors would garner enough split votes in favour of their candidates.125 
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Firstly, in single-member seats, local Conservative parties frequently, quietly, and 
efficiently gauged their chances of success by engaging in thorough and extensive 
canvassing, and then withdrawing before a contest. Secondly, the generally smaller 
size of Scottish constituency electorates meant that it was more practicable for 
candidates and agents to conduct thorough canvasses. Finally, Scotland’s 
enfranchised middling classes were more circumscribed than in England, and 
therefore often more socially intertwined. For this reason, voters more commonly 
expected canvassing to be carried out by the candidate or by a canvasser intimately 
known to the individual elector. The canvass was, therefore, in some ways more 
central to Scotland’s electoral culture than it was elsewhere in the UK.  
A great deal of canvassing was undertaken by party adherents – this was 
crucial, as the local reputation of canvassers was an important factor in swaying 
electors.126 Scottish Conservatives made greater use of professional canvassers than 
did the Liberals. Electors’ requests for the party not to advertise their allegiance 
appear repeatedly in party records, as Haddingtonshire electors requested of Lord 
Ramsay: ‘[I’ll] let you know the result of my canvass of the Coalstoun tenants … all 
wish that their vote should not be made public till the time comes’.127 In this case, 
their votes were made public on polling day, but in many aborted contests the need to 
do so never arose. As the prevailing mood in many parts of Scotland, especially 
amongst the unfranchised, favoured the Liberals and radicals, this is not surprising. 
Yet, given this widespread desire for confidentiality, it had the effect of masking the 
extent of Conservative support in Scotland’s public culture.  
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Despite engaging in canvassing activity, Lord Ramsay declared in an address 
that this was in response to Liberal action: ‘it is attempted from the silence and 
apparent stillness of his party, to lay on our shoulders the responsibility of first 
taking the field’ – he reminded electors that ‘votes may be solicited although there is 
no published committee’.128 The line between passively participating in county 
society and actively canvassing electors was a fine one.  
Given that the mood in burgh districts was even more liberal and radical than 
most counties, it may well be that the experience of Conservatives in those seats was 
more distressing. In the single burghs, personal canvasses were possible, such as in 
1832 when James Ewing and his committee embarked on an extensive personal 
canvass of Glasgow, claiming to have gained over 2,000 pledges by the December of 
that year.129 Nevertheless, this required many collaborators. Indeed, Ewing’s effort 
may only have been possible because of his strong municipal links – many of his 
canvassers went on to stand as candidates for the Town Council.130 This illustrates 
that efficient municipal party organisation could, under certain circumstances, be 
harnessed in order to promote party activity on a higher electoral level.  
Apart from the canvass, one of the main party election activities was treating 
– that is to say, paying for drinks, dinners, and other refreshments for voters, as part 
of a campaign of ‘legitimate’ influence.131 Unlike in other parts of the United 
Kingdom, where larger electorates had been more common before 1832, this practice 
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proved entirely novel in many Scottish constituencies, as there had been no need to 
treat electors in any organised fashion. It was immediately recognised as necessary 
by party agents such as Patrick Wilson in Roxburghshire, who informed a fellow 
agent in November 1832 that ‘it was the opinion of those, who took the deepest 
interest in the success of Lord John Scott that eating and drinking should be resorted 
to whenever it was thought expedient’. The Liberals, he claimed, had ‘set us the 
example not only of giving public entertainments, but of having private parties to 
secure voters’ in the county, but it was the Conservatives in Roxburghshire – and 
throughout Scotland – who eventually proved more willing to entertain and treat 
electors.132  
This practice continued to be employed throughout the period, and was often 
in excess of party expectations and wishes: ‘The voters have always been 
accustomed to get refreshments on the polling days. To stop this altogether would 
give them great offence and to keep it within bounds is very difficult’.133 In an 1846 
by-election for the Falkirk Burgh District, the party’s Chief Agent for the west of 
Scotland thought that ‘the publicans’ bills are shameful,– and the amount in any one 
of their towns is large enough for the reasonable expense of an ordinary contest of a 
single seat’.134 This suggests that it was more of an expense in the burgh districts. 
Generally, Scottish Conservatives were similar to their English and Welsh 
counterparts, in that they increased their popularity through lavish entertaining, 
though this may have declined later in the period as contested elections became more 
                                                          
132 Patrick Wilson to John Gibson, 27 Nov. 1832, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/1126/220. 
133 James Blackwood to Buccleuch, 11 Sep. 1845, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/581/5. 
134 Robert Lamond to G.E.H. Vernon, 24 Jun. 1846, Newcastle MSS, Ne C 4662/2. 
51 
 
infrequent. 135 Overall, it was the Scottish Conservatives who were generally more 
willing to entertain and treat Scottish electors throughout the period.  
While the overall costs of contestation in Scotland remained fairly consistent 
between 1832 and 1868, spending patterns changed over time, particularly as 
contested elections became more infrequent. They also gradually became more 
restrained in character. Though high transport costs were also a factor in elections 
elsewhere in the UK, the cost of transporting electors to the poll generally constituted 
a somewhat larger proportion of Scottish election spending; this was especially true 
in borders constituencies whose electorates contained a large number of outside 
voters, and in geographically vast Highland seats. One Renfrewshire election agent 
complained in 1852 that ‘the great extra expense at the election … [was] caused by 
the number of horses and carriages engaged and the number of agents required to 
bring the voters to the poll’.136 In addition to their greater expectation of a personal 
canvass, Scottish electors may have more keenly anticipated party assistance in 
travelling to their closest polling place.  
The cost of elections was similar to those in other parts of the UK, such as 
Wales. It was thought in 1845 that a complex county such as Roxburghshire would 
cost £2,500, or £2,000 at most.137 At the higher end, contesting Peeblesshire in 1837 
cost £5,256.19.10 from the commencement of the contest.138 While county contests 
may well have been occasionally cheaper than those in burghs, it was estimated that 
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in Dumfries Burghs, a Conservative challenge would cost at least ‘two thousand 
(£2000) pounds’.139 Overall, costs of this nature stayed fairly constant throughout the 
post-Reform period in Scotland. With the possible exception of burgh districts, 
which (when contested) seem to have been costlier to secure, the cost of elections 
was comparable to those in other parts of the UK.  
Although the political meeting did not overtake the canvass until after 1868, 
it nevertheless increased in importance as the century progressed, and was always an 
important aspect of party activity during election periods.140 After 1832, the hustings, 
particularly those events which took place as part of the nomination, were a pivotal 
feature of Scottish elections, exhibiting many similarities to those which had taken 
place elsewhere. Some Scottish constituencies had experienced public nominations 
before 1832, but in others, including many of the previously closed oligarchic 
burghs, they were an entirely new phenomenon.141  
Frank O’Gorman has established the vibrancy of English elections before 
1832, but this vitality was notably absent in Scotland – at least outside of the larger 
counties.142 Even small English boroughs had experienced large and publicly 
attended nominations, whereas the introduction of post-1832 election practices 
represented a more jarring change for Scotland. Indeed, many of the largest Scottish 
burghs had not previously held public nominations in the presence of electors and 
non-electors. For instance, the nomination and election for Edinburgh took place 
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within the council chambers before 1832, with candidates both nominated and 
elected exclusively by members of the Town Council.143  
Public speaking was an extremely useful talent for Conservative candidates to 
possess, especially in a political culture which now valued it to a much greater 
extent.144 This skill was especially necessary when candidates might have to 
overcome a hostile audience composed of electors and non-electors. This was an 
additional handicap for Conservatives, as non-electors were far more likely to 
support non-Conservative candidates. Given their inability to express their 
sentiments in the polling booth, they did so boisterously during public occasions. If 
candidates were not good speakers, they often complained of being drowned out by 
the crowd. Even good speakers, such as Hay Macdowall Grant in Banffshire, were 
often heckled and prevented from making themselves heard.145 There are numerous 
examples of poor speakers standing as Conservatives in this period, such as Forbes 
Hunter Blair for Edinburgh in 1832 and Sir George Campbell for Glasgow in 
1868.146  
It is notable that this type of candidate was particularly unsuccessful, 
suggesting that speeches by parliamentary candidates, especially nomination-day 
orations, did have an effect on electoral outcomes in Scotland. They were not, 
therefore, merely a venue for ritualised verbal (or, occasionally, physical) abuse. The 
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novelty of the public nomination in many Scottish seats therefore had two main 
effects. First, Scottish electors and non-electors, already having experienced 
boisterous public meetings in other political contexts, very quickly adapted to the 
new state of affairs. They made the nomination a more animated affair, bringing 
Scotland more in line with other parts of the UK. Second, many Scottish candidates, 
particularly Conservative ones, failed to adapt along with their new audience. As a 
result, their electioneering strategies showed a more marked preference for personal 
and individual activities, such as canvassing.  
Overall, the electioneering activities carried out by the Scottish Conservative 
party were wide-ranging, encompassing (among other things) canvassing, treating, 
transporting electors, and public speaking. Generally smaller electorates, a 
preponderance of single-member seats and non-contiguous burghs, and greater 
geographical dispersal of constituency electors led to specific tactical responses by 
the Scottish Conservatives. They placed particular emphasis on the canvass, often 
withdrawing before polling to avoid unnecessary expenditure when a seat was 
thought unwinnable. The party treated electors more than their Liberal opponents, 
and later placed a proportionally greater emphasis on organising the transport of 
electors to the poll.  
Nevertheless, the gradual deterioration of some of these aspects mirrored the 
decline of party activity generally. In part at least, this decline was due to their retreat 
from activities which brought them into close and personal contact with the 
electorate and wider society. The sites at which the elite and popular connected 
moved away from the physical, as activities such as orations gradually gave way to 
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the written word.147 This was true of both parties, but more pronounced for the 
Scottish Conservatives, who continued to nurse an elitist worldview throughout the 
period.148 As such, the space between the ‘formal’ politics of the party and the 
‘informal’ political word of those that they sought to represent widened significantly 





The party operated in a national landscape in which the newspaper press was 
gradually expanding, due in no small part to the gradual reduction and eventual 
abolition of duties.150 While Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine could assert in 1836 that 
newspapers might only reflect the feelings and tastes of the middle classes, rather 
than the wider populace, the steady expansion of the press made this assumption 
increasingly inaccurate.151 They reflected the reading tastes of the middle-class social 
strata who possessed the vote, and, increasingly, those who did not.  
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The UK party leadership was extremely suspicious of the newspaper press. 
After 1830, the metropolitan papers were, with a few exceptions, on the side of the 
Whigs. Peel asserted that he had serious misgivings about the constitutionality of 
extra-parliamentary efforts to promote their cause through newspapers.152 Wellington 
also held this attitude, advising Buccleuch that ‘it is not safe to have any 
communication with them … I would not recommend you to interfere in their affairs. 
There is not one of them who can be trusted’.153  
Despite this, the Scottish party (initially at least) displayed a remarkably 
pioneering attitude towards the newspaper press. Alison, in his two 1835 
Blackwood’s articles, expounded on the need for a cheap and popular Conservative 
press, in order to define the party ideologically and to combat the efforts of hostile 
titles. Blackwood’s itself was a central organ through which developing strands of 
conservatism were shaped and transmitted on a more elite level. Alison thought 
newspaper-promotion of greater importance than his more famous calls to attend to 
the registers and to form Conservative Associations.154 The Scottish section of the 
party was the leading light in this sphere, with his exhortations inspired by local 
circumstances. Alison told Peel that he was unsurprised about his hesitance to attend 
a Glasgow dinner, ‘considering the impressions in regard to the political feeling of 
the west of Scotland which the Liberal press constantly endeavour to create’, though 
he did acknowledge that ‘the result of much of the elections hitherto at least has done 
so much to confirm [this]’.155 Alison recognised that Glasgow and the west were 
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particularly lacking in friendly titles, though the situation was not much better in the 
rest of Scotland. The press could help to ‘universalize the central tenets of the 
Conservative credo’, and to link local actors with national politics.156 Alison’s efforts 
played a significant role in bringing this about in Scotland, and in the wider United 
Kingdom.  
The number of UK provincial titles expanded from 130 in 1832 to over 200 
by 1840. Many were vehemently partisan, and interwove local and national issues by 
reprinting articles from other national journals with similar ideological slants.157 In 
Scotland, many of these features were also evident. In Greenock, for example, there 
was a long dispute printed in the letters page of the Greenock Advertiser between 
anonymous writers and both the Liberal and Conservative candidates – despite these 
letters having to be paid for as advertisements. As such, these columns were used by 
both parties for ‘supplementary propagandising’. It is notable, however, that the 
Advertiser favoured the Liberals, so Conservative efforts were presumably 
disadvantaged.158 Antipathy towards the party in popular arenas such as public 
meetings meant that Conservatives such as Macdowall Grant were more reliant on 
the press to disseminate their message: ‘Prevented, as I have already been, by 
popular clamour, from expressing at length my sentiments, on the hustings … 
compelled to have recourse to the medium of a newspaper’.159  
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In places such as Dumfriesshire, it was thought that the party would meet 
‘with great opposition amongst the dissenters, especially if they be roused by their 
clergy, and the public press’.160 In addition to functioning on a (broadly defined) 
Radical-Liberal-Whig-Conservative spectrum, newspapers also staked out religious 
positions. Given the fluid nature of religious issues and their tempestuous 
relationship with party politics in the period, this made the operations of party-
aligned Scottish titles a matter of unique delicacy.161 In places such as Forfarshire, 
the Montrose Review supported the Liberals and Free Church, while the Montrose 
Standard supported the Conservatives and Established Church in the late 1850s.162 
Nevertheless, such straightforward dichotomies were unusual, and, moreover, the 
changing of owners or editors tended to exacerbate the uncertainty of press 
allegiances.  
On a local level, party newspaper activity was notably vigorous in the early 
part of the period. Before 1830, the private purchase of a newspaper was considered 
unusual. By 1833 however, Horne urged Buccleuch to consider starting a newspaper 
in Dumfries, as ‘if a contest for the county began before we had such an organ, at 
command, the mischief might be incalculable, and it is on that ground alone that I 
urge it’.163 Although a memorandum was drawn up, it was not until 1835 that the 
sympathetic Dumfries Herald was founded, with the poet Thomas Aird as editor. The 
extent to which Conservative journals were founded alongside those of other 
allegiances at this time was fairly consistent across cities and counties.164  
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The role played by the party in founding and promoting many of these new 
titles was substantial. In the case of the Berwick and Kelso Warder, proceedings got 
off to a rocky start, as some were sceptical of the new venture, it being thought that 
success might have been more likely ‘if we could have secured the old paper’, which 
had switched sides.165 Similarly, Buccleuch was advised that the geographical scope 
of the paper was inauspicious, as near Jedburgh, ‘we have so little intercourse with 
Berwick that a paper established there would have no likelihood of extending its 
circulation very far’.166 The paper was nevertheless founded with Buccleuch’s 
backing, in no small part because the existing radical papers in the area were ‘read 
with avidity by the lower classes in the villages, and even by many of the 
tenantry’.167 This was the main reason for its foundation – the tenantry were the 
mainspring of Conservative support, and as such, a sympathetic channel of 
communication between them and the party was a top priority. The prominent role 
played by Buccleuch was indicative – the promotion of existing journals, and, 
crucially, the founding of new titles was heavily dependent on the contributions of 
wealthier magnates.  
Conservatives engaged in such activities due to the direct competition of 
liberal and radical-supporting organs. The extremely fissile nature of liberalism in 
the period, combined with a surfeit of Liberal candidates, meant that non-
Conservative titles often spent more time denouncing rival liberals than they did 
conservatives. In 1840, for instance, the Conservative candidate for St Andrews 
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Burghs was able to draw on criticisms of his opponent made by ‘his quondam friend, 
the Fife Herald’, which had made much of his ‘neglect of his constituency’.168 
Conservative efforts in this area were more directed and closely controlled. 
Nevertheless, Liberal infighting may have been an inadvertent advantage to that 
party, stimulating a profusion of journals across the non-conservative spectrum.  
Party efforts also included boosting the circulation of already-existing 
sympathetic newspapers. In 1829, it was thought that a single newspaper copy was 
read by thirty people.169 Consequently, this was every bit as important as the 
founding or funding of papers. These efforts were generally made by less senior 
members of the party on an informal basis, in contrast to the elite-inspired efforts to 
found and fund titles. In one instance, a minor Edinburghshire landowner suggested 
that his MP should send a Conservative paper to one of his tenants, especially as he 
worshipped at a dissenting church, whose liberal minister was ‘a great politician; and 
… had taken a very active hand in canvassing, during the former and late election’. 
Further, it was mentioned that he had, himself, sent to his tenants ‘the Edinburgh 
Courant, as they thought the Evening Post, was rather ultra-Conservative’. Tenants 
thus voluntarily consumed conservative titles, but they did not do so passively at the 
behest of their landlord – their identification with the content was thus a matter of 
active choice. The extra-local nature of these efforts was emphasised by the fact that 
in another parish of Edinburghshire, he thought that it was best to send them ‘the 
Scottish Guardian, published at Glasgow’.170  
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Local landowners, both small and large, often undertook such activity as a 
matter of course, as a way of influencing their tenants. Indeed, Horne advised 
Buccleuch that his activities in that area were misdirected: ‘some of your Grace’s 
copy of the Albion are ill placed, at this moment’.171 Some senior party figures were 
involved in promoting circulation, such as the agent for Roxburghshire, who asked a 
Kelso Writer in 1832 to ‘direct the Kelso Mail to be sent to Mr Walter Nicol, teacher, 
79 South Bridge, Edinburgh, who has declared in our favour … if you can send him 
the two or three last papers also so much the better’.172 Again, this illustrates that 
local newspaper circulation was not strictly confined to its intended locality.  
The party’s forward-thinking attitudes during the early post-Reform period 
resulted in the formulation of some elaborate proposals. Recognising that they were 
falling behind in newspaper take-up, John Hope WS wrote that ‘several 
Conservatives … resolved to give the plan of circulating Conservative newspapers a 
fair trial … and they accordingly have placed at my disposal, a sum of money for the 
purpose’. The party in Edinburgh tentatively embarked on a comprehensive and 
organised campaign to bolster Conservative circulation. It was further proposed that 
this system be adopted more broadly throughout the country, and that ‘one journal 
[Edinburgh Advertiser] … should be considered the accredited organ of the party’. 
This would have several potential advantages: ‘not only would unity of sentiment be 
produced, and the paper itself better supported, but … the literary talent of the 
Conservative party would be directed into one channel’.173  
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It was also proposed to encourage the circulation of the paper through the 
formation of reading clubs, in which copies would be passed around districts 
according to a pre-determined list – a practice often associated with readers of radical 
titles. It was thought that this would have the appreciable effect of expanding the 
party to include a significant popular element, as ‘friends would be known, and in 
communication with each other twice a week: the transmission of the newspaper 
would be a bond of union’ – as such, ‘in the event of a sudden vacancy … these 
committees of friends would be ready to canvass the whole county in half a day’. 
Though there is no evidence that these more ambitious notions were acted upon, they 
illustrate, if nothing else, the ambition of party activists at the time. They also 
highlight the contemporary belief of party members that newspapers were a vital tool 
not only in winning over the electorate, but also in building up a resilient party 
organisation. 
These proposals were intended to combat the unpopularity of the party, which 
was thought to have been ‘brought about chiefly, if not solely, by means of the whig 
and radical press’.174 As in the rest of the UK however, Conservative organs exerted 
an increasingly peripheral influence over the expanding and industrialising Scottish 
cities, though their reach remained stable in the counties. By 1859, despite all efforts, 
the idea of a cheap Conservative party newspaper in Edinburgh was still only at the 
proposal stage.175 In Scottish cities more generally, Conservative titles had stagnated 
– in Aberdeen for instance, the lively local debate of the 1830s had been maintained 
by the whig Aberdeen Herald, conservative Aberdeen Journal, and the Non-
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Intrusionist Aberdeen Banner. By 1857, though the Journal was still conservatively 
inclined, the opposition had added the Aberdeen Free Press to its stable.176 Limited 
progress was made – in Glasgow, a group of Conservative businessmen founded the 
moderate Glasgow Constitutional in 1835 as a counterweight to the more reactionary 
conservative Glasgow Courier. Nevertheless, the Courier was struggling by 1857, 
the same year that the Constitutional was wound up. Its demise was blamed on the 
reluctance of prominent Conservatives in western Scotland to finance its conversion 
to a daily publication.177  
Horatio Ross, former MP for Montrose, complained to Buccleuch that though 
the Scottish were ‘a reading and a thinking people … all the newspapers which they 
get are of a democratic character. I believe it is very much owing to this that there is 
not a better feeling amongst the working classes’.178 His assertions were reasonably 
well-founded; by 1862, the Edinburgh Evening Courant was the only remaining 
conservative daily in Scotland.179 Even then, it was not well thought of, as one 
Scottish MP informed Disraeli that the liberal titles were generally ‘the best 
conducted and clearest written papers, and too many Conservatives I am sorry to say 
take the leading whig paper the Scotsman in preference to their own leading 
journal’.180 By 1867, the Courant was sold on by a committee of prominent Scottish 
Conservatives who had collectively owned its shares. It was claimed that this 
‘committee are in no way responsible for the past management as it was left to the 
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proprietors and they certainly have made a mess of it’.181 Want of attention on the 
part of the committee almost certainly accelerated its decline, as did a lack of 
financial support from the party. Efforts were made by ‘some independent members 
of the Conservative party’ to save the paper, however, and it carried on.182  
Large numbers of newspapers outside of London had been founded after 
1855, the majority of which were liberal-leaning. In the wider UK party, it was 
recognised by party managers that the lack of Conservative journals was a ‘great 
existing anomaly’.183 In Scotland, this anomaly was even more pronounced, as the 
vast majority of new titles were liberal in inclination. Ultimately, the Scottish 
Conservative party went into the 1868 election with a similar metropolitan 
newspaper presence than it had possessed in 1832, despite the massive expansion of 
the sector. This was largely due to a lack of financial support – splits in the party had 
severely impacted on the willingness of prominent Conservatives to finance the 
foundation of new papers and the expansion of existing ones.  
In attempting to discourage Buccleuch from founding the Berwick and Kelso 
Warder in 1835, William Scott had stated that those in Teviotbank ‘will not read a 
conservative paper at all unless they get it for nothing, and even if they do they will 
not believe a word its contents’.184 Yet, the paper, once founded, was successfully 
printed and distributed until 1858, and continued under similar names until 1899.185 
Although the party’s potential readership was a minority of the Scottish populace, it 
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was, particularly in the early part of the period, a significant minority. As in Wales 
and other parts of the UK, many Scottish counties and towns possessed one paper 
promoting each side, one conservative and one liberal/radical.186 Quite apart from 
their role in shaping political identities, they were a constant feature of local life, and 
thus needed to reflect the practical requirements and conceptual outlooks of their 
readers. As such, they arguably both reflected, and themselves shaped, the political 
make-up of local areas. That the majority of localities had at least one Conservative 
organ in circulation is indicative; even in many areas which consistently returned 
Liberals to Westminster, there were a sufficient number of conservatively inclined 
readers to keep these titles in circulation. Or, at least, enough readers to encourage 
local party figures to subsidise their operation.  
While their opponents may have claimed that Conservative electoral support 
was borne of intimidation, influence, or apathy, the purchase and consumption of 
newspapers was in most cases an entirely voluntary action. The partial commercial 
success of Conservative titles, though bolstered by significant party efforts, depended 
on the existence of a sympathetic readership. The role of the press in connecting 
local and national politics also affected the party internally – the reporting of national 
issues in local contexts bolstered the unity of party’s grassroots.187 The breakdown in 
party organisation after 1846 and the decline in the Scottish Conservative press were 
therefore mutually reinforcing. 
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Outside of election periods, Scottish parties, like their counterparts in the rest of the 
UK, needed to attend to the registration of voters. Voter registration, as in England, 
was an entirely new phenomenon after 1832 and was a difficult and lengthy process. 
Parties took the lead in registering sympathetic voters, as well as objecting to the 
inclusion of hostile ones on the electoral roll. Moreover, as registrations were 
conducted annually, between elections, it became necessary for parties to undertake 
near-constant activity.188 By 1835, the most important feature of Scottish electoral 
politics, in both county and burgh, was the battling between the parties in the 
registration courts. Indeed, Archibald Alison wrote that with regard to Conservative 
Associations, the registration courts were the ‘great theatre of their exertions’.189 
Though he was referring to the UK more broadly, Alison was very well aware of the 
effects of the new Scottish electoral laws. Registration provided the main impetus for 
the expansion of Conservative Associations across the UK from 1835 onwards. 
Attending to the register was to become their main function, and in some cases their 
sole function.190  
This was the domain of local party organisations, as opposed to candidates, 
magnates, or the almost non-existent central party apparatus. The Conservative 
party’s Scottish leader, the Duke of Buccleuch, was advised by a former 
Conservative MP in 1835 that the principal object of the Scottish party should be to 
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‘choose a commercial agent in each county to attend to the registrations’.191 While 
national figures such as Buccleuch were peripherally involved, however, registration 
activity was largely organised at the individual constituency level. In the Scottish 
counties at least, the Liberals were less active in this sphere. This was largely due to 
the cost of fighting court battles, combined with a lack of organisational capacity, a 
situation similar to that south of the border.192  
The strength of Conservative organisation meant that by 1839, matters were 
sufficiently coordinated that Sir James Graham was able to inform Francis Bonham 
of the state of the registers in sixteen seats across the south of Scotland. Many of 
these were constituencies in which the Conservative party’s presence has been 
underestimated or overlooked – Glasgow, for instance, was described as ‘Register 
much improved. Prospects good’.193 The Scottish party was extremely active across a 
great many constituencies throughout the 1830s. In seats where neither party was 
completely secure, attending to the registers was essential. 
The peculiar legal complexities of registration meant that the party in 
Scotland was particularly reliant on lawyers, given the legal confusion generated by 
the vague wording of the Scottish Reform Act. The lack of legal precedents meant 
that, in the early years at least, registration criteria varied from county to county. 
Norman Gash has described registrations as ‘a matter of local tactics that could only 
be effectively conducted by local men’.194 This was disproportionately true in 
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Scotland. John Hope WS wrote that ‘Since the passing of the Reform bill there never 
has been so much keenness displayed as in the Lothian Appeal Courts, as on the 
present occasion. No point could be decided without four speeches of counsel’, and 
that ‘the ablest men will make mistakes when they are forced to give summary 
judgements upon an infinite variety of points’.195 The judgements made in 
registration cases were not, however, always the result of impartial deliberation. 
Party politics infected the very machinery of registration, an area which previous 
scholarship on Scottish registration has neglected. It was noted in 1832 that ‘the whig 
and radical press teemed with the abuse of the Tory Sheriffs and the Tory registration 
courts, accusing them in no measured terms of partiality to their own party’.196  
John Cay, Sheriff of Linlithgowshire, made decisions which greatly 
displeased the party. He also published a book on Scottish registration law, derided 
by Hope as an attempt to ‘persecute the community with a Dictionary of 
decisions’.197 Hope’s derision reflected the fact that it was not in the Conservatives’ 
interest to consolidate or provide clarity to registration law, as they benefitted 
disproportionately from ambiguities across different local areas. Moreover, it was 
also extremely lucrative work for lawyers like Hope. Indeed, before Archibald 
Alison was appointed Sheriff of Lanarkshire, his retaining fee for revising the 
Aberdeenshire registers on behalf of the Conservative interest was 200 guineas.198 
After he was appointed Sheriff in 1834, Alison was swamped from 12 August to 15 
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October each year when the registers were under revision. He claimed in his memoir 
that before party activity had died down in the 1850s, there were sometimes 6,000 
claims and 4,000 objections per annum in Glasgow alone, along with 3,000 claims in 
the other constituencies within his jurisdiction.199 The electorate of these counties 
and burghs only amounted to around 10,000 in 1832, suggesting that Alison was 
exaggerating – nevertheless, it does give an indication of the industrial scale of 
registration activity. 
Cay’s book reflected an increasing level of consistency across legal 
jurisdictions after the chaos of the 1830s. However, the Sheriffs remained influential 
in determining the outcome of registration battles throughout the period, as they 
retained significant leeway in deciding individual cases, within a more slowly 
evolving legal framework.200 The majority of the Scottish bar, from which Sheriffs 
were drawn, was Conservative, as were the majority of Sheriffs already in place.201 
As such, the party enjoyed an inbuilt institutional advantage in registration battles 
during the 1830s and 1840s.  
By 1840, Conservative efficiency in the registration courts was reflected in 
the increasing accuracy of Horne’s predictions; out of thirty counties, he correctly 
predicted the results of twenty-five in 1835, twenty-six in 1837, and twenty-eight in 
1840, for the 1841 election.202 Combined with electioneering activities, the notable 
resurgence of the party was in large part due to registrations. The limits of this, 
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however, were illustrated by their experience in the Haddington Burghs. The 
Conservative victory there in 1837 was largely due to registration activity, putting 
them nine votes ahead of the opposition. This wafer-thin majority was achieved at a 
ruinous registration cost of over £10,000.203 Gaining burgh district seats by this 
method was prohibitively expensive. Moreover, rural landowners had less connection 
and interests in the burghs, and therefore had less incentive to fund such activity. The 
party’s focus on registration could not deliver long-term electoral success, as it 
restricted them to the counties. Though to a lesser extent, costs were nevertheless still 
formidable in rural seats.  
The cost and effort of attending to the registers meant that in some seats there 
was little party activity. This inactivity spread after the 1830s, as costs spiralled. The 
Corn Law split effectively ended registration efforts in many constituencies. While 
Buccleuch though that it would ‘not be politic at this moment to give up the 
registration fund’ in Roxburghshire, the lack of a candidate effectively rendered it 
redundant.204 By 1852, he was informed that the Conservative registration fund was 
unviable, as ‘the contributions have fallen off more than one half, and which of 
course has increased the expense to those who remain’.205  
Registration activity was not, however, the only means by which 
Conservatives won elections, though their Liberal opponents often claimed that this 
was the case. In places such as Kirkcudbright, it was thought that ‘the registrations 
have not been attended to, but the county is said to be Conservative’.206 After 1846, 
the more fluid nature of political allegiances made party registration work more 
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uncertain – put simply, it was difficult to convince Conservatives to fund the 
registration of voters whose loyalties were, or could become, suspect. However, the 
effects of such activity often had a lingering effect – where the party had been 
previously active in attending to the registers, Protectionists could win with little 
trouble, such as in Peeblesshire, where William Forbes Mackenzie easily saw off a 
Liberal challenger in 1847.207  
The overall electoral effects of such activities were mixed; attending to the 
registrations could only make a noticeable difference in seats balanced on a knife-
edge, and with relatively small electorates. Nevertheless, in being so active in this 
regard across Scotland, the party must be given significant credit for politicising a 
large number of electors, thus widening and polarising the political culture of the 
Scottish counties. Further, their limited activities in cities such as Glasgow and 
Aberdeen, though electorally unrewarding, had a similar effect on urban 
electorates.208 If there had not been a Conservative ‘other’ in these places, the 
residents of urban Scotland would have had less incentive to adopt self-consciously 
‘Liberal’ identities on a local level. New voters after 1832 constituted the ‘catalyst 
for political change’, and these voters in Scotland were, in a very large number of 
cases, enfranchised due to, or in spite of, Conservative registration efforts.209 
Significantly, while these efforts had become less vigorous by the late 1840s, they 
had already politicised large numbers of Scottish electors (and would-be electors). 
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Registration activity prior to 1846, therefore, was crucial in terms of entrenching the 





Apart from registering those who were ‘legitimately’ qualified, the Scottish Reform 
Act, unsurprisingly, created significant opportunities for the creation of voters who 
were not. These were known as ‘fictitious’ or ‘faggot’ voters. The Act was partly 
intended to bring Scotland’s electoral framework more closely into line with 
England’s, and it did do so in many ways. Unintentionally though, it also preserved 
and even intensified one of the most distinctively Scottish parts of political culture. 
This was particularly true in the counties, as the section of the Act concerned with 
the rural franchise consisted of ‘ill-assorted nonsense’.210 The importance of vote-
making was recognised by the party in addition to legitimate registration activity: 
‘The experience of the last few years, has shown … that the Conservative interest 
can be best and cheapest and most effectively supported by attending to the 
registration courts and making votes’.211 Vote-making was a well-established feature 
of the electoral system long before 1832. Having spent most of the previous half-
century creating parchment votes to bolster the oligarchic Dundas interest in 
Scotland, the party was uniquely positioned to take full and early advantage of the 
opportunities presented by voter creation.212  
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One vote-making method was to buy the properties of individual opposition 
voters, often above market value, as a way of depriving them of the franchise. 
Properties offering a single qualification could be bought for as little as £150. 
However, evidence from Edinburghshire suggests that this method was not very 
successful, and in fact aggravated previously uninterested voters.213 This practice 
was embarked upon throughout Scotland, including by Lord Elcho in 
Haddingtonshire.214 The purchase of non-rural property was recognised as necessary 
even in very rural counties such as Selkirkshire, which could not, ‘with any degree of 
certainty, be commanded without considerable acquisitions of house property both in 
Galashiels and Selkirk’.215  
The most effective purchases, however, were of medium to large-sized 
estates. Such purchases did however, in the understated words of Horne, ‘require 
great capital’.216 William Ogilvie, a Borders proprietor and Buccleuch’s chamberlain, 
was considering the purchase in 1845 of ‘a small property in the neighbourhood of 
Melrose for about £2,000, which would qualify eight or ten’.217 Even to the local 
gentry, such sums for even a ‘small’ property were excessive. This type of vote 
creation was therefore largely undertaken by wealthier county magnates. Moreover, 
this method appears to have been more widespread in the Lowlands – there were few 
instances of large-scale political purchases in the Highlands, perhaps because of the 
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unique character of land ownership in that region. Highland land was cheaper, but of 
generally lower value; vote-creation may therefore have been more inefficient.  
Properties could be used to multiply votes through the creation of joint 
tenancies. There were ample opportunities ‘for strengthening the conservative 
interest by the conjoining of tenants – by proprietors giving votes to their sons and 
brothers’.218 This was recognised as a useful tool by party activists, and encouraged 
in almost all counties in which the party had a significant presence. Tenants of 
Conservative proprietors were also strongly pressured to add others when their leases 
were up for renewal.219 
By far the most controversial method of vote-making was the manufacture of 
‘fictitious votes’. While other methods relied on the creation of £50 leases of 
nineteen-years duration, tracts of land could also be split up into £10 so-called 
‘liferent’ leases of fifty-seven years duration.220 Both leases qualified their holders 
for the rural franchise. As such, landowners could theoretically divide up their 
holdings into numerous £10 portions in order to create votes. The rents were paid by 
those who, though nominally possessors of a property, might never work on their 
land, or indeed, ever set eyes on it. Conservatives were not alone in employing such 
methods. In fact, Liberal efforts were used as justification for Conservative vote-
making: ‘[the] opposite party have been making some exertions to create votes’.221 
While Liberals such as Roxburghshire candidate J.E. Elliot stated that he had ‘always 
abused the system and both in private and public have raised my voice against it’, in 
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practice Liberals also used the same pretexts to justify their efforts: ‘Every possible 
exertion has been made on the other side … The People are very anxious to keep the 
upper hand’.222  
The geographical spread of liferenters, like the purchase of estates, was 
uneven – they were far more prevalent outside of the Highlands. There were, 
however, instances of the practice in constituencies which were consistently and 
securely Liberal, such as Forfarshire.223 This suggests that at least some vote-creation 
was speculative, carried out in the hope that there would also be wider shifts in the 
allegiance of constituency electorates. The majority of outside liferent voters were 
residents of the main cities, thus able to travel with relative ease to a county in case 
of a poll.224 Hence, the most concentrated numbers were to be found in south-eastern 
Scotland, particularly in the counties of Linlithgow, Edinburgh, Selkirk, Peebles, and 
Roxburgh.225 A parliamentary select committee revealed in 1837 that both sides were 
equally complicit in the practice, and equally enthusiastic about it. Liberals, however, 
were less active in this regard because they had fewer allied landowners and less 
plentiful funding.226 
While the registration and defence of manufactured votes in the courts was a 
matter for the local party machinery, vote-making was not. Landowners were needed 
to ‘provide the necessary funds to meet the expenses, it being apparent that the 
ordinary subscription to the registration fund would be quite inadequate’.227 Given 
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the symbiotic relationship between vote-making and landownership, it is 
unsurprising that, when combined with the financial outlay needed, it was the more 
prominent landowners who undertook such activities. The importance and necessity 
of these activities served to bolster landowner authority over the party machinery. 
This partially explains why the Scottish Conservative party was even more 
landowner-dominated than its English counterpart. 
However, this was not unchallenged. Numerous proposals were made which 
would have placed the party apparatus at the centre of these activities. One of these, 
by James Thompson of the Forfarshire Militia, proposed the purchase of estates by 
companies consisting of over 100 subscribers, who would then gain the vote.228 This 
general desire to formalise vote-making was shared by agents such as John Hope 
WS, who thought that these efforts should not ‘be the result of the political exertions 
of any individual family, but that they should be a result of a general conservative 
movement throughout the country’.229 Though not put into operation, these plans do 
illustrate the ambition of party activists. One complex vote-making method that was 
put into action was the creation of interposed trusts, in which a number of liferenters 
on an estate established a trust which named the landowner’s agent as the trustee, and 
assigned him any rents which were owed. Although the Conservatives used this type 
of manoeuvre to greater effect than the Liberals, it was originally pioneered by the 
latter party in Edinburghshire.230 
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Vote-making, though more frequent in counties, was not confined to them, as 
the definition of the £10 householder franchise in burghs as set out in the Scottish 
Reform Act was also ‘riddled with ambiguities’.231 Aborted schemes such as James 
Thompson’s also sought to create companies for vote-making in the burghs, but 
generally speaking the Conservative party did very little in this area.232 The most 
prominent exception to this was Haddington Burghs, where Conservative peers such 
as Lothian and Buccleuch had manufactured eighty votes in Jedburgh by 1841. They 
did so, however, at a cost of £7,600 – this suggests that the prohibitive cost of urban 
vote-making made systematic activity unappealing.233 The Liberals were far more 
active in urban vote-making, assisted by their general popularity and the willingness 
of sympathetic burgh dwellers to assist them.  
By 1840, even the extremely wealthy Buccleuch seems to have tired of the 
great expense, complaining that ‘I cannot go on doing it, the burden has become too 
great’.234 When he complained to Horne of a six-month delay in receiving accounts, 
Horne replied that ‘I am not exclusively to blame, having had much difficulty in 
getting the necessary explanations from the local agents’.235 Vote-making could be 
unreasonably expensive, though profitable for professional agents and property-
owners who wished to sell.  
The practice of creating votes could also impact on the long-term profitability 
of estates. To take one instance, the Dalgleish estate in Selkirkshire was bought by 
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Buccleuch in the 1830s, and served to qualify fifty-six liferenters. It is worth noting 
also that the total county electorate in the 1835 election was 423, meaning that the 
Dalgleish liferenters alone made up over ten per cent of the electorate.236 By 1861, its 
rental income was inadequate, but it was thought impossible to reform its running 
‘owing to the peculiarly fractured legal ownership of the estate, belonging as it did, 
to a great number of liferenters’. Each and every liferenter had a say in the running of 
the estate and there was not, in the opinion of the Factor, the ‘slightest chance of 
getting their unanimous consent’. 237  
After the Corn Law split, the party found that, at least in problematic 
constituencies, the voters they had made were no longer entirely dependable. Given 
the disproportionate number of wealthy magnates who followed Peel on Free Trade, 
this disconnect was particularly damaging, as those enfranchised through vote-
making were far more likely to be Protectionists. The case of the Selkirk Inn, owned 
by Buccleuch, is indicative; the liferenters all wished ‘to get quit of their votes’ 
because they were ‘all red hot Protectionists … even should they remain on the roll, I 
should not be surprised to see them support some Protectionist candidate the very 
first opportunity, without any regard for your Grace’s opinion’.238  
Despite these drawbacks, such issues did not have an appreciable effect on 
the representation of Selkirkshire, which continued to return Conservative members 
to Westminster until its abolition in 1868. The manufacture of votes continued there 
on a smaller ad hoc basis, and in other seats where a safe majority was to be 
maintained. Local Selkirkshire Writers were in fact still purchasing properties on 
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which to make votes in 1862.239 Yet, by 1865 John Hope WS told Buccleuch that ‘I 
do not think vote making in any county can now keep pace with the natural increase 
of the constituencies’.240 While he may have overstated his case, it was nevertheless 
true that the organic and gradual increase of electorates had rendered vote-making 
less effective by the 1860s.  
Significantly, despite their own vote-making activities, the Scottish Liberals 
were particularly successful in impressing upon the public mind the notion that it was 
a generally Conservative practice.241 The Conservatives occasionally tried to combat 
this: ‘Lord Lothian seems to be very averse to the example set by their opponents 
being followed by the Conservative party’ – he thought that if they did not follow 
suit, then ‘it will entitle our candidate to allude with more effect to their swamping 
operations’.242 Conservatives sporadically eschewed large-scale and conspicuous 
vote-creation and instead adopted a superficially piecemeal approach. These efforts 
were, however, in vain. Vote-making helped the party to recover ground in the 
1830s, and its long-term effects meant that it protected some Conservative seats long 
after these activities had died down. Vote-making benefitted the party in the short-
run, and in certain counties, though only in conjunction with other factors.243  
However, on balance, the declining effectiveness of the tactic, and the all-
round criticism it attracted up to 1885 and beyond, permanently stained the party’s 
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reputation in Scotland, already sullied from opposing Reform in 1832.244 Party 
figures believed that they could maintain their position through such means, but this 
meant there was less motivation to develop the party along more appealing 
ideological lines. With the bad publicity stemming from it, it also removed their 
ability to do so, meaning that tactics of declining effectiveness remained at the centre 





Given its concentration in county constituencies and the propertied nature of its 
members, the party excelled at exercising influence over tenants on the estates of its 
adherents. This was a crucial voting bloc, as the largest single body of new electors 
were tenant farmers – an analysis of Scottish county electors in 1832 has estimated 
that 52.12% were farmers, most of whom were tenants.245 The party utilised a variety 
of tactics in order to bolster their electoral fortunes, to varying extents. These ranged 
on a spectrum from soliciting voluntary deference, to various types of influence, to 
outright coercion.  
Initially, it was thought that Scottish tenants would voluntarily follow their 
landlords’ political wishes without much need for cajoling.246 However, it quickly 
became clear that the tenantry could by no means be taken for granted. Sir Robert 
                                                          
244 Vote-making played a prominent role in aiding Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign, despite both 
sides having actively engaged in the practice. See David Brooks, ‘Gladstone and Midlothian: The 
Background to the First Campaign’, SHR, 64 (1985), 42–67.  
245 J.I. Brash, ‘The New Scottish County Electors in 1832: An Occupational Analysis’, Parliamentary 
History, 15 (1996), 122, 127. 
246 Peel to Buccleuch, 24 Aug. 1834, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/1031/5/1. 
81 
 
Peel was informed by a Perthshire Conservative in 1836 that ‘the Scotch are too 
proud of their reasoning powers to follow when their understanding is not directly or 
indirectly complimented’.247 This factor, already peripheral, had all but disappeared 
by the 1850s. Robert Abercromby, for instance, claimed in 1851 that after his tenants 
had misled him as to their voting intentions in 1841, ‘I made a resolution never again 
to ask a tenant for his vote’.248 Philip Salmon has asserted that electoral deference in 
the counties, as conceived by D.C. Moore, was almost non-existent in 1830s 
England.249 Though I.G.C. Hutchison has suggested that deference ‘played its share 
in explaining voting patterns’ in Scotland, the share in question was minimal, and it 
was not an unequivocal deference.250 Rather, it was a specific type of ‘legitimate’ 
deference which ‘arose naturally from wealth, public service, and a persistent 
presence’.251 Unlike its English counterpart, the Scottish Reform Act did not include 
a provision for the printing and distribution of pollbooks. As such, quantitative 
analytical techniques are inapplicable to Scotland, as very few of those that were 
printed have survived.252 Other surviving evidence nevertheless indicates that 
deference in Scotland, as conceived by D.C. Moore, was marginal.  
However, it was patently the case that many tenants cast their ballot for 
Conservative candidates in tandem with the wishes of their landlords. Party activists 
and landowners employed a variety of techniques in order to influence electors. New 
electors were in many cases apathetic; the Agent for Roxburghshire thought that 
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‘many of them care little or nothing about it and will only come at the insistence of 
their landlords or other friends of ours who have influence over them’, and, crucially, 
‘from finding that it is their interest to vote for us’.253  
Magnates exercised considerable authority through the use of informal 
influence. The lists of influential figures in Scottish constituencies contained in 
Dod’s 1853 Electoral facts are largely confirmed by both contemporary newspaper 
reports and surviving private papers. The numerous memoranda on the state of 
Scottish representation compiled by Donald Horne for the Duke of Buccleuch make 
repeated reference to this in the first decade after Reform. In 1834, for instance, he 
stated that Lanarkshire would be contestable ‘with the Duke of Hamilton’s 
approbation … this, with the support of Lord Douglas, would carry the county’. Even 
to party leaders, however, it was not always clear who exactly possessed local 
influence, and in what quantity. This was true of Wigtown, where, ‘It is believed 
Lord Galloways interest predominates in this county’.254 By 1853, Galloway’s 
influence had largely been supplanted by the Earl of Stair.255 Although influence 
could be a powerful factor, it was opaque, and, moreover, was subject to significant 
change over time.256  
The ambiguous nature of influence was particularly evident in burgh districts, 
where the limited influence which did exist was usually exercised by Liberal 
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proprietors.257 While influence lingered in even the populous Scottish counties, it 
rapidly declined in the districts as the nineteenth century progressed. Horne thought 
that, with regard to the Ayr Burghs, the ‘state of parties [was] not well known and 
registrations not attended to; but a Conservative supported by the Duke of Argyll and 
Lord Eglinton would, it is said, carry the seat’.258 In the Ayr District, like many 
others, little influence remained by 1853.259 In the single burghs, this was even more 
pronounced. Aberdeen, for instance, was the subject of a battle in the 1830s between 
the allies of the Conservative Hadden family and the Whig Blaikies.260 This family 
conflict was, however, superseded after the 1841 election.261  
Exerting positive influence involved careful negotiation and nuanced 
persuasion. While a landowner might state that their tenants were ‘heartily welcome 
to choose for themselves, and will give me no offence whatever by voting differently 
from their landlord and friend’, informal ties of friendship and formal ties of 
economic interest played a definite role in winning over electors.262  
Though many contemporaries believed that bribery was more prevalent after 
1832, they also thought that it was exceedingly uncommon in Scotland. The scant 
work carried out on this topic has suggested that there were only ‘rare instances’.263 
Indeed, the only reference in the party papers of Scottish Conservatives alluding to 
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the practice is contained in a letter from an unknown writer to Sir Francis Drummond 
in 1835, asking that ‘some friend should come over to Cupar on Monday with power 
to use … £500 for influencing certain votes here, here and on the coast’. However, 
the writer went on to state that he knew it was the candidate’s ‘fixed intention to 
keep himself clear of any pecuniary involvements of the nature I allude to’.264 It is 
not, however, to be expected that written references to such illegal activity would 
have been preserved in the records of party members, or even committed to paper in 
the first place. More likely is that any such activities were carried out by local agents 
with the tacit consent (or at least wilful ignorance) of their party employers, with 
expenditure listed under other account headings such as transport and tavern bills. 
Indeed, this may partly explain the perennial complaints of party financiers that local 
Writers charged them exorbitant sums for their services. If bribery was practiced by 
the party in Scotland, it was on a small, ad hoc level.  
In many cases, financial incentives of a less explicitly criminal nature were 
offered to electors. In one memorandum, the candidate for Selkirkshire emphasised 
how much of county business depended on the custom of large landowners. This was 
not confined to tradesmen; one ‘highly educated’ farmer, Walter Tod, who was also 
known ‘for his attainments to men of science’, was suggested as the perfect 
candidate to rearrange Buccleuch’s library, especially as he had ‘never hesitated to 
lend us his personal influence which in some cases is powerful’. The level of 
influence which electors might have over their fellows also affected their potential 
reward – significant compensation was requested for a ‘Mr Simpson of 
Caulderhope’, as he was the ‘best canvasser and most experienced politician in the 
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county’.265 Patronage not only brought in votes, but also helped to maintain the 
cohesion of those who worked overtly for the party during elections. There was little 
to no distinction between those who worked for the party in influencing voters, and 
those who influenced voters in return for party favours. Before the rise of the 
professional party agent, paid agents were usually local solicitors hired on an ad hoc 
basis. Though not employed in the professional sense, both their function and their 
impact were roughly similar.  
Archibald Alison had encouraged this in his seminal 1835 article, arguing 
that the party’s salvation lay not in professional canvassers, but in the ‘friends, 
neighbours and equals’ of the new electorate.266 Separation of the professional party 
agent and non-professional canvasser is difficult; estate managers, for instance, often 
doubled as political agents, and were also qualified solicitors, and might also hold 
local municipal office. This was especially true of the Highlands, which possessed a 
very sparse professional class. This meant that the local middle class and gentry were 
more likely to perform multiple overlapping roles. 
Liberals often condemned their opponents for (what they claimed were) the 
widespread employment of sharp practices by Conservative landowners in coercing 
their tenants, by threatening them with eviction or the non-renewal of leases.267 It 
would appear that this did happen on occasion in different parts of Scotland, such as 
in Ross-shire, where a Mr. Maclennan was ‘deprived of the Letterfearn lands for his 
having voted for Seaforth’, as the land was owned by Thomas Mackenzie, the 
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unsuccessful Conservative candidate.268 Similarly, when Lord Morton’s 
Edinburghshire tenants voted against his wishes, he promised to ‘lose no opportunity 
of purging the estate’, but acknowledged that, of the tenants whose leases were not 
up for renewal, his only option was to make them ‘pay up every farthing of rent and 
arrear the day it becomes due. Unluckily however my conservative tenants are those 
who do not pay their rents’ – he lamented that ‘the only hold I have on them is of that 
description’.269 Though he would have liked to coerce his tenants, his opportunities 
for doing so were limited. Coercion of this sort was used to varying degrees by many 
Conservative landowners, but it was by no means universal, and the opportunities for 
doing so were very restricted. On balance, negative press coverage more than 
cancelled out any advantages gained through various types of coercion.270  
Interestingly, rather than intimidation by Conservatives, a more common 
feature of Scottish political culture was the intimidation of Conservatives. While the 
sparse existing scholarship has suggested that Scottish elections were ‘sober, almost 
solemn occasions’, there has been no comprehensive study of this.271 Though 
elections were not generally riotous, low-level disturbances were not uncommon. In 
Roxburghshire, for instance, there was a nationally famous spate of election violence 
running throughout the 1830s. This was also accompanied by smaller, everyday 
incidents, such as when the Conservative candidate, Francis Scott, was ‘followed by 
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the boys and pelted with mud’.272 Party-compiled voter lists in Scotland across the 
period abound with examples of those thought to have been browbeaten by Liberals 
and radicals, with entries similar to ‘Voted tho’ intimidated’ not uncommon.273 
Intimidation of Conservative electors took place across counties, burgh districts, and 
single burghs, such as in Greenock in 1852, where the Conservative candidate 
terminated his contest halfway through polling, citing ‘the system of intimidation 
which has been pursued towards my supporters … has completely paralysed the 
party who supported me’.274 It is therefore not surprising that in an 1876 report on 
the state of the Scottish party, the secret ballot was mentioned more than once as a 
potential boon to Conservative fortunes.275 While intimidation may have been cited 
by some electors as an excuse to avoid voting with their landlords, this was not 
exclusively the case. Further, it also likely had the effect of discouraging apathetic or 
lukewarm electors who would otherwise have voted for the party.  
Intimidation was a near-constant feature of politics across the period. 
Conservatives were doubly disadvantaged by this, as their own attempts at 
intimidation were ineffective and commonly denounced, while Liberal intimidation 
was more effective and comparatively un-noted by the press. The party was 
particularly despised in Scotland by non-electors, to a greater degree than their 
counterparts south of the border. As such, intimidation by their Liberal opponents 
was a prominent feature of the Scottish Conservative experience. Ultimately, a 
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voter’s readiness to follow the lead of their landlord, customer or employer depended 
on a number of factors, including their personalities of both voters and influencers, 
the prevailing local political atmosphere, and countervailing forces such as 
intimidation. The employment of influence as a party tactic was to prove increasingly 
ineffective as the century wore on, particularly after 1846. This decline was 
exacerbated as Hypothec and the Game Laws became hot-button topics among the 
rural tenantry.276 These issues drove a wedge between tenant and landowner that 
drastically reduced the effect of electoral influence.277  
In the Scottish counties, the path to success increasingly lay in amassing 
numerical superiority through ideological means, though influence continued to play 
a significant role up to 1868. More broadly, the employment of such tactics brought 
politics into the practice of everyday life, and actively encouraged electors and non-
electors to participate in politics, whether in acquiescing to such pressures, or in 
vigorously resisting them. As such, influence and coercion played a considerable role 





In sum, both the make-up and activities of the Scottish Conservative party exhibit 
strong elements of continuity and change, and illustrate that the party made a 
material impact on mid-nineteenth century Scottish society. Though it was never 
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entirely exclusive nor homogenous, continuity tended to prevail in its local structures 
and composition. Early organisational innovations and a tentative widening of the 
party base in the 1830s was not sustained, and in some cases, this declined. The party 
went into the 1860s with largely the same personnel and organisation that it had 
developed in the 1830s.  
Nevertheless, the structure and composition of the party’s electoral apparatus 
was far more intricate and diverse than has been generally assumed. Landed 
magnates, though far less prominent than has been assumed, still played a 
conspicuous role in the party’s activities at a local level. Its organisation was highly 
flexible, with significant decision-making autonomy evident at different levels. It 
was mostly directed by gentlemen of the ‘agricultural interest’, but not exclusively 
so. Moreover, the party’s agents were integral to the party’s operation, and possessed 
a large degree of independence in conducting their activities. Indeed, the party’s 
candidates were themselves a diverse group, though most possessed certain shared 
attributes. These included local connections and the support of the landed interest, in 
order to be successful on polling day.  
In terms of the activities undertaken by the party, the predominant theme was 
not one of continuity, but of change. Impressive vigour did, however, give way to 
relative inertia after the middle of the century. After the twin blows of 1843 and 
1846, the Scottish Conservatives went from being one of the most active parts of the 
UK party to one of the least. Some tentative signs of revival were evident in the years 




Despite this decline, the diversity of the party’s organisations and groups was 
reflected in the extensive array of activities that were undertaken. The party in the 
1830s and, to a lesser extent, 1840s, displayed a remarkable vigour and energy that in 
many cases outshone their more numerous Liberal opponents. Activity encompassed 
traditional and (in Scottish terms at least) novel electioneering tactics, which 
included treating and the transportation of electors to the poll. The party also played 
a significant role in expanding the reach and variety of the Scottish newspaper press. 
Though less successful than the Liberals in this area, they made a substantial 
contribution to the development of Scotland’s vibrant and competitive print culture. 
Additionally, the existence of Conservative papers throughout the country indicates 
that Scotland’s reading public was not quite so monolithically liberal as has been 
assumed.  
During the traditionally quiet periods in-between elections, annual battles in 
the registration courts and the manufacture of fictitious votes kept politics in the 
public mind. These activities required a highly developed party machinery, and were 
the main reason for the rapid organisational expansion of the party. Finally, the 
various tactics used to exert influence over electors and to coerce them made the 
party inseparable from the wider social life and political culture of the nation. Their 
early activities and innovations in the areas of local Associations, registrations, and, 
especially, newspapers, placed them at the vanguard of the UK Conservative party. 
The party’s strenuous and widespread activities, reaching into almost all areas of life, 
had the overall effect of making Scotland more politicised, as a rising proportion of 
electors and non-electors developed more rigidly partisan allegiances. There is a 
great deal of irony in this, as the Scottish Conservatives were generally opposed to 
91 
 
any expansion of popular politics, formal or informal.278 This oppositional political 
culture brought ever-increasing numbers of people into the political sphere, making 
politics more public and more popular.  
                                                          





























CHAPTER TWO: NATIONAL ORGANISATION, LEADERSHIP, AND 
ACTIVITY 
 
Above and outside of local constituency organisations and activities, the Scottish 
Conservative party also operated on a national plane. More than a regional cluster of 
local bodies, it operated between the local constituency level and the parliamentary 
summit of the party in Westminster. However, the effectiveness, independence, and 
unity of this strata fluctuated over the course of the post-Reform era. Furthermore, 
because it existed in a liminal position between the clearly recognisable and 
reasonably well-defined local and Westminster levels of the party, it is more difficult 
to locate and define. While somewhat elusive, the national layer of the Scottish party 
was substantial and significant.  
The divisions between the local and central levels of the party were by no 
means absolute – central actors and institutions were closely involved in the local 
goings-on of the party. Similarly, local actors and their actions had a limited but 
noticeable effect on the workings of the party in Westminster. Likewise, the divide 
between the electoral and parliamentary aspects of party business was also 
ambiguous. These areas of activity often overlapped and changed over time, either 
organically, or through internal conflict. Though all of these party elements were 
contained within an overarching body, they did not always work together 
harmoniously.  
This chapter will begin by examining the short-lived Scottish Conservative 
Club and wider party activities in Edinburgh, followed by the rise of the Scottish 
party in Glasgow. It will then go on to explore the leadership of the party during 
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Peel’s ascendancy. Following this, it will scrutinise the changes to the Scottish party 
leadership after the Corn Law split, finishing with an exploration of the state of the 
Scottish party on the eve of the Second Reform Acts, again focusing on Edinburgh 
and Glasgow.  
 
 
I. Edinburgh and the Conservative Association of Scotland 
 
The era following the Reform Acts of 1832 has been referred to as the age of ‘club 
government’.1 While the importance of clubs in party development has come under 
recent scrutiny, they were nevertheless important centres of organisational activity.2 
London’s ‘clubland’ was extensive and closely connected to politics, in a capital city 
which possessed government institutions, and, most importantly, the Houses of 
Parliament. Nevertheless, apart from a legislature, other UK cities possessed many 
characteristics which encouraged the formation of clubs. Dublin possessed the 
Kildare Street Club, and the Sackville Club was an explicitly Conservative 
establishment.3 Edinburgh, like Dublin, was also a former legislative capital, 
containing national ecclesiastical, governmental, and legal institutions.4 Given 
Edinburgh’s role as a social centre for the Scottish aristocracy and professional 
classes, it is unsurprising that the Scottish party followed its Irish and English 
counterparts in seeking to form an Edinburgh Conservative Club. The conflicts 
involved in its formation and the character of its eventual demise do much to 
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illustrate the nature and boundaries of the Scottish party on a national level. 
Moreover, these also highlight the existence of deep internal divisions.5  
The formation of a club in Edinburgh was considered from the beginning of 
the period, as a proposal was discussed by several London-based Conservative 
figures, and was strongly backed by the Duke of Buccleuch before the final passing 
of the Reform bill. However, this came to naught – perhaps because William Scott, a 
party stalwart, informed Buccleuch that many in Scotland thought that ‘the present 
would not be the best time to set agoing a conservative club’. This was due to the 
despondent nature of party feeling on the eve of Reform, and a recognition that 
popular opinion, already intensely anti-Conservative, would be further exacerbated 
by such an action. Rather, it was suggested that ‘we must bide our time’, as once 
popular ire had subsided such a plan could be executed ‘steadily, quietly, and 
prudently’.6  
These plans were not resurrected until 1834, this time packaged as a 
replacement for the existing Pitt Club of Scotland. A printed circular asserted that a 
new, more explicitly partisan Association was needed for the new political era. 
Signed by a mix of old Melvillites, and by rising party figures such as Donald Horne, 
it was evidently intended to encourage members to signal their support by 
transferring the remaining funds to the new club.7 One longstanding member was 
told that ‘the time is come when it should no longer occupy the ground which may 
more advantageously be filled by younger men’, especially as its dwindling 
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membership had rendered the club ineffectual.8 Scottish Conservative organisation 
on a national level was not entirely novel, but there was, nevertheless, significant 
impetus to innovate in the wake of wide-ranging political changes.  
Some level of organisation had already been established by Edinburgh’s 
Junior Conservatives, who had been holding private dinners since at least 1833.9 
After some ex-Pitt Club members and ‘respectable Senior Conservatives’ had joined, 
it was thought that a more ambitious project might be attempted, with ‘Lord Lothian, 
Lord Selkirk, Lord Eglinton, Sir John Forbes and Sir Francis Drummond’ as Vice-
Presidents, effectively making the senior party leadership and club leadership almost 
concurrent.10 Buccleuch was so thrilled by these events that he offered his 
unqualified support before being told of the details, being ‘unwilling to damp in any 
degree the zeal which has been exhibited’.11  
After these preliminaries, a general meeting of Edinburgh Conservatives 
reached several conclusions relating to the character of the proposed club, including 
that it be named the ‘General Conservative Association of Scotland’, in essence a 
national version of the Conservative Associations which were forming in many 
constituencies. This link was explicitly stated, as one of the chief proposed objects of 
the club was to ‘promote and encourage the formation of District Associations 
having similar objects throughout Scotland’. The committee went so far as to suggest 
that it ‘make the necessary communications with every county in Scotland, for the 
purpose of extending the Association’.12 These resolutions illustrate that it was 
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seriously intended to create a unified and far-reaching central electoral organisation, 
with close links to local Constituency Associations. The scope of this plan far 
exceeded the ambitions of party managers in the Carlton Club, and such an 
organisational structure was in fact ahead of its time by many decades.13 
These ambitions were, however, unfulfilled – while some Scottish 
Conservatives may have been more ambitious and creative than their English 
colleagues, they were constrained by the same practical and ideological objections to 
such plans which inhibited ambitious members of the Carlton Club.14 After the 
Edinburgh meeting, one of its attendees informed Buccleuch that ‘it was deemed 
most important that when the association came to be formed it should be done in 
such a manner as to enable the peerage to afford their countenance and support’.15 
These peers, like their English counterparts, jealously guarded their local electoral 
authority from central interference.16  
A subsequent meeting was held by prominent Scottish Conservatives in 
London, many of whom were more closely connected to Westminster than to the 
local party in Scotland. It was composed of ‘such Scotsmen as were in London’, in 
the Carlton Club, and a committee was formed to respond to the resolutions of the 
Edinburgh committee.17 Further resolutions were then forthcoming from Edinburgh, 
including the recommendation that the club be named the George IV Club, St 
Andrews Club, ‘or some such indifferent name’, as ‘the word ‘association’ might be 
                                                          
13 See Blake, Conservative Party, 145–9. 
14 See Salmon, Electoral Reform, 44–58. 
15 Patrick Robertson to Buccleuch, 27 May 1835, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/582/9/6. 
16 Salmon, Electoral Reform, 49–50. 
17 Account of meeting in the Carlton Club, 1835, Dalhousie MSS, GD45/1/251. 
98 
 
objectionable … giving a handle to our enemies to consider it in the light of a 
Political Union’. Many traditionalist party members had long thought that regular 
extra-parliamentary political organisation was ideologically unacceptable; as such, 
this represented an attempt to make such a body seem less threatening.18 Avoiding 
such designations was also a symbolic concession to those who wished to maintain 
local electoral autonomy. The club’s involvement in the constituencies was to have 
been achieved by ensuring that ‘each county in Scotland [would have] two 
gentlemen connected with it’ on the club’s general committee. While the club was 
therefore to maintain a less explicitly political (or, rather, electoral) outward 
appearance, close connections with local Associations were to continue 
confidentially, as ‘the secretary of this Club should not correspond with any other 
than the Chairman or Secretary of such recognised local Clubs or Associations’.19  
They also recommended that the chairmen of all local Associations and 
members of the Carlton Club be admitted to the club when nominated. By doing so, 
the club’s organisers were attempting to create an essentially corporatist organisation 
which would operate between local parties and at a central level in London, co-
opting figures from both levels. In England, dislike of local interference by the 
Carlton Club was one of the principal reasons why national electoral organisation 
was limited.20 Scotland’s localities were to prove somewhat similar in disposition. In 
attempting involve itself with, and appeal to, all levels of the party, the Scottish 
organisers risked appealing to none.  
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By June 1835, 450 Conservatives had expressed an interest in membership, 
despite a further disagreement having arisen between London and Edinburgh over 
the inclusion of a club reading room in the plans. It was eventually approved despite 
the wishes of the London committee, and the word ‘Conservative’ was again added 
to the club’s title. Given the large number of prospective members, and the fact that 
the plans had leaked to the press, the Edinburgh committee felt able to press ahead, 
informing their southern counterparts that that ‘the formation of the Association or 
Club only awaits the sanction of the promoters in London’.21  
By then, it had been agreed that the club should be explicitly focused on 
constituency politics, and that the reading room would contain ‘all [Scottish] 
provincial papers’, but only three (unnamed) English ones.22 The London committee, 
though it repeated its objection to a reading room and the name of the club, resolved 
that it did not ‘wish to press it if against the feeling of those persons already 
members’.23 The communications between the committees highlights the existence 
of two overlapping, but distinct, groups in the Scottish party. The first was an 
electorally focused and locally autonomous Scottish party, composed of minor gentry 
and professionals, mainly lawyers. The second was made up of aristocrats and MPs, 
who were more concerned with parliament and governance from a British 
perspective. These groups, though possessing different priorities and interests, were 
initially able to work harmoniously. However, the differences between and within 
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these two groups eventually hindered efforts to form the club. The original Junior 
Conservative Club (mostly composed of Edinburgh lawyers) had effectively been 
commandeered by the gentry and party leadership, meaning that it could not 
effectively expand its membership outside of traditional circles.24  
The Junior Club was already in place, as a preliminary committee had been 
organised in June 1834, with the primary object of forming a club so that ‘young 
men of conservative principles might become acquainted with each other’, as it was 
feared that ‘without such a club, young men might be entrapped by designing whigs, 
or bit with the current doctrines of liberality and humbug’. Primarily a local 
initiative, it was intended that the club should hold a dinner to generate interest in 
Edinburgh, and that the promotion of party activities throughout Scotland should be 
‘most unquestionably a secondary consideration’. Indeed, the plans made for the 
dinner indicate that great effort was to be taken to ‘make converts from the lower 
ranks’, by lowering the price of admission.25 In recognising that they would have to 
adapt their tactics to attract new adherents, the Junior Conservatives showed 
creativity and initiative in attempting to revive the party in the city.  
Initially, it was thought that it might be improper for ‘a peer to place himself 
at the head of a Political Association as the party had uniformly discountenanced 
such an act’, so action was taken to ‘organize the younger portion of the Edinburgh 
Conservatives without a nominal head in the meantime, till we ascertain whether we 
can be useful in conducting the election proceedings’.26 As matters had progressed 
and peers indicated their willingness to join, by June it was thought that the 
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membership would include ‘all the landed proprietors with the exception of six or 
seven’.27  
It was at this point that the Junior Club was commandeered by more senior 
figures. William Burn commented that there were ‘some rather unruly members 
amongst the committee of the Conservative Club’, but that this would be mitigated as 
‘all the old, respectable and influential Tories are to join’.28 The resolution that the 
entry fee would be at least £3, coupled with an annual subscription of £1, ended any 
chance of the club embracing the wider electorate.29 When the idea of a club was 
first mooted in 1832, William Scott thought that it should contain the ‘greatest and 
noblest in the land; but it must not be too exclusive and aristocratic. It should in fact 
be open to all, … even the decent £10 freeholder’ – in this way, such a body could 
‘combine all the respectable classes in the community’.30 Though such ideas were 
not completely unheard of in wider Conservative circles, they were evidently viewed 
with more disdain by those the higher echelons of the party.  
The London committee was willing to allow much of the club’s character to 
be dictated by relatively junior Edinburgh Conservatives, indicating that the party 
was not strictly hierarchical. Nevertheless, the limits to this autonomy led to the 
squandering of a potential opportunity. Edinburgh Conservatives ultimately failed to 
organise themselves effectively, or to carve out a niche in what was to become a 
bastion of liberalism and whiggery. In commandeering an organically conceived and 
                                                          
27 (Melville?) to Buccleuch, 22 Jun. 1835, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/582/9/17. 
28 Burn to Buccleuch, 23 Jul. 1834, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/582/9/2. 
29 Further resolutions of the Edinburgh committee, 10 Jun. 1835, Dalhousie MSS, GD45/1/251; 
Horne, notes on Edinburgh Club, [1834–5], Buccleuch MSS, GD224/582/9/23. 
30 William Scott to Buccleuch, 8 Jun. 1832, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/650/1/30. 
102 
 
potentially accessible local organisation for national ends, the older party hands also 
implicitly suppressed younger conservatives who might have energised and 
transformed the party in the succeeding decades.  
It was, however, an entirely different rivalry that led to the club’s final 
demise, after only a few years of erratic activity. Having been initially formed by 
junior Edinburgh lawyers, it was appropriated by the new leaders of the party in 
Scotland, headed primarily by the Duke of Buccleuch, and composed mainly of 
substantial county landowners. Some of the old guard were also induced to join the 
new organisation. These included minor gentry, such as Sir Francis Drummond, and 
senior lawyers, such as Sir John Hope, Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, and later 
Lord Justice Clerk.31 The Edinburgh club committee was composed mostly (in the 
early stages at least) of lawyers, and the club’s initial direction was heavily 
influenced by what J.I. Brash has called the ‘Hope clique’.32  
As plans progressed further, Buccleuch and the magnates took more control 
of the club’s direction. This was made glaringly evident by the Edinburgh 
committee’s insistence that the Secretary of the club must under no circumstances 
‘be engaged in any department of the legal professional pursuits in Edinburgh’. It 
was mysteriously added that ‘The members of the committee appointed in Edinburgh 
present at the meeting in London will be able to explain the inducements which has 
led to this recommendation’. While great pains were taken not to record on paper the 
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reasons for this resolution, the memorandum does later allude to possible ‘jealousies 
and dissensions likely to arise’ if a lawyer were selected.33  
Francis Drummond was asked to be a Vice-President of the club, and John 
Hope also appears to have been involved.34 By this point, however, they had been 
essentially side-lined. Despite the resolution that no lawyer should serve as Secretary 
of the club, they nevertheless put forward their own candidate, a Mr Fisher. After 
Fisher’s candidacy was rejected, they then pushed for the appointment of another 
applicant (Mr Robertson), who ‘they calculated on commanding considerable 
influence’. They also falsely claimed that Robertson’s candidacy had Buccleuch’s 
blessing. After this deception was uncovered, the final establishment of the club was 
stalled solely because of ‘the want of an active and efficient Secretary, as until this 
appointment shall be made, it is impossible to convene either committee or any other 
parties who will take an interest or make any exertion for its advancement’.35  
In the meantime, the Hope clique took advantage of this pause to change tack. 
Hope now attempted to impede the club’s development, presumably as he now saw it 
as a threat to his influence over Aberdeen and Peel.36 In the opinion of William Burn, 
they employed ‘every means … to throw discredit on the association, and impute 
unworthy motives to its principal supporters’.37 Perhaps because members of the 
Hope clique were the principal organisers of the local party in Edinburgh for both 
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municipal and parliamentary elections, Hope had enough influence to discourage 
many local Conservatives from seeking membership.38 
Apart from internal party considerations, the involvement of the old guard in 
the club’s formation also damaged its potential effectiveness in a public sense; 
though many electors were increasingly disillusioned with the Whigs, they 
nevertheless retained their passionate contempt for (what had been) the pre-Reform 
Tory party. This had been closely associated in the public mind with the 
authoritarianism of the old Faculty of Advocates from the days of Henry Dundas 
onwards.39 Indeed, the leaking of the club’s prospectus led the Scotsman, despite 
there being no mention of registration or electioneering in the document, to assert 
that the club was formed with the sole purpose of spreading ‘bribery, influence, and 
intimidation throughout Scotland’.40  
This inertia continued into late 1836. Initial funds of ‘between £400 and 
£500’ were held by the interim Secretary and Treasurer, but with no plans to spend it 
– the small amount was thought insufficient to form a club, or to help with election 
efforts. It was suggested by Sir John Forbes that the shell of the organisation be 
united ‘with the general association in England which would give it a better place in 
the feelings of the party in Scotland’.41 He thought that internal relations in the 
Scottish party were now so acrimonious that only amalgamation with a wider UK 
organisation could preserve what little had been achieved. This suggestion does not 
seem to have been acted upon, and the club quietly perished in late 1836.42  
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The circumstances surrounding the short-lived Scottish Conservative Club 
highlight several overlapping themes. Firstly, the relations between senior party 
members resident in the constituencies and London-focused magnates and MPs at the 
head of the party were largely amicable. Secondly, the deference which was shown 
to this latter group was an organisational hindrance. It obstructed efforts by members 
closer to the grassroots within Scotland to refashion the party. They intended to do so 
by appealing to, and building up, a broader base. While certainly not advocates of 
untrammelled inclusivity, they did have first-hand experience of navigating the new 
electoral landscape, and more clearly recognised that the party needed to adapt. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, intense hatred of the old pre-Reform Tory 
leadership was not only present in the wider electorate – it also existed, to a 
surprising extent, within the Scottish party itself. By this point, even Conservatives 
had tired of the Hopes and Dundases, and were eager to draw a line under the old 
Tory interest in Scotland. Conflict over the club was the arena in which internal 
struggles for power over the new party took place. In failing to guarantee that the 
club would not challenge their remaining influence, the Hope clique engineered its 
collapse. Though this damaged the party’s prospects, it did hasten the decline of the 
clique, allowing Buccleuch and the county magnates to further solidify their position 
as the party’s new leading cadre. 
A local Association was founded in Edinburgh, after it became clear that the 
national club was unviable. It was first mentioned in the newspapers of February 
1836, and it held annual dinners until at least 1838.43 The last mention of the 
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Association’s registration activities in local newspapers was in 1847, though it also 
played a role in the Edinburgh election of 1852.44 Its activities would appear to have 
been confined to the city of Edinburgh – indeed, its chairman, Robert Ritchie, was a 
City Councillor.45 This localised focus, with an emphasis on municipal politics, may 
have partially insulated it from the factional squabbles and prejudices of the national 
party, enabling it to reach out to a wider audience. Speeches and toasts at its dinners 
gave extensive praise to the working classes, and at least some of its candidates were 
drawn from outside of the professional classes.46  
The Conservative party in Edinburgh was not entirely an elite, or even a 
middle-class group; although very little evidence of it has survived, an Edinburgh 
Operative Conservative Association was founded in the 1830s, complementing its 
better-known Glasgow counterpart.47 Conservative Operative Associations were 
particularly prominent in the Midlands, West Riding, and Lancashire, and were part 
of a broader effort by the party to foster working-class support.48 Despite its less 
exalted status, it was more successful and enduring than the abortive Scottish 
Conservative Club, and possessed functioning reading and committee rooms.49 It was 
founded in August 1837, and continued until at least 1841.50 It would appear that, 
much like the Glasgow Operatives Association, it had a staunchly Presbyterian 
character.51  
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It was described by the hostile Scotsman as an ‘Association of ninnies’, 
whose membership was likely composed ‘merely of a few hopeful clerks and 
shopmen’.52 This assertion was, however, inaccurate. Many of its members were 
bootmakers from the area around Buccleuch Street and Potterrow, and printers and 
wax chandlers were also part of the organisation.53 Hence, it cannot be said that the 
existence of the Glasgow Operative group was a singular, isolated anomaly in the 
history of the Scottish working class. In the late 1830s, there was sufficient support 
for Peelite conservatism to encourage the foundation of working-class organisations 
in both of Scotland’s major population centres.  
This enthusiasm extended to Edinburgh’s student population. Although the 
activities of the Glasgow University Conservative Club are well-documented, the 
existence of a similar club in Edinburgh has been overlooked. It was formed in late 
1837, as the ‘Edinburgh Protestant Conservative Association’. At its inaugural 
meeting, some of the 400 students present, who the Morning Post thought to be 
Roman Catholics, objected vociferously to the inclusion of ‘Protestant’ in the title. 
They disrupted the meeting for over an hour, causing much noise, disruption, and 
tumult – ‘Protestant’ was nevertheless retained in its title.54  
It is clear that the Conservative party was active at all levels in Edinburgh. It 
was, however, more successful in less celebrated (and less documented) sectors, 
including student, working-class, and municipal organisations. These organisations 
illustrate that there was far more widespread support for the party (and, by extension, 
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conservatism more generally) than has been assumed. On a local and municipal 
level, they hence enjoyed a modicum of success, both in Edinburgh and in Scotland 
more generally. On a parliamentary and national level, organisational efforts were far 
less effective – no Conservative MP was elected for the city of Edinburgh until well 
after 1868. Attempts to create a national organisation in the city were ambitious, 
indicating that there was an appetite in many quarters for such an undertaking. 
Moreover, these efforts illustrate that many, if not most, thought it necessary for the 
Scottish party to possess a national apparatus separate from the Carlton Club.  
The causes of its demise, however, reveals that internal divisions, mainly 
between the pre- and post-Reform leading lights of the party, made it impossible for 
the Scottish party to be headquartered in Edinburgh. Disagreements between 
London-focused party members and the party’s junior members, though less 
acrimonious, were also a factor in this. Overall, the party was highly active in 
promoting national organisation, the mixed results of which highlight how the party 
was adapting (or, in some cases, failing to adapt) to the changing times.  
 
 
II. Glasgow and Western Conservative Organisation 
 
While Edinburgh was still Scotland’s metropolis in legal, ecclesiastical, and 
institutional terms, it was no longer the unquestioned centre of the country by 1832. 
Glasgow and the west of Scotland had an increasing claim on primacy, at least in 
demographic and economic terms. During the course of the 1830s and early 1840s, 




competing centre of Scottish conservatism. The election of Derby as Lord Rector of 
Glasgow University in 1834 was an early indication that Scottish opinion was 
increasingly inclined towards political restraint.55  
Peel’s dinner celebrating his election as Lord Rector of Glasgow University 
was, however, the most prominent manifestation of this emergence. Peel’s speech on 
this occasion built upon Derby’s earlier work, by espousing a similar message of 
political and religious moderation.56 This, and the internal party discussions which 
preceded Peel’s trip to Scotland, illustrate that the leaders of the UK party were more 
than aware of the Scottish party’s internal deficiencies. Encouraged by ample 
evidence (including a flourishing Glasgow Operative Association) that the city was a 
fertile seeding ground for a broader Scottish liberal conservatism, central party 
figures forged direct links between Glasgow and Westminster.57 Glasgow was, in 
many ways, on the verge of usurping Edinburgh as the centre of Scottish 
conservatism. Thwarted by the events of 1841, 1843, and 1846, however, this never 
came to pass. 
The primary role of Peel’s 1837 Glasgow dinner was to promote the interests 
of the party in Scotland and the UK. The Scottish party might also have felt that it 
was falling behind in terms of competitive dining, given the successful Edinburgh 
festival in Grey’s honour (among others). Despite the Edinburgh party’s efforts to 
promote dining, that event had ‘eclipsed all these victories, so if even there was 
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anything in the boast, there is nothing now but emptiness’.58 The Glasgow dinner 
built on previous goodwill from 1834; one Glasgow professor advised Peel that 
Derby’s ‘acceptance of the Lord Rectorship and visit to Glasgow did much good’, 
which would be ‘confirmed and extended’ by Peel’s attendance.59 Dinners were an 
invaluable part of the political process at this time, especially useful in creating and 
solidifying partisan loyalty. Moreover, as an ‘intersection between metropolitan or 
national politics and local political concerns’, their effects could operate on multiple 
levels.  
Beyond the 3,400 guests who attended the dinner, the content of Peel’s 
speech reached out to electors throughout the UK, and more specifically to those of 
Glasgow and Scotland.60 After his election, he received a great many letters 
informing him of the local importance of this victory, suggesting that it was a strong 
‘indication of popular feeling [which] speaks kindly for the prevalence of 
conservative principle, both without and within the Academic walls, over a large 
portion of Scotland’.61 It was thought of as ‘a most important change in the 
sentiments of the youthful part of the community, as well as of the public at large’.62  
His successful speech at the dinner appealed to Glasgow (and to large 
sections of the country) by espousing moderate Tamworth conservatism, which 
found a particularly appreciative audience among Glasgow’s mercantile classes. 
Even before Peel had agreed to attend his installation as Rector, Archibald Alison 
had expressed surprise that ‘the sons of the reforming merchants of Glasgow who 
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were so deeply imbued with democratic principles in 1832, should so soon have so 
soon converted to constitutional principles’.63 The mercantile classes of Glasgow 
were, however, far from homogenous – newer businessmen coexisted and competed 
with older, more established merchants, particularly in the fields of the East and 
West Indian trade. Some had already been traditional Tory supporters, but most were 
liberal in inclination – though, overall, this liberalism was far more moderate than 
radical.64 Indeed, Alison was keenly aware of the de facto commercial hierarchy of 
Glasgow, with the sugar aristocracy at the summit and coal and iron masters at the 
base.65 Though possessing different interests, many of these moderates were thought 
ripe for conversion.  
Political conversion of a broader section of the populace was greatly aided by 
the religious content of Peel’s message. Derby’s speech of 1834 had begun this 
process, having been intended to ‘unite the Tories and Church Whigs, who in 
Glasgow form a powerful body’.66 Up to 1839, Peel appeared to be increasingly 
sympathetic towards Church Extension, which attracted evangelical followers to the 
party.67 While this had positive effects in Glasgow and the west, the uniting of 
moderate Church Whigs and ‘obstinately obsolete’ Conservatives in Edinburgh 
seemed to be an unattainable goal.68 Put simply, the generally less traditionalist 
Glasgow Conservatives were more willing to consider the political wishes and 
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demands of the Church of Scotland’s Evangelical faction, who had hitherto inclined 
towards the Whigs.  
Glasgow was fertile ground for Peel’s message at least partly because the 
party had fewer links to the traditional landed class.69 Peel was also invited to 
Edinburgh shortly before his visit to Scotland. Lord Melville informed him that ‘they 
were all very anxious that you should not decline this honour’, and to that end a 
delegation of prominent Edinburgh Conservatives was sent to persuade him.70 The 
habitually unsociable Peel declined the invitation to Edinburgh, but acknowledged 
that ‘Glasgow was unavoidable’.71 In encouraging Peel to disappoint the delegation, 
Sir John Hope stated that Edinburgh had ‘no merchants – no manufacturers – no 
citizens of wealth or value or influence’, and that ‘meetings and dinners in Edinburgh 
on either side for many years past have been and always will be, entire failures in 
point of effect and impression in the country’.72 Not only would an Edinburgh dinner 
have had little positive effect, it might also have dampened any enthusiasm sparked 
by the Glasgow banquet. Indeed, the Edinburgh event was to be a small and 
exclusive gathering, in stark contrast to the large and open dinner in Glasgow.73 By 
attending the proposed Edinburgh dinner, Peel would have dined with ‘those they 
[the electors] know before as the active partisans of the old and somewhat ultra 
Scotch Tory party’.74 This point was driven home by Sir James Graham, who thought 
Edinburgh was the least fertile ground in Scotland for a Conservative revival: ‘In the 
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rest of Scotland the distinction between the Old Tory party and the Conservative 
Reformers is much less strongly marked and maintained than in Edinburgh’.75 Hope 
concurred, asserting that there was a strong Conservative feeling throughout 
Scotland, but that it was ‘unlauded and countervailed among the middling ranks, by 
jealousy and distrust’ of the old Edinburgh Tories.76  
Key party figures were highly aware of the poisonous reputation of the 
Edinburgh party, and therefore actively sought to bypass it. In doing so, leading 
members of the UK party effectively carved out their own niche in Scotland. Though 
they did not (and could not) actively seek to direct the party in the western Scotland, 
they did circumvent both Buccleuch and the Edinburgh cliques in dealing directly 
with regional political actors, creating an ad hoc parallel hierarchy. This was aided 
by the existence of an established party machine in Glasgow. Extensive Glasgow-
related correspondence with and between major London figures such as Peel, 
Graham, and Bonham commenced just a few months after Peel’s banquet. This 
suggests that in addition to the public nature of the occasion, it was used by senior 
party figures to make contacts and forge relationships, leading to the establishment of 
an informal private communications network.  
The first such surviving letter informed Peel that the Glasgow party had 
settled upon Robert Monteith of Carstairs as Glasgow parliamentary candidate for 
the 1837 election. It also revealed that Conservative business in the city and 
surrounding region was primarily directed by Archibald Campbell of Blythswood, 
                                                          
75 Graham to Peel, 11 Oct. 1836, Graham MSS, 79680, ff. 41–2. 
76 John Hope to Peel, 27 Nov. 1836, Peel MSS, 40422, ff. 249–51. 
114 
 
who had served as MP for the city between 1820 and 1831.77 Monteith was 
subsequently defeated by 750 votes; Archibald Alison complained to Peel ‘either that 
the cause of the constitution is hopeless in the larger Scotch Boroughs or … the 
moral influence of the festival here in honour of yourself was less considerable than 
it really has been’.78 Nevertheless, subsequent correspondence indicates that senior 
party figures continued to nurse high hopes for party fortunes in the city.  
The crucial factor in encouraging these hopes was the double vote; Glasgow 
and Edinburgh were the only two-member constituencies in Scotland. Multi-member 
seats had a marked effect on patterns of voting behaviour in England.79 While other 
factors had rendered this feature irrelevant in Edinburgh, it was thought that it might 
bring success in Glasgow. Indeed, the tactic of ‘plumping’ for one candidate was 
employed by Conservative voters in the city throughout the period, as shown by the 
small number who did so for James Ewing in 1832, and the significant number who 
plumped for the Conservative candidate in 1852.80 It was thought that the lead 
Conservative candidate in 1837, Robert Monteith, had a ‘fair chance of dividing so 
many liberal voters as may allow him second on the poll’.81 The party had pinned its 
hopes on encouraging enough moderate Liberal voters to split their ballot between a 
Liberal and a moderate Conservative, in order to keep out the other radical candidate. 
Conservative candidates performed far more poorly in Scottish burghs than they did 
in their English equivalents. The case of Glasgow indicates, however, that this 
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imbalance was at least in part due to their distinctive electoral configuration, rather 
than any stark difference in the ideological make-up of the Scottish urban 
electorate.82  
Francis Bonham was also kept closely informed of party matters in western 
Scotland. At some point after 1835, he became a member of a small standing election 
committee in London along with, among others, Sir George Clerk. One of its duties 
was to correspond with local parties to offer advice, and in turn to collect electoral 
information.83 It is highly significant that Clerk’s name does not appear in any of the 
Glasgow correspondence, despite his evident interest in Scottish affairs and trusted 
position in the Westminster hierarchy. This was presumably due to his close 
connections to Buccleuch and the Edinburgh section(s) of the party.  
Local figures generally retained a great deal of independence, and guarded 
this jealously. Despite this, the level of co-operation and understanding between 
London figures and those in Glasgow was notable. This is especially so when the 
geographical distance and unique characteristics of Scottish affairs is taken into 
account; as a country whose best interpreters were figures with local ties, the extent 
of central involvement in western Scottish politics was considerable. Certainly, it 
was a far closer connection than the arms-length relationship between central party 
figures and an ‘alien and enigmatic Ireland’.84  
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One such figure who possessed both central influence and local ties was Sir 
James Graham; he had connections with Lanarkshire and Glasgow which predated 
Reform, and was well acquainted with the Duke of Hamilton. By 1838, he had begun 
to re-involve himself in the affairs of the region.85 Indeed, his post-Reform 
connection to Glasgow was far closer than has previously been assumed. This re-
engagement in Glasgow’s politics may have been motivated by the death of 
Campbell of Blythswood, as the loss of the party’s leader in the city had damaged its 
prospects.86 Though it had lost the 1837 parliamentary election, the party did win a 
majority of seats on the Town Council, which suggested to many that continued 
effort would bear fruit: ’I find our friends clearly of opinion, that it was well to begin 
with the municipal majority, which in time the parliamentary cannot fail to follow’.87 
Though he was mostly concerned with Westminster affairs, Graham kept a close eye 
on the party’s electoral operation in western Scotland, receiving frequent and 
detailed updates. Moreover, he regularly offered advice and information in return. 
His frequent visits to Scotland allowed him to build up close relationships with 
prominent western Scottish Conservatives, including Archibald Alison and Robert 
Lamond. 
Most of Graham’s Scottish intelligence came from Lamond, a local Writer 
who also held the position of chief Conservative Agent in western Scotland. 
Interestingly, although Lamond corresponded with Donald Horne, the chief agent in 
the east who reported to Buccleuch, it appears that he did not send any information 
gleaned from Horne’s letters on to Graham.88 Similarly, there is no 
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acknowledgement of Lamond’s input in Horne’s frequent electoral reports to 
Buccleuch. This suggests that while there was a division between east and west in 
terms of leadership and influence, co-operation on an operational level did exist, 
though this was perhaps unsanctioned, or at least unofficial. 
In turn, Graham seems to have been the principal conduit between the party 
in the west and Francis Bonham’s central electoral apparatus. Graham and Bonham 
exchanged frequent letters which discussed various Scottish electoral matters. These 
were detailed from the outset, with one early letter informing Bonham of the 
electoral prospects of counties throughout the western region, described by Graham 
as the ‘Heart of Scotland’.89 By 1839, this link had been further strengthened; in one 
typical instance, Graham organised a meeting with Bonham and Granville Somerset 
about the choice of candidate for Dunbartonshire.90 He was also able to pass on to 
Bonham the result of annual registrations in no fewer than fifteen lowland Scottish 
seats.91  
Graham was increasingly influential in Scotland; hence he also, in turn, 
increased the Westminster party’s influence in Scotland. Given the presence of 
Scottish party figures in London when parliament was in session, it is unsurprising 
that Scottish affairs were often dealt with south of the border. Horne was well aware 
of this, once informing Buccleuch that ‘More is known in London than here’ about 
electoral matters in the Orkney islands.92 Horne himself was also a member of the 
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Carlton Club from early 1838 onwards.93 Nevertheless, this Westminster 
involvement was generally concerned with the gathering of intelligence and the very 
occasional employment of tactful influence. The Carlton Club electoral machine had 
even less influence over the Scottish localities than it did in England and Wales.  
By the autumn of 1839, it was still thought that the party stood a good chance 
of success at the next Glasgow contest. Their confidence was mainly due to the belief 
that their efforts at the registration courts had rendered the upcoming municipal 
election a foregone conclusion, and that this would translate into success at the 
parliamentary level.94 This illustrates the close relationship between municipal and 
parliamentary politics; registration efforts in the burghs were closely connected to the 
state of local and national politics. Party figures were, moreover, aware of this, and 
understood their significance. Monteith, one of their prospective candidates, would 
not agree to stand again ‘till he saw the result of the municipal election’.95 
Nevertheless, the loss of Campbell of Blythswood continued to affect the 
party’s unity. Graham, though he possessed significant influence and acted as 
mediator, could not solve this: ‘The parties are so exasperated against each other, that 
in the absence of recognised leaders it is difficult to bring them to terms’.96 
Confusion in the city continued; Horne thought that it was intended to ‘bring forward 
Sir James Graham and Mr Monteith in the confident expectation of carrying the 
former’, but neither figure stood in 1841.97  
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Outside of internal squabbles, the party’s electoral prospects appeared 
favourable. As a result of Peel’s dinner, a Peel Club was formed at the University of 
Glasgow in 1837, which held annual dinners, and was likely instrumental in ensuring 
that Graham succeeded Peel as Lord Rector.98 It is notable that a Liberal Association 
at the University was not founded until 1839; the Peel Club did not restrain its 
criticisms of the body, or of the party that it supported.99 Further, while there was 
close and effective co-operation between professors and students in the Peel Club, 
Liberal academics absolutely refused to become involved in the Liberal Association. 
Even the pro-Liberal Scotsman was compelled to state that this had caused it to 
degenerate into ‘an arena of political jangling and contention!’.100 Further, the Peel 
Club was not an exclusively elitist organisation; its inaugural dinner, attended by 
professors and students, also boasted Hugh Hamilton as a speaker – a cloth-lapper by 
profession, he also held the position of chairman in the Glasgow Conservative 
Operatives Association. 
In Glasgow, a group of workers resolved to form themselves into an 
Association, seemingly without elite prompting, on 3 December 1836.101 They issued 
an address to Peel, to which he replied in a flattering tone, praising Glasgow, 
Scotland, and the working classes.102 Among their other activities, the operatives 
heard lectures on subjects such as Chartism, and held dinners in honour of 
Conservative ideals, which included ‘a few of the leading Conservative gentlemen of 
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the city’.103 Its initial general committee was made up of two wrights, three 
warehousemen, four cloth-lappers, one fringe-maker, six printers, and one lawyer.104 
The Association was also involved with the wider UK party, having hosted a 
deputation from London which was interested in securing Monteith’s return. 
Seventeen members offered to actively canvas for Monteith, and the operatives also 
offered their services to the ‘Independent Registration Committee’ tasked with 
purging the electoral roll of unqualified Liberals.105 In 1839, the operatives held their 
second annual meeting, and with the exception of several Conservative gentlemen 
who had been specially invited, ‘the hall was crowded by workmen’.106 The 
organisation was by then sufficiently established and sizeable to embark upon a 
subscription drive for a reading room. By late 1840, enough money had been 
collected to establish it.107  
Nevertheless, the party was less sanguine by 1840, as ‘registrations of this 
year were not so well got up owing to the Non-Intrusion question which has split 
parties much in this city’.108 Increasing hostility between the party and Non-
Intrusionists, exacerbated by Peel’s disinclination to grant lay patronage to Church of 
Scotland congregations, was beginning to undermine its popular support in the 
city.109 By the election of 1841, Monteith and Graham were no longer in the running, 
and so the party put up a single candidate, James Campbell. Campbell came the 
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closest to winning a Glasgow seat for the party, losing the second-placed position by 
a mere 327 votes.110 When explaining the negative parliamentary and positive 
municipal results to Peel, Lamond stated that their mixed fortunes were largely due 
to the Corn question, and that church issues had only held them back ‘to a small, but 
certainly to some extent’.111 This was likely because of the residual religious 
standing of the local party – Campbell had probably benefitted from his reputation as 
an evangelical churchman.112  
A widening ideological gap between the operatives and the rest of the local 
party was evident at the group’s third annual meeting, as the Conservative gentry 
stayed away. The Association was increasingly at odds with Peel’s government, 
having asserted in 1842 that ‘we regard the total abolition of the law of patronage as 
indispensable, not only to the peace, but also the efficiency of the Church’.113 This 
position led to a sudden drop in membership, and rendered the organisation 
financially unstable.114 Membership had dwindled from thirty-five in 1840 to thirty-
one in 1842, and a meeting in 1843 attracted only nine attendees. While Corn Law 
repeal destroyed most Operatives Associations in England, it was the earlier Church 
question which killed off the Glasgow branch.115  
The party in Glasgow peaked at the election of 1841. By the eve of the 
Disruption, religious tensions had further damaged both their popular base and 
internal organisation. Though Sir James Graham described Lamond as ‘one of the 
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ablest and most active of the Conservative party in the west of Scotland’, he also 
worried that he ‘rather inclines to the Non-Intrusion party’.116 This general 
breakdown is reflected in the steep decline in the volume of correspondence. By the 
eve of the Corn Law split, Graham had again declined to stand for Glasgow, 
referring in the past tense to ‘Lamond and his old Conservative party at Glasgow’.117 
Glasgow ceased to be a significant constituency for the party, no longer possessing 
the electoral, organisational, or popular base to constitute itself as an alternative 
centre of Scottish conservatism.  
Overall, party activity in Glasgow in was, in many ways, the opposite of 
Edinburgh. It included elements of a newer, more commercial Scotland, both in 
terms of personnel and of ideology. In dealing with London more than with the rest 
of the Scottish party, it could sidestep pre-existing rivalries. Peel’s dinner acted as a 
catalyst for increased activity, being a result of both top-down effort and spontaneous 
grassroots enthusiasm. Local, municipal, working-class, and university bodies were 
founded and achieved significant successes. However, many similarities to the 
Edinburgh party are also evident – most prominently, a lack of universally 
recognised local leaders, and an intensifying disagreement over major issues, 
particularly the Church question. Peel and Graham’s close involvement with this 
issue initially benefitted the party in the west of Scotland. Conversely, this made the 
negative effects of the party’s religious policies after 1839 even more keenly felt in 
the west. Despite strong efforts in Edinburgh and Glasgow, Scottish conservatism 
failed to find a national urban centre. In the absence of this, the Scottish party was 
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denied a single geographical base, with leadership instead being invested in various 
figures, spread across the Scottish counties.  
 
 
III. Scottish Conservative Leaders 
 
Many figures held leadership positions in the Scottish party between 1832 and 1868. 
Of note, however, are the ways in which the extent and competency of these leading 
positions changed. This depended on the character and influence of those who held 
them and the state of the wider party. Towards the end of the period, this position 
became increasingly nebulous, dispersed among a wider selection of people. The 
period began with the retirement of Lord Melville as leader of the Scottish Tories, 
closely followed by rise of the Duke of Buccleuch as the most prominent leader of 
the Scottish party. Following the Corn Law split, the Earl of Eglinton took on this 
role, but to a much more limited extent. After his death in 1861, the party was left 
without a single leading figure. Responsibility was dispersed between individual 
MPs and lairds, and (to a limited extent) a more organised central party apparatus.  
The Dundas interest, long dominant in Scottish politics, had been in decline 
long before Lord Melville’s resignation from the cabinet in 1827. As a landowner of 
limited acreage and means, he did not possess a sufficiently large economic base to 
continue as Scottish manager.118 Formerly in control of Edinburgh and large swathes 
of Scotland, the family’s influence was reduced to parts of Edinburghshire.119 Peel 
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had hoped to keep Melville involved in Scottish affairs, but Melville evidently had 
no wish to continue: ‘When I quitted it in 1830, it was really a bona fide … in the 
intention of never returning to it, and of passing the remainder of my days, not likely 
to be very many, at this abode’.120 Apart from a letter to the speaker of Edinburgh 
Town Council about the city’s creditors, it appears that he did indeed confine himself 
to Edinburghshire politics.121 It was perhaps this vacuum which encouraged the ill-
fated activities of the Hope clique – certainly, there was no love lost between Hope 
and Melville, and the latter’s retirement may have emboldened Hope.122  
Sir Francis Drummond of Hawthornden also came to prominence in the 
Scottish party, taking an active interest in Conservative politics in the city and county 
of Edinburgh, as well as in the Haddington Burghs.123 He also took an interest in 
party affairs more broadly – Lord Wharncliffe was advised that Drummond ‘takes 
charge of the great Conservative interest in Scotland’.124 His surviving papers 
contain a great deal of correspondence and electoral information on constituencies 
across the country. He corresponded on election matters with Lord Rosslyn, one of 
the chief members of the London elections committee, but not, crucially, Bonham, 
Graham, or Peel.125 His reputation was perhaps tainted by his association with the 
Hope clique, and his later collusion in trying to foist a pro-Hope Secretary on the 
Edinburgh Conservative Association.126 This Hope-Drummond alliance is probably 
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why, despite his spending large amounts of money on the creation of votes in the 
Haddington Burghs, Buccleuch and the Marquess of Tweeddale prevented 
Drummond’s son from standing as the Conservative candidate in 1841.127 This rival 
electoral activity ended with Drummond’s death in 1844.128  
Similarly, after the Edinburgh Conservative Association debacle, Hope was 
reduced to a marginal figure in the Scottish party, though he continued to have 
considerable influence over Lord Aberdeen, especially on church matters.129 After 
the Disruption, Hope had largely exhausted his influence, perhaps because, in the 
words of Buccleuch, he ‘keeps quite aloof from the rest of the world, mixes very 
little in Society, and consequently does not know so well the general feelings of the 
country’.130 This decline was exacerbated by his antagonistic role in the Church 
crisis, which had made Hope extremely unpopular among the wider public.131 The 
efforts of Drummond and Hope illustrate that the leadership of the Scottish 
Conservative party was by no means uncontested. Nevertheless, the marginal nature 
of these challenges, and their near-total lack of success, underlines the extent to 
which the Duke of Buccleuch was the clear leader of the Scottish party.  
In seeing off various challenges to his authority, Buccleuch ensured that the 
Scottish party generally looked not to Edinburgh or Glasgow, but to Drumlanrig 
Castle. As such, Buccleuch, with the general support of other Conservative magnates 
in the counties, effectively took over the party from the old lawyer set, ‘the other 
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great source of Scottish Conservatism’.132 Though he was effectively the most 
prominent Scottish Conservative from 1832, it was not until 1834, with an election 
looming, that he actively grasped the reins. The prominent Conservative William 
Burn was able to state in mid-1834 that ‘the Duke of Buccleuch is of all others the 
individual to whom the conservative party here, and I may say in Scotland, have to 
look to as their head and main rallying point’.133 Buccleuch effectively became 
leader by general consensus in both Scottish and Westminster circles, rather than by 
any active effort on his part. A former MP requested that Buccleuch aid in 
‘establishing a useful concert in the Scotch elections’, and Horne wrote to him on his 
own initiative to state his hope that Buccleuch would ‘take control of Scotch 
patronage, otherwise I fear our party here will not be strengthened’.134  
Within Edinburgh, Buccleuch had in fact already ‘organised a system of 
correspondence and communication, which will keep our friends together and enable 
them to act in concert’, and was planning to gather information for the rest of 
Scotland.135 Having also taken charge of the election of Scottish representative peers, 
he agreed to engage in ‘frequent confidential communication’ with Peel on patronage 
and appointments, effectively confirming his willingness to act as leader.136 While 
J.I. Brash describes Buccleuch as ‘essentially a territorial magnate’ without any 
claim to an actual leadership position, this presupposes that any such formal 
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positions existed, or could exist, given the contemporary nature of political parties.137 
Peel himself was not elected or appointed leader of the wider Conservative party – he 
held the position because others recognised him as leader. It is illustrative that when 
William Gladstone wished Buccleuch to intervene in a distant electoral contest in 
Orkney, he wished him to do so ‘in his character of government agent for Scotland, 
(respectfully) assuring him … By “respectfully” I mean, avoiding any appearance of 
authoritative interference’.138 Buccleuch can be described as leader of the Scottish 
Conservative party, insofar as contemporary parties had leaders. Indeed, on his death 
the Scotsman acknowledged that ‘there can be no doubt, that, for many years, the 
Duke of Buccleuch was, in a very real sense, the head of our northern 
Conservatism’.139  
At the beginning, Buccleuch’s knowledge was ‘not very extensive as to the 
state of Scotland’, but his selection of Donald Horne as the de facto chief 
Conservative Agent for Scotland ensured that he was soon well-informed on the 
wider state of the party.140 Numerous detailed reports were prepared for Buccleuch 
by Horne, beginning in late 1834. These covered the state of the constituencies, 
registrations, candidates, local parties, and the shifting influence of landlords.141 
While J.I. Brash suggests that these were mainly prepared with the object of keeping 
the Duke up-to-date, they were in fact also used to direct activity – Horne was 
occasionally informed that, as a result of his memoranda, the ‘Duke will see what 
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can be done’.142 This activity reached from the Border constituencies to Orkney and 
Shetland.  
Though extensive, Horne’s knowledge-gathering was not entirely successful 
– in an 1835 letter for instance, he professed to have no information on the Ayr, 
Dumfries, or Wigtown Burgh Districts143 Similarly, in 1839, Horne was not in 
communication with either the candidate or committee for the St Andrews Burghs, as 
‘in Colonel Lindsay and Sir Ralph Anstruther’s absence [he was] at a loss who to 
apply to’.144 Thus, Horne’s reach, and by extension Buccleuch’s influence, was 
restricted by factors including the personnel on the ground and the type of 
constituency in question. While counties and single burghs had reliable contact with 
Horne, the small and dispersed nature of burgh districts seems to have made regular 
communication more difficult. As a landed magnate, Buccleuch was well-placed to 
revitalise the party in the counties, but the breaking of oligarchic monopolies in the 
burghs after 1832 meant that his previous experience of influencing them was now 
unusable. These factors largely account for the lop-sided nature of the party’s 
advances during this period. Interestingly, there is no surviving evidence of electoral 
intelligence passing directly between Horne and Bonham, the information only being 
alluded to by the Duke in his correspondence with the latter.145 While Horne may 
have been, in effect, Scotland’s Bonham, he was firmly subordinate to the Scottish 
party leader, rather than the central electoral apparatus.  
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Buccleuch performed various duties, including the organisation of Scottish 
peerage elections, dispensing political patronage, and advising the Lord Advocate 
and Westminster on policy matters. Nevertheless, most of his attention before 1841 
was concentrated on the electoral side of party activity, which included mediating in 
local disputes and finding candidates for seats. The provision of financial aid across 
Scottish constituencies was by far his most important and effective contribution. His 
willingness to bankroll electioneering to such a generous extent likely strengthened 
his authority – though he was careful to avoid upsetting local interests, the general 
lack of local objections to his widespread activities is notable. Indeed, the 
Conservative county resurgence in the 1837 and 1841 elections can be in large part 
attributed to Buccleuch’s efforts.146 Besides directly securing Midlothian, 
Selkirkshire, Berwickshire, and Roxburghshire, his efforts throughout Scotland led to 
a revitalisation of the party more generally.147 At a time when the definitions of 
‘party’ and ‘leadership’ were ambiguous and subject to change, Buccleuch 
effectively created his own position, and a fairly comprehensive one at that.  
His leadership style did, however, come at a cost – Chapter One illustrates 
that this revitalisation involved the extensive employment of influence and vote-
making. As the largest and wealthiest landowner in Scotland, Buccleuch gained a 
reputation for treating tenants in a generally feudal manner, and for evicting Liberal 
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farmers.148 Indeed, this was a frequent complaint of the non-Conservative press.149 
This likely made him more of a liability than an asset in terms of public opinion 
towards the party.  
Having spent £20,000 on the 1837 election, Buccleuch withdrew abroad in 
late 1838.150 Lord Aberdeen, ‘at the request of the Duke of Wellington and Peel’, 
agreed to ‘take that general charge of Scotch Conservative matters, which the Duke 
of Buccleuch performed so well’.151 Aberdeen’s leadership, however, was of an 
entirely different style to Buccleuch’s.152 He treated the role with disdain, bordering 
on outright contempt. Whereas Buccleuch was an enthusiastic participant in electoral 
business, Aberdeen seems to have cultivated a similar attitude to Peel with regard to 
this area. When discussing whether to introduce his Church bill, he dismissively 
stated that ‘how far this course will affect the political interests of the Conservative 
party in Scotland, I really do not know; and to say the truth, I do not greatly care’.153 
This reflected his priorities, which unquestionably prioritised parliament, policy, and 
governance over partisan and electoral considerations. 
Though Aberdeen stated at the outset that taking on the role had been ‘sorely 
against my inclination’, his correspondence with Hope indicates that he was aware of 
Edinburgh’s municipal politics, as well as electoral affairs in Aberdeen, Banffshire, 
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Moray, Renfrewshire, and Roxburghshire.154 Nevertheless, there is no indication that 
he acted on this knowledge, at least not outside of his local territory in the north-east. 
Aberdeen’s short tenure illustrates a number of issues related to the position of 
Scottish leader. Firstly, with parliament located in Westminster, its primary role was 
electoral, and, to a lesser extent, policy-related. In neglecting the electoral side of the 
position, Aberdeen demonstrated that the role was less influential if only used to 
conduct policy-related business. Secondly, his leadership highlights the extent to 
which Buccleuch was an active, innovative, and effective Scottish leader, a role that 
has hitherto gone almost entirely unrecognised.  
It is unclear when exactly Buccleuch relieved Aberdeen of his burden, but by 
the 1841 election Aberdeen had largely relinquished his former duties. As the fraught 
and closely packed elections of the post-Reform decade subsided after 1841, 
Buccleuch was able to focus more consistently on Scottish policy and governance. In 
the politically charged period leading up to the Disruption, Buccleuch took on a more 
active role in discussing, along with Sir James Graham, the Lord Advocate and 
Solicitor-General, the ‘Poor Laws, Kirk, and other Scotch matters which are 
beginning to be urgent’.155 Buccleuch began to act as a conduit between Graham and 
the Westminster party on one hand, and the Scottish law officers on the other.156 
During the course of the 1840s, he advised Peel on patronage matters more 
frequently, and after 1842 held the positions of Lord Privy Seal and Lord 
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President.157 Moreover, his wife the Duchess became Mistress of the Robes to Queen 
Victoria. Upon the Duke’s death, the Scotsman asserted that, in addition to his 
position as party leader, ‘whenever the Conservatives happened to be in power, he 
occupied the position, without [being] formally recognised in the capacity, of a 
substantially influential Minister for Scotland’.158  
Overall, then, Urwin’s assertion that ‘no great leaders of Scottish 
Conservatism’ had emerged is erroneous, as Buccleuch was far more than a 
‘nominal’ leader and was, behind the scenes, notable.159 He took a close interest in 
all aspects of party activity, encompassing electoral, parliamentary, and 
governmental competencies, making him one of the most active figures of the period. 
Certainly, he was the most active in Scotland, across all political parties. He 
managed to overcome fractious opposition and entrenched localism to position 
himself as the largely uncontested leader of the Scottish Conservative party. In doing 
so, the partial recovery of the party during the 1830s must in large part be attributed 
to him.  
This relatively established state of affairs was, however, brought to an end by 
the party split over Corn Law repeal. Buccleuch, though unenthusiastic about free 
trade, remained loyal to Peel and thus gave up his position as leader of the Scottish 
party.160 Other influential Scottish landowners, including Aberdeen, Dalhousie and 
the Duke of Argyll, also followed Peel – the party lost a disproportionate number of 
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the wealthier Scottish magnates.161 Despite this exodus, a great many of the lesser 
gentry remained resolutely protectionist in outlook, as did a significant proportion of 
the old Conservative electorate. Further, though there was a definite schism north of 
the border, most Scottish Peelites remained, essentially, moderately Conservative in 
outlook – as such, the magnitude of the split should not be overestimated.162  
Because the Scottish party was already in a more precarious state than its 
southern counterpart, the split had a more damaging effect. Apart from the electoral 
influence which Peelite magnates held over their tenants, the loss of their financial 
backing also effectively precluded the party from adopting an expansionist electoral 
strategy.163 Despite this, some Scottish protectionists thought that there was still a 
‘strong party headed by … Lord Eglinton’.164 Eglinton effectively acted as a first 
among equals, in a group which included the Dukes of Hamilton and Montrose.165 
Much like Buccleuch’s initial forays into leadership, Eglinton’s first tentative steps 
towards claiming the position involved communication with the party leadership in 
parliament. He first corresponded with Derby in the August of 1846 on the upcoming 
election of Scottish representative peers. During a time when the loyalties of Scots 
peers were suddenly brought into question, Eglinton informed Derby that ‘if you 
think it advisable I will immediately set about quietly ascertaining who will be the 
most eligible, and who are genuine Conservatives’, if Derby decided to oppose 
Buccleuch’s list. Nevertheless, he evidently thought that his role should be a 
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subordinate one, as ‘the Duke of Richmond is the proper person to take the lead in 
Scotland, though of course I will take all the trouble off his hands’.166  
The Duke of Richmond was generally considered to have been one of the 
leaders of the Scottish party, though there is little evidence to support this 
assertion.167 It is notable that almost no correspondence from him pertaining to the 
Scottish party appears the surviving collections of senior party figures. He did not 
even attempt to influence his own Aberdeenshire tenants, the registration of those on 
his estates being undertaken on his Factor’s own initiative.168 Despite Eglinton’s 
repeated attempts to involve him in the peerage elections, by November he had still 
‘heard nothing from the Duke of Richmond, but I hope he will not leave Scotland 
without coming here’.169 Eventually, Eglinton and Buccleuch agreed not to put 
forward opposing lists for the election of the Sixteen. Instead, Protectionist 
candidates would gradually step in as natural vacancies occurred.170 This suggests 
that the party split in Scotland had been fairly amicable. By 1853, Richmond was 
still reluctant to take an active role, as Eglinton complained that ‘I have nobody to 
consult with – Richmond is at Glenfiddich, and it takes a week at least to get an 
answer from him’.171 After his death in 1860, the sixth Duke became increasingly 
interested in politics, including elections in Aberdeenshire.172 He did not, however, 
rise to a really prominent position in politics until after 1868, becoming the first 
Scottish Secretary in the 1880s. 
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In 1848, Eglinton had expressed a wish to retire as a whip in the Lords, and 
from politics more generally, though he assured Derby that he would stay on until a 
suitable successor could be chosen.173 Though he succeeded in resigning as a whip in 
1849, he continued to act as a prominent Conservative in parliament, and a 
replacement figure to undertake his Scottish duties was never found.174 Perhaps 
symbolically, in 1852 the university students of Glasgow ‘carried their threats into 
effect’ in electing him Lord Rector, in spite of his stated wish to give way to the 
Duke of Argyll.175 It must be said in his favour that, while Buccleuch had never 
enjoyed a positive public reputation, Eglinton benefitted from genuine and 
widespread popularity throughout Scotland. His famous tournament of 1839 had 
greatly endeared him to the country, jump-started his political career, and won the 
confidence of Derby.176 Though he evidently wished to give up the position, Eglinton 
did not complain about the situation, or shirk his (more limited) duties.177 There is, 
however, no surviving record of whether he continued to perform the role during the 
periods in which he acted as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, in 1852 and 1858–9. 
His influence over electoral affairs was extensive in his native Ayrshire, and 
the course of politics there was in many ways characteristic of the relationship 
between Eglintonian Scottish Conservatives and the Scots Peelites. During the 1847 
election, Eglinton was more than willing to reach out to the sitting Peelite member, 
Alexander Oswald, in the hope of healing divisions in the party. However, by the 
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election of 1852, Oswald was out of the running, and a replacement Derbyite 
candidate, James Hunter Blair, sought to avoid the free trade issue in the hope of 
healing local party rifts – his opponent, Edward Cardwell, nevertheless gained the 
support of both Peelites and Liberals.178 The by-election of 1854, however, 
illustrated that the Liberal-Peelite alliance was weak, and viewed by Liberals as a 
short-term agreement – indeed, the Derbyite James Fergusson won partly because the 
local Liberals had split over the issue of whether to support the Peelite Oswald. By 
this point, Oswald had moved too far outside of the orbit of Scottish conservatism, 
whereas others, such as local landowner, Lord Glasgow, continued to be considered 
‘party men at heart, who could still return to the fold’.179 The nature of the division 
between Derbyites and Peelites often depended on local circumstances, but there 
were some factors which operated on a national level.  
From the outset, the Scottish Conservatives were in a less secure position 
than the English party, as Scots Peelites possessed a slight majority of seats over out-
and-out Protectionists in 1847.180 Lord Advocate Duncan McNeill, having voted for 
free trade, informed Peel that ‘we have nowhere as yet any contest between the two 
sections of the Conservative party nor do I expect any such contest’, and cheerfully 
added that ‘In several places Whigs and other kinds of Liberals are fighting against 
each other. This is the case in Glasgow – Greenock – Elgin Borough and Orkney’.181 
The ingrained instinct of both factions was to avoid damaging rivalries. This ensured 
that, with the exception of a few seats such as Roxburghshire and the Haddington 
Burghs, the Liberals were not initially able to take advantage of the situation. The 
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election resulted in a slight drop in Conservative representatives from twenty-two to 
twenty-one, though twelve were Free Traders and only nine were Protectionists.182 
Throughout the 1850s, there were continued efforts by both sides to bring 
about a ‘cordial union of Conservatives of all shades’ in Scotland.183 More generally, 
Peelites throughout the UK continued to use the label ‘Conservative’, and retained 
their membership of the Carlton Club, which does much to disprove the theory that 
Peelites were part of a broad Liberal movement.184 This was particularly true in 
Scotland, given its unique circumstances. Scottish Liberals, enjoying a particularly 
strong position, were far less willing to ally with Peelites on a local level. 
Correspondingly, the weak position of both Peelites and Conservatives in many cases 
forced cooperation through sheer necessity. As Gerald Warner put it, ‘Scottish Tories 
had learned long ago that they must hang together or they would hang separately’.185  
The case of the Midlothian Protectionist Society illustrates the nature of this 
cooperation on an organisational level – the local MP, Sir John Hope, was a 
Protectionist, as were most of the local gentry.186 Reports of a steep decline in his 
health spurred the formation of a Midlothian Protectionist Society, which sought to 
ensure that any successor candidate would not be a Free Trader.187 Despite an 
acrimonious dispute between hard-line Protectionist elements led by Sir William 
Drummond, Peelite grandees, and those of all shades in-between, the row was kept 
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strictly confidential.188 Drummond’s main crime, in the opinion of Sir John Hope, 
was to be ‘blindingly unacquainted with the quiet feeling of the Conservative 
interest’.189 This interest was very broadly constituted, as Hope was supported by 
both avowed Peelites and committed Protectionists. He was persuaded, despite his 
age and poor health, to continue in office.190 The local unity between different 
Conservative factions was thus maintained, and uncompromising Protectionists side-
lined, all of which was achieved without a single mention of the row in the press.  
The Scottish Peelites declined rapidly from the mid-1850s onwards. Though 
this decline was by no means uniform across Scotland, by 1857 the Scots Peelites 
had generally disappeared in a parliamentary sense. Though some MPs continued to 
be, in a broad sense, ‘Independent’ Conservatives, the few remaining local Peelite-
Protectionist conflicts had been extinguished.191 It is notable that the Scots Peelites, 
having begun in a relatively stronger position than their English counterparts, faded 
faster from the parliamentary scene. Also notable is the lack of movement by Scots 
Peelites towards Liberalism, though some magnates, such as the eighth Duke of 
Argyll and Earl of Glasgow, and no doubt many voters, did drift in that direction.192 
The majority of English Peelite MPs moved back towards Derby.193 Despite the 
questionable allegiance of a few other Scottish MPs, the only member to explicitly 
move towards Palmerstonianism was Lord Elcho.194  
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During this period, the Scottish Conservatives were by no means inactive in 
promoting Protectionism. By 1850, steps had been taken to form a Scottish 
Protective Association, with the Duke of Montrose as President and Eglinton as 
Vice-President.195 Some of the gentlemen connected with this Association were 
involved in the formation of the Midlothian Protectionist Society. It was affiliated 
with the National Association for the Protection of British Industry and Capital, 
which existed between 1849 and 1853 – Sir William Drummond acted as the Scottish 
delegate to a meeting of this body, held in London in May 1850.196  
These efforts, however, were largely ineffective – despite his personal 
enthusiasm for the issue, John Blackwood informed Eglinton that ‘There is a certain 
degree of apathy and down-heartedness abroad among the supporters of Protection at 
present’, and that a planned Edinburgh demonstration in November would be of little 
use, as ‘it is not so clear that our broadside would be loud enough to tell amid the 
general silence throughout the country’.197 Despite these misgivings, Eglinton asked 
Derby to attend, and to bring Disraeli and Granby, in order to ‘give it the appearance 
of a national demonstration’.198 It was thought that such an event would have the 
additional benefit of re-energising the party throughout Scotland, both ideologically 
and organisationally: ‘[in order to] set the country societies again in motion, it 
appears to me that some declaration from our leaders would be the best course’.199 
Despite there being sufficient local interest in Edinburgh for it to go ahead, the event 
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was cancelled, ‘as such a demonstration, held in the metropolis of Scotland, ought to 
bear a national character … neither the time or the state of public feeling admitted of 
its being triumphantly carried out’.200 There were Protectionist meetings, dinners, 
and deputations at places such as Edinburgh and Haddington, but generally the lack 
of activities throughout Scotland reflected the slow decline of Protection as a pivotal 
question.201 Protectionism was not a sufficiently popular issue around which to 
rebuild the party throughout Scotland.202  
The widespread malaise affecting the Scottish party extended to its wider 
activities. While a limited attempt was made to challenge the Liberals in 1852, by the 
election of 1859 the party put up a contest in only four opposition-held seats, and 
only six in 1865. This is partly due to the entrenchment of local majorities through 
long-term registration activity, and because the frenetic activity of the 1830s was the 
result of extraordinary conditions.203 Nevertheless, it must be noted that the loss of 
Buccleuch as the leader (and, perhaps more importantly, financier) of the Scottish 
party effectively precluded it from making any electoral attacks on a national 
basis.204 Eglinton, while influential in a few seats in the west, was not a large or 
extremely wealthy magnate. He does not appear to have extended financial support 
for electoral contests beyond his immediate sphere of influence.  
This was certainly not due to parsimony, as he spent between £30,000 and 
£40,000 on the Eglinton tournament in 1839, and was famously extravagant when 
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, spending an estimated £50,000 on entertainment during 
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his first period in office alone.205 Rather, the lack of electoral activity during 
Eglinton’s tenure suggests that while he was, in a nominal sense, the leading Scottish 
Conservative, he did not consider it to be his primary political role. His parallel and 
overlapping roles in Ireland, and as a prominent party member in the Lords, were his 
most important responsibilities. He was sufficiently involved in the UK 
organisational apparatus to take responsibility for organising a dinner in honour of 
chief UK electoral organiser William Jolliffe, to recognise his ‘invaluable services to 
our party’.206 Eglinton was, however, less active in Scotland than Jolliffe was in 
England, in terms of organising election activity. Though Jolliffe’s apparatus did 
peripherally concern itself with Scottish activities, it mainly concentrated on English 
and Irish boroughs after 1853.207 
Perhaps reflecting his prominent position in the parliamentary party, Eglinton 
did not attempt to continue Buccleuch’s role in Scottish constituency politics. Rather, 
he concentrated on limited Protection-related activities, the promotion of discrete 
projects, such as the short-lived NAVSR, and on distributing political patronage 
during the short periods when Derby was in office. He also continued to manage the 
election and whipping of the Scottish representative peers into at least the mid-1850s. 
His formal position as an assistant whip was revealing – lacking the wealth, 
influence, and independence of Buccleuch, Eglinton was more subordinate to the 
central party apparatus. Because of this, the ability of the Scottish party to act 
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independently on a national level was curtailed – as Eglinton himself put it to Derby 
from the beginning of his tenure, ‘I wait for my orders’.208 The early Protectionist 
party, deprived of Bonham, had only an amateur electoral and parliamentary 
organisation, whipped by an uninspiring William Beresford, who played a non-
existent role in organising the 1852 election.209 Jolliffe gradually rebuilt the English 
electoral organisation, and made some (limited and occasional) efforts to fill the 
vacuum left in Scotland by Buccleuch. Despite having no identifiable pre-existing 
connections to Scotland, he corresponded with the local magnates of Lanarkshire to 
secure the by-election candidacy of Alexander Baillie-Cochrane.210 
Eglinton was therefore more of a leader of the Conservative party in 
Scotland, rather than leader of the Scottish Conservative party. His position was 
nevertheless unchallenged, in stark contrast to Buccleuch’s long struggle to 
overcome rival factions. This was likely because no-one wished to take on the role 
during a period of wider Conservative inactivity. His widespread popularity among 
the Scottish people and respected position in the party hierarchy must not, however, 
be discounted as contributory factors.  
The death of Eglinton in 1861 once again left the party with a gap to fill. His 
funeral, attracting ‘a very large attendance of his friends and tenants, and of the 
country people’, was considered by Lord Colville to be a testament to his widespread 
popularity.211 Colville, a whip, performed what had been Eglinton’s role in managing 
the election of the Sixteen, but he was not a leader in Scotland in any sense. Though 
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he was, by this time, a long-serving chief whip for Derby in the Lords, he possessed 
no landed base in Scotland. This was true in a very literal sense – he owned no 
country house, and spent parliamentary recesses residing offshore on a yacht.212 
Scottish business was henceforth conducted by a number of middling peers and MPs 
in safe seats, described by Hanham as ‘respectable lairds but nothing more’.213 The 
overall decline in party activities and vibrancy was further exacerbated by this 
leadership vacuum.  
By 1864, Philip Rose, the Conservative election manager, could confidently 
tell Derby that there was ‘never was a time in the history of the Conservative party 
when it was so thoroughly organised as at present’, due to ‘the continuous 
communications kept up during the last few years with our local representatives 
through the Kingdom’.214 Though central organisation was reaching north of the 
border to an increasing extent, contact with Scotland was limited at best. The party in 
London was well aware of this problem; Derby lamented the abysmal performance 
of the Scottish party in the 1865 elections, attributing it to arrogance combined with a 
lack of effort.215 This was perhaps why he made repeated efforts to convince 
Buccleuch to resume his previous role.216  
Buccleuch maintained a cordial correspondence with Derby from at least the 
late 1840s onwards.217 He gradually moved back towards the Derbyite Conservative 
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party over this period. Moreover, he had always used his influence to head off 
potential confrontations between Peelites and Protectionists, in both elections of 
representative peers and parliamentary contests: ‘I think it is of great importance that 
some understanding should be come to upon that subject … a Conservative should 
not oppose a Protectionist and vice versa solely upon the grounds of their own 
differences of opinion’.218 Though he had been a general supporter of Aberdeen’s 
government, he had refused repeated attempts by Lord Aberdeen to bring him into 
the administration, first as Master of the Horse, then as Keeper of the Great Seal of 
Scotland, despite these being purely symbolic positions involving no 
responsibility.219 Indeed, he informed Eglinton that when it came to candidates, he 
would generally ‘support the best man without reference to which section of the 
Conservative party he belongs to, and if possible to prevent a split’.220  
After 1855, his position changed substantially, as he once again involved 
himself in the promotion of the Scottish Conservative press.221 During Derby’s 
1858–9 administration he again refused office, stating that he would ‘never again 
[agree] to undertake any office of any kind in any government that might be 
formed’.222 Despite frequent attempts to entice him back into politics, he remained 
steadfast.223 However, he did agree to pass on election data from the south of 
Scotland in early 1859, and advised Derby on Scottish patronage and government 
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appointments, including the posts of the Lord Advocate and Solicitor-General.224 He 
appears to have volunteered his services more often in the wake of Eglinton’s death, 
corresponding with Derby on Scottish legislation and offering ‘unofficially to give 
you [Derby] all the information and assistance in my power upon political matters in 
Scotland’.225 Confidentiality was perhaps necessary – by this point, Buccleuch was 
‘old and discredited’, mistrusted by many Conservatives for his decade-long 
prevarication, and his reputation was damaged by the conversion of his wife to 
Roman Catholicism – this all ‘put an end to his influence in the north’, except in 
areas where he was a significant proprietor.226 Though he once again became a 
prominent Scottish Conservative in terms of backroom political activities, Buccleuch 
was neither able nor willing to take up his former role.  
Overall, the Scottish Conservative party possessed a series of leaders (or 
leading figures) between 1832 and 1868. Given its informal nature, the scope and 
influence of the role was largely dependent on the characteristics of the leader in 
question, and the state of the broader party. The Duke of Buccleuch took on this role 
initially, carving for himself a significant niche which brought him much influence 
within Scotland, and eventual status in the parliamentary party. After 1846, the Earl 
of Eglinton took on this role, but to a far lesser extent. His role was more one of a 
first among equals, and his influence in Scotland was more popular than electoral. 
After 1861, the party no longer boasted even a first among equals. Responsibility for 
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necessary duties devolved on a range of minor figures. This meant that any 
additional native activity which might have benefitted the party on a national level 
was out of the question.  
 
 
IV. Organisation and Leadership in Decline 
 
The state of the party after the 1865 election, the last before the Second Reform Acts, 
was similar in many ways to its state in 1832 – in disarray, bereft of leadership, and 
with a listless and demoralised membership. Yet, much like the early 1830s, signs of 
a limited recovery were evident in the years leading up to 1868. This internal 
rejuvenation was, however, almost entirely without external effect, at least on a 
purely electoral level – in winning a mere six seats in 1868, the party had performed 
worse than it did in 1832, and remained a socially exclusive body.227 Indeed, of these 
six, only Donald Cameron of Lochiel and Sir Graham Graham-Montgomery were 
not heirs to a peerage.228 Much like in the 1830s, activity in the cities of Edinburgh 
and Glasgow played a prominent role in this partial revival of activity. Moreover, the 
intervention of a central party leader – in this case Disraeli – was crucial in both 
stimulating this renewal and limiting it. 
This, however, was where similarities ceased. Disraeli’s intervention, this 
time in Edinburgh rather than Glasgow, ran into many of the same problems which 
had held back Edinburgh-based conservatism for decades. Its narrow support base 
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was composed of the landed and upper professional classes. The landed classes were 
more concerned with protecting their crumbling county powerbases than in nurturing 
the embryonic (or, rather, resurrected) phenomena of urban and working-class 
conservatism. The professionals, mainly Advocates, were as unpopular as ever 
among the wider electorate.  
Glasgow-based conservatism, having long-since lost its broader base and 
connections with the central party was, if anything, more traditionally aristocratic 
than it had been thirty years before. Despite these drawbacks, and their attendant 
electoral consequences, locally inspired efforts there did inspire a partial recovery in 
the subsequent election of 1874.229 Disraeli had not been much involved with 
Scottish affairs in the 1850s, either directly or through the English electoral 
apparatus. This was perhaps because of his cool relationship with Jolliffe. Indeed, 
when Jolliffe had initially been offered the UK electoral management role, he had 
indicated that he would only accept it if he was explicitly regarded as Derby’s 
appointee.230 By the mid-1860s, however, Disraeli seems to have taken an interest in 
the Scottish party on his own initiative, having written to Sir Graham Graham-
Montgomery to ascertain the state of the party north of the border.231  
Whether the original impetus came from London or from Edinburgh, 
Disraeli’s attendance at a banquet in Edinburgh celebrating the new English Reform 
Act was a welcome event for both Scottish and Westminster sections of the party. It 
was chaired by William Stirling and attended by around 1,200 prominent Scottish 
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Conservatives.232 As such, it was the largest and most important Conservative event 
to have taken place in Scotland since Peel’s 1837 Glasgow dinner. Much like the 
Second Scottish Reform Act, the significance of the Edinburgh banquet has been 
generally overlooked.  
As ever, the interconnections between municipal and national politics 
threatened to hamper the effects of the occasion. Disraeli was to be offered the 
freedom of the city, but the complex factional composition of the Town Council led 
to it being simultaneously offered to John Bright. This was not only to ‘keep up an 
appearance of approval of what are called “liberal principles”’, but also ‘to spite the 
Whigs’.233 Another correspondent thought that, interestingly, ‘The Whigs will be far 
more angry at the Freedom being conferred on the latter [Bright] than on the former 
[Disraeli]’.234 The timing of the visit also bolstered the attention paid to the banquet. 
Taking place after the passing of the English bill but before the Scottish, the Bright 
ploy may have been an attempt to extort additional Scottish seats from Disraeli in the 
upcoming redistribution, as ‘a refusal to attend would be almost certain to cause 
great offence not only here but in other municipal bodies in Scotland’.235  
Bright’s absence from Scotland meant that this potentially embarrassing 
incident was avoided, but it underlined the fact that Disraeli was travelling to 
partially hostile territory. Though they had no hope of parliamentary success, 
Conservatives controlled around a third of the Town Council, illustrating that this 
hostility was far from universal – there was still a significant minority of 
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conservative support in the Scottish burghs, despite it appearing, on the surface, to be 
barren ground for the party. Indeed, a Scottish Conservative informed Disraeli that 
while he would have been pessimistic about Conservative prospects three weeks 
prior to his writing, ‘the movement has spread and is spreading’, as Conservative 
Agents were fielding numerous inquiries, and Conservative lecturers were in demand 
because ‘The People ask for them – their meetings are crowded – have had to send 
two more gentlemen, and yet, the demand is for more’.236  
Disraeli himself wanted to speak at a working-class meeting, and made 
arrangements to do so. Unfortunately, having arranged the timing of this without 
taking advice from Edinburgh, the planning turned into something of a fiasco, with 
the main organiser in Edinburgh claiming that ‘had this affair not been proclaimed 
from Lands’ End to John O’Groats, I would at once have thrown it up’, but that 
cancelling the event would result in ‘ridicule and indignation’.237 The meeting was 
set for 6pm, which it was thought would result in a poor turnout and cause offence to 
potential attendees. This incident was illustrative of the general effect of the Scottish 
visit – almost successful, but essentially a missed opportunity.  
Despite rumblings of a broader popular enthusiasm, the guest-list for the 
dinner was restricted to the socially exclusive ranks of aristocratic Scottish 
conservatism, with a limited smattering of upper middle-class professionals.238 Peel’s 
dinner, though hierarchical, had included a broad variety of social groups – Disraeli’s 
was very much in the traditional mould. Similarly, his speech was somewhat 
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disappointing. While Peel’s was a landmark occasion, appealing to new groups in 
Scotland while also espousing a strong message which resonated throughout the UK, 
Disraeli’s was focused more on personal advantage than political outreach. Though 
there was significant hope of extra seats for Scotland, he avoided this topic. Instead, 
he spent most of his speech claiming principal credit for the party’s embrace of 
moderate parliamentary reform, obscuring the central role played by Derby in this.239 
Disraeli received a long and detailed set of memoranda containing suggestions on 
Scottish speech topics prepared for him by Archibald Campbell Swinton, a 
prominent Edinburgh Conservative lawyer. Despite this, he focused on English 
Reform (and his role in it) for the first three-quarters of his speech.240 The final 
Scottish Act, passed shortly after his visit, gave no extra seats to Scotland, other than 
those which had already been promised. 
Nevertheless, the visit did have some limited effects in Scotland. Much like 
Peel’s visit, Disraeli’s spurred the creation of new Conservative organisations – in 
this case, the Scottish National Constitutional Association. Given Disraeli’s wary 
attitude towards later UK organisational innovations, however, it is unclear how 
much of a direct role he played in its inception.241 It was, anyway, a largely 
ineffective organisation dominated, unsurprisingly, by lawyers.242 Its role in the 1868 
election was largely peripheral, as it offered help in only an advisory capacity, and 
lacked any institutional means to encourage local parties to participate. Nevertheless, 
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this body represented the first serious attempt to form a national organisation since 
1835, and was a precursor of more effective Scottish bodies.243 More broadly, 
Disraeli’s visit to Scotland showed the party that their electorally subordinate 
position was not inescapable.244 A sense was imbued that sustained and long-term 
action could improve the party’s prospects. 
The banquet did not, however, spur immediate action in Edinburgh – no 
Conservative candidate was put up for the 1868 election, and the party did not 
contest the city until 1874. The 1868 election was, however, the first contest since 
1852 in which the Glasgow Conservatives put up a candidate and, moreover, made 
strenuous efforts to get him elected. It was thought that the old Glasgow-Edinburgh 
rivalry might mar the Disraeli banquet, as there continued to be ‘a jealousy between 
the two cities’, but an Edinburgh deputation ‘went to Glasgow … to engage the 
gentlemen of that city to take part’, with ‘most favourable’ results.245 Several 
prominent Glasgow Conservatives attended the dinner, and it is notable that 
Disraeli’s 1873 speech in Glasgow upon his election as Lord Rector of the university 
was a much more successful occasion.246 Throughout the nineteenth century it seems, 
Glasgow was a more auspicious location for Conservative activity.  
The new electorate in Glasgow enfranchised by the Second Reform Act 
changed the electoral framework, and challenged both Conservatives and Liberals in 
the city. As the booming commercial centre of Scotland, the largest group of new 
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electors were incomers to the city from the rest of Scotland.247 The Conservatives 
made renewed attempts to meet the challenge – first notice of the impending 
formation of the Glasgow Workingmen’s Conservative Association came during the 
1868 election itself, and it was formally established at a rally in January 1869.248 Its 
rapid and successful expansion after this suggests that it might have greatly aided 
election efforts if established earlier. Much like the avidly Protestant nature of the 
old Glasgow Operative Association, an upswing in Orange activities boosted its 
growth. However, this was not the main driver of the Association; rather, issues such 
as the teaching of the bible in schools and promotion of the Established Church were 
of greater importance.249  
Although working-class organisation came too late for the election, there was 
a Glasgow Constitutional Association, composed of traditional Conservatives and 
some moderate Liberals, who, after much prevarication, chose Sir George Campbell 
of Garscube to stand.250 It is interesting to note that two of their other possible 
choices, Sir Archibald Alison, 2nd Bt, and Colonel Campbell of Blythswood, were 
descendants of two of the most prominent Glasgow Conservatives in the 1830s.  
Campbell of Garscube, despite possessing a promising local reputation as a 
local landowner and decorated veteran of Balaclava, had few other positive traits. 
His speeches were rambling, incoherent, and badly delivered. Moreover, having only 
been chosen as candidate at the last minute, he fared poorly when questioned on the 
issues of the day.251 Despite this, the party campaigned aggressively and in an 
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organised fashion during the election period – seven meetings were held in four 
weeks, and regular advertisements appeared in the press. These meetings were more 
than two of the three Liberal candidates had managed to organise, and no Liberal 
candidate was in a position to release a complete list of their election committees and 
supporters.252  
The results of their campaign were disappointing, as despite the constituency 
now possessing three seats, Campbell of Garscube came in fourth. The result was 
nevertheless suggestive – their last serious attempt at the city, in 1841, had garnered 
roughly a third of voters. Garscube garnered over twenty-five per cent of the voters 
in 1868, indicating that a robust base of Conservative voters continued to exist in 
Glasgow.253 Further, this electoral base was largely unaffected by the substantial 
extension of the franchise. Not only was there a solid Conservative vote in the city, 
but that vote was also partly made up of the newly enfranchised. Finally, almost 
ninety per cent of the Conservative vote came from plumpers, rather than Liberals 
splitting their votes – one estimate suggested that as many as 3,000 of the 10,000 
Garscube voters were working-class voters who had not split their votes.254  
The Glasgow contest reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of Scottish 
conservatism as a whole. In choosing a mediocre candidate from the landed gentry, 
the party showed that it was still insufficiently aware of the potential strength of 
urban conservatism. Nevertheless, the election demonstrated the existence of a solid 
proportion of public opinion which was sympathetic to the party. Their local efforts 
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were rewarded in 1874, when they won a Glasgow seat for the first time since the era 
of the Clyde Burghs in 1821. More broadly, there was a body of Scottish opinion that 
was disposed towards conservatism, not only in the counties, but also in the cities. In 
order to access it, and to expand upon it, new personnel, more effective national 
organisation, stronger leadership, and the emergence of new issues and ideologies 
were required. The right combination of these were, however, not to be achieved 





In conclusion, the national organisation, leadership, and activity of the Scottish 
Conservative party underwent a series of transformations between 1832 and 1868. 
The negotiations surrounding the foundation of the Edinburgh Conservative Club 
illustrate that internal party relations were far from harmonious. A publicly unified 
façade concealed a number of separate but overlapping factions, which alternated 
between cooperation and conflict. Divisions included those between larger magnates, 
minor gentry, and lawyers. The most damaging split, however, was between the old 
pre-Reform Tories, headed by the Hope clique, and the newly ascendant county 
potentates, headed by the Duke of Buccleuch. Despite the impressive level of local 
organisation achieved (as explored in Chapter One), it is clear that internal divisions 
prevented the party from progressing on a national level after 1832.  
                                                          




However, the Edinburgh Club debacle does highlight several significant 
themes. First, the fact that the club was generally supported by so many illustrates 
that the Scottish party was thought sufficiently distinctive to merit a separate 
territorial headquarters. More than a mere Conservative regional section, the Scottish 
Conservative party was a discrete entity. Second, there was a strong and committed 
appetite to develop a complex and wide-ranging national organisation, which far 
exceeded the ambitions of even the party managers in the Carlton Club. There still 
remained many in the Scottish and British party who retained ideological objections 
to such extra-parliamentary organisation. Nevertheless, those who held such opinions 
seem to have been markedly peripheral in the Scottish party. The prevailing belief 
north of the border was that such activity was necessary – unpalatable perhaps, but 
essential, given the particularly hostile Scottish electoral landscape. As such, the 
overall case of the Edinburgh Conservative Club has the potential to impact on future 
scholarship relating to the wider British age of ‘club government’.  
The failure of efforts in Edinburgh led to a focus on the promotion of a 
Glasgow-centred liberal conservatism, beginning with Peel’s dinner and lasting until 
just after the 1841 election. Though short-lived, this focus involved close cooperation 
and communication with a range of senior UK party figures, bringing into question 
the assertion that Scotland was neglected by the wider Conservative party. Moreover, 
the promising advances made there, though wrecked by the Church crisis, show that 
there was a significant potential base of Conservative support in Scotland’s industrial 
centre. This base was not successfully tapped into until much later in the century, but 




In the absence of a consistently receptive urban centre for conservatism, the 
party found itself trapped in its county strongholds, led by the Duke of Buccleuch. 
Though not able to break his party out of the counties, Buccleuch was in many ways 
a remarkable leader. The short and ineffectual tenure of Lord Aberdeen as interim 
leader only serves to throw this into greater relief. He concerned himself with 
electoral politics across the country in almost all aspects, managed the peers’ 
elections, advised on patronage and appointments, had a significant say in policy 
matters, and represented Scotland actively in both the Lords and cabinet. As such, he 
was one of the most active and effective party leaders of his era. Because, however, 
most of his efforts were for the territorial party, rather than on a parliamentary level, 
his significant contributions have been almost entirely overlooked.  
The relative efficacy of Buccleuch was again highlighted by the performance 
of his successor, Lord Eglinton. Though he had far less claim to the leadership of the 
Scottish Protectionists than Buccleuch did the old Scottish Conservatives, he was the 
de facto leader of the Scottish party. Eglinton performed many duties in succession 
to Buccleuch, including advising on policy, patronage and appointments, publicly 
promoting issues such as Protection, and managing the peers’ elections. His focus 
was also, however, more explicitly on Westminster and on Irish politics, his Scottish 
role being a subordinate consideration. Indeed, given his broader social position, he 
was more subordinate to the central party hierarchy than Buccleuch had been. 
Crucially, he did not, and perhaps could not, handle electoral business in the same 
way. Moreover, his attempts to promote conservatism through other bodies, such as 
the NAVSR, were largely unsuccessful. These were all contributory factors to the 




well as could be expected considering the wider political situation. He was a 
competent and stable central figure during a period when the UK party as a whole 
spent most of its time in opposition.  
The necessity of his work was highlighted by his death in 1861, after which 
the Scottish party was left without even a nominal leading figure. It is likely no 
coincidence that the party’s electoral decline intensified after his demise. Derby 
relied on some of the few remaining MPs, minor lairds, and a partially reconciled 
Buccleuch to deal with Scottish matters on an ad hoc basis. At this time, Disraeli 
began to take an increasing interest in Scottish affairs, suggesting that native vitality 
had been all but exhausted.  
Disraeli’s 1868 Edinburgh banquet was in many ways a missed opportunity. 
If executed more carefully, it might have sparked a similar effect to Peel’s 1837 
Glasgow banquet. It was, however, held in still-factionalised Edinburgh, restricted to 
Conservative social elites, and marred by internal miscommunications. Moreover, 
the speech was not of the same significance as Peel’s, focusing mostly on England 
and offering no concessions to Scotland in the upcoming Scottish Reform Act. 
Nevertheless, the dinner itself does seem to have resulted in additional intra-party 
communication and activity in Scotland, and the formation of the first national 
organisation since the demise of the Edinburgh Conservative Club. The strenuous 
efforts made in Glasgow, though not fruitful, were indicative of a revived spirit. 
Overall, the national leadership of the Scottish party had a pronounced effect 
on the organisation and activity managed throughout the period. Organisational 
efforts were, in many ways, abortive and ineffective. By the contemporary standards 
of the era, however, they were impressive, functioning fairly well in spite of (or 
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perhaps because of) their poor prospects north of the border. Organisation, 
leadership, and activity on a national level between 1832 and 1868 were 
characterised by initial innovation and potential, followed by overall decline, but 




CHAPTER THREE: PARLIAMENT, LOCAL AND NATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE, AND THE BRITISH CONTEXT 
 
The Scottish Conservative party relied heavily on native leadership, activity, and 
organisation, especially before the 1850s. Nevertheless, the role played by the wider 
party outside of Scotland was also significant, and became more so towards the end 
of the period. The Scottish party existed not in parallel, but within the broader UK 
Conservative party. Further, the essential function of ‘party’ in this period must be 
kept in mind; the party’s core purpose was to achieve predominance in the House of 
Commons, which would then allow its members to govern Scotland and the UK.1 
English and Scottish politics were generally ‘meshed together’, whereas Irish politics 
were more separate.2 The core role played by parliament meant that a great deal of 
Scottish party business necessarily took place outside of Scotland.  
In addition to this, the actual governance of Scotland involved a confusing 
and constantly evolving jumble of institutions and figures across Scottish and British 
levels. At a local level, the terrain featured overlapping elected and appointed 
municipal bodies, sheriffs and other judicial institutions, and specialist local boards, 
such as the Poor Law authorities. Above this, the Lord Advocate and Solicitor-
General managed much of the day-to-day and long-term national business, in 
conjunction with specialist central boards. Finally, providing the legislative 
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underpinnings to these institutions and roles, and resolving the significant political 
questions of the day, was the responsibility of parliament.3  
Though most day-to-day governance took place in Scotland on a local level, 
the party’s input was greatest at national levels, in Edinburgh and London. This 
activity was primarily undertaken by figures with strong Westminster and Whitehall 
connections. Because the party was quite closely integrated across the United 
Kingdom, it follows that, to some extent, the Scottish Conservative party was not 
geographically restricted to Scotland. Various figures who were based outside of 
Scotland had a claim to membership of (and influence over) the Scottish party. This 
was despite often possessing weakened or tenuous Scottish connections.  
This chapter will explore the various ways in which the Scottish Conservative party 
operated in a wider British and governmental context, situating native Scottish 
activity within an integrated framework of parliamentary party politics and 
local/national governance. First, it will examine the role of the Scottish contingents 
in party affairs at Westminster, touching on how the unique legislative needs of 
Scotland were handled. It will then uncover the party’s role in the governance of 
Scotland, including the appointment of local and national personnel, and how the 
responsibility for various areas of governance shifted between different people and 
institutions. The interest and activity of central party leaders in relation to Scotland 
and the Scottish party will then be explored. Finally, it will touch on less prominent 
party members who, despite not residing in Scotland or representing Scottish seats, 
constituted a disparate but identifiable Scottish party in exile.  
 
                                                          




I. Scottish Conservatives at Westminster 
 
Scottish Conservative MPs and peers were firmly embedded within the wider UK 
parliamentary system. Nevertheless, they were also, in some ways, distinctive and 
separate. During a period when the reach of party machinery within Westminster 
waxed and waned, this distinctiveness was subject to change over time. Some 
aspects, however, were more consistent – for one, when parliament considered 
passing a bill of direct relevance to Scotland, it was felt to be important that it had 
substantial support from Scottish MPs. This held true of both parties, such as in 
1853, when the Earl of Aberdeen’s Lord Advocate updated him on a Scottish 
measure which had passed ‘by a majority which included two thirds Scotch 
members … the proposition was accepted by a large majority and by thirty-six to 
seven of the Scotch members’.4 The Scotsman could declare confidently that same 
year that all of Scotland knew that no Scottish measure had ever been passed when a 
majority of native members were opposed to it.5 It was rare for governments to press 
on in the face of combined opposition from Scottish MPs.6 MPs from other parts of 
the UK did, on occasion, block Scottish legislation which had majority Scots support, 
such as the School Establishment (Scotland) bill; the issue of religious instruction 
had struck an uneasy chord among MPs from other parts of the UK.7  
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When party politics was factored into this, it could further stymie legislative 
efforts; if a bill was treated as a party matter, it stood a very good chance of being 
defeated. As such, before pushing through significant legislation, successive 
governments up the 1880s looked for broadly bipartisan opinion emanating from 
Scotland. Indeed, the three Scottish Education Bills proposed between 1854 and 
1865 were defeated despite each having the support of a majority of Scots members.8 
Given these circumstances, it was of paramount necessity for Scottish MPs to meet, 
both within and across party lines, in order to achieve consensus before legislation 
reached the floor of the House. Meetings were also likely to be needed during the 
passage of bills, as the scant parliamentary time assigned to Scottish legislation 
meant that debates needed to be as short as possible. This need was evident from the 
very beginning of the period; for instance, the debating time allotted for the Scottish 
Reform bill was merely a single hour late at night, as opposed to seven days reserved 
for its English equivalent.9  
After 1832, party meetings were held more frequently to allow for more 
discussion between backbenchers and the leadership – the idea of party consultation 
eventually grew out of this.10 Scottish Conservative MPs were, of course, involved in 
these all-UK party meetings, but it is important to note that separate meetings of 
Scottish MPs did occur, concerned with specifically Scottish issues, such as in 1842: 
‘As I understand, that there is to be a meeting of the Conservative Scotch members at 
Sir Robert Peel’s tomorrow, the course to be adopted by the Government has, of 
course, been decided on’.11 This meeting took place at Peel’s residence; other 
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meetings of the UK party more generally were held at various other houses, the 
Carlton Club, and other locations. 
Given Peel’s preference for small meetings of interested parties and debaters 
over more general assemblies, Scottish meetings were likely preferred over larger 
gatherings.12 Unfortunately, evidence of these meetings in surviving papers is sparse, 
and no minutes appear to have been taken. As such, the frequency of such meetings 
and the issues discussed in them unfortunately remain a matter of speculation. It may 
well be that the lack of evidence generated or retained was somewhat intentional. 
Apart from anything else, the Conservative party as a whole was invested in 
maintaining parliament as the single centre of legislative activity for the entire UK. 
Moreover, within this parliamentary context, ‘party’ was itself neither static or 
rigidly defined. Such meetings may have been an occasional necessity, but such 
territoriality in a formal and public sense was not to be excessively encouraged. It is 
likely that meetings were held only when necessary, and not encouraged as a matter 
of course. Nevertheless, these meetings were almost certainly important occasions 
for Scottish (and, indeed, Welsh and Irish) members, as they could focus on a larger 
variety of ‘local interest’ concerns, often involving private bills, without the 
interference of English MPs.13 
The distinctive nature of Scottish Conservative MPs was also recognised in 
terms of whipping. English MPs were dealt with by figures such as Lord Rosslyn, 
Hardinge, and Granville Somerset, as well as the whips. Sir George Clerk served as 
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MP for Edinburghshire from 1835 to 1837 and Stamford from 1838 to 1847. He also 
acted as a whip, and chief whip, for Peel during and in-between his administrations 
(though not during the brief period when he was out of parliament).14 In addition to 
his ordinary duties, he also took specific care of the Scottish members, just as 
Frederick Shaw (MP for Dublin University) did for Ireland. This indicates that much 
of the work of whipping was assisted by dividing up responsibilities along informal 
territorial lines.15  
Though by no means considered to be a separate species of MP, Scots were 
recognised by the party apparatus as a distinctive subspecies. Clerk, as a 
longstanding Scottish MP, was the obvious choice to manage the Scottish contingent. 
He possessed an in-depth knowledge of Scottish issues and close personal 
relationships with many fellow Scots members – Clerk had first been elected for 
Edinburghshire in 1811 at the age of twenty-three.16 Quite apart from conciliating 
overlapping national sensitivities, it made sense from a practical standpoint for 
Scottish managers to oversee Scottish party organisation in London. The most 
important duty of whips was to ensure regular attendance at votes, a more onerous 
task for the Conservatives given their larger proportion of country gentlemen, who 
often viewed being an MP as a part-time occupation.17 Indeed, Scottish Conservative 
members were slightly more likely be backwoodsmen than Conservative MPs more 
generally. Unfortunately, there are few surviving papers related to the day-to-day 
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business of whipping, meaning that much of the detail of Clerk’s (and others’) work 
is unrecoverable.18  
Scottish MPs in the Commons were also partly handled by the Lord 
Advocate, if the party was in power. Sir William Rae, for instance, did so when the 
House was sitting but also when it was not; at Peel’s request, he ‘communicated with 
nearly all our good and zealous friends who were in the last parliament’.19 Residing 
in (and governing) Scotland while parliament was in recess, Rae was better placed to 
manage those Scottish MPs who had returned to their constituencies. The Lord 
Advocate’s dual role therefore enabled him to act as a bridge between Westminster 
and territorial party affairs, though only when in office.  
The organisational formality of the party in the Commons must not, however, 
be overstated. Outside of party meetings and the business of whipping, ties between 
Scottish MPs were consistently and relentlessly reinforced by informal social 
relationships, in the absence of rigid organisational control.20 It is notable that despite 
a large bipartisan turnout of the Scottish political classes at the initial meeting of the 
NAVSR to protest (among other things) Scotland’s neglect by parliament, only a 
single Scottish MP attended.21 Informal association within Westminster was vital to 
the integration of Scottish business into overall party activity. Senior party figures 
relied on Scottish MPs for the provision of even basic information on Scottish 
affairs, indicating a periodic inattention to these topics. Disraeli, for one, may have 
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taken a slightly closer interest in Scotland by the 1860s, but betrayed a lack of 
knowledge a decade earlier: ‘Your questions about local taxation in Scotland are 
rather vague, but I conclude you only want a general idea of our system’.22  
This inattention did not escape public notice, resulting in frequent complaints 
from various quarters who had ‘for a long series of years seen the great 
inconvenience occasioned by the inadequacy of the means for the management of 
Scotch business in parliament’.23 It often fell to Scottish members to organise 
individually and autonomously, in order to advance their nation’s interests. As such, 
separate Scottish Conservative activity at Westminster was not entirely inspired from 
above; it was also the result of native initiative.  
Party coherence and organisation in the Commons was devastated by the 
Corn Law split – Peel himself averred that with regard to Peelite numbers, ‘I know 
not whether they are sixty or six’.24 This confusion persisted for much of the 1850s, 
as several MPs drifted in different directions – indeed, a list of ‘Peelites regular’ in 
the papers of William Jolliffe included ten Scots members, of whom at least four 
were arguably still (or soon to be once again) Conservative.25 The inclusion of 
Scottish MPs on such lists reveals that Scotland came under the purview of the new 
party organisation; Jolliffe and Philip Rose took charge of whipping and constituency 
matters respectively from 1853 onwards. Before this, the parliamentary organisation 
of the ‘unimpressive’ whip William Beresford was almost non-existent.26 This 
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presumably meant that the small number of Scottish Protectionist MPs were initially 
left to their own devices.  
Though the partisan organisation of parliamentary activity expanded as the 
1850s progressed, there appears to be no evidence of formal organisation or 
whipping based along Scottish territorial lines. Clerk’s Scottish work was likely 
continued after 1847 by William Forbes Mackenzie, who acted as chief whip until 
November 1853.27 After this, however, there is no evidence of a Conservative whip 
in the Commons with an explicit Scottish connection or designated Scottish duties. A 
steady decline in the numbers of Scottish Conservative MPs no doubt played a part 
in this. Similarly, while progress had been made, the party in the mid- to late-1850s 
was still diffuse, and even thought by some to be close to disintegration.28  
It is perhaps more helpful, however, to view ‘party’ in this state as the norm, 
and the complex apparatus of the Peel years as somewhat atypical growths within the 
prevailing system of parliamentary government.29 As such, informal arrangements 
for dealing with Scottish business by the party in Westminster should be judged in 
this light. Figures such as Derby (and later Disraeli) relied on advice and gossip from 
various Scottish MPs, at least some of whom sat for non-Scottish seats.30 Towards 
the end of the period, Scottish business continued to be somewhat marginalised in 
the Commons, with debates held at the end of sittings.31 Nevertheless, the continuing 
existence of separate Scottish institutions, and the need for attendant legislation, 
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meant that separate party arrangements continued to be necessary for Scottish 
Conservatives, however informal and restricted these might be.  
Party organisation in the House of Lords was also organised, and in some 
ways more formalised. For general parliamentary business, by 1838 there already 
existed an office in Westminster, ‘maintained by subscription’, in which ‘two or 
three persons are employed to furnish us (Lords) with periodical abstracts of the Bills 
in progress through the House of Commons’; it was thought desirable by Aberdeen 
that an additional employee to deal with ‘Scotch business alone’ be added to this 
arrangement.32 On the joint advice of Sir John Hope and Buccleuch, Edinburgh 
Advocate David Mure was recommended for the role.33 Candidates for the job, it was 
thought, should be ‘gentlemen:– of some knowledge of life and the world combined 
with business talents – with whom communication (if wished by any Scotch peer) 
would be agreeable’.34 It was also thought that no professional fee for their services 
should be offered. Based outside of London, and designated by Buccleuch as the 
‘Parliamentary correspondent in Edinburgh’, Scottish bills and parliamentary papers 
were sent to him, as were reports of ‘the votes of both Houses’, and ‘the Scotch 
petitions’.35 This position was described by Mure as a short ‘experiment’, and no 
record remains of whether it came to be more permanent.36 Nevertheless, it 
underlines that the party in the Lords, though by no means a paragon of efficiency, 
was at least as organised as the party in the Commons.  
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Though less powerful than the Commons, the Lords played an important part 
in executing the legislative functions of the state. Indeed, this was particularly true 
for Scotland in legal terms, as until 1876 the Lords acted as the ultimate appeal court 
for Scottish cases; the lack of a requirement for a Scottish judge on the panel led to 
occasional rulings which were based in English law.37 Given that the Scottish 
Conservative leadership and many of its most prominent members sat in the Lords, it 
is unsurprising that the upper house was such an important centre for Scottish 
activity. Much like in the Commons, partisan meetings of Scots peers were held. 
Joint Commons-Lords gatherings were rare, yet in some instances they were held 
along territorial lines, such as in 1845 when a meeting of ‘Scottish peers, peers 
connected with Scotland and representatives of Scotland in the House of Commons’ 
was convened to discuss issues related to banking north of the border.38  
The main difference evident in peers’ meetings, however, was greater 
autonomy – they were more inclined to decide their chosen course among 
themselves, rather than accepting the wishes of the party leadership. This tendency 
was exacerbated by the less than tactful persuasive efforts of Wellington and 
Aberdeen. Many countervailing factors, however, ensured that effective organisation 
of Scottish peers could be carried out. The Scottish peers (that is to say, both Scots 
with British titles and those elected for the Scottish representative peerage) were 
chiefly handled by the Duke of Buccleuch. Others, such as Aberdeen, performed this 
role on occasion.39 Though by no means noted for his personal charm, Buccleuch 
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was not unpopular among the peers, and was certainly more personable than the cold 
and aloof Aberdeen, or the elderly and near-deaf Wellington. Perhaps more 
importantly, a great many of the Scottish Lords possessed only Scottish peerages, 
and therefore owed their place in Westminster to election, sixteen of their number 
being selected by the whole Scottish peerage. There were already institutional 
mechanisms to keep the Sixteen organised, which included maintaining their 
qualifications and organising proxy voters for their election. Initially, this work was 
undertaken by Advocates and paid for by the Treasury, but ‘latterly … by each peer 
whom they assisted’.40  
Before 1832, the Scottish representative peers had been managed by the third 
Duke of Buccleuch on behalf of Henry Dundas, though there were occasional 
upsets.41 Between 1832 and 1847, every single member of the Sixteen was 
Conservative, at every single election; in being elected, an explicitly partisan element 
to their conduct was introduced. The twenty-eight Irish representative peers, on the 
other hand, were elected for life, and so were not nearly as influenced by this 
feature.42 The Sixteen were effectively nominees of the party: ‘Scotch peers … I 
have written to the Duke of Buccleuch to state to him my opinion that he ought to 
settle with the government who they wish to have returned in the event of a 
vacancy’.43 In addition to handling the peers within the Lords, Buccleuch also took 
‘an active charge in the management of the peers election. This has given me a great 
knowledge of that great body’; he thought that during the post-Reform Whig 
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administration the Sixteen had ‘acted with a spirit of independence, I believe without 
a precedent’.44  
Having long been accustomed to supporting the government of the day during 
the Dundas ascendancy, the peers had effectively been Ministerialists above all else. 
Their newfound intransigence during the Grey Ministry, combined with the fact that 
the Treasury was no longer subsidising their necessary administrative functions, was 
a strong indication that they were now firmly partisan – and monolithically 
Conservative at that. Partisan considerations now trumped personal connections and 
familial ties when it came to election, as in 1832 when Lord Home refused to support 
his brother-in-law’s candidacy, despite his being ‘one with whom I have held for 
years in the greatest intimacy and friendship. But no consideration on earth shall 
induce me to vote for him, in consequence of his having given his support to the 
existing government’.45 A full list of the peerage compiled in 1840 indicated that 
forty-five were considered Conservative, eighteen ‘Whig radical’, ten ‘doubtful’, and 
ten unknown.46 In practice, the Conservatives therefore enjoyed complete control 
over the election of the Sixteen. Successive voting lists running from 1831 to 1847 
present a narrative of consistent and increasingly entrenched uniformity, as 
Buccleuch gradually refined and entrenched a partisan voting bloc which made such 
elections a mere formality.47 The Scottish Conservative peers were a distinctive and 
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important part of the party in Westminster, and, moreover, perhaps one of its most 
organised and cohesive sections before 1847.  
After the Corn Law split, the election of the Sixteen and the handling of peers 
in Westminster itself was taken over by Eglinton, but it was clear from the outset that 
Buccleuch would be a hard act to follow: ‘Is it proposed to send circulars to those 
peers who voted with us? Who would undertake this? … There is no one in our 
House at all to be compared to Buccleuch … and influence with many of them’.48 
Though many of the grander Scottish Conservative magnates who held British 
peerages had voted for repeal, the generally less wealthy Sixteen largely came out on 
the Protectionist side – ten voted against repeal, four in favour, and two abstained. 
Eglinton thought that the ‘four black sheep’ should be removed, especially as one, 
Lord Rollo, was ‘a stupid old fool whom nobody knows or likes’.49 Others, however, 
were thought harder to shift due to their popularity with Buccleuch and the wider 
Scottish peerage.  
The party split rendered the Sixteen vulnerable to the election of non-
Conservatives for the first time since before 1832, as the loyalties of Scottish peers 
became more suspect. For instance, Eglinton stated that after his meeting with Lord 
Elgin, he ‘could not fathom from him whether he was a Peelite or not’.50 Perhaps 
because of this general confusion, it was decided that ‘taking a strong line in the 
Scotch Peers election’ was unwise, especially as the principal obstacle to securing 
the Sixteen, Buccleuch, was ‘as much with us as he dares to be after his performance 
                                                          
48 Dalhousie to [?], 31 Dec. 1846, Dalhousie MSS, GD45/14/578. 
49 Eglinton to Derby, 23 Aug. 1846, Derby MSS, 920 DER (14)/148/2/3; See Appendix D.  




of last session’.51 It was decided not to ‘meddle with any of the sixteen, but to insist 
upon filling up any vacancies which may occur with men of one party’, in order to 
‘act on the defensive with the Whigs, and to be conciliatory to any repentant 
Peelites’.52 This cooperation between the two wings of the old party continued 
throughout the 1850s, such as in 1853 when the Protectionists had no viable 
candidate to put forward for a vacancy. It was therefore decided to allow Buccleuch 
to put forward a Peelite candidate, as he had ‘expressed his determination always to 
support the best man without reference to which section of the Conservative party he 
belongs to, and if possible to prevent a split’.53  
The uncertain nature of many peers’ loyalties continued to dog party efforts 
to reclaim its hegemony, such as with the seventh Lord Seafield, who was thought to 
be a Peelite merely because he had not been ‘staunch’ in supporting a local 
Conservative parliamentary candidate, and was married to the sister of a peer whose 
allegiance was doubtful.54 Despite these issues, Scottish Conservative peers were, 
relatively speaking, in a better position than the party in the Commons, with the 
overall Conservative majority restored by 1858.55 Eglinton and Derby were close, 
and both in the same chamber, whereas Scottish MPs, alongside their other UK 
colleagues, were forced to rely on Disraeli in the Commons at a time when many 
backbenchers were still profoundly unsure of him. Derbyite and Peelite peers 
cooperated more harmoniously than their counterparts in the Commons. Moreover, 
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many of Eglinton’s efforts in Westminster, including whipping, were bolstered by 
Lord Colville, a Scottish representative peer who was appointed a Lords whip in 
1852 and ‘possessed good sense, knowledge, and tact’.56  
Overall, the Scottish section of the party was a somewhat distinct and 
cohesive entity in the House of Lords, especially as the leading Scottish 
Conservatives throughout the whole period were members of the Upper House. As 
such, it was, at times, more effective than the Scottish contingent in the Commons. 
After the Corn Law split, the declining number of Scottish Conservative MPs meant 
that, relatively speaking, this imbalance was exacerbated towards the end of the 
period.  
As a prominent Scottish Conservative put it to the new Protectionist leader 
after the schism, ‘bodies of men in the House of Commons, like bodies of men out of 
it, can effect nothing unless arranged and directed – that without the tie of party they 
are the bundle of sticks unbound’.57 Yet the members of the party in both Houses 
were never entirely unbound; certainly, constraints tightened or loosened, but the 
Conservative party continued in some form or other to organise itself within 
Westminster throughout the period. Though all bound together as a British bundle, 
the party also accommodated some elements of territorial distinctiveness, again with 
varying levels of constraint.  
The profound changes which took place within the party in terms of 
parliamentary organisation illustrate that there was no straightforward separation 
between its electoral and parliamentary functions.58 These two broadly defined facets 
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were themselves amorphous, changing both in scope and prominence as party 
fortunes, and the very definition of ‘party’ shifted. Likewise, the division between 
Scottish, British, and other territorial party sections was never entirely clear-cut or 
stable. Personnel were intimately involved in aspects which crossed lines, meaning 
that the Scottish Conservative party in parliament was somewhat distinctive, but only 
in a restricted sense.  
 
 
II. Scottish National and Local Governance 
 
The activity of the Conservative party, when it was in office, was almost inseparable 
from much of the everyday business of government. Moreover, parliament largely 
operated on the premise that its purpose was to oversee the running of the Empire, 
leaving much domestic decision-making in local hands. In the case of Scotland, this 
was further complicated by the mixed division of governmental responsibilities and 
activities between local, Scottish and British levels, resulting in a system which 
arguably contained elements of an informal administrative devolution.59  
The Conservative party played a prominent role in the governance of 
Scotland. This included the involvement of Conservative Lords Advocate and the 
wider Faculty of Advocates. In addition to this, the party was also involved in the 
everyday administration of Scotland through municipal and judicial bodies. Given 
Peel’s long periods in office, governmental and parliamentary politics were closely 
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linked until 1847. After this, the short-lived nature of Derbyite governments, 
combined with broader changes taking place within Scottish civil society, meant that 
the Conservative party’s formal influence over governance was reduced. 
Nevertheless, the party continued even in this period to exert a significant level of 
influence over Scotland. There has been a heavy emphasis within Scottish 
historiography on the Whig dominance of Edinburgh, focusing on their prominent 
political lawyers. What is often overlooked, however, is that the majority of the 
Scottish bar in the middle of the nineteenth century was Conservative in inclination. 
The Liberals maintained a strong grip on the formal levers of power.60 Nevertheless, 
the bar and judiciary played a significant role, as ‘law and politics were inextricably 
intertwined in Scotland’.61 
The Lord Advocate was, in a formal sense, chief prosecutor in Scotland and 
merely an advisor to the Home Secretary.62 In practice, however, he was the de facto 
Minister for Scotland at Westminster and head of governance within Scotland, 
exercising a substantial amount of autonomy. It was an inescapably political role, as 
was that of the role’s deputy, the Solicitor-General. It was in the area of lesser legal 
appointments that the lawyer-dominated section of the party, headed initially by Sir 
John Hope, was most influential. Indeed, at the start of the first post-Reform Peel 
administration, a tussle between Buccleuch and Sir John Hope over Scottish legal 
appointments presaged the shift in party power from Edinburgh lawyers to county 
magnates.63  
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The Conservative party played a prominent role in the workings of the 
Faculty, but it is also true that the Faculty itself played a prominent role in the 
party’s, and the country’s workings. The partisan make-up of the Faculty was one of 
the biggest stumbling-blocks to decisive government action. When there was 
harmony of opinion in Scotland on an issue, encompassing party leaders, judges and 
lawyers, and popular opinion, swift action could occur. Without broad support, 
however, inaction almost invariably followed. The 1850s predecessor bill to the 1868 
Court of Session Act, for instance, was killed off because of the objections of two 
senior judges, and the Act of 1868 was passed only because it enjoyed the support of 
leading Conservative and Liberal lawyers.64 While public opinion and leading 
politicians were predominantly Liberal in Scotland, especially after 1847, the 
composition of the judiciary and faculty did not reflect this: ‘There will be no great 
difficulty in finding fit persons to be selected for promotion to the Bench; it is 
curious that with the exception of Rutherford late Lord Advocate, every Advocate of 
eminence is Conservative’.65 Many middling Conservative Lords Advocate proved to 
be far better members of the senior judiciary. Duncan McNeill served as Lord Justice 
General and Lord President of the Court of Session between 1852 and 1867, while 
John Inglis was Lord President of the Court of Session from then until 1891, 
described by Omond as ‘the central figure in the legal world of Scotland’.66  
This Conservative judicial predominance had a significant impact on the 
course of Scottish history. Indeed, because common law was an important part of 
                                                          
64 Hutchison, ‘Anglo-Scottish Political Relations’, 258. 
65 Buccleuch to Peel, 14 Oct. 1842, Peel MSS, 40517, ff. 14–16. 
66 Omond, Lord Advocates of Scotland. Second series, 219–22. 
178 
 
society throughout the period, much of the everyday regulation of Scottish society 
was undertaken by the courts, rather than parliament.67 The party’s influence was 
essentially negative insofar as it thwarted reforms, or was exercised in the courts, 
which were ostensibly separate from the arena of public and popular politics. For 
these reasons, its impact on Scotland in the mid-nineteenth century has been 
somewhat overlooked in subsequent scholarly work.  
The talent of Scottish Conservative lawyers did, however, hinder the party’s 
selection of Lords Advocate. The loss of them to the bench was a constant problem 
throughout the period. Indeed, McNeill was only appointed Lord Advocate in 1842 
on the understanding that he was ‘not to insist upon his claim to be promoted to the 
Bench, otherwise obvious inconvenience will arise’.68 Scottish Conservative lawyer 
Archibald Campbell Swinton summed up the drawbacks of the position neatly: put 
off by the ‘brief tenure of office which any Conservative Crown Counsel is likely to 
have’, even those who did seek the office were eventually ‘seduced … to claim the 
softer cushion of the bench’.69  
Quite apart from the arduous and uncertain nature of the job, Conservative 
Lords Advocate also had the additional insecurity of their electoral base to consider. 
It was expected that Lords Advocate should hold a seat in parliament, which could 
throw up considerable difficulties when the policy work related to the position 
clashed with the necessities of electioneering. Some Lords Advocate had represented 
English constituencies before 1832, though this was recognised as less than ideal. 
Francis Jeffery, for instance, had sat for the pocket borough of Malton up until 1831, 
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while his predecessor, Rae, had represented Harwich for the last three years of his 
pre-Reform tenure.70 Between 1832 and 1868, however, Lords Advocate of all 
parties sat for Scottish constituencies, with only two (Conservative) exceptions. This 
again underlines the ways in which both governance and party affiliations were 
connected across national lines.  
These factors contributed to the generally underwhelming quality of 
Conservative Lords Advocate. The first, Sir William Rae, was described by Michael 
Fry as exhibiting ‘impartiality, quiet good sense, and capacity for sensible reform’, 
but subsequent holders of the post were less talented.71 Duncan McNeill was the last 
Conservative Lord Advocate to enjoy a lengthy tenure; subsequent Lords Advocate 
only served during the brief periods when the party was in office. No subsequent 
Conservative Lord Advocate up to 1868 (excepting the final one) lasted more than 
ten months in the position.72 This was indicative of the wider problems facing the 
party; though there were a great many capable Conservative lawyers, almost none of 
them wanted the job. Primarily, this seems to have been due to potential loss of 
income, and the difficulties involved in gaining a seat in parliament. It was definitely 
preferable for a Lord Advocate to hold a Scottish seat, yet a near-impossible task to 
find one willing to return a Conservative (and a non-local Conservative at that) to 
Westminster. Inglis stood for Orkney in 1852 but was narrowly defeated. He then 
contested the County Antrim constituency of Lisburn at a by-election, but lost by 
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three votes; a Scottish Lord Advocate seeking election for an Irish constituency was 
entirely unprecedented.73 During his second stint in office in 1858, Inglis was forced 
to sit for the English borough of Stamford. The various duties performed by the Lord 
Advocate made the position increasingly unworkable. All of this had the effect, at 
least when the Conservatives were in office, of pushing the focus of governance of 
Scotland in two directions; towards Westminster, but also towards the Scottish 
localities.  
The forces at play within the realm of high politics were countervailed by the 
high degree of governmental autonomy which Scotland enjoyed on a local level. 
Many of the institutions which governed Scotland straddled the line between formal 
and informal, were firmly embedded in civil society, and were created locally rather 
than imposed from on high. Even in the burghs, though political power was held by 
the predominantly Liberal middle-class elite, this was not hegemonic.74 As has been 
demonstrated, Conservatives sat on Town Councils in places such as Edinburgh and 
Glasgow throughout the period. It seems unlikely that they had no influence at all 
over the operation of local governance because, as Lindsay Paterson has observed, 
‘The Scottish middle class was too mundanely practical to allow ideological disputes 
to stand in the way of getting things done’.75  
In the counties, local governance was generally less dominated by Liberals, 
local electors being subject to the same conditions which motivated the return of 
Conservative parliamentary candidates. Moreover, the peculiar position of the legal 
profession in Scottish society again operated in the party’s favour. The Sheriff was 
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the chief local representative of the state, involved in practically all facets of 
governmental affairs within their jurisdiction (though to a lesser extent in the burghs 
and larger cities). The appointment of Sheriffs and Sheriffs Substitute was made by 
the Lord Advocate, after consulting local elites.76 Though they were a slightly less 
politicised group than the Lord Advocate and Solicitor-General, Sheriffs were still 
frequently party stalwarts. Their affiliations bled into the execution of their duties, 
most prominently in their registration court decisions, as explored in Chapter One.  
The party’s in-built advantage was considerable; first, having spent a great 
deal of time in office before 1832 and up to 1847, Conservative Lords Advocate 
were able to manoeuvre sympathetic candidates into these roles, many of whom 
served for decades. Second, with the majority of the bar (from which Sheriffs were 
chosen) being Conservative in inclination, this hobbled the efforts of Liberals to 
combat this during their own periods in office. Even after 1847, when the 
Conservatives were seldom in power at Westminster, the occasional appointment of 
party stalwarts was managed, such as the appointment of William Edmonstoune 
Aytoun as Sheriff of Orkney in 1852. Aytoun, a prominent poet and political thinker, 
was a frequent contributor to Blackwood’s. Archibald Alison had refused the Scottish 
Solicitor-Generalship in 1834, eschewing a national position in favour of becoming 
Sheriff of Lanarkshire.77 The influence of Sheriffs could reach into the cities, and 
their actions take on national significance – Alison’s jurisdiction, for instance, 
included the city of Glasgow. In addition to cases affecting Scotland’s largest city, 
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Glasgow Sheriff Court evolved into the de facto chief commercial court of Scotland. 
Not only did this ostensibly local position in fact afford him significant national 
influence, it also allowed him to continue to do so during the long periods when his 
party was excluded from office, up to his death in 1867. Sheriffs, moreover, were 
always present on the parochially based Poor Law Boards which, from 1845, 
increasingly administered social welfare on a local level in Scotland.78  
The Established Church, in undertaking many of these social functions up to 
the 1840s, was strongly influenced by conservatism, as the predominantly 
conservative gentry continued to exercise patronage over parish appointments. After 
1843, the final collapse of parish relief forced the Church to give way to local Poor 
Law Boards (which were, however, still organised on a parish by parish basis) and 
the national Board of Supervision, created in 1845.79 While the Board of Supervision 
was dominated by liberals, and local boards by the liberally inclined middle classes 
and the clergy, their dominance was not all-encompassing. The success of the board 
system resulted in it being duplicated many times to administer other areas, and new 
authorities were also given to existing boards. These local and national boards were 
composed mainly of lawyers, members of other prominent professions, and the 
aristocracy. Their duties were diverse, and grew as legislation accumulated. They 
were, among other things, responsible for the Poor Law, lunatic asylums, prisons, 
borstals, housing regulation and property valuation.80  
It is notable that the national Poor Law Board of Supervision, arguably the 
most important, was required to contain the Lord Provosts of Edinburgh and 
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Glasgow, two professional officers, and – crucially – the Sheriffs of three counties 
from different Scottish regions.81 Moreover, aristocrats were still a significant 
presence on such bodies. The initial commission on the Scottish Poor Law had been 
chaired by Lord Melville. Indeed, the first Supervisory Board contained several 
Conservatives, and John McNeill, the Lord Advocate’s brother, acted as Chairman of 
that body until 1868.82 Though no definitive evidence of McNeill’s political beliefs 
could be found, his worldview was characterised by a mix of moderate conservatism 
and whiggism. Moreover, he also served on other non-governmental bodies 
dominated by Conservatives, including as secretary of the committee organising the 
erection of a Duke of Wellington statue in Edinburgh.83  
Local boards and commissions dealing with the varied aspects of local 
governance were largely directed by local elites, and in larger burghs of over 10,000 
people were entirely outside the jurisdiction of the Board of Supervision. If indeed 
the period between 1830 and 1860 represented the zenith of Scotland as a ‘self-
governing civil society’, then private organisations and charities also played a 
prominent role in the everyday operation of society.84 Though the elites most 
involved in this area of civil society were predominantly Liberal, they were not 
entirely so; for instance, a list of the twenty-nine most active subscribers to such 
organisations in Edinburgh contains several Conservative names. Some, such as the 
Duke of Buccleuch, acted as figureheads, but others, such as Sir Adam Hay, 
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Alexander Pringle, and Archibald Campbell Swinton, were more likely active 
participants.85 These subscribers, with the exception of Hay who served in parliament 
before 1832, were all Conservative MPs or unsuccessful candidates during this 
period.86 The role of partisan allegiances in determining the character of mid-
Victorian civil society is nuanced and at times opaque; it is an area much deserving 
of further study.  
Overall, the Conservative party had a strong presence, and a marked effect, 
on Scottish governance at national and local levels, though this declined as their 
periods in office became more intermittent. Nevertheless, they continued to exert 
some influence, though in a less visible or formal fashion. Conservatives exerted 
influence using a number of positions and institutions, including through the offices 
of Lord Advocate and Solicitor-General, and as members of national supervisory 
boards. At a local level, Sheriffs, members of local boards, and contributors to 
Scotland’s vibrant tapestry of private voluntary organisations also included a 
significant proportion of Conservative party members or supporters. Thus, every 
level of Scottish society was at least partly shaped by the Conservative party, and 
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III. Westminster Conservatives and Scotland 
 
While increasing responsibility for everyday regulation was granted by the central 
state to local bodies, Westminster party input on Scottish governance was by no 
means absent. The involvement of Westminster in Scottish affairs involved all 
parties; the highly integrated nature of Scottish governance within the Union 
guaranteed that Westminster would play a conspicuous role in its management. Yet, 
it remains the case that seemingly static institutional structures were dependent on 
day-to-day political circumstances. The nature and extent of this involvement in 
governance was often determined by who was involved – these were often partisan 
figures whose positions were dependent on which party was in power. As such, 
Westminster’s role in Scottish governance waxed and waned. The Westminster 
Conservative party’s role in this area was significant; during the early part of the 
period, partisan governance carried out within Scotland was mirrored by intimate 
Westminster involvement in Scottish affairs.  
The party in Westminster was, if anything, more concerned with Scottish 
matters than their Liberal opponents, despite (or perhaps because of) that party’s 
electoral ascendancy north of the border. After 1847, long periods in opposition, 
combined with lacklustre Lords Advocate, resulted in more intervention from 
Westminster party figures. Their efforts, while of mixed effectiveness, constitute 
evidence of continued central interest in Scottish affairs and a willingness to adopt 
innovative approaches. Home Secretaries did not take a close interest in Scottish 
affairs – Lord Palmerston was perhaps the Home Secretary most famously indifferent 
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to Scottish matters.87 Sir James Graham was, however, the most prominent exception 
to this rule, serving in that office between 1841 and 1846. As has already been 
demonstrated, his involvement in the Scottish party’s electoral business, particularly 
in western Scotland, was already established after Peel’s dinner, and he was elected 
Lord Rector of Glasgow University in succession to Peel.88 
After taking over the Home Office in 1841, Graham appears to have pivoted 
away from Scottish electoral business, though the less frequent nature of elections 
after 1841 may account for this. Like his predecessors and successors, Graham did 
not attempt to directly administer Scotland from Whitehall; he asked Buccleuch to 
undertake some activity, for instance, because affairs were ‘better arranged by a 
cabinet minister on the spot, than by letters’.89 Similarly, he complained to his Lord 
Advocate that ‘we could do more by two hours of conversation than by writing 
volumes’.90 Though figures such as Buccleuch, Hope, the Lord Advocate and the 
Solicitor-General met in Scotland in order to transact Scottish business, these 
meetings were themselves held at Graham’s behest.91  
Despite this delegation to party figures on the ground, Graham was a strongly 
influential figure in Scottish governance, in addition to his electoral interests. As well 
as organising Scottish meetings in his absence, he also summoned the Scottish law 
officers to attend on him at his estate near Carlisle to discuss Scottish affairs.92 In 
organising the initial Poor Law Boards, he also kept party considerations in mind; 
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both Peel and Graham consulted with Rae over the political composition of the 
Board of Supervision, to ensure that there would not be ‘too strong an infusion of our 
political friends’, but at the same time seeking to appoint non-Conservatives who 
were ‘not offensive; constantly resident, and versed in country affairs’, such as Lord 
Dunfermline, who was considered ‘a Whig, but not violent in his political 
animosities’.93 The appointment of those who supervised the new Scottish Poor Law 
apparatus, though ostensibly bipartisan, was not completely so. The party ensured 
that the board was as Conservative (or, failing that, as moderately Whiggish) as 
possible. Such activities occasionally led to conflict between the Scottish and UK 
wings of the party, such as when Graham’s appointment of an acquaintance as 
Sheriff Clerk of Edinburghshire drew the ire of Buccleuch. Though Graham denied 
that his candidate was ‘a stranger in the county of Edinburgh’, he conceded that the 
unilateral appointment could be regarded as ‘a breach of the respect due to you 
[Buccleuch]’.94 Graham played a prominent part in governmental business north of 
the border, but it was necessary for him to do so on the basis of local advice, and 
through negotiation with native party figures.  
Lord Aberdeen also had a significant input on a legislative and governmental 
level. Even before his brief period acting as head of the Scottish party, he had also 
agreed to ‘attend to Scotch Bills which have been brought from the House of 
Commons’.95 Aberdeen was concerned about this area, concurring with Hope’s 
sentiments that ‘we ought to take some means to secure Scotch business in the House 
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of Lords, its due share of attention’.96 His input on Scottish issues, most notably the 
Church question, was substantial – William Gladstone thought that ‘the opinion 
which will have by far the greatest weight in determining the course of the 
Conservative leaders and party upon this matter, will be Lord Aberdeen’s: after him I 
think Graham’s, Clerk’s, and Rae’s’.97 This descending list rather neatly sums up the 
hierarchy of party influence, though only for the Church question, and only at that 
precise moment in time. More broadly, the prevailing pattern was one of mixed 
competencies and competing spheres. This was underlined by Hope’s influence over 
Aberdeen despite his controversial standing with the party and wider nation; he and 
Aberdeen exchanged hundreds of letters on the Church question.98  
Before 1847, the extent of central party involvement was further complicated 
by the position of Peel himself. He was a frequent visitor to Scotland, and had a 
fairly deep knowledge of the country, going so far as to tell Aberdeen that ‘there is 
no one, hold Scotchmen, who feels a stronger attachment to that country than I do’.99 
Indeed, having been Home Secretary for a great deal of the 1820s, he was well-
steeped in the often murky issues of Scottish politics.100 It was likely this interest and 
background which led him to involve himself deeply in complex party issues such as 
the dissemination of Scottish patronage. Even minor figures such as Scottish 
constituency agents appealed directly to him for favour when moving south.101  
Moreover, prestigious (though symbolic) appointments also benefited from 
his close attention – when deciding on the next Lord-Lieutenant of Linlithgowshire, 
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he stated ‘How anxiously I have been turning in my mind the means of making an 
appointment … After reviewing over and over again’.102 He took extensive advice 
from a small number of party figures, and normally relied on Buccleuch (in addition 
to Rae and a few others) to make the most appropriate recommendation. Buccleuch 
was also a major conduit through which patronage requests reached Peel.103 More 
general intelligence from Scotland, on the other hand, reached Peel from a wide 
variety of sources, including contacts presumably acquired during his Glasgow 
dinner. He corresponded with the Lord Provost of Glasgow and Robert Lamond, 
chiefly on how various Scottish and British issues were affecting popular opinion 
and electoral prospects in the city.104  
More broadly, the party’s treatment of Scotland during the Peel years 
contradicts the widely held perception, exacerbated by the handling of the Church 
crisis, that it neglected Scottish business – three significant Scottish bills were 
shepherded through parliament in 1845 alone, and Peel’s government of 1841–6 
contained four Scottish ministers.105 The role of Westminster figures in the Scottish 
party during the Peel era was significant, embracing both the governmental and 
electoral. This role, however, was very far from autocratic; senior party members 
were more than willing to take advice from all levels of the Scottish party, and to 
devolve responsibility where appropriate.  
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Given their long periods out of office after 1847, and the decreasing size and 
importance of the Scottish Conservative parliamentary contingent, it might be 
expected that links between senior Westminster figures and Scottish governance 
would be diminished. Certainly, the quality of Derby’s Lords Advocate would 
superficially suggest that this is the case. Though there is some truth to this 
assumption, Derby was not entirely unacquainted with Scotland, having visited and 
toured the country on various occasions.106 Moreover, he in fact dealt with some 
Scottish patronage himself, in those relatively rare instances when he was in a 
position to dispense it.  
Indeed, he was careful to cultivate intellectual and literary Conservatives, 
having gone out of his way to procure a cadetship for the nephew of James 
Blackwood, of the publishing family behind Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine.107 
The patronage that he did dispense was somewhat less aristocratic in nature than 
Peel’s. Though it is likely that this was partly due to the number of Scottish magnates 
who followed Peel, he nevertheless focused on prominent Scottish figures who had 
remained loyal after the Corn Law split. His decisions in this regard were very astute 
given the limited means at his disposal, and illustrate that he possessed a fairly good 
knowledge of the situation north of the border – or, at least, a willingness to listen to 
the more perceptive Scottish Conservative voices. For instance, Eglinton beseeched 
Derby not to ‘lose sight of Alison and Aytoun, who have done so much service’.108 
William Aytoun was duly appointed Sheriff of Orkney and Shetland.109  
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Archibald Alison, the best-selling historian and Sheriff of Lanarkshire, was 
made a baronet. The knowledge and skill of Derby was particularly evident here, as 
Alison, though a highly capable lawyer and very deserving of favour, held 
traditionalist views – by giving him to a baronetcy instead of a judgeship, Eglinton 
wrote to Derby that he had ‘made one man extremely happy … at the same time you 
leave it open to yourself perhaps to appoint a more efficient judge … this Baronetcy 
removes one great difficulty’.110 Eglinton himself was a skilled manager of 
patronage, having been notably successful in dispensing it in another national context 
while serving as Lord-Lieutenant for Ireland.111  
Largely on his own initiative, Derby was able to placate a longstanding and 
staunch supporter. At the same time, he avoided the bad publicity that Alison, 
notorious for his hard-line stance on public order, might have garnered, and was also 
able to appoint another candidate to the bench. This indicates that Derby was very 
well aware of Scottish political currents, and moreover, was able to navigate the 
murky waters with skill.  
He was also careful to reach out to Peelites in Scotland. Though his 1852 
ministry did not attract many Peelites, Inverness-shire MP Henry Baillie did agree to 
become joint Secretary of the Board of Control.112 His relative generosity may have 
hastened the reconciliation of many Scottish Peelites (at least within the Faculty of 
Advocates) with the Conservative party, as by the time Aberdeen had left office in 
1855 they had seen little reward for their loyalty. Peelites more generally had 
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benefitted from the lion’s share of offices in the Aberdeen administration, but the 
opposite seems to have been true with regard to Scottish appointments.113 Indeed, 
former Peeblesshire MP William Forbes Mackenzie informed Derby that he had 
‘found all the Peelites in a pitiable condition:– even under Lord Aberdeen their share 
of the good things was very small, but now that their party is out altogether, they see 
no prospect of any of the Judgeships or of the Sheriffships coming their way’.114  
Derby was also open to innovative ideas in terms of Scotland’s place in the 
constitution, as he was willing to alter the structure of its governance long before the 
creation of the post of Scottish Secretary in 1885. The Conservative party was more 
open to reform than the Liberals were generally at this time, though this may be 
partly because that party had a very competent and dedicated Lord Advocate in 
James Moncreiff, who served four lengthy terms between 1851 and 1869. He was an 
effective lawyer, legislator, administrator, and Commons speaker, and ably carried 
out the onerous duties of the office for twenty years. By contrast, his Liberal 
predecessor, Andrew Rutherford, had been unable to handle them.115  
During the Conservative 1858–9 administration, Derby seriously considered 
constituting the Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland as ‘a rival Official Agent, the minister for Scotland in the House of Lords, 
[and] a member of the cabinet’.116 Intended in large measure to supersede the role 
played by the Lord Advocate, the plan was, however, unfeasible.117 It was also Derby 
who solved the problem of Scotland’s position relative to the appellate jurisdiction of 
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the House of Lords. At select committee hearings on the topic in 1856, opinions 
given by the Scottish judiciary were split, though Duncan McNeill favoured 
appointing a Scottish lawyer to the tribunal as a life peer. Nothing was done until 
1866, when McNeill wrote a lengthy letter to Derby suggesting that he retire from 
the Scottish bench, in order to take up a seat in the Lords. Crucially, he suggested 
that he could be ‘useful not only in the matter of Scotch appeals but also in reference 
to other Scotch business’.118 Though McNeill was too old in the event to be of much 
use in either legal or party business, Derby gave him a peerage in 1867. This was (at 
least in part) an attempt to alleviate the shortage of senior Scottish party figures, and 
possibly to reorient Scottish governance away from the Lord Advocate. 
By the mid-1860s, Derby’s Scottish contacts had largely dried up through 
death, electoral defeat, and other forms of attrition. This was illustrated by 
Buccleuch’s complaint to Derby that, with regard to the Trusts Administration 
(Scotland) bill, ‘the progress and almost the existence of this bill had been kept so 
quiet, that few know anything of it … I had never even heard of it’.119 In his 1858–9 
ministry, Derby had made Henry Lennox a Junior (Scottish) Lord of the Treasury. 
Lennox was the younger brother of the then-future sixth Duke of Richmond and 
Gordon, and sat for Chichester, where his family had significant influence. There had 
in fact been rumbles of discontent in the Scottish party that such a figure was taking 
partial charge of Scottish business.120 After the resignation of Lennox, the role was 
held by Peter Blackburn, and then by Sir Graham Graham-Montgomery in the next 
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Derby ministry – both were effective nonentities.121 Indeed, it is notable that no 
Scottish Conservative MP served in a full cabinet post during the entire period, 
though peers did do so.  
It was probably this lack of Scottish confidants which prompted Derby to 
renew his overtures to Buccleuch. He hoped to tempt him back into his former 
position in the Scottish party, or at least into a more active one. Perhaps given the 
inadequacy of his Lords Advocate, he also offered Buccleuch’s son Henry Douglas-
Scott-Montagu, then resident in Hampshire, the position of de facto Minister for 
Scotland in the Commons. Derby presumably thought that Douglas-Scott-Montagu’s 
English residency need not necessarily have been too much of an obstacle. Many 
Scottish Conservatives, even those with Scottish seats, spent little time in Scotland. 
Douglas-Scott-Montagu, however, thought himself ‘unequal to take charge of and 
conduct Scotch business in the House’, chiefly because he ‘has lived but very little in 
Scotland, and never had the opportunity of taking any part in the ordinary county and 
country business’.122 By the very end of the period, eminent Scottish Conservatives 
who actually resided within Scotland were thin on the ground; this had the effect of 
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IV. The Scottish Party in Exile 
 
The main political divisions in Victorian Britain were not between its constituent 
nations, but instead between parties. As such, Scottish Liberals could often rely on 
English Liberals and religious dissenters to support their activities.123 It is less 
recognised, however, that these cross-border linkages were perhaps even more 
intense within the Conservative party. The Scottish Conservative party was not 
confined to those MPs who sat for Scottish seats, or who possessed peerages and 
estates within the territorial bounds of that country. Rather, there was a group, whose 
size and influence varied over time, who can be reasonably designated the Scottish 
Conservative party in exile. The bulk of these figures resided in England, and mostly 
represented English constituencies, because of a paucity of winnable constituencies 
north of the Border. In addition to those who never held Scottish seats, eight of the 
seventy-seven Scottish Conservative MPs also went on to sit for English 
constituencies before 1868. Furthermore, most of these eight were among the more 
talented and active of their cohort.124  
These exiles were an important, though heretofore unexamined, mirror-image 
counterpart to the large numbers of English Liberal ‘carpetbaggers’ who represented 
Scottish constituencies. Though they were less prominent in terms of influence 
within the territorial Scottish party, they could, at times, exert a significant influence 
over Scottish affairs at Westminster. This was bolstered by the relative overall size of 
the legislature – Scottish constituency MPs of all parties, after all, made up only 
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eight per cent of the total membership of the Commons.125 The relative importance 
of this group to the Conservatives increased later in the period; as the Conservative 
contingent returned by Scottish constituencies declined both in absolute size and 
relative talent, Scots-connected members sitting for seats elsewhere in the UK took 
on a greater prominence almost by default.  
Who exactly held nominal membership of this group is indefinite. The Lords 
Advocate sitting for English seats towards the end of the period, for instance, 
definitely count as members of the Scottish party, despite the severing of the 
electoral connection to their home country. Scots sitting for English seats was by no 
means a new phenomenon; during debates over the First Reform Act, Sir George 
Murray noted that a disproportionate number of Scots sat for English boroughs. The 
phenomenon of Scottish MPs representing English constituencies was by no means 
confined to the Conservative party either; Jeffrey’s defence of the Scottish Reform 
Act was bolstered by interventions from Joseph Hume, the Scottish radical and MP 
for Middlesex, as well as Sir James Mackintosh, then representing Knaresborough.126 
Given the initial surfeit of Scottish Conservatives, combined with a lack of 
contestable Scottish seats, however, this phenomenon was an increasingly 
Conservative phenomenon as the century wore on. While not in all cases 
unambiguous members of the Scottish Conservative party per se, they did maintain a 
sort of associate membership. This depended on a number of factors, but chiefly 
required a willingness to intervene in Scottish issues.  
                                                          
125 F.W.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts 1832–1987 (Dartmouth, 1989), 153. This percentage varied 
slightly as some seats were disfranchised, and later reallocated to different constituencies.  




The first and most prominent of these MPs in the pre-Derby era was Sir 
George Clerk. Having lost his Edinburghshire seat in the 1837 election, he was 
brought in for Stamford at a by-election in 1838. Nevertheless, he continued to 
perform his Scottish-specific duties, as discussed earlier in this chapter. He remained 
in England for the rest of his political career, moving to represent Dover between 
1847 and 1852. Nevertheless, he continued to involve himself with county politics in 
Edinburghshire up to and beyond the end of his career in parliament.127  
Another southward-moving Conservative was John Campbell Colquhoun. 
Having lost his Kilmarnock Burghs seat in 1841, he contacted Bonham, hoping to 
find an English seat. Despite wishing to move south, Colquhoun was a fairly unusual 
specimen, insofar as he was a genuinely evangelical Scottish Conservative MP, 
though by no means a Non-Intrusionist.128 He came in at a by-election for 
Newcastle-under-Lyme for a single term in 1842. Though he represented a 
Staffordshire constituency, Colquhoun contributed materially to the debates 
surrounding the Scottish Church question, as well as on religious matters in England 
and Ireland.129 Moreover, he weighed in on other Scottish issues, including the 
proposed Scottish Poor Law.130 Overall, he was generally more concerned with UK 
issues than Scottish issues after 1841, but nevertheless contributed significantly 
towards the progress of Scottish business in the Commons.  
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Very occasionally, Scottish politicians sitting for English seats attempted to 
move northwards, such as George Hope, former member for Weymouth and 
Southampton. He attempted to gain the favour of the local party in Linlithgowshire 
in 1852, hoping to play on his family connection to the Earl of Hopetoun, the 
county’s principal grandee. However, his attempts were rebuffed by local 
Conservatives. This was despite his being a Liberal Conservative who would have 
been ‘much more acceptable to the Ten Pounders’ – significant elements of the local 
party thought that his progressive religious opinions would lead to accusations that 
he was ‘a great deal of a Catholic’.131 This illustrates that any Conservative wishing 
to move northwards needed strong local influence, connections, and background in 
order to even consider standing. Moreover, political stances, especially religious 
ones, which were somewhat less controversial in certain English constituencies, 
could be a serious electoral hindrance in Scotland.  
At least a few Conservatives did, however, move northwards and take part in 
Scottish party business, though without seeking election. Robert Adam Christopher 
Dundas, for instance, intended to retire from a long Commons career, during which 
he had represented four English constituencies. He told Jolliffe of his intention to 
‘reside in Scotland’, and to play a prominent role in the Scottish party, as he was 
‘glad to cooperate with the Duke of Hamilton and Lord Eglinton in achieving 
this’.132 He then went on to inform Jolliffe of the state of affairs in the Scottish party. 
Though of little public political use, the movement of those outside of parliament 
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between countries evidently served to create some informal ties between territorial 
and central branches of the party.  
William Forbes Mackenzie played a rather prominent legislative role in exile, 
having lost his Peeblesshire seat in 1852. Despite this, the single most important 
contribution of his parliamentary career, the Forbes Mackenzie Act which regulated 
Scottish public houses, was passed in 1853, after he had returned to parliament as 
MP for Liverpool. This illustrates that significant legislation relating to Scotland 
could be passed by Scottish Conservatives no longer directly representing Scotland. 
Moreover, Forbes Mackenzie continued his involvement in Scottish party affairs, 
keeping Derby informed of the goings-on in Edinburghshire and other places.133  
After 1847, the ever-decreasing number of winnable Scottish seats 
encouraged ambitious Scottish Conservatives to migrate southwards, resulting in a 
proportionately larger number of Scottish Conservatives representing English 
constituencies. Indeed, one of the most prominent exiles sitting on the backbenches 
during the second half of the period was Alexander Baillie-Cochrane, who was 
somewhat unusual insofar as he moved in both directions during the course of his 
career; he sat for Bridport between 1841 and 1847, Lanarkshire between 1857 and 
1859, and then Honiton from that year onwards.134 His base, however, was his estate 
at Lamington in Lanarkshire. His unsuccessful attempt to contest Southampton in 
1852 illustrates the multi-generational diasporic nature of Scots in politics, 
government, and business. Baillie-Cochrane retained the strongest Scottish 
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connections of the candidates. His two Liberal opponents, however, also retained 
more faded connections; Sir Alexander Cockburn was the grandson of the former 
MP for the Linlithgow Burghs, but had been born in what is now Romania while his 
father and mother were on a diplomatic posting.135 Cochrane’s other Liberal 
opponent, Brodie McGhie Willcox, was born in Belgium to an English father and 
Scottish mother, and brought up in northern England. He proceeded to follow closely 
in the footsteps of his London-based Scottish shipbuilder uncle, Augustus Brodie 
McGhie, and eventually co-founded P&O with Arthur Anderson, a native of the 
Shetland Islands.136  
By the 1860s, even those Scottish Conservatives who had obstinately clung to 
their native residence, despairing of the situation at home, were considering 
migration. In 1834, Archibald Alison had refused the national post of Solicitor-
General, preferring to reside in Lanarkshire as Sheriff of that county. By 1862 
though, he was seriously considering responding a requisition from the electors of 
Lambeth to stand in a by-election there.137 He eventually declined, but his son wrote 
to Disraeli, assuring him that his father hoped to ‘have the pleasure of sitting with 
Disraeli on the ministerial side of the House of Commons’ in due course.138 Disraeli 
and Alison appear to have enjoyed a cordial and fairly warm relationship, despite the 
former having lampooned Alison in Coningsby as the longwinded Mr. Wordy.139 
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Alison, by then in his seventies, did not in the event stand for election before his 
death in 1867.  
Perhaps the single most capable Scottish Conservative MP in the mid-
Victorian period was Sir James Fergusson, MP for Ayrshire from 1854 to 1857, as 
well as 1859 to 1868. His rocky parliamentary career illustrates why so many 
Scottish Conservatives had migrated, though he was only forced southward 
permanently after 1868. Initially brought in for Ayrshire at a by-election, Fergusson 
was only confirmed as MP after a hostile petition had been seen off.140 Three years 
later, he lost the seat by a thin margin to a Liberal at the general election of 1857. 
Still desirous of a career in parliament, he asked Disraeli to use his influence 
to find him another seat, and wrote to Jolliffe in a similar vein.141 He was invited by 
Philip Rose to contest Cambridge, but he thought it impossible for him to run without 
‘assistance from the party’, as he had already ‘stood two county contests in two years 
and a half almost entirely at my own expense’.142 He eventually contested Sandwich 
in 1859, losing out on a seat by a mere fifty-four votes.143 Crushed by yet another 
defeat, he offered abject apologies to Jolliffe, ruefully commenting that ‘Providence 
intended me to be a Scotch laird and not [an] MP’.144 Later in 1859, however, the 
sitting member for Ayrshire passed away, and Fergusson was able to come in again 
for the county at another by-election, though again by a small margin, this time forty-
six votes out of an electorate of 4,072.145 Though unopposed in 1865, he left 
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parliament altogether in 1868 when the constituency was split by the Second Reform 
Act. After some time out of Westminster, he spent the rest of his parliamentary 
career as a member for Manchester. It is notable that despite this chequered career, 
he did advise Disraeli on Scottish matters.146 Fergusson was very much the exception 
to the rule; very few were willing to make such strenuous, repeated, and expensive 
efforts for such a tenuous hold on a Scottish seat.  
English-based Scots, though often talented and possessing a deep interest in 
Scottish affairs, were, in the words of Hanham, ‘by no means leaders in Scotland’.147 
Though a significant part of the Scottish party, they could not take on a managing 
role. The perils of attempting to balance engaging in Scottish business with an 
English electoral base was amply illustrated by James Caird. A native of Stranraer, 
he unsuccessfully contested Wigtown Burghs as a Liberal Conservative in 1852.148 
He was eventually returned for Dartmouth as a Liberal in 1857, but in 1859 he 
decided not to recontest that seat, having irritated his constituents by spending much 
of his time in parliament on promoting an effort to merge the county franchise of 
Scotland with that of England.149  
This tendency to move southwards continued after 1868; an 1878 committee 
of leading Scottish Conservatives, convened to assess what could be done to revive 
the party, were (with one exception) all Scots by education and residence, but ‘most 
of them had weakened their northern connection’.150 This was unsurprising, as 
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though their numbers had recovered somewhat by the time of the report, only six 
Scottish Conservative MPs were elected in 1868. The existence of a large section of 
the Scottish party outside of Scotland serves as a useful reminder of the problematic 
definition of ‘Scotland’ as an entity which exists in a variety of spaces outside of the 
territorial.151 Its reach extended beyond its borders; just as the rest of the 
Conservative party had a marked effect on Scotland, so did Scottish Conservatives 
(and Scottish conservatism) have a marked effect on the wider UK party. 
Nonetheless, there were definite limits to this, as illustrated by the varied 
experiences of different exiles. For one, parliament, in addition to its role as national 
legislature, was also the arena in which many local matters were negotiated, debated, 
and legislated for, guarding ‘the interests of local power as a national institution 
serving local purposes’.152 Deprived of a Scottish territorial and electoral base, the 
scope of activity which exiles could engage in was limited. This was a crucial 
distinction, as the representation of ‘local’ interests was an integral element of an 
MPs’ duties – indeed, it has been suggested that Scottish and Welsh MPs focused 
more on local issues than was the norm.153 Moreover, the ties of background, family, 
social acquaintance, and cultural attachment were subject to deterioration; when 
Buccleuch’s son declined to act as Derby’s Minister for Scotland because he had 
little experience of local politics in Scotland, he thought it a ‘further hindrance living 
in Hampshire, [as] he would have every year less means of acquiring the necessary 
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information’.154 This was despite his position as MP for Selkirkshire, suggesting that 
even those with Scottish electoral bases could find themselves gradually moving 
away from the territorial Scottish party.  
The Forbes-Mackenzie Act, a national piece of legislation promoted by a 
Scot representing English electors, was within the scope of exiles. Local activities 
directly affecting the individual counties and burghs were not. Exiles played a more 
prominent role in Scottish affairs as the period progressed, taking an active interest in 
Scottish parliamentary business and going so far as to spearhead Scottish legislation. 
However, this was an overall hindrance to the Scottish party, as these activities seem 
to have done little to promote the interests of the Scottish party within Scotland itself, 
especially on the local and electoral level. Indeed, their interventions may have been 
more tone-deaf than would otherwise have been the case, given their relative lack of 
everyday interaction with Scots on the ground. Their substantial role illustrates the 
extent to which Scottish Conservatives were integrated into the wider national party, 
and vice versa. Conversely, the limitations inherent in their activities highlights the 
aspects of the party that were unquestionably Scottish in a territorial sense, distinct 





Ultimately, the party in Scotland was most distinctively ‘Scottish’ on a local level, 
and least distinctive in the Houses of Parliament and the Carlton Club. Nevertheless, 
                                                          




there were significant elements of the Westminster party’s configuration which 
indicate that the separate nature of Scotland and Scottish affairs was understood and 
accommodated within the party apparatus. Separate arrangements were made for the 
organisation and coordination of Scottish MPs, both in terms of legislative activity, 
and within the bounds of the party. Separate whipping arrangements were pursued, 
and the party leadership made an effort to consult and gather Scottish MPs when a 
bill had particular relevance to that country. In addition to these top-down initiatives, 
much of the distinctiveness to be found in the Scottish contingent was independently 
inspired. Scottish MPs (and those MPs with an interest in Scotland) were active in 
carving out their own separate niche. This niche included the outside meeting of 
members to discuss and negotiate on Scottish legislation and maintaining lines of 
communication with the party leadership. The informal and strictly functional nature 
of this niche, however, was at least partly deliberate. Suspicion of formal territorial 
groupings, especially in a parliamentary context, was likely shared by many 
Conservatives. Indeed, the UK party itself within parliament was not a rigidly 
systematic entity.  
In the House of Lords, party organisation was also pursued along territorial 
lines. This involved whipping (though of a more persuasive character), and at one 
time included an institutional arrangement intended to organise the legal 
interpretation of Scottish bills. There were also gatherings of Scottish peers – both 
Scots with British peerages and Scottish representative peers. The Sixteen, being 
elected, were perhaps the most institutionally politicised peers in the land – their 
places in the Lords were subject to periodic election, a process that was arranged and 
tightly controlled by the leaders of the Scottish Conservative party. Overall, though 
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operating within what might be seen as the institutional embodiment of Union, the 
Scottish Conservatives nevertheless managed, within wider party organisation, to 
maintain a modicum of distinctiveness.  
The distinctiveness of Scotland in legal and governmental terms was also 
acknowledged by the party. The Conservative Lords Advocate and Solicitors-
General up until 1847 were dedicated and largely effective administrators, in 
addition to being loyal party members. Indeed, partisan considerations played a 
central role in their appointment, election to the Commons, and the decisions which 
they made while in office. After 1847, however, short periods in government, the 
lure of the Scottish Bench, and a lack of contestable Scottish seats meant that finding 
effective figures to serve in these offices was almost impossible. 
The party’s relationship with the Scottish legal profession was less 
conspicuous, but nevertheless highly significant. A number of in-built advantages 
enabled them to exert a disproportionate sway over the legal profession, and 
consequently the everyday regulation of Scottish society. In particular, the 
favourable composition of the Faculty of Advocates and subsequent political 
inclinations of Sheriffs enabled them to influence county governance, as well as the 
work of the various local and national boards which increasingly administered 
Scotland’s social welfare. Though these bodies were by-and-large liberal in 
composition, the party was nevertheless able to make its presence felt.  
Conservatives influenced Scottish governance at every level, from national to 
local. These combined levels can arguably be termed a Scottish state. States are not 




regard to Scotland in this period.155 Beyond the formal mishmash of municipal 
authorities and boards, a great deal of Scotland’s society was shaped by institutions 
embedded in civil society.  
Much debate has been generated on the role of urban civil society in the 
transformation of Victorian Scotland. Graeme Morton’s work concentrates on civil 
society in urban areas, asserting that ‘however a definition of civil society is 
sharpened, its practical content – as far as contemporaries were concerned – existed 
in the town and city’.156 Scotland was certainly a rapidly urbanising country, and 
Morris observes that the 1851 census places one in five of the Scottish population in 
the cities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Dundee, with 39.4 percent residing 
in settlements of over 5,000 by 1861.157 Nevertheless, just over sixty per cent did not. 
They resided in rural areas, and in smaller towns, which were themselves deeply 
embedded in the social culture of the surrounding countryside.158 Given the 
urban/rural partisan divide of the mid-Victorian period, the history of urban Scotland 
has often been, to an extent, implicitly the history of Liberal Scotland. Inadvertent 
conflation of the two has, perhaps, resulted in both being assigned greater 
prominence than they deserve. Just as Scotland was not as Liberal as has been 
assumed, neither was Scottish civil society as urban. The influence of the 
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Conservative party, and of rural forces, on the character of Scottish civil society is 
thus deserving of further examination.  
Alongside this, Westminster party leaders were also involved in Scottish 
affairs. Far from neglecting Scotland, prominent Conservatives were closely 
involved in Scottish politics. Figures including Sir James Graham, Aberdeen, and 
Peel were well-versed in Scottish particularities, often more so than their Liberal 
equivalents. Further, the assumption that central party interest in Scotland declined 
after 1846 is flawed; Derby and Disraeli showed a strong interest in Scotland. The 
deteriorating state of the party within Scotland itself encouraged them to innovate, in 
exploring new avenues of communication and potential administrative reform.  
Below this senior level, moreover, MPs and other party figures with Scottish 
links and interests constituted a Scottish party in exile. These exiles played a 
prominent, though heretofore unacknowledged role in Scottish politics, despite not 
being resident in Scotland or possessing a native electoral base. The myriad activities 
of this widely dispersed group illustrate the extent to which the Scottish Conservative 
party was embedded within a greater UK Conservative party, and that Scots both 
within and outside of Scotland could have a marked effect on the character of the UK 
party. Conversely, the inherent limitations in the scope of their activity serves to 
highlight the areas in which the Scottish Conservative party was, in a territorial 
sense, autonomous and distinctive within the British Conservative party.  
The party in its British and governmental context is the most difficult to shed 
light on, as the identity of discrete Scottish strands is complicated by the overarching 
nature of the Westminster legislative system, as well as the mixed and opaque nature 




that the Scottish Conservative party had notable influence over the wider party, local 
and national government, and wider Scottish society. Concurrently, the Conservative 






























CHAPTER FOUR: SCOTTISH CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF 
REFORM 
 
The Scottish Conservative party (and the Conservative party more generally) was a 
composite entity up until the Corn Law split in 1846, both within parliament and in 
the country. It contained several different overlapping and fluctuating factions. These 
included what some historians have labelled ‘ultra tories’, ‘romantic conservatives’, 
‘tory radicals’, ‘country tories’, and ‘liberal conservatives’.1 The size, influence, and 
actions of these groups varied over time, with internal tensions being a strong 
indicator of the party’s internal vitality. As will be demonstrated, the Scottish party 
outside of parliament was predominantly country tory in character, with other brands 
of conservatism occupying subordinate positions. However, the party did not exhibit 
a separate and systematic Scottish ideology, here defined as an organised value-
system underpinned by distinctive social and economic theories. Though the Scottish 
balance of conservatism was different to the party in other parts of the UK, it was 
still a variant of British conservative ideology. As such, the following discussion will 
primarily explore Scottish variants of a broadly defined British conservative 
worldview. There was no Scottish equivalent of the Independent Irish party; indeed, 
becoming a separate force did not enter the mind of any Scottish MP, regardless of 
their party allegiance. If the Scottish Conservative party had developed its own 
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ideology, as opposed to somewhat variable attitudes on sets of issues, this would 
have been clearly evident in parliament.  
The parliamentary Conservative party in the 1830s and, to a lesser extent, 
1840s was conspicuously harmonious, and prided itself on its ability to maintain a 
generally united front.2 This unity was aided by the very nature of the party led by 
Peel; as Norman Gash has pointed out, ‘Conservatism in theory and the 
“Conservative party” in practice were two separate things’.3 As such, the 
superficially united broader party contained divergent strands of conservatism, which 
was reflected in the ‘independent’ nature of many of its adherents. Divisions within 
the parliamentary party, however, were generally more muted. This bolstered the 
ability of the those in Westminster, not strictly beholden to their party allies or wider 
electoral base, to follow their own course.  
The most problematic issue facing the various factions of Scottish 
conservatism was the Church crisis, which cut across internal factional lines, as well 
as external party ones. This originally concerned Church Extension, which aimed to 
expand the Church of Scotland’s reach into the rapidly growing cities through the use 
of public funds. Increasing polarisation within the Church and in wider society was 
fuelled by the progressively more vigorous demands of Evangelical Non-
Intrusionists, who infuriated the Church’s Moderate faction by attempting to prevent 
patrons from ‘intruding’ a minister on a parish against the wishes of its congregation. 
This issue was one facet of broader tensions relating to the relationship between 
church and state which preoccupied many throughout the UK, and which had long 
                                                          
2 D.H. Close, ‘The Formation of a Two-Party Alignment in the House of Commons between 1832 and 
1841’, EHR, 84 (1969), 269. 
3 Norman Gash, ‘Peel and the Party System, 1830–50’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 




been an issue in Scotland.4 A combination of wider British and explicitly Scottish 
factors led to its exacerbation north of the border in the 1830s.5 Legal rulings which 
thwarted Non-Intrusionist efforts in the parishes brought into question the separation 
of temporal and spiritual authority in relation to the Scottish Established Church. The 
crisis threatened to devastate the Scottish party, and set significant elements of it in 
direct opposition to the UK party leadership. Nevertheless, the conclusion to the 
crisis, though harmful to the Scottish party in a popular sense, did not create a 
significant internal split. As will be explored, though the party contained a wide 




I. Traditional Tories, Ultras, and Reaction to Reform 
 
The attitudes of ultra tories towards Reform were not entirely the result of knee-jerk 
rejections of change. For various reasons, they were strongly opposed to the new 
electoral system, particularly the new ‘tenpounder’ voters. Though ultras were 
initially strong within the Scottish party, their influence declined steeply during the 
1830s. Despite this, their residual power impaired the party’s attempts to rehabilitate 
its public reputation. Though the 1832 election in Scotland was fought on the same 
set of issues as elsewhere in the UK, the longstanding reputation of pre-Reform 
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Scottish tories as particularly reactionary and authoritarian had a marked impact; the 
party lost proportionately more seats than the UK party as a whole.  
The rank-and-file of the post-Reform Scottish party, like elsewhere in the 
UK, tended towards a more uncompromising anti-reformist position than its leaders, 
who operated within a parliamentary context which required negotiation and 
compromise.6 One minor Scottish laird, Sir Duncan Cameron of Fassifern, wrote to 
his cousin that ‘I cannot describe how much I disapprove of the Reform bill, and … I 
will make every exertion ... to go and vote for a Tory candidate’.7 Archibald Alison 
had written a series of articles in 1831 and 1832 explicitly comparing Reform at 
home to the French Revolution abroad, and this apocalyptic attitude lingered in the 
Scottish Conservative mindset for a few years at least after 1832.8 Despite some 
obstinacy, the prevailing attitude within the Scottish party was nevertheless one of 
begrudging pragmatism – though the Roxburghshire Conservative committee-
member William Scott might assert that, in the wake of Reform, ‘our party is entirely 
paralyzed, and men look to what is passing as they would do a conflagration or a 
flood’, his main concern was that ‘we in Scotland have little or no experience in the 
business of popular elections, and that we must at first feel a little awkward in setting 
about the work’.9 In tune with (or perhaps leading) wider Conservative opinion, 
Alison also immediately emphasised the importance of working efficiently within the 
new political framework.10  
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Though even the more hard-line party members had begun to temper their 
public language, much of the electorate generally reasoned, not unjustifiably, that 
their underlying attitudes had not changed substantially. Even before the passing of 
Reform, some of its opponents had taken to calling themselves ‘moderate 
reformers’.11 Though the Scottish party came to accept the new situation, it never 
embraced it wholeheartedly. After 1832, Edinburghshire MP Sir George Clerk 
warned Peel that, in Scotland, ‘the chance of any Conservative especially one who 
had taken any part in opposing the Reform bill, [is] extremely doubtful’.12 Though 
new candidates might not have opposed Reform, they had not been in parliament at 
the time, and belonged to the party who had opposed it. This was perhaps why, on 
the eve of the Second Reform Acts, Disraeli was informed by a Scottish 
Conservative MP that the continued unpopularity of the Scottish party was partially 
because ‘they can’t tolerate the supremacy of a party that opposed the Reform bill of 
1832 and tried to keep them out of the power in the constitution’.13 
By the mid-1830s, the influence of the ultras within the Scottish party was on 
the wane. Sir James Graham noted that while the Edinburgh party was particularly 
stagnant, ‘in the rest of Scotland the distinction between the Old Tory party and the 
Conservative Reformers is much less strongly marked and maintained’.14 
Traditionalist Edinburgh party members continued to exert a disproportionate 
influence over the party’s overall direction, by virtue of their residence in Scotland’s 
capital. Locally based national bodies, such as the Faculty of Advocates, served to 
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provide traditionalists (especially lawyers) with more enduring institutional bases, 
though change was occurring even within these groups.15 Their decline in Scotland 
more generally, however, was quite rapid. In practice, ultras made an active effort to 
compromise with other emerging forms of conservatism, or at least to keep their 
dissension out of the public sphere. 
This was all, however, generally overlooked by the public. As such, 
Conservatives remained useful bogeymen for other parties. Politicians such as Fox 
Maule in Perthshire regularly described their party’s candidates as a ‘real Tory sort, a 
remnant of the old system’, and used proposers who could describe themselves as ‘a 
strenuous advocate of the Reform bill, – he was still a Reformer’.16 Though 
Scotland’s popular politics before 1832 had been spirited, the principles of the 
emergent middle-class electorate had nevertheless been galvanised by the Reform 
issue, to the detriment of the Conservative party.17 John Phillips has argued that the 
growth of party loyalties in the English boroughs stemmed from the heated debate 
over the Reform Bills themselves – this was also a significant catalyst in Scotland’s 
cities.18 There is ample evidence that electors supported the Liberals and Whigs out 
of gratitude for their role in passing Reform. One Ross-shire and Cromarty voter, for 
instance, informed the Liberal candidate that ‘Were I actuated by personal feelings 
and friendships, I should certainly give my humble support to the Conservatives’ – 
because, however, the Liberals had given him the vote, he would ‘from a feeling of 
gratitude… endeavour to influence others’.19 Such attitudes were present even in the 
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Conservatives’ most reliable voting bloc – the rural tenantry. In Perthshire, a local 
laird informed Peel that in 1832 the ‘feuars were joined by many of the tenantry from 
a feeling of gratitude to the party which had extended the franchise to them’.20  
Yet, even the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, Sir John Hope, who in many 
ways epitomised the old Scottish Tories, was aware of the ‘jealousy and distrust of 
the constant parade in front of them of the names of those they know before as the 
active partisans of the old and somewhat ultra Scotch Tory party’ – he went on to 
state that ‘Of that party, I must avow, the Scotch are thoroughly tired, and that 
feeling was one of the strongest which actuated Scotland in 1831–2’.21 He evidently 
did not consider himself to be one of the ‘ultra Scotch’ Tories. This indicates that 
Scottish ultras, like their southern counterparts, possessed a more complex and 
nuanced set of views than has often been assumed.22 Though they were not merely 
one-dimensional reactionaries, many new electors and the Conservative gentry were, 
to put it mildly, not fond of one another. The Scottish Reform Act had created a new 
class of elector – £10 proprietors in the villages of county constituencies and burgh 
districts. These were proportionately more likely to be religious nonconformists and 
staunch supporters of Reform. Their hostility to the party was recognised, with the 
feuars in the villages thought to be ‘with few exceptions radical in their opinions, and 
would at all times vote for any demagogue’.23 These electors were the object of 
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particular attention (and contempt) by party members because of the ability of the 
‘town element’ to challenge the party’s dominance of rural seats.24  
Their attitude towards this very specific group, expressed in the candour of 
private correspondence, reveals the core attitude of party members towards this 
‘element’. A former Scottish Tory MP, W.R. Keith Douglas, told Buccleuch that ‘the 
feeling among the Shopocracy, the lower grades of the land, and the master 
tradesmen of Scotland, at least of this part of Scotland [Dumfries], is one of deep 
malignity and hatred towards conservatism’.25 The contemptuous way in which he 
described the tenpounders illustrates the depth of the hostility felt by Conservatives 
towards their enfranchisement. He sent a subsequent letter to Buccleuch stating that 
‘Democracy [was] … desired… [by the] majority of the town population of 
Scotland’.26 The hostility, therefore, stemmed at least in part from a belief that new 
urban electors would be the core catalyst for further constitutional change, which 
would subsequently bring about societal collapse. Lord Melville, former leader of the 
old Scottish Tory party, concurred in this opinion of ‘the abominable ten pounders 
both in counties, and still more in burghs’.27 Sir John Hope was even more explicit 
and scathing: ‘Our £10 voters in town and country are sour, unwilling, hard, 
unrelenting, and conceited Democrats’.28  
The Conservative party made spirited efforts to regain lost ground ‘by 
purchasing ten-pound properties, and thereby getting them out of the hands of a class 
of men who can never be depended upon, and who should never, for their own sakes, 
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have been entrusted with the franchise’.29 As Reform could not be undone, Scottish 
Conservatives were determined to ensure that (what they perceived to be) the 
destructive tendencies of the new system were minimised. As such, their vigorous 
efforts in fighting registration battles and manufacturing fictitious votes were not 
merely practical actions. Rather, these efforts were perceived to be essential to the 
survival of society. According to their worldview, the ideal balanced constitution of 
the United Kingdom, a blend of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy embodied by 
the Crown, Lords, and Commons respectively, had been destabilised by Reform. 
This, in their view, vested too much power in ‘democratic’ forces. Efforts to exclude 
new electors and create client electors were an informal way to rebalance it on a local 
and practical level.30 The Scottish Conservative party did not, therefore, eschew a 
policy-centred electoral strategy in favour of such tactics. Registration and vote-
making themselves constituted a fundamental political policy, rooted in a deeply held 
conceptual worldview.  
These attitudes were the most influential, but were not comprehensively so. 
Opinions of the tenpounders within the party were not uniformly negative. As early 
as 1832, the Roxburghshire Conservative committee thought it imperative to form an 
association ‘open to all … even the decent £10 freeholder … there must be no black-
balling of want of birth or rank’.31 There were, therefore, some in the party who 
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advocated a positive relationship between landowners and urban electors, and made 
practical suggestions to bring this about. There were also tentative indications that 
tenpounders could be successfully courted, such as in Argyllshire, where ‘a 
Conservative candidate has stated that a new friendly disposition has been evinced 
by the village tenpounders, and … the [progress] of the canvass has greatly exceeded 
the most sanguine expectation of the Conservatives’.32 In general, however, the new 
Conservative organisations tended to be somewhat, though not entirely, exclusive.33 
Overall, the Scottish ultras were a strong internal force in the years 
immediately following 1832, but declined rapidly during the course of the 1830s. 
Many of these hardliners made limited efforts to engage positively with the new set 
of circumstances, illustrating that they were not merely simplistic reactionaries. 
Indeed, some gradually evolved towards a more country tory mindset. Nevertheless, 
their attitude towards many of the new electors, which was shared to some extent by 
other conservative factions, was the main impetus for the strategy of influence and 




II. Romantic and Radical Conservatism 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given its situation in the country of Sir Walter Scott, the 
Scottish party contained a distinct vein of romantic conservatism. These 
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conservatives were particularly uneasy about the effects of industrial growth and 
rationalism on society, and strongly supported religion as a pillar of social order. 
Like country tories and tory radicals, the ideal society, as envisioned by romantics, 
was agrarian and deferential. However, unlike these other groups, romantics were of 
a distinctly literary inclination. This literary interest was expressed through the 
particular veneration of a supposedly utopian medieval past.34 Radical conservatism 
north of the border was almost non-existent, but a peculiarly Scottish romantic 
conservatism was evident in the Scottish party. It was, however, at this time, a fairly 
integrated subset of British romantic conservatism. Primarily, this was because, 
despite spirited efforts, Scotland was not fertile ground for any sort of politicised 
conservative romanticism.  
Unique strains of Scottish toryism before 1832 can be traced back to native 
forces, as it was not merely an English import.35 As such, the party in Scotland owed 
its existence to a process of territorial diffusion, rather than outside penetration.36 
The association of toryism with a romantic notion of Scottish national identity had its 
root in the late eighteenth century, as Henry Dundas played a role in shaping a tory 
vision of Union. This vision promoted Scotland’s imperial and governmental 
participation in Britain and its Empire, while still retaining many of its ancient 
institutions. Later, the enormous popularity of the Sir Walter Scott continued to 
promote, in a cultural sense, the constitutional principles of Dundas after his fall 
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from grace.37 Scott has been credited with ‘creating the community of Scotland by 
imagining it’, and his influence on romanticism and Scottish conservative politics 
continued long after his death in 1832.38  
The Scottish Conservative party sought to utilise this version of history to 
create an image of a ‘natural’ Scottish society which was, above all, paternal. The 
paternalism of Scotland’s Conservatives was typified by a desire to promote a 
society defined by four main characteristics. Such societies were to be authoritarian, 
hierarchical, organic, and pluralistic.39 Thus, society would be governed with rigour 
by the aristocracy, and characterised by a hierarchical separation between the 
propertied and those who depended on them. However, each individual was thought 
to possess both organic duties and reciprocal rights. Additionally, such a pluralistic 
society would emphasise the personal and the local, with the most important 
hierarchical relationships existing within the bounds of landed estates, parishes, and 
other such immediate spheres.40 This elitist and deferential model stood in marked 
contrast to the image of Scotland and its past which eventually found its political 
expression in liberalism – respectable, independent, middle class, and pious.41 
Scottish identity contained strong elements of an ‘Anglo-British’ identity which 
emphasised English constitutional history and liberties, and Scottish reformers were 
able to appropriate this to create a ‘patriotic consensus’, emphasising the overarching 
Britishness of liberty. Scottish Tory anti-Reformers, by contrast, had focused their 
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arguments on the practical advantages of Scotland’s de-facto ‘semi-independence’, 
an argument which by this point ran contrary to the public mood.42  
This public mood effectively excluded the party from urban Scotland in terms 
of parliamentary elections from 1832 onwards. In promoting the erection of public 
monuments and buildings however, Scottish Conservatives were still able to make 
their influence felt in urban Scotland. One of the most prominent of these efforts was 
the party’s role in promoting the erection of the Wellington statue in Edinburgh. 
Though these efforts reveal the competing forces at play within Scottish and British 
conservatism, they were notable failures in their political objects; such Conservative-
promoted statues did not have a galvanising effect on urban opinion.43 More 
explicitly Scottish projects were embarked upon with the aim of promoting a 
distinctively conservative vision of society past and present, including the Robert 
Burns festival of 1844, in which the Earl of Eglinton played a prominent part.44 
Eglinton was the most prominent Scottish party member who vigorously promoted 
romanticism. His political outlook was influenced, but not defined, by this; though he 
objected to the effects of modern technological advances on society, he did not 
object to technology itself, and his own business interests included iron, coal, and 
railways. 
The Burns festival represented an attempt by the party to expand beyond their 
domination of Walter Scott’s legacy, which had been heavily alluded to in the 
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chivalric elements of Eglinton’s 1839 tournament. They sought to appropriate the 
public memory of Burns for their cause, despite his more general association with 
radical and democratic ideals.45 Though the festival met with public approbation, the 
attempt to associate the memory of Burns with an elitist and paternalist worldview 
was unsuccessful.46 Even Punch, usually tone-deaf when it came to Scottish issues, 
shrewdly observed that there was ‘a deep meaning’ in the fifteen-shilling ticket price 
of the festival, intended as an ‘unerring test of the sincerity of the heart through the 
breeches pocket’, ensuring that the event was socially exclusive.47  
Moreover, in the practical world of electoral politics, romantic appeals rarely 
made an appearance, reflecting the fact that romanticism, though a significant 
underlying element of the Scottish party, was not dominant. Isolated candidates, such 
as Maitland Makgill Crichton in 1840, appealed to such sentiments by calling for 
‘Scotland [to be] represented solely by her own true-hearted sons, and those 
unfruitful exotic uprooted and cast forth … [as then] the claims of our country would 
command more respect’, but these were very much the exceptions to the rule.48 
Though efforts such as the Burns festival were failures in terms of political 
conversion, they did reinforce the landowner’s place in local county politics through 
the exercise of ‘soft power’.49 Further, they reinforced and strengthened a romantic 
version of Scottish national identity which would go on to play a prominent part in 
the party’s activity in the mid-Victorian period.50  
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The main outlet for Scottish conservative romanticism was in the wider 
British party. While Eglinton’s 1839 medieval tournament was distinctively Scottish 
in some ways, it was also part of a larger British enthusiasm for such events; indeed, 
one attendee commented that ‘all London, if not all England, was there’.51 This was 
perhaps because the most romantically inclined Scottish Conservatives were, in this 
period, almost completely integrated into the overall phenomenon of British romantic 
conservatism. Eglinton’s neighbour and friend, Alexander Baillie-Cochrane, went on 
to become a member of Young England. Cochrane later spoke at length about the 
deep effect Eglinton’s tournament had on his own ideological development, despite 
that fact that he had been unable to attend: ‘I was a very young man then; but I heard 
so much about it, I feel as if I had been present at it’.52 Even before the formation of 
Young England, some of their romantic forerunners in the political sphere had been 
Scottish, such as Robert Monteith, a member of the Cambridge Apostles who twice 
contested Glasgow for the Conservatives.53 Similarly, Peter Borthwick, the 
romantically inclined MP for Evesham, was a Scot by birth and education.54  
Though dismissed as the purveyors of ‘light-hearted mysticism’, Young 
England nevertheless represented a distinct and briefly significant strand of 
conservatism in the 1840s.55 It sought to restore the ideal of compassionate 
paternalist leadership, and looked to an idealised medieval society as its model.56 
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Baillie-Cochrane was the oldest, richest, and ‘most obviously Byronic’ of the Young 
Englanders. He was certainly closer to the core group than another Scottish member, 
Henry Baillie, brother-in-law of Young Englander George Smythe and MP for 
Inverness-shire.57 Though Cochrane claimed in his memoir to be an outsider, his 
surviving correspondence does not bear this out.58 Lord John Manners, one of Young 
England’s core members, wrote that Cochrane should, with ‘Disraeli, and Smythe, 
settle what you can, draw up an alliance, enact a code of laws – and then I will do all 
I can to subscribe to it’.59  
Cochrane had even written a novel which touched on many of the themes 
explored in Disraeli’s Sybil. Moreover, in an interesting example of intellectual 
cross-pollination, Disraeli recreated the Eglinton tournament in his novel Endymion 
(though without the torrential rain which had marred the occasion).60 Alex Tyrrell 
has recently suggested that Eglinton’s tournament was intended to be a ‘Scottish 
version of Young England’.61 In fact, as the tournament preceded the formation of 
Young England, it is more accurate to see Young England as a British version of 
Eglinton’s tournament. The procession of country house visits which had heavily 
influenced the Young Englanders’ worldview most definitely included Scottish 
estates. Lord John Manners, for instance, was a regular visitor to Scotland, and at one 
point in 1844 wrote to Cochrane that he had ‘been making a fool of myself at Gordon 
Castle’ and was shortly to be ‘off to Culloden!!’.62 Similarly, Disraeli had visited 
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Scotland in 1825, when he visited the Abbotsford estate to meet Sir Walter Scott.63 
Given Scotland’s prominent role in the romantic movement, it is unsurprising that 
the Scottish Conservative party contained some romantic elements. What is more 
interesting, however, is their relative lack of prominence. Rather than build a Young 
Scotland, romantically inclined Scottish Conservatives instead helped to make 
Young England a more British movement. As such, between 1832 and the late 
1840s, Scottish Conservative romanticism’s most important effect was to give a 
noticeably Scottish colour to the wider British movement.  
Another strand of British conservatism in the 1830s and 1840s, tory 
radicalism, focused more closely on the practical realities of living standards. This 
vein was distinguished by its support for popular, bordering on radical, solutions to 
the Condition of England question.64 Peel adopted a strategy of fostering alliance 
between the landed and middle classes. Tory radicals, on the other hand, sought to 
unite the interests of the working and landed classes. Though many Scottish 
conservatives were distinctly uneasy about the effects of industrialisation, they 
balked at the idea of forging alliances with those most affected by it. Scottish 
conservatives were conspicuously absent in the Factory Hours movement, with only 
a few isolated party members outside of parliament expressing support for its aims.65 
Moreover, the extremely negative attitude of the Scottish party towards Chartism 
confirms that it was particularly unsympathetic to radicalism.66 While some such as 
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Alison had limited sympathy for their general goals, they had absolutely none for the 
manner in which the Chartists sought to realise them.67 Further, though some Chartist 
votes were tactically given to Conservative candidates in the election of 1841, there 
was little love lost between them.68  
Overall, then, the Scottish Conservative party were even less enthusiastic 
about the prospect of radical-aristocratic alliances than their English counterparts. 
Rather, their efforts in Scotland were strongly focused on courting the rural tenantry, 
the ‘respectable’ middle classes above the tenpounder level, and on creating votes for 
those whom they deemed ‘respectable’. Additionally, though Scottish conservatism 
contained significant romantic elements, their efforts to convert this into political 
support were unsuccessful, and efforts were thus diverted into wider British streams 
of romantic conservatism. Instead, country tories emerged as the strongest single 
group within the party.  
 
 
III. Scottish Country Tories 
 
The landed class made up the bulk of the Scottish Conservative party. Their 
conceptual outlook, and thus the dominant outlook of the party, was profoundly 
influenced by their position (or self-identified position) in the social hierarchy. The 
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dominance of this group was not completely reflected in the composition of the 
party’s Commons cohort, but it was nevertheless significant.69 The Scottish 
Conservative gentry, like their counterparts in other parts of the UK, viewed 
parliament as a vital element of the balanced constitution. Though they were perhaps 
slightly more influenced by Enlightenment values and authoritarian beliefs than their 
southern counterparts, their primary concerns remained centred on localism, 
hierarchy, deference, and the maintenance of an agrarian society through protection. 
The Scottish Conservative party, both in and out of parliament, was deeply attached 
to paternalist principles. As David Roberts has pointed out, the positive expression of 
paternalism was not easy in a parliamentary context; ‘patriarchal government’ was 
essentially a local and personal concept, inherently unsuited to the formal and 
national nature of Westminster governance.70 Nevertheless, paternalism of a 
traditionalist ‘country tory’ type was the bedrock on which Scottish conservatism 
was built.  
Some conservative squires thought that agricultural tenants should be 
encouraged to participate in a newly enlarged party. This view was certainly more 
internally popular than the courting of tenpounders. One Perthshire Conservative 
complained to Peel that the county gentry did not involve their tenants in local 
politics, ‘perhaps from the remnants of feudal feelings in Scotland, are still too much 
looked down upon as dependants or serfs’.71 There was, therefore, a section of the 
party which recognised that it was in their interest to involve the tenantry in politics 
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on somewhat more equal terms. However, this attitude was by no means 
overpowering. As a rule, the ‘dependants or serfs’ attitude deeply permeated the 
Conservative gentry’s outlook, though they took great care not to betray this in their 
public utterances. Even the hardliner third Duke of Montrose wrote to his Factor 
before an election to politely express his hope that ‘friends, tenants and followers … 
will not engage themselves on the destructive side of the question’.72 Many members 
of the new Conservative Associations were socially inferior to the gentry, though 
well above tenpounders.73 The Stirlingshire Conservative Association, for instance, 
included a schoolmaster, distiller, and two land agents.74  
This hierarchical and paternalist attitude was generally similar to that of the 
English gentry. However, one aspect which was peculiar to Scotland’s landowning 
class (though perhaps not to Ireland’s) was the extent to which this was bolstered by 
a particularly robust sense of authoritarianism. The old Dundas Tory interest had 
been notorious for its authoritarianism from the 1790s onwards, and though this had 
mellowed by the 1830s, it was still markedly stronger than south of the border. This 
mindset was not most evident in the generally more quiescent Scottish countryside, 
however.75 Rather, it manifested itself in the party’s uncompromising attitude 
towards urban disorder. Though the Home Secretary was nominally in charge of 
public order in Scotland, in practice this responsibility fell to the Lord Advocate. 
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There was significant disorder when Conservatives were in office, such as in 1842 
when Lord Advocate Sir William Rae was terminally ill but refused to delegate 
responsibility. Because of this, Sir James Graham wrote to Rae’s deputy, Solicitor-
General Duncan McNeill, ordering him to ‘take charge of the Public Peace: and the 
Commander of the Forces has been ordered to obey your requisitions for military 
assistance … The state of the country will allow no hesitation or want of vigour at 
headquarters’.76 Though sanctioned in an official sense by Whitehall, such decisions 
were in practice made at the discretion of government officers in Edinburgh.77  
Below the level of national governance, local law officers (a disproportionate 
number of whom were Conservative) were also responsible for the maintenance of 
local order. Archibald Alison, in addition to his intellectual pursuits, was also the 
Sheriff of Lanarkshire, at this time the most rapidly industrialising and restless region 
of Scotland. His lengthy tenure provides a telling example of how Scottish 
conservatism’s authoritarian paternalism could impinge on urban and industrial 
Scotland. When responsible for maintaining order in Lanarkshire in the run-up to the 
1835 elections, he believed that Liberals might even have resorted to systematised 
violence if their majorities had not been so secure.78 Though in favour of social 
reforms, he also strongly believed in public executions, and that the core cause of 
criminal behaviour was ‘human wickedness’.79 Indeed, he had become notorious by 
the late 1840s for putting down any hint of disorderly behaviour by force, especially 
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during the cotton-spinners strike of 1837–8, the riot and miners’ strike at Airdrie of 
1842, and the local Chartist unrest of 1848.80  
In the rural localities, a great many Conservatives were responsible for 
maintaining the peace; during the 1835 election, for instance, violence in the 
Roxburghshire polling town of Hawick provoked the Conservative Lord Lieutenant, 
Lord Lothian, to order military intervention. This action was essentially a 
propaganda gift to the local opposition.81 The gentry were also Deputy Lord-
Lieutenants, local militia officers, and board-members of a host of local institutions, 
such as hospitals and schools.82 Their authoritarian tendencies were most strongly 
displayed and reinforced during times of unrest. Though the day-to-day exercise of 
such power was characterised by negotiation and compromise, it nevertheless 
reinforced their perception that their authority was legitimate and justified.  
Even in the realm of private industry, Conservatives made their authoritarian 
leanings abundantly clear.83 In 1837, the Bairds of Gartsherrie, wealthy ironmasters, 
dealt harshly with a strike by their colliers. As James Baird pointed out, ‘The other 
coal masters took no steps to resist it; but we resolved that we would not, if we could 
help it … and we accordingly gave every man notice to quit in fourteen days’. The 
colliers were defeated after fifteen weeks, on the day after the Bairds had 
successfully secured the return a Conservative (Alexander Lockhart) for Lanarkshire 
                                                          
80 Michie, Enlightenment Tory, 69, Chapter 3; see also Ewen Cameron, ‘Internal Policing and Public 
Order, c. 1797 to 1900’, in Edward M. Spiers, Jeremy A. Crang and Matthew J. Strickland (eds), A 
Military History of Scotland (Edinburgh, 2012), 442–5. 
81 See, for instance, Caledonian Mercury, 24 Jan. 1835. 
82 See Appendices F and G.  
83 More generally, research has suggested that paternalism was an implicit but significant feature in 
non-agrarian occupational areas, such as the Midlothian coal industry. See John A. Hassan, ‘The 





at the election: ‘Some of our workmen had hoisted a small flag in honour of Mr. 
Lockhart's return, and as the colliers came forward, one of them … said, “Mr. James, 
you have hoisted your flag today, and we have hauled ours down”’.84 Whether 
originating from the McNeills, Alisons, Lothians or Bairds of the party, it is (to put it 
mildly) unlikely that such authoritarian attitudes won the party many urban admirers.  
If the Conservative party in general drew its support overwhelmingly from 
the counties and landed gentry, this was even more true of its Scottish section. While 
landowners in other parts of the UK also enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the social 
hierarchy, Scotland’s landowning aristocracy was by far the most concentrated; even 
by 1873, more than three-quarters of Scotland’s total land area was owned by only 
580 people.85 Most of these did not make any appreciable mark on the national stage, 
but were nevertheless figures of considerable importance in their own localities. 
They were likely of more importance than their English counterparts, given their 
larger average landholdings, the smaller size of the Scottish professional classes, and 
the relative lack of yeoman landowners in the Scottish countryside. Arguably, these 
local figures had more impact on the everyday life of Scots than senior political 
figures. 
There were different varieties of paternalism within the ranks of the landed 
classes – Scotland, like other parts of the UK, also boasted a stable of Whig 
magnates.86 Nevertheless, a clear majority of Scotland’s aristocracy, from grandees 
to minor proprietors, considered themselves to be Conservative. They drew upon 
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Enlightenment values and ideas which emphasised communitarianism, with the base 
political unit viewed in a corporate rather than individual sense; collective groups 
such as the town interest, manufacturing interest, and agricultural interest were 
perceived as the proper way to conceptualise politics and society.87 Because 
landowners saw themselves as the natural leaders of the all-important agricultural 
interest, it is unsurprising that Scottish Conservatives thought that the ‘natural’ way 
of viewing society was that ‘The conservatives must always have the support of the 
majority of the tenantry … and without the tenpounders the opposite party would not 
make any effectual struggle’.88 Such statements were common in the private 
correspondence of the conservative gentry, but the deeper worldview which 
underpinned such attitudes was rarely made explicitly clear. As Robert Blake 
observed, ‘The great majority of the inarticulate squires who voted against repeal of 
the Corn Laws neither understood nor cared about … romantic, Gothic, high Church, 
quasi-Jacobite notions’.89 The Scottish country tories who were the backbone of the 
party were not concerned with drafting and implementing national programmes or 
policies. Instead, they were primarily focused on working quietly towards the 
maintenance of the status quo in their own immediate spheres of influence.  
Those who actively promoted Scottish paternalism in an intellectual sense 
were somewhat rare. Though he spent his career grappling with the vicissitudes of a 
rapidly growing industrial Scotland, Archibald Alison’s popularity among traditional 
conservatives on both sides of the border was rooted in his own background. Most of 
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those who wrote for periodicals, though urban intellectuals, were either raised or 
attended school in rural areas, and experienced paternalism, authoritarianism, and the 
‘natural’ social hierarchy throughout their lives.90 It is therefore unsurprising that 
many of the reviewers, including Alison, viewed an ideal society as one that was 
commercial, but also paternalist and agrarian – agriculture was held to be superior to 
industry.91 Michael Michie has illustrated that Alison’s work points to a ‘consistent 
appropriation of eighteenth-century themes’. Alison had, in his youth, attended 
lectures by William Robertson, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart, and 
himself asserted in his memoir that he ‘took with … ardour to the study of political 
economy’.92  
If Alison was fairly representative of the average Scottish country tory, this 
illustrates how such adherents were slightly different to their counterparts in the 
English squirearchy. Though they both promoted the maintenance of an agrarian, 
paternalist, and localist society, Scottish country tories were more influenced by the 
tenets of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment – or, at least, the more 
paternalist and elitist aspects of it. Alison, and, by extension, many of his influential 
readers, likely took as their model the agrarian but also commercial society 
visualised and advocated by Adam Smith.93 Purist and uncompromising political 
economic theories, promoting commercial over deferential relationships and Free 
Trade more generally, made Scottish country tories distinctly uneasy. Nevertheless, 
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their own outlook was itself based on more moderate aspects of political economy, 
which included an acceptance of industry and commerce as essential elements of 
society. This was the most fundamental aspect which separated them from the 
backward-looking utopianism of the Young Englanders. They did not reject 
modernity itself, but instead disliked the thick ideological shell which increasingly 
surrounded and justified its more unwholesome aspects. This was evident even in 
romantically inclined Scots such as Eglinton; though he may have idealised and 
celebrated the past, he was very closely involved in the industrial society of the 
present.  
Strong affection for their locality underpinned their party activities. As David 
Eastwood has pointed out, mere landownership did not automatically translate into 
political influence; it also had to constitute the ‘basis of public activity rather than 
remaining the means of personal economic benefit’.94 On one occasion, an 1837 
meeting of the Highland Society was used by Sir James Graham to promote the 
party’s interests, but also to gauge feeling towards it: ‘We dined 1,200 in a room 
erected for the occasion … The Conservative feeling was strongly underestimated: 
the reception of the Duke of Buccleuch was enthusiastic; and a very fine disposition 
was evinced towards me’.95 Activity undertaken by landlords was often reciprocated 
in kind. This reinforced their belief in the mutually beneficial nature of hierarchical 
and paternalist social structures. In 1839, for instance, in the wake of electoral 
violence at Hawick, the Duke of Buccleuch’s tenantry gave him a dinner, at which 
Sir James Graham attended; he thought that it would be ‘a great gathering from the 
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south of Scotland; and after the Hawick affair, and all that has been said about 
landlords’ intimidation and fictitious votes in Scotland, it will be a splendid 
spectacle’.96  
Though self-interest certainly cannot be discounted, from their own 
perspectives the public activity undertaken as a ‘natural’ result of landownership 
justified their moral position as local leaders. Paternalist solutions to various 
problems were not national, but instead centred on local action by (usually 
Conservative) landowners. In 1841–2 at Sanquhar, the Duke of Buccleuch paid 120 
struggling weavers to build roads and draining, and put aside £800 to keep the rest 
employed in weaving at a three-quarters wage rate until economic conditions had 
improved.97 Buccleuch, and many of the Scottish gentry, viewed this as paternalist 
conservatism in practice.98 There was, nevertheless, an unquestionable disconnect 
between the attitudes and actions of the gentry and the reaction this engendered 
among significant sections of the electorate, especially in urban areas. New electors 
had an invigorated sense of their own importance and agency as individuals, and the 
outlook maintained by the majority of landowners did not take this into account. 
Some prescient Conservatives did notice this, such as one who noted that during the 
party’s Perthshire by-election victory in 1832, ‘the Tory landlords found it necessary 
to mix much more with their tenantry and to display a familiarity with and a kindness 
towards … the tenantry’.99 He asserted in a later letter to Peel that the party’s success 
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in Scotland’s counties could be assured if ‘all proprietors made friends of their 
tenants … saw them daily – spoke to them of passing events and convinced them by 
daily experience that the interests and happiness of the landlord and tenant were 
identified’.100  
Patrician landlords were less willing to engage with electors on the more 
equal terms which the reformed system had created. Moreover, though many 
landowners were generous philanthropists, many were not, and were castigated for it. 
Alison may have firmly believed that ‘ascendancy of democracy had uniformly 
terminated in public misery’, but he also often complained that ‘the long-established 
selfishness of aristocracy had frequently in past times driven the people to 
resistance’.101 Ultimately, not only was paternalism against the spirit of the age, it 
was entirely unsuited to the needs and conditions of industrial, urban society and the 
interests of its newly enfranchised electors.102 Indeed, despite the often spirited and 
occasionally formidable efforts of the Scottish gentry, paternalist efforts had not even 
been particularly effective in the counties, especially as the countryside was itself 
also subject to the widespread changes being wrought on society.  
Localist issues and attitudes deeply affected the political fortunes of 
individual candidates and MPs, which often blurred party lines and created local, 
Scottish, and British cross-currents. The short-serving Conservative MP for 
Inverness-shire was an archetypal country tory, content to sit quietly on the 
backbenches. One of his few notable interventions, however, came in 1837 when he 
broke with the general line taken by his party. He opposed a committee resolution 
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that no Welsh clergyman be appointed who was fluent in the Welsh language, 
recognising from his own experience of Gaelic that Welsh-language ministers would 
be of greater utility in successfully preaching to such congregations.103 Localist-
inspired positions could thus occasionally contribute to wider issues which were 
national in scope and in a parliamentary context. However, almost all Scottish 
Conservative MPs represented rural electors who were only peripherally concerned 
with the great urban problems of the day. As such, they had less interest in many 
pressing national questions. Protection was the most prominent exception to this, as 
it constituted a touchstone issue for both country tories and liberal conservatives.  
Though it was a British question, the protection issue nevertheless had some 
distinctly Scottish characteristics.104 The wider protectionist ideological argument 
had effects on Scotland’s distinct political, social, and economic milieu.105 Though 
the politics of ideology in the Scottish counties generally played second fiddle to the 
politics of registration and influence, it was of paramount importance to the internal 
dynamics of all parties. Moreover, given the prominent role of political parties in 
bringing such issues to the fore, it no doubt provided the catalyst for the politicisation 
of many Scots, both electors and non-electors. Kenneth Cameron has noted that the 
strength of support for the Anti-Corn Law League in Scotland among agriculturalists 
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and the working classes has been exaggerated.106 Conservative strength in the 
counties, therefore, was not entirely due to vote-making, influence and registration 
activity. The party possessed a genuinely popular constituency in Scotland among 
those for whom protection was a prime issue. Even before the overwhelming Liberal 
victory across Scotland in 1832, a Liberal candidate was advised that ‘advocacy of 
the Reform bill will [not] be sufficient … The Corn Laws are the matter which the 
farmers in Easter Ross are most anxious about … they still believe that these 
iniquitous laws are beneficial to them’.107 Similarly, across the country in southern 
Scotland, the former Conservative MP for Roxburghshire stated in 1841 that 
‘Roxburghshire is carried as an agricultural district’, and that ‘the agriculturalists are 
unanimous in support of the law as they stand’.108  
Apart from political and material considerations, this support was also at least 
partly ideological. Conservative protectionists strove to counter the assertion that 
repeal would lead to an increase in ordinary living standards, asserting that it would 
in fact have the opposite effect. As such, protection was portrayed as a way for 
government to promote ‘social cohesion, economic stability and political peace’, 
through the balancing of interests by varying tariffs.109 Such arguments, while 
ultimately unsuccessful, provided an ideological and moral justification for 
protection, which at least partly explains why such views were not entirely restricted 
to Scottish agricultural producers.  
Even within the agricultural sector, support for the Corn Laws was also 
strong in many areas where mixed farming was more predominant, and cereal 
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production less crucial. This was partly due to the touchstone nature of the issue; 
farmers of all types recognised that repeal would affect the entire agricultural sector, 
as free trade would not be restricted to corn. Moreover, higher corn prices were 
thought to have encouraged the cultivation of marginally productive lands 
throughout the UK – lands which Scotland, particularly in Highland areas, possessed 
in abundance. The conservative press encouraged this perception, and suggested that 
Scotland’s impressive achievements in agricultural improvement meant that any 
significant dip in prices would render investments in these lands worthless. Indeed, 
even on Skye some complained that reduced freight and duty paid by outside 
breeders would ruin small tenants. Many of these tenants depended on fishing and 
restricted cattle sales, especially considering the decline in the kelp trade and public 
works.110 
The Whigs were, nevertheless, resilient in many Scottish counties, which lent 
some weight to their claim that repeal has support from all sections of Scottish 
society. However, many ostensibly ‘agricultural’ counties contained manufacturing 
towns and villages of tenpounders, and many Scottish Whigs were often careful not 
to associate themselves too closely with the free trade lobby.111 On the ground, 
smaller landowners and agricultural tenants were extremely unlikely to support the 
Anti-Corn Law League, though the League took great care to give prominence to 
those few who did. These were more likely to be politically conscious Liberals, like 
George Hope of Fenton Barns.112 Even among agricultural labourers, the League 
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failed to combat the widely held conviction that a fall in prices would lead to a 
decline in work and wages.113 Overall, the split between rural and urban interests was 
in fact more complex and nuanced than repealers sought to portray. Conservative 
efforts to maintain agricultural protection highlights the extent to which the paternal 
and elitist underpinnings of the Scottish party were intimately connected to 
protectionism. Repeal agitation was often viewed as a threat to the primacy of the 
landocracy, and to property in general.114  
Conservatives made great use of protection, and often explicitly linked their 
perceived paternal role to the issue. A broadsheet extolling the virtues of 
Edinburghshire MP Sir George Clerk emphasised his focus on ‘Agricultural 
prosperity … He’s a kind landlord – ask his Tenants about that’, whereas his 
opponent Dalrymple ‘cares more for the Edinburgh radicals than for all the farmers 
of Midlothian.115 Despite their public avowal to defend the agricultural interest, 
Scottish Conservative candidates made their unwillingness to act as a mere delegate 
of electors repeatedly clear at the hustings. Henry Home Drummond told his 
Perthshire constituents that ‘I cannot bring myself to believe that the gentlemen 
before me would wish to send me there as a mere voting machine’.116  
It was not only electors who sought to control and influence their potential 
representatives. One prospective candidate was told by Lord Airlie that he could not 
give him his support, and that he ‘was certain that the Conservatives would not do so 
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either, unless he could bend himself down to certain points’.117 The prospective 
candidate declined to ‘bend himself down’, illustrating that the power held by the 
extra-parliamentary Conservative gentry had its limits. They could prevent a 
candidate’s election, but could not make a successful candidate their delegate. This 
was especially true of incumbent MPs; once in place, the local gentry shied away 
from the possibility of provoking an expensive contest if the current MP were to 
retire.  
The Scottish Conservative party in the Commons increasingly trod an uneasy 
path as the 1840s wore on, as Peel enacted measures which were increasingly 
unpalatable to the landed gentry. Though the Scottish country gentlemen were 
generally in favour of the Corn Laws, a disproportionate number of Scottish 
Conservative MPs followed Peel on free trade. This split was more than one of 
competing views on a single issue; it was at base ‘a confrontation between two 
differing views of constitutional authority’.118 Similarly, the larger and more talented 
magnates, including Wemyss, Dalhousie, and Buccleuch, were increasingly drawn 
into alliance with Peel after 1832.  
There were two main reasons why a disproportionate number of senior 
Scottish Conservatives voted for repeal – one significantly more influential than the 
other. The less powerful factor was genuine ideological conversion – Dalhousie and 
Lord Elcho were won over to Free Trade on this basis. Both were fairly young, and 
had reached political maturity after 1832 when the ideals of political economy were 
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increasingly pervasive. Despite the continued espousal of credible protectionist 
arguments up to and beyond 1846, such figures were not shaped by the political 
debates and circumstances of early nineteenth century, as their predecessors had 
been.119 They were also closely involved in the somewhat more moderate politics of 
the party in Westminster. and possessed a weakened sense of the traditional 
paternalism which still pervaded the party in the counties.120  
These examples, however, are not representative of the Scottish party as a 
whole. Other Scottish Conservatives in the Commons, though they may not have 
been diehard protectionists in the first place, primarily voted for repeal out of loyalty 
to the party leader (or their patron). Duncan McNeill, as Lord Advocate, remained 
loyal to the government, while A.E. Lockhart’s seat was effectively controlled by 
Buccleuch. The course of his reconciliation with Derby followed a suspiciously 
similar timeline to that of his political patron. Overall, the majority of Scottish 
Conservative repealers were Peelites only in the sense that they followed Peel.  
The social and economic background of MPs was not the most salient factor 
in determining how parliamentarians reacted to repeal.121 Nevertheless, with regard 
to the wider membership of the Scottish Conservative party, it holds firm; larger 
Scottish magnates and those with a particular slant towards Peelite conservatism 
outside of parliament followed Peel, while many tenant farmers and smaller Scottish 
proprietors became the nucleus of the new Protectionist party. That this occurred, 
despite the lesser reliance of Scottish landowners on arable production, is a testament 
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to the greater extent to which Scottish Conservatives held deeply paternalist, localist, 
agrarian, and hierarchical attitudes. Country toryism was the single most powerful 
influence on the Scottish party’s general direction, though this was coloured by a 




IV. Liberal and Urban Conservatism 
 
I.G.C. Hutchison notes on the first page of his Political History of Scotland that 
liberal toryism was not seen to develop in Scotland in the 1820s.122 This branch of 
conservatism was generally adopted by ‘responsible, prudent, and orthodox men of 
business’. It sought to adapt traditional toryism to the needs and conditions of 
urbanisation and industrialisation, and, after 1832, to do this having accepted the 
Reform Act. Rather than seeking to form alliances with the working classes as tory 
radicals advocated, it courted the emergent commercial and urban middle classes, 
focusing on issues such as administrative efficiency over the ‘condition of the 
people’ question.123 This brand of conservatism enjoyed some growth in post-1832 
Scotland, especially in Glasgow and the west. It also enjoyed significant support 
from both the UK party leadership and some country tories.  
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Though liberal toryism did make significant popular inroads in 1820s 
Scotland, it is notable that the Liverpool ministry did garner a degree of praise for its 
Scottish reforms, which included its actions in reducing political patronage, its 
appointment of acceptable ministers to government-controlled parishes, and its 
appointment of Whig judges to the Scottish bench.124 This progress, however, was 
entirely forgotten in the wake of the party’s strenuous efforts to thwart parliamentary 
Reform. After 1832, even traditionalist elements of the party were beginning to 
slowly come around, if not to the concepts which underpinned liberal conservatism, 
then at least to its organisational accoutrements. Even the hardliner W.R. Keith 
Douglas thought by 1835 that it was advisable to ‘form resolutions recommending 
the constituencies within the counties and burghs of Scotland to form Constitutional 
Associations to act and support the object of fair and unrestrained election’.125 In 
addition to the liberal ‘Constitutional’ designation which (ostensibly) indicated 
forward-looking conservatism, he also thought that such Associations should be 
formed in the burghs, indicating that the cause of liberal conservatism was 
considered promising in urban Scotland.  
Though Michael Michie has claimed that Alison was out of step with the 
liberal conservative character of the Peel’s leadership, Alison and Blackwood’s in 
fact moved cautiously towards Peelism in the 1830s.126 Though Alison had private 
misgivings about its more strident aspects, he and Peel maintained a sympathetic 
personal correspondence during the 1830s.127 Though he was a traditionalist in many 
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ways, he did move with the times, and was even ahead of them in his own limited 
fashion. For one, it has been noted that his ‘Duties of the Conservative Party’ article 
presaged Peel’s later Tamworth Manifesto.128 Moreover, Blackwood’s itself was 
anxious to promote acceptance of Reform in the party; a letter was drafted to Alison 
in 1835, informing him that one of his earlier and more hard-line articles had been 
rejected because though ‘we may deplore the popery of the English Conservative 
Reform bill it is now the law of the land [and] we will not better our cause by …’.129  
Though mostly dominant, aristocratic and country tories were not the only 
section of the Scottish party. Buccleuch was advised in 1832 that it would be 
necessary to find commercial and industrial figures to stand as candidates.130 Despite 
its country tory inclinations, party members did make significant efforts to find 
candidates of this type to stand in urban areas. Though generally unsuccessful at the 
polls, it does illustrate that urban conservatism did exist in Scotland – when 
Conservative candidates did stand in burghs seats, they very rarely received less than 
one-third of the vote.131 As such, not only was there an urban Scottish Conservative 
party, it also enjoyed a significant degree of popular support (though very rarely a 
plurality). 
Urban candidates were closely connected to burgeoning commercial and 
industrial interests, which occasionally threatened vulnerable sitting Liberals, such as 
Robert Wallace in Greenock.132 Such candidates, even those who were strangers to 
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their chosen constituencies, often put a great deal of effort into electioneering: ‘Perth 
City … seat contested by Mr Black, a London merchant in the Conservative interest 
who has made great progress in his canvass’.133 They often enjoyed strong support 
from the central party in London; Sir James Graham, for instance, entertained a high 
opinion of Robert Monteith. He informed Bonham that ‘Monteith is our best man for 
Glasgow, and there is an advantage in keeping him steadily fixed to that single 
object’.134 The chief source of Conservative influence in the party’s most secure 
urban seat, the Falkirk Burghs, acknowledged the importance of the candidate in this 
setting: ‘I need not tell you how capricious a constituency a burgh one is, and how 
much depends on the candidate, the people employed to canvas, as well as the 
manner for canvassing’.135  
This semi-autonomous stream within the Scottish Conservative party had a 
generally liberal conservative character, but it was nevertheless very similar – though 
not quite identical – to that of the country tories. R.L. Hill has suggested that there 
was ‘no Industrial Tory party or Industrial Tory group with an outlook or a policy of 
its own’ in England, an assertion which holds true north of the border.136 Robert 
Monteith, for one, can be most readily understood as a romantic conservative. He 
was heir to a substantial textile fortune and intimately involved with urban and 
industrial interests. Nevertheless, he was also a Cambridge graduate with a deep 
interest in medievalism, who resided in a neo-Gothic mansion and later converted to 
Roman Catholicism.137 Some prominent Scottish Conservatives were, however, more 
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clearly defined by their industrial interests. Lord John Manners experienced this 
during a tour of Glasgow given by Sir James Campbell (father of Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman). Campbell was the founder of a successful firm of 
warehousemen, a Conservative Lord Provost, and an unsuccessful parliamentary 
candidate for the city in 1841: ‘At Glasgow Sir James Campbell showed us over his 
gigantic establishment, and expounded the various causes which are driving the 
English and Scotch manufactures to ruin. Competition and free imports, were the two 
main causes’.138 It was therefore possible to reconcile protectionist leanings with 
industrial interests. More broadly, protectionist advocates had long been active in 
crafting arguments which appealed to urban and industrial interests.139 
The Scottish Conservatives developed a significant urban interest in Glasgow 
during the 1830s, despite still containing prominent members such as the Duke of 
Montrose, who thought that radicals in his area were ‘affected by Glasgow 
Notions’.140 Many party stalwarts recognised that ‘there are many whigs who are 
now only seeking some excuse to become conservatives. The feeling for 
conservatism has greatly increased during the last six months, but not to the same 
[extent as] … in England’.141 Though less pronounced north of the border, the party 
sought to capitalise on the increasing popularity of moderate Peelite conservatism. In 
Glasgow, this was aided by the heterogenous nature of the middle classes in that city, 
and the fact that, for various reasons, there were sizeable pockets of protectionist 
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support among the Scottish urban middle classes.142 For instance, the protection of 
Canadian timber over its Baltic rivals affected a large swathe of Glasgow 
manufacturing interests, and was second only to food as an important protected 
commodity.143 Though agricultural protection was not very popular in Glasgow, the 
existence of local protectionist interests who were obliged to defend the Corn Laws 
on general principle bolstered the strength of broader conservatism.  
Peel’s election as Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow in 1836 was, as 
Professor D.K. Sandford informed Peel, an ‘indication of popular feeling [which] 
speaks kindly for the prevalence of conservative principle, both without and within 
the academic walls, over a large portion of Scotland’.144 As Alison acutely observed, 
it came as a surprise to the local party that ‘the sons of the reforming Merchants of 
Glasgow … should so soon have so soon converted to constitutional principles … a 
situation where Adam Smith faltered, and Burke failed; which Sir Walter Scott 
anxiously desired’.145 Crucially, Glasgow had come around to a British-inspired 
liberal conservatism, and elected Peel because of his leadership of the British party 
and seeming sympathy for Established Church evangelicals.146  
The rapprochement was therefore not because of, but rather mostly in spite 
of, the character of the native Scottish party. Glasgow University’s students, who had 
elected Peel as Lord Rector, were predominantly middle class, and had founded the 
first Conservative Club in a Scottish university – named, significantly, the Peel 
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Club.147 The established middle classes were Peel’s target group, and it is notable 
that the Scottish party, aware of its own poisonous reputation, went to great lengths 
to ensure that Peel would not be personally contaminated. Even Sir John Hope noted 
that, should Peel’s visit succeed in its objects, ‘we would unite in a manner so 
grateful to both classes … under the banner of … Ultra Tories, Conservatives and 
Reclaimed Whigs’.148  
In order to gain traction in urban Scotland, the underperforming Scottish 
party was open to rapprochement between factions. By the late 1830s, after Peel’s 
visit, middle-class Conservatives had become a powerful force in Glasgow 
politics.149 Moreover, they had gradually begun to challenge their subordination to 
the local conservative gentry within the party apparatus itself, dealing with them on 
roughly equal terms. Liberal conservatism had a potential popular base in Scotland, 
but it was fragile and dependent on direct links to the central UK party. This popular 
base, however, was also deeply religious – Peel’s election as Lord Rector owed a 
great deal to the religious dimensions of local (and national) politics. Indeed, part of 
the banquet’s success was due to Peel’s assertion in his speech that he intended to 
promote ‘the National Establishment which connects Protestantism with the State in 
the three countries’.150 Most crucially therefore, the initial successes of Glasgow’s 
emergent liberal conservative group was heavily reliant on religiously minded 
adherents. This factor would also, however, become the primary cause of its demise.  
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V. Church, State, and the Westminster Party 
 
The Scottish Conservative party contained unique and diverse viewpoints on 
religious issues. Conservatives made much of defending the Church of England, but 
this essential mainstay of conservatism was notably subdued, though not absent, 
north of the border. It was the most important area in which Scottish electoral politics 
differed from the rest of the UK. Most elections were fought on British issues, 
though often skewed by particular Scottish conditions. While church-state relations 
were a significant factor in elections across the UK in 1841, in Scotland the Church 
crisis was the main defining issue. This muddled the political landscape, as the 
contest between political parties and their worldviews was overlaid by competing 
religious loyalties and enmities between Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Roman 
Catholics, and various nonconformist congregations.151 The Scottish Conservative 
party initially benefitted from its religious stance, but the actions of the senior 
Conservative leadership from 1839 onwards severely damaged the party’s nascent 
popular recovery. Moreover, the Church crisis cut across the party’s intra-factional 
boundaries, seriously weakening its internal unity.  
Immediately after 1832, the Scottish party, like its counterparts elsewhere in 
the UK, made attempts to garner electoral support through the traditional cry of 
‘Church in Danger’.152 In 1835, the Liberal candidate for Ross-shire found his 
opponent boasting of his successful canvas as he ‘trusts greatly to the clergy 
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prompted by the cry of the “Church in Danger”’.153 Though this did not succeed in 
1835, it did in 1837, with that subsequent contest also styled as a direct conflict 
between Protestantism and its many enemies.154 New party organisations made much 
of the issue, and the Caithness-shire Constitutional Association even attempted to 
employ it to attract dissenters who were traditionally hostile to the party: ‘we hold 
out the hand of fellowship to those members of dissenting bodies, who wish the 
safety of their country, and of its protestant institutions … the cause is theirs as it is 
ours’.155  
It was widely recognised that church ministers could play a significant role in 
influencing voters. Given the smaller size of average Scottish electorates, the 
influence of the press was often superseded by informal conversations and 
interactions between minister and parishioner.156 Conservatives were happy to take 
advantage of this, and sympathetic ministers, usually belonging to the Established 
Church and often appointed by Conservative landowners, guided electors in the 
direction of the party. However, as the demands of Church Evangelicals for Church 
Extension and Non-Intrusion polarised opinion, religion became an increasingly 
unmanageable issue for both parties. The Whig Admiral Minto was able to state in 
1835 that he was ‘sorry to learn the two parties in church affairs are proceeding to 
such extremes. I have always avoided taking any share in their controversies’.157 As 
the 1830s wore on, avoiding the issue became impossible for members of both 
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parties. By 1841, Conservative landowner Alexander Thompson of Banchory warned 
that ‘the last election is the first General Election in which the principle of Non-
Intrusion has come into play – and this only to a partial extent – and yet the result has 
been most striking’.158  
Though an increasing popular affinity for liberal conservatism spurred Peel’s 
highly successful visit to Glasgow, the most important single factor building on this 
affinity after the visit itself was Peel’s perceived sympathy for the Church 
Evangelical aims. By the time of Peel’s visit, the Whig leadership had made it clear 
that they were uninterested in engaging with Scottish religious issues – as early as 
1835, when Aberdeen wished to discuss the nominations to the Scottish Church 
Commission on Religious Instruction, ‘Lord Melbourne, as usual, appeared to know 
little about the matter’.159 The Scottish liberal press was generally hostile to Non-
Intrusion, and Melbourne had made it abundantly clear that he would not bow to the 
demands of the Non-Intrusionists.160 In the meantime, the Conservative party had 
been making great efforts to engage with the issue, and had quickly recognised the 
potential electoral advantages of this. In Paisley, it was thought that ‘There is a very 
strong church party in Paisley, and a liberal conservative might do’.161 Peel, in 
conjunction with Rae, had made positive noises about Church Extension in the 
Commons, as had Aberdeen and Haddington in the Lords.162 Even at this early stage 
however, Peel sought to avoid discussing Non-Intrusion, acknowledging that ‘If we 
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touch the law of patronage in connection with our measure, we shall provoke great 
difference of opinion on principle’.163  
This stance had first been articulated by Derby in 1834, during his Glasgow 
speech in which he had espoused his ‘Knowsley Creed’.164 This speech had served to 
‘unite the Tories and Church Whigs, who in Glasgow form a powerful body’, and 
made the possibility of a broader alliance between Church Evangelicals and 
Conservatives seem achievable.165 While the Evangelical wing of the Church was 
radical and democratic in principle, this went hand in hand with actual practices and 
beliefs which were somewhat conservative and oligarchic.166 It was perhaps because 
of this that Peel and Thomas Chalmers, the Scottish theologian and political 
economist, enjoyed a lengthy and cordial relationship which predated Peel’s 
Glasgow visit.167 Chalmers had lengthy conversations with Peel during the visit 
itself, and was extremely pleased to discover the extent of Peel’s support for Church 
Extension. Peel’s perceived sympathies brought evangelical churchmen into the 
conservative fold up until roughly 1839, and it is no coincidence that this time was 
the party’s highpoint in terms of public support.168 This esteem was particularly 
welcome, as the evangelical churchmen in question were generally middle-class, the 
same social group which Peel was targeting for conversion to his brand of liberal 
conservatism.169 
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As theorist of political economy in his own right, and an intransigent 
opponent of the patronage exercised by country tory landlords, Chalmers’s 
sympathies were firmly liberal conservative. Though he had opposed Reform, he had 
supported Catholic Emancipation.170 Even in terms of the language employed, the 
alliance seemed fitting – calls for Church reform were, after all, conspicuously 
similar in tone to critiques of old corruption before Reform, and of manifest abuses 
after it.171 As Boyd Hilton has observed, Chalmers’s positive reputation within the 
liberal conservative establishment has been generally forgotten, however, because of 
the rapidity with which it declined.172 From 1839 onwards, the Non-Intrusionists 
steadily intensified their demands. During his speech to the General Assembly in that 
year, Chalmers demonstrated his willingness to support the hard-line elements of the 
Evangelical party, where previously it had been thought that he would act as a 
moderating influence on them.173 Their demands seemed worryingly democratic to 
aristocrats, and worryingly anti-Erastian to Church Moderates.174  
Chalmers’s final break with the Conservative party came during his potential 
candidacy for the vacant chair of divinity at the University of Glasgow. Sir James 
Graham, now Lord Rector, ensured that he did not get the job. He was furious that 
Chalmers had engaged in a ‘bold defiance of constitutional authorities’.175 By this 
                                                          
and Social Class in Mid-Nineteenth Century Glasgow: A Study of Nine Churches’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History, 32 (1981), 47–64. 
170 Hilton, Age of Atonement, 61. See also Ian A. Muirhead, ‘Catholic Emancipation: Scottish 
Reactions Part One’, Innes Review, 24 (1973), 26–42; Ian A. Muirhead, ‘Catholic Emancipation in 
Scotland: Debates and Aftermath’, Innes Review, 24 (1973), 103–20. 
171 Pentland, Radicalism, Reform and National Identity, 46. 
172 Hilton, Age of Atonement, 62. 
173 See Thomas Chalmers, Substance of a Speech Delivered in the General Assembly, on Wednesday 
the Twenty-Second of May, 1839, Respecting the Decision of the House of Lords on the Case of 
Auchterarder (Glasgow, 1839).  
174 Stewart J. Brown, Thomas Chalmers and the Godly Commonwealth in Scotland (Oxford, 1982), 
303; Machin, ‘Disruption and British Politics’, 21. 




point, he had alienated many prominent Conservatives; both Aberdeen and Alison 
lobbied Graham to block the appointment.176 Despite ample warning that such an 
explicit action would be disastrous for the party, and knowing himself that it would 
‘be most unpopular’, Graham felt that ‘support of him is impossible after the part he 
has recently taken and his conduct to Lord Aberdeen’.177 Aberdeen’s compromise 
bill, which sought to reconcile the different religious parties, had been rejected in 
1840. This occurred after Chalmers and the Evangelicals had very publicly 
denounced it as unsatisfactory. Ultimately, Chalmers’s perceived wrongdoing had 
been as much about his methods as his aims. By courting public opinion so openly in 
an extra-parliamentary context, he had offended the sensibilities of senior party 
figures, including Peel and Aberdeen, who disapproved of such activities. 
The country tories were generally Established Church Moderates, though a 
disproportionate number of its leading figures were Episcopalians. Rank-and-file 
Scottish liberal conservatives, on the other hand, tended more towards 
evangelicalism and Non-Intrusion. Yet, even within their meagre ranks, liberal 
conservatives in the higher echelons of the Scottish party inclined more towards a 
Peelite view which privileged the primacy of the state over Evangelical claims. As 
such, Non-Intrusion created a rift within the already-limited bounds of Scottish 
liberal conservatism. The party leadership was well aware of how damaging a refusal 
to make substantial concessions would be to their electoral prospects. Despite this, 
the Evangelicals’ post-1839 demands constituted an intellectual red line. For those 
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religiously minded Conservatives such as William Gladstone, the objections were 
primarily religious, but also concerned with the legal insubordination which 
Chalmers advocated: ‘The case of the supporters of the veto seems to me to be 
utterly weak in scripture and in reason; in law, very doubtful’.178 Mainly though, 
opposition among the party’s higher echelons were more about democratic than 
Erastian concerns.  
Liberal conservatives such as Graham and Peel were willing to countenance 
Church Extension to bolster social stability in urban Scotland.179 Their version of 
stability, however, was predicated on the primacy of the executive state. Hence, 
Graham’s main complaint was that ‘the general assembly has thought fit to brave the 
law, and to enter in a struggle for the mastery with the instituted authorities of the 
state’.180 Though liberal conservatism meant accepting Reform as it stood, it also 
focused on thwarting further efforts to expand ‘democracy’. Peel saw the crisis in 
these constitutional terms, with Non-Intrusion as ‘neither more nor less than popular 
election … [resulting in] canvassing and intrigue and all the low artificing by which 
the popular election can be influenced’.181 He went on to suggest the appointment of 
ministers would become an area in which election agents were needed, and that 
fictitious votes would eventually become commonplace in the election of parish 
ministers. This is by far the strongest evidence that Peel saw Non-Intrusion as the 
undesirable religious equivalent of electoral reform. For Peel, and many Scottish 
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party members, Reform, Non-Intrusion, and Free Trade were merely three different 
political, religious, and economic facets of the same overall problem.182  
Traditionalist scholarly work on Peel’s character, spearheaded by Norman 
Gash, goes into exhaustive detail. Though perhaps slightly too in awe of his subject, 
he provides a clear and detailed picture of one of the eminent (and flexible) 
statesman of the age, and suggests that the modern Conservative party began during 
Peel’s tenure.183 An influential revisionist strand of thought is somewhat less 
complimentary, holding that Peel was in fact ideologically dogmatic and averse to 
compromise.184 More recent research, which effectively distils both viewpoints, 
recognises the intellectual milieu in which Peel operated, and how this affected his 
actions.185 The resultant picture is of a party leader, but not in the modern sense, and 
ultimately a servant of the Crown. The evolution of his thoughts and actions with 
regard to the Scottish Church crisis tally with this fresh interpretation. 
The decline in amity between the party and the evangelical electors was 
further accelerated by Peel’s disastrous meeting with a church delegation before the 
election of 1841, in which he explicitly stated that he could never support the Duke 
of Argyll’s legislative efforts to meet their demands. This influenced electoral 
fortunes, yet it must be noted that 1841 was also the party’s Scottish electoral 
highpoint.186 In England, the party enjoyed a major electoral victory as a champion 
of its Established Church, which partly explains why the advance in Scotland was 
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less pronounced. In the Scottish counties at least, the effect of the issue was negative 
but not disastrously so.187 Perhaps more significantly in the longer term, it prevented 
the Scottish party from gaining its long-planned for and long-worked for urban 
foothold.188 Though the politics of influence mitigated the damage in many counties, 
Graham was all too well aware that ‘as far as towns and boroughs are concerned, the 
Church question places us in a false position’.189 In political terms, the Conservative 
party bore the brunt of the blame for Disruption, especially among members of the 
newly formed Free Church.  
Below the senior levels of the party, many of the country tory gentry were 
similarly unsympathetic to Non-Intrusion. Though they had this in common with 
Peelites, their underlying reasons for this were not entirely identical. Peel believed in 
the primacy of the state and of parliament, and thus advocated Erastian control. 
Scottish country tories, on the other hand, expected the state to protect and perpetuate 
aristocratic governance on a local level. They thus saw attempts to restrict their 
power over the appointment of parish ministers as democratising in a different sense. 
As the self-identified leading defenders of social order in the localities, their 
principal fear was likely that the loss of control over appointments would unbalance 
the social order on a local level, with attendant effects on national politics. 
Established Church ministers generally voted for and promoted the Conservative 
party, and advocated policies (such as protection) which were thought to underpin 
the agrarian social order.190 To country tories, Non-Intrusion thus threatened the 
social balance on both an abstract national and everyday local level. While there was 
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no doubt a great deal of self-interest involved, they were chiefly motivated, at base, 
by a desire to maintain what they viewed as the delicate and slowly deteriorating 
balance of the constitution. 
This essentially aristocratic constitutional outlook also precluded their 
participation in, or approval of, Orange activities in Scotland. This was similar to the 
English party’s tendency to remain aloof from more extreme forms of Protestantism, 
and the ambivalent attitude of Conservatives in Ireland.191 Though the Duke of 
Gordon did act as a figurehead for the Scottish Orange Order in the early 1830s, this 
short-lived connection was terminated when it became clear that the Orangemen 
would not passively work towards the party’s more moderate ‘constitutional’ 
political ends.192 Patrician conservatives were inherently uneasy about such extra-
parliamentary movements. This, combined with the refusal of Scottish Orangemen to 
conform to a deferential ideal, precluded any significant Scottish cooperation until 
after 1868.193 In fact, the particularly authoritarian streak of the Scottish gentry led to 
the Order being harshly suppressed by party figures. Lodges lacked the legal 
protection enjoyed by their counterparts in Ulster, and Scottish Conservatives, 
particularly Archibald Alison, viewed them in the same light as striking workers or 
Chartists. Despite holding a high rank in the Freemasons, Alison did not discriminate 
when he perceived a threat to public order. As Michie dryly observed of Alison’s 
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judgements, ‘convicted Protestant Irish were transported as readily as their Catholic 
counterparts’.194  
This aristocratic outlook also separated them from the embryonic working-
class elements of their own party.195 The force sustaining the short-lived Glasgow 
Conservative Operative Association was predominantly religious. Some radicals 
readily labelled the operatives the ‘Orange Tories’, but unlike their Irish 
counterparts, they do not appear to have had any explicit links to the Order.196 
However, anti-Catholicism became an increasingly prominent feature of the 
Association. In 1839, an ‘animated and amicable discussion’ was held by its 
members in which the perceived advance of Catholicism since the Emancipation bill 
of 1829 was condemned.197 It was founded as a result of Peel’s visit to Glasgow, and 
the Association’s initial address indicates that it was concerned with promoting a 
conservative-radical alliance. It stated that they regarded ‘the interests of the working 
classes as identified with, and inseparable from, those of the aristocracy’.198  
Nevertheless, it also declared its support for Church Extension, and by 1842 
they regarded ‘the total abolition of the law of patronage as indispensable, not only to 
the peace, but also the efficiency of the church’.199 Scottish minister Robert 
Buchanan wrote in 1841 that he had received a letter from the Secretary of the 
Glasgow Operatives, stating that ‘out of its 500 members, not more than six are 
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opposed to the church’s movements; and that the whole of the remainder so entirely 
identify their Conservatism with the church's principles and present proceedings’.200 
While the operatives moved away from the Conservative party, the Scottish 
party was also moving away from the operatives. A public dinner given by the 
Association in 1837 was attended by ‘a few of the leading Conservative gentlemen of 
the city’, and by the height of Conservative popularity in 1839 its second annual 
dinner attracted ‘several of the leading Conservative gentlemen of the city and 
neighbourhood, who were present by special invitation’.201 By 1841, however, their 
third annual meeting was attended ‘almost exclusively by the working classes, 
scarcely any of the leading Conservatives who were invited having been present on 
the occasion’.202 The group’s wellspring was almost entirely religious, and it was 
thus destroyed by the party’s actions in this area.  
The elitist attitudes of many country tories was compounded by their 
religious affiliation. A disproportionate number of Scottish Conservatives were 
practising Episcopalians, including Buccleuch, Dalhousie, Aytoun, and Alison.203 
Many were able to maintain a double-allegiance, taking part in the activities of their 
local Established church as the patron and local squire, while maintaining their 
Episcopalian faith. Even Archibald Alison, an Episcopalian and staunch defender of 
the Church of England, was not overly concerned with this issue; only three of his 
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171 Blackwood’s articles were concerned with the subject.204 Though the defence of 
the Anglican establishment may possibly have been the overriding preoccupation of 
the English Conservative landed class, this was definitely not true of Scotland.205 
Alison and the vast majority of Episcopalian country tories broadly supported the 
Church of Scotland so long as it played the same role in promoting social stability as 
the Anglican Church south of the border.206  
While the Church of Scotland was undergoing an evangelical revival in one 
direction, the Scottish Episcopal Church, in flirting with the Oxford Movement, was 
moving in a broadly opposite direction. This served to increase the distance between 
Scottish Conservative Episcopalians and the Non-Intrusionists. Though both 
Tractarians and Non-Intrusionists emphasised spiritual independence, there was no 
love lost between the two movements.207 Indeed, the Episcopalian faith of 
landowners who had allegedly refused to provide sites for the building of Free 
Churches (most prominently Buccleuch) was noted in both parliament and the 
press.208 If the Conservative party was perceived by many electors as an ‘other’ in 
popular-aristocratic terms, it also laboured under the disadvantage of being perceived 
as an alien entity in terms of religious adherence, separate from Scotland’s 
Established Church.  
This was one of the most prominent reasons why Scottish romantics joined 
the wider stream of British romanticism in this period, and why British romanticism 
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made little headway in Scotland. Pragmatic Episcopalians such as Buccleuch and 
Dalhousie could not publicly support a British romanticism which was underpinned 
by a very robust Tractarian Anglicanism.209 Peter Borthwick had at one point 
intended to take Anglican orders, and though Baillie-Cochrane was ambivalent about 
Roman Catholicism, he was stridently anti-Kirk.210 Robert Monteith, a social 
romantic, was primarily concerned with the impact of the Church crisis on Anglican 
affairs: ‘if it will spread into England … the voluntaries will become puritans, the 
puritans democrats; and we shall have again a fatal circle, which two centuries ago 
brought Charles to his scaffold and inveigled Great Britain in civil war’.211 Young 
England was distrusted on both sides of the border because of its vaguely Anglo-
Catholic underpinnings.212 Eglinton’s tournament, though anticipating Young 
England in many ways, was deliberately shorn of any religious content – perhaps 
because Eglinton shrewdly recognised that this would automatically limit the size of 
his potential audience.  
Overall, the Episcopalian and paternalist character of the Scottish 
Conservative party made it very unlikely to embrace Non-Intrusion wholeheartedly. 
Moreover, these elements were also the chief reason behind the party’s failure to 
nurture working-class operatives and their unwillingness to court Orange support. 
Despite this, the most uncompromising attitudes towards the Church question came 
not from the party in Scotland, but instead the UK party leadership. Having done 
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most of the work to create a space for Scottish liberal conservatism, they also bore 
chief responsibility for destroying it.  
 
 
VI. The Scottish Party Divided 
 
Sir James Graham stated that, on the Church question, ‘our friends in Scotland must 
take their own line, each according to his individual opinion, taking care of course 
not to commit others’.213 Despite the party’s dominant country tory character, there 
were significant and substantial elements of the Scottish party which leaned 
decidedly towards greater concessionary efforts. The Scottish party, despite its 
predominant dislike of Non-Intrusion, was more willing than the senior UK 
leadership to consider compromise. This willingness stemmed from political 
expediency, but also out of some genuine sympathy for the evangelicals’ cause. Peel 
would not (and could not) enforce a single party line on the Church crisis, and by no 
means ignored backbench Scottish opinion altogether: ‘How will the new Scotch 
members vote on the proposition for new endowments … Established Church of 
Scotland. After all our theories this after all, will be no unimportant one for you and 
for me to look at’.214 Despite this, Peel’s conception of executive authority meant 
that their opinions would always be a secondary consideration. After winning the 
1841 election, ‘Conservative backbenchers found that a triumph for Peelism meant 
scant regard for their religious, economic or social sensibilities’.215 In Scotland, 
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many backbenchers and rank-and-file party members came to realise this even 
earlier, from 1839 onwards.  
A small group, the most influential and public of whom was the Dean of 
Faculty Sir John Hope, advocated making little or no concession to the Evangelicals. 
Chalmers himself warned Peel that if he persisted ‘in his violent and infatuated 
course he will alienate from Conservatism the best men I know in Scotland; There 
are many who viewing his proceedings as a premonitory symptom of what we have 
to look for under its reign’.216 Despite attempts by the party leadership to rein him in, 
Hope was notorious for publishing an uncompromising pamphlet which further 
polarised the situation, though it was described by Graham as ‘tedious beyond 
endurance, and proceeds on the assumption, that no argument is good, unless it is 
repeated twenty times’.217 As the Evangelicals made increasingly ambitious 
demands, however, Hope’s influence over party policy increased. Though Peel 
worried about ‘The extreme opinions of Hope on one side of the Church question 
and the intemperance with which he urged them’, the course that he urged was 
usually followed.218  
Hope was stauncher than most, but many were also increasingly anti-
Evangelical as time wore on. In the Lords, though Dalhousie was initially 
sympathetic to their cause and close to Chalmers, he broke away from him very 
publicly during the General Assembly of 1839.219 Similarly, in the party outside of 
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parliament Archibald Alison strongly opposed concessionary efforts, and Robert 
Dundas, former MP for Edinburgh, was decidedly of the opinion that ‘it would be 
useless to attempt any intermediate arrangement’.220 Moreover, there is some 
evidence that sizeable elements of the Glasgow party were opposed to the Non-
Intrusionists.221 C.L. Cumming Bruce, MP for Elginshire and Nairnshire, was deeply 
religious, but also a strong advocate of the primacy of the state. He went so far as to 
state in the House that ‘he knew that many Scotchmen were afraid to declare their 
feelings on this subject. But if he were called upon to conceal his feelings, and his 
seat depended upon it, he should throw his seat to the winds, and do justice’.222 At 
the parliamentary level, however, this was not the dominant attitude – most were 
willing to be swept along by the winds of change. This was amply demonstrated 
when the Lord Advocate himself, Sir William Rae, found it necessary to publicly 
break with the policy of his own party leadership. He did so to placate the electors of 
his Bute constituency, and received significant internal criticism from party leaders. 
Despite this, Rae was unrepentant, telling Hope that ‘there are situations in which 
prudence is the better part of valour’, and that he had deliberately included 
ambiguities in his statements – though ‘obliged to sail as near to the wind as possible 
… am happy to state that I have got out of the scrape without committing myself in 
any way’.223  
Many candidates found themselves caught between the need to court Non-
Intrusionist electors and the need to maintain the internal unity of the local party. The 
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exceptional ability of local party groupings to hide their internal disagreements from 
the public played no small role in this. The incumbent MP for Perthshire, Henry 
Home Drummond, told his likely successor that ‘it would be far better if you were 
left free and uncommitted on the subject; but I doubt if we shall be able in this way 
to keep our party united’.224 It was thought that a private declaration censuring Non-
Intrusionism would placate the local party, but Stirling worried ‘how such a 
declaration could be made known without also being made public – and how far it 
might be expedient to admit that such a preliminary step had been thought necessary 
by the party’.225 Because of these difficulties, Home Drummond agreed to stand 
again for Perthshire, and successfully adopted an ambiguous position. Though he 
privately stated that could not ‘see, how the clergy can be prevented from destroying 
the establishment if so determined or why we should make a common sacrifice of 
other interests’, he had since 1840 publicly and repeatedly stated that though he 
would not pledge himself, he was strongly in favour of Non-Intrusion.226 Such 
hedging was a common tactic for Conservatives throughout Scotland.227  
One Conservative county gentleman thought that ‘of the members returned 
by Scotland, much more than half, are pledged to Non-Intrusion principles – or rather 
to support the majority of the General Assembly’.228 Though he was overstating his 
case, the fact remains that a significant proportion of Scotland’s Conservative MPs 
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advocated compromise out of conviction and/or expediency. Moreover, even in the 
more senior echelons of the party, there was more diversity in attitudes than has been 
acknowledged. The most important of these dissenters (as it were) was Sir George 
Clerk, who was firmly ensconced in the senior party establishment. Indeed, 
Gladstone thought that Clerk was one of the four most important figures in the party 
leadership who would decide policy on this issue.229 Clerk suggested that 
presbyteries should be permitted to reject a ministerial nominee on voting numbers 
alone, even if the reason for that objection was questionable.230 He had, however, lost 
his Scottish seat by this time. Because he now sat for the English borough of 
Stamford, he was relegated to the Scottish party in exile, and this perhaps limited his 
ability to influence high-level decision-making.231  
Chalmers regretted the loss of Clerk in 1837, but told Peel that he was happy 
to have ‘gained two, Mr. Colquhoun and Lord Ramsay, the former … who in 
everything connected with the ecclesiastical or educational state of Scotland has as 
sound and enlightened views as any one I know, whether in or out of parliament’.232 
While his hopes for Ramsay (later Lord Dalhousie) were spectacularly dashed, he 
was not disappointed by John Campbell Colquhoun of Killermont. Formerly a 
Liberal MP for Dunbartonshire, Colquhoun was an evangelical Anglican who 
became the Conservative MP for Kilmarnock Burghs between 1837 and 1841. After 
his election, Graham informed Peel that ‘he is warm almost to intrusionism in his 
religious feelings; but he is an upright independent gentleman … [of] considerable 
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abilities’, and Peel in turn informed Chalmers that ‘I share sincerely your satisfaction 
at the return to parliament of Mr Colquhoun and am confident that he will be of the 
greatest use in the interests of the Church of Scotland’.233 Colquhoun’s repeated and 
determined efforts to convince Peel, Graham and Aberdeen of the necessity of 
further compromise were entirely unsuccessful.234 By 1841, the senior party 
leadership had tired of him, including Peel.235 When it became clear that Colquhoun 
would likely lose his Scottish seat, Graham told Bonham that ‘I cannot safely advise 
you to take any active part in recommending our Scotch Urquhart ally to any English 
constituency’, as he thought him a ‘very hellish and dangerous personage, to be 
treated with great caution; and it would not do to have his god-faction at any popular 
election’.236  
Colquhoun was not entirely exceptional; another Scottish Conservative MP, 
Alexander Campbell of Monzie, was a Presbyterian evangelical Non-Intrusionist. 
Apart from the Commons cohort, the chief Conservative Agent for Glasgow and 
western Scotland, Robert Lamond, inclined towards ‘the Non-Intrusion party, but has 
stood aloof from their violence and their follies’.237 On a local municipal level 
moreover, Non-Intrusionist Conservatives stood in Edinburgh Town Council 
elections from 1841 onwards, and Free Church Conservatives remained an 
‘important minority voice’ in the Edinburgh party until at least the late 1850s.238  
                                                          
233 Graham to Peel, 14 Nov. 1837, Graham MSS, 79680, ff. 70–7; Peel to Chalmers, 21 Dec. 1837, 
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Overall, then, the Scottish Conservative party displayed at all levels a 
distinctly inconsistent attitude towards the Church question. Many were 
uncompromising Moderates, others pragmatic dissemblers, and still others genuine 
supporters of Non-Intrusion. This wide spectrum of opinion illustrates the highly 
diverse nature of Scottish conservatism, and that this particular issue cut across 
factional groupings. Liberal conservatives, ultra tories, and country tories each 
approached the issue from different angles, but this was further complicated by their 





The Scottish Conservative party after 1832 contained an overlapping mix of ultra 
tories, romantic conservatives, tory radicals, liberal conservatives, and country tories. 
However, only one of these was of paramount significance. The ultras declined in 
significance with remarkable rapidity, and liberal conservatives made significant but 
limited inroads in isolated areas. These extreme ends of the spectrum were 
peripheral. Radical conservativism was almost non-existent in Scotland, and the 
unique evolution of Scottish romantic conservatism was not yet paying political 
dividends. Scottish romantics were more likely to join the British stream of romantic 
conservatism than to work actively within the Scottish party. Overall, the Scottish 
Conservative party was more of a country party than its southern counterpart. 
Without a liberal conservative leadership or prominent Peelite talent to reform the 




influence. As such, it remained a bastion of traditional paternalism and agrarian 
attitudes, augmented with somewhat robust authoritarian tendencies.  
The Conservative party after the Disruption carried on much as before – on 
the surface, at least. The party kept its internal disagreements out of the public eye, 
and continued to enjoy a strong position in the counties, courtesy of the politics of 
influence, registration, and vote-making. This ensured that the religious crisis which 
had torn Scotland’s Established Church in two did not have a similar effect on the 
Conservative party. Nevertheless, its approach to the issue was far more diverse than 
has been assumed, with Conservatives at all levels of the party adopting a wide 
spectrum of stances on the Church crisis. While the party emerged intact, its voting 
base was damaged. This once-and-for-all destroyed any chance for the party to shed 
its image as the ‘country’, ‘moderate’, somewhat Episcopalian party which had 
opposed Reform. The Scottish Conservative party thus remained, under Buccleuch 
until 1846, the country party. Moreover, the broadly based Liberal party, despite its 
similarly unfriendly disposition towards Non-Intrusion, managed to position itself as 
the party of Presbyterianism, which constituted the base of Scottish identity. The 
Conservatives, unable to present themselves as a force for moral or religious 






























CHAPTER FIVE: MID-VICTORIAN SCOTTISH CONSERVATISM 
 
Between the 1840s and the Second Reform Acts of 1867–8, Scottish conservatism 
did not undergo any fundamental transformation. Certain aspects, such as 
romanticism, became more influential. Others, such as liberal conservatism, declined 
in importance. Scottish conservatism may have been a generally reactive 
phenomenon in this period, but it was not merely passive. Though the party more 
often found itself vigorously adapting to change, rather than leading it, Scottish 
conservatism did influence the development of mid-Victorian Scotland.  
As will be explored, though the split between Free Trade and Protectionist 
Conservatives was initially acrimonious, cooperation between these groups quickly 
became the norm in Scotland. Peelites were generally reabsorbed into a broader 
conservatism during the 1850s and 1860s. Following on from this, the party’s 
changing relationship to religious and related social issues will be examined. Scottish 
conservatism, though more religiously diverse than has been assumed, did not benefit 
from the fractured religious landscape after 1843. It was an influential force in terms 
of religious change, but this did not increase the party’s popularity. Next, the party’s 
efforts to promote conservatism in urban Scotland, through various innovative 
methods, will be discussed. These efforts did not bring electoral success, but were 
nevertheless historically significant. Finally, the effects of broader social changes on 
Scottish conservatism will be examined. These changes increasingly threatened the 
party’s preeminent position in rural areas, and Scottish conservatism thus declined in 
popularity as the period progressed. By the eve of the Second Reform Acts, the 
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Scottish party lacked a distinctive platform, and did not possess the intellectual 
capacity to formulate one.  
 
 
I. Peelites and Protectionists 
 
In tandem with the rest of the UK party, the Scottish Conservatives split over Peel’s 
decision to repeal the Corn Laws. There was, during much of the 1850s, a Scottish 
Peelite party. However, this party was even weaker than its southern counterpart 
(which was not in itself very robust). There were fewer liberal conservatives in the 
Scottish party and among the Scottish electorate before 1846, so the Scottish Peelites 
began at a particular disadvantage. Perhaps because of this, they were less given to 
internecine warfare than in other parts of the UK. They quickly formed informal co-
operative relationships with Scottish Protectionists, and had faded away by the late 
1850s, with the clear majority being reabsorbed into the Derbyite Conservative party. 
In 1846, however, it appeared (on the surface at least) that Scottish liberal 
conservatism was in fact stronger than in the rest of the UK, given the higher 
proportion of Scottish Conservative MPs who followed Peel, in addition to powerful 
magnates such as Buccleuch, Dalhousie, and Wemyss.1 Nevertheless, this positive 
appearance was misleading. Dalhousie followed Peel for ideological reasons, but 
retired from domestic politics to take up the post of Indian Viceroy, and indignantly 
wrote to Derby that ‘I am no personal adherent of Sir Robert Peel quietly following 
                                                          




wherever he chooses to go’.2 More importantly, Buccleuch was only a Peelite insofar 
as he remained loyal to Peel, his initial conversion to Free Trade not being borne of 
powerful conviction.3  
Loyalty, rather than conviction, also accounted for the conversion of some 
lower down in the party hierarchy. This included many county gentlemen; one Free 
Trade Conservative MP, Alexander Pringle, informed Sir George Clerk that he had 
met very few Conservatives who approved, ‘but so far as I can attain, the chief 
proportion of them are not inclined to resist; but rather to support the present 
ministry … In the south, they appear to take it up much more violently’.4 It is 
perhaps no coincidence that Pringle’s trajectory closely followed that of Buccleuch, 
his political patron. Even from the beginning, signs of cooperation were evident 
between the two Scottish groups.5 The popular sitting Free Trade MP for Perthshire 
agreed, in conjunction with Protectionist county gentlemen, to postpone his 
retirement, thus ensuring that the county did not fall to the Liberals. The county 
gentlemen on both sides of the divide found him to be an acceptable compromise 
candidate. His expected replacement, William Stirling, also ‘did not take the 
Protectionist view of politics’, but it was thought that putting up a new candidate 
might provoke a contest.6  
Confusion reigned among the Scottish gentry into the early 1850s, with 
allegiances frequently unknown. Indeed, Eglinton was forced to assume that the new 
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Lord Seafield was a Peelite merely because he was married to the sister of one.7 
Despite the rupture, most Scottish Peelites, even those in parliament, remained 
moderate Conservatives. Sir George Clerk, despite sitting as a Peelite MP for Dover, 
remained on the Conservative committee in his old seat of Edinburghshire.8 The 
general experience of Scottish Peelites throughout most of the 1850s was of being 
associated with, yet not quite part of, the Conservative party. Buccleuch, despite also 
retaining his membership of the Edinburghshire Conservative committee, would only 
‘subscribe in proportion to my estate in the county and no more’ to fund the potential 
candidacy of the ultra-Protectionist Lord John Scott, his own brother.9 Though he 
disapproved of Scott’s uncompromising protectionism, he nevertheless agreed to 
contribute, though on a far lesser scale than his previously lavish election spending.10  
The Scottish Protectionist and Peelite groups were keen above all to keep 
dissension and disagreement strictly private and confidential, much like they did in 
the run-up to the Disruption.11 This was, however, very difficult to maintain on the 
hustings. Just as Scottish MPs and candidates had been free to take their own 
positions on the Church question, Peelites and Protectionist tailored their public 
pronouncements on Free Trade to suit local electoral conditions. Thus, Archibald 
Campbell Swinton, soon to contest the Haddington Burghs, was presented to 
Buccleuch by future Derbyite Lord Advocate Charles Baillie as ‘decidedly 
Conservative in general politics’, but also who would ‘oppose any re-imposition of 
duties’.12 Similarly, Buccleuch advised a prospective Conservative candidate that in 
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‘a burgh constituency Protection … will not go down’.13 The Bairds of Gartsherrie, 
despite publicly campaigning in the Falkirk Burghs as Liberal Conservatives, were 
also members of a Glasgow Protectionist body.14 Indeed, the Conservative Peter 
Blackburn, when contesting Glasgow in 1852, found that the party there was still 
split between Free Traders and Protectionists, though the latter group included the 
more powerful sugar and West Indian interests.15 Yet, given the electoral realities of 
Scotland’s largest urban constituency, Blackburn was forced to deny that he was a 
Protectionist.16  
After the demise of the Aberdeen administration in 1855, Peelites slowly 
drifted into either the Liberal or Conservative camps. Some scholars have concluded 
that Peelites on a wider British level did not eventually re-join the Derbyite 
Conservative party, generally moving towards the Liberal party.17 Scholars who take 
this view often point to the presence of some leading Peelites at the 1859 meeting in 
Willis’s Rooms as a conspicuous turning point. The movement of many rank-and-file 
Peelite MPs back into the Conservative fold was, by contrast, a muddled and erratic 
process. More recent and specific work on Scotland, moreover, which places less 
emphasis on prominent and senior Peelites, has illustrated this progression.18 An 
overwhelming proportion of Scottish Peelite MPs were reabsorbed into the 
Conservative party by the end of the 1850s and early 1860s.  
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There were some Scots who moved towards liberalism, most prominently 
Lord Elcho, who went on to become a prominent Adullamite.19 Elcho was, however, 
a rather extraordinary exception to the rule. Peelites in parliament sustained 
themselves during the 1850s through ‘the pious cult of a dead leader and a self-
adulatory sense of superiority’.20 The stark fact was that, with the arguable exception 
of Elcho, the Scottish Peelite members were all mediocrities, with little to feel 
superior about. This is perhaps why, with the exception of Elcho, they so quickly 
disappeared or re-converted. Elcho had in fact crossed party lines back and forth so 
often that his 1857 address to his constituency was over five pages long. Indeed, he 
concluded it by writing that ‘My address has now attained a length which, I fear, 
must have exhausted your patience, and which I feel requires an apology’.21 Millar 
suggests that Elcho ‘offers a good example also of how a member of this group could 
move explicitly towards independent support of Palmerston rather than of Derby’.22 
In fact, by 1860 he was the only example; others were, like William Stirling, 
‘a member of the Carlton and a Liberal Conservative, not a Liberal or Whig’.23 
Though some Scottish MPs continued to use the Liberal Conservative label, all 
moved, explicitly or implicitly, into the Derbyite camp. Of those who did not, such 
as James Stuart Wortley, all had been defeated, voluntarily retired, or had moved to 
English constituencies by 1865.24  
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Many party members below the parliamentary level did, however, drift away 
from the party during the 1850s. They were encouraged in this by Palmerston’s 
foreign policies, but also the conservative aspects of his domestic platform. One 
‘liberal-conservative’ Perthshire elector, for instance, identified himself as a ‘general 
supporter of Palmerston, so long as he keeps off the Radicals’. 25 Yet, many of these 
waverers, especially the more senior ones, only gave their support in conditional 
terms. Even an ideologically committed Peelite such as Lord Drumlanrig still saw 
himself in 1853 as a Conservative. As Gordon Millar has pointed out, this was 
similar to the way in which adherents of the Free Church viewed themselves as the 
rightful upholders of the Establishment.26 While lay patronage would remain a 
barrier to rapprochement between the churches until late in the century, the barrier of 
agricultural protection which separated the parties steadily weakened during the 
1850s.  
On the Scottish Protectionist side, things had looked bleak in the late 1840s. 
Buccleuch, who had provided leadership and much-needed funding, was content to 
withdraw from national politics, being ‘too happy and too busy in attending to my 
own affairs and county business’.27 Repeal had widespread support outside of the 
gentry, and even in some Scottish rural areas. The Duke of Richmond’s Factor 
informed him that in counties across the northeast, ‘there is great apathy in Scotland 
in regard to the Corn Laws’.28 As such, the Scottish party found itself even more 
isolated than the English party. The Scottish Conservatives also shared the English 
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party’s lack of organisational apparatus, being forced to start from scratch. Just as the 
Protectionists lost Bonham alongside Peel, the Scottish Protectionists lost Horne 
alongside Buccleuch.29  
Much work was done to rebuild the party in the late 1840s and early 1850s, 
essentially from scratch. It helped that the majority of the Scottish squirearchy, 
especially lesser lairds, remained loyal, as did a great number of voters. It would also 
appear that the majority of those who held fictitious qualifications manufactured by 
the party remained protectionist in inclination. They often refused to switch over to 
Free Trade doctrines even if the landowner who had created their vote was one of the 
converted. Indeed, some Selkirkshire parchment voters who remained protectionist 
despite their patron’s conversion saw ‘themselves [as] Conservatives, but I cannot 
help looking upon them more in the light of Dissenters’.30  
From 1849 onwards, the party embarked on a UK-wide campaign to convert 
public opinion, which included the formation of the National Association for the 
Protection of Industry and Capital throughout the British Empire.31 In Scotland, 
native action was also taken; William Aytoun and John Blackwood served as 
delegates to the National Association, and as members of the new Scottish Protective 
Association, which was led by Eglinton.32 Scottish efforts in this area were 
particularly needed, as the northern electorate’s particular disdain for protection was 
beginning to dampen the enthusiasm of the party internally. John Blackwood 
informed Eglinton that, having ‘spoken to most of the members of committee now in 
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Edinburgh’, they had concluded that a Protectionist demonstration would be 
inadvisable owing to a ‘certain degree of apathy and down-heartedness abroad 
among the supporters of Protection at present’, because ‘it is not so clear that our 
broadside would be loud enough to tell amid the general silence throughout the 
country… [without] a fall of 6/ or 7/ in the price of wheat’.33  
The Glasgow section of the party, already damaged by the Disruption, might 
have been expected to disappear altogether. In fact, a significant faction survived in 
the city; one that was, moreover, still wedded to protectionism. A lengthy 
correspondence between George Sutherland and Disraeli made clear that while ‘the 
religious party differences remain’, they were ‘nearly unanimous in our aversion to 
Peel’s policy’.34 The Glasgow Industrial and Reciprocity Association was thus 
founded, on the understanding that ‘The old Clique will not join us – we could not 
expect that, but they will not oppose, that is enough’.35 Sutherland soon found that he 
had ‘overestimated religious differences, Frees and Old Church, are meeting on this, 
who did not used to meet’, and that meetings were attended ‘by several of 
undoubtedly the leading and most extensive merchants and manufacturers of 
Scotland. They have entered … into the scheme and I can see no reason for 
supposing that the Association will not be influential and numerous’.36  
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Yet, the lack of active leadership on a national level was hampering its 
prospects; Sutherland frequently hinted at the ‘difficulty, or uncertainty of any 
movement here until the Conservative leader be announced’, and Blackwood also 
asserted more generally that if they were to ‘set the country societies again in motion, 
it appears to me that some declaration from our leaders would be the best course’.37 
Scottish protectionism made substantial progress given its disadvantaged position, 
but it lacked public support. More importantly, the central party was unable (or 
unwilling) to provide support for such extra-parliamentary agitation. During the 1852 
election in the Leith District of Burghs, the Conservative candidate, who supported 
reciprocal Free Trade, lost the election handily; as Omond observed, ‘The old cry of 
free trade and cheap bread, as potent then as it had been during the lean years that 
were past, carried the day’.38  
Just as Peelites made great efforts to cooperate with Protectionists, so 
Protectionists made great efforts to accommodate Peelites. Intransigent Protectionists 
were forcefully suppressed by more moderate party elements. In 1851, James 
Drummond of the Midlothian Protection Association was severely censured and 
effectively ostracised by the local gentry for attempting to foist a rigidly Protectionist 
candidate on the county.39 The moderate Protectionist incumbent, Sir John Hope, 
agreed to stand again.40  
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Within the Derbyite Conservative party, many in Scotland already considered 
protection a dead issue, given the impracticability of re-imposing it.41 Indeed, the 
candidate for Banffshire, H. McDowall Grant, was advised by a local Conservative 
laird that ‘even many of the strongest Protectionists in England seem to be 
abandoning the idea as hopeless’, but that he should nevertheless ‘make your 
principles and hopes known to the farmers (for I do not think you will get the 
shopkeepers to support you)’.42 This fluidity initially served to confuse electors and 
worked to the party’s disadvantage. The Lord Advocate John Inglis, for one, 
professed his Free Trade sentiments when unsuccessfully standing for election in 
Orkney in 1852. The audience at his nomination, however, thought that as a member 
of a Protectionist government, there was ample doubt as to his allegiance on the 
issue.43  
Generally, from the early 1850s onwards the Scottish party followed the lead 
of early adopter G.W.H. Ross. An unsuccessful Derbyite candidate for Ross and 
Cromarty, he had campaigned in 1852 for the relief of the agricultural interest, rather 
than renewed tariffs.44 Such a shift was assisted by Derby’s strategy. He had 
consciously avoided committing the party to uncompromising protectionism in the 
late 1840s, and ensured that it was not the ‘main plank’ of his 1852 administration.45 
By the late 1850s, even this compromise was increasingly untenable, as Lord Home 
observed that farmers in Berwickshire were ‘better off than before, they are no 
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longer Protectionists and that link which bound them to the Tory party being 
broken’.46 
During the breakup of the Conservative party, new leader Lord Eglinton had 
lamented that ‘no measure could be passed so prejudicial to the interests of the 
country as the repeal of the Corn Laws’.47 Eglinton was a particularly ardent 
Protectionist in the late 1840s and early 1850s, even by the standards of the Derbyite 
party at that time.48 After losing its remaining liberal conservative sections, the party 
might have been expected to become even more of a ‘country’ party than before. 
Yet, some larger magnates with diverse business interests did not follow Peel on Free 
Trade. Similarly, Eglinton combined landholding with significant industrial interests, 
and actively involved himself in industrial matters. In 1843, for instance, he wrote to 
Peel to request a change in the mail packet schedule between Scotland and Ireland, 
having ‘been so fervently and repeatedly asked by the leading commercial men of 
Glasgow and elsewhere to bring [the issue] before your notice’.49 His longstanding 
relationship with the ironmaster Bairds of Gartsherrie led James Baird to record that 
‘I think I have never met a man with more thorough business habits’.50 The party, 
like its leader, was never merely an agrarian and traditionalist grouping. Given 
Eglinton’s continuing importance in the party up to his death in 1861, it is safe to 
assume that his views softened as Derby sought to wean the party from 
protectionism. 
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Nevertheless, its most powerful remaining Scottish intellectual lights – 
Alison and Aytoun – continued to espouse hierarchical and elitist ideals. Moreover, 
the paternalist mindset of the landlord survived within new facets of the state, such as 
in the central Board of Supervision tasked with overseeing the implementation of the 
new Scottish Poor Law.51 Its chairman, Sir John McNeill, carried out his duties on 
the basis of his belief that the landed classes had a duty to support the poor. Though 
this paternalism was of limited scope, it did, as Levitt points out, mean that ‘that the 
poor, unlike in England, were saved from the wrath of the utilitarian Whigs’.52 As 
late as 1865, a recently retired Conservative Constituency Agent asserted that his 
professional object was to ensure that ‘the landed interest, and the noblemen and 
gentlemen and educated classes of the country should occupy their natural position in 
the management of the affairs of the country, instead of the Cotton Lords and selfish 
manufacturers’.53 The underlying attitudes of the country tories up to 1868, and 
arguably beyond, were still based on the representation of interests over individuals. 
There had, however, been some changes in outlook within this overarching 
framework. There was an increasing willingness by some prominent party members 
to appeal directly to those interests in a popular sense, rather than focusing almost 
exclusively on creating and registering pliant voters. Eglinton took the lead on this, 
and though he was not able to ‘get up’ a mass national demonstration in favour of 
protectionism, that he would even attempt such a thing represented a decisive break 
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from earlier party strategy under Buccleuch.54 Eglinton had shown his independent 
willingness to engage in mass events from his 1839 tournament onwards, but at least 
part of this stemmed from a change of ethos in the Derbyite party. Derby held a 
different conception of constitutional authority to Peel’s which, though by no means 
populist, placed a lesser emphasis on executive authority within parliament, and 
acknowledged the increasing importance of ‘party’ and party organisation. The 
organised UK-wide campaign to win over public opinion was therefore carried out 
by Eglinton and his Scottish allies with Derby’s express approval.55  
Traditionalist intellectuals such as Aytoun and Alison became increasingly 
central to promoting Scottish conservative ideals after the Corn Law split, which was 
recognised by Eglinton and Derby.56 It is notable, however, that the infamously 
authoritarian Alison was given a baronetcy rather than a senior judicial post, which 
was instead awarded to the more moderate (and Peelite) Duncan McNeill, brother of 
Board-of-Supervision chairman Sir John McNeill.57 This was an indication that, by 
the early 1850s, Eglinton was going along with Derby’s efforts to move the party 
towards a more moderate position in certain areas. Alison, having been in many ways 
at the vanguard of the party in the 1830s, now found himself lagging behind. Indeed, 
one of his articles was rejected by Blackwood’s in 1850 because it was too critical of 
Peel, and Michie has observed that, due to his later obsession with currency and Free 
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Trade by the late 1850s, he became, ‘in his embittered old age … in effect, a 
currency crank’.58  
Despite appearing to be an increasingly old and tired party north of the 
border, there were occasional indications of youthful vitality. Eglinton found himself, 
in succession to the likes of Peel and Graham, elected as Lord Rector of Glasgow 
University. This was not instigated from on high, as he was elected despite his 
‘desire to give way to the Duke of Argyll’.59 The University of Glasgow 
Conservative Club continued to thrive, attracting donations from MPs across the 
Peelite-Protectionist spectrum, and even from former party managers Robert Lamond 
and Donald Horne.60 Peel had been selected as patron of that organisation in 1849, 
and its honorary members included Derby and William Wordsworth.61  
Overall, the Scottish Protectionist party moved towards becoming a more 
purely ‘country’ party than it had been previously, as the last liberal conservatives 
split off. It was not, however, exclusively so. Despite starting in a somewhat stronger 
position than their southern counterparts, the Scottish Peelites declined with greater 
rapidity. The Peelite and Protectionist contingents quickly began cooperating in 
Scotland, with most Peelites (at least in the higher echelons) being reabsorbed into 
the Derbyite fold by the later 1850s. Though the intellectual heavyweights of the 
Scottish party continued to nurse traditionalist ideals, various figures sought to move 
the party towards a greater popular engagement with the electorate.  
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II. Religious Change and Social Policy 
 
Though the influence of the Established Church was reduced after 1843, it remained 
an important institution, and the secession of its more radical elements meant that it 
became even more wedded to the ‘country’ mores espoused by the Conservative 
aristocracy. Given the newly fractured Scottish religious landscape, especially in the 
towns, the party found itself even more restricted to its rural base. Furthermore, the 
actions of some landowners in refusing Free Church sites and dismissing Free 
Church labourers served to sour relations in rural areas.62 Though this was also true 
of some Liberal and Whig landowners, such as the Duke of Sutherland, the 
disproportionate number of Conservative lairds meant that it damaged the party more 
severely. The party contained a surprisingly diverse assortment of religious 
denominations, but did not benefit from this in electoral terms. The Scottish 
Conservative party, and conservatism more broadly, thus had a meaningful effect on 
Scotland’s religious landscape across a variety of denominations. More broadly, the 
role and prominence of religion itself was changing in mid-Victorian Scottish 
society; the party also played a significant part in shaping these trends. 
The connection between local religious tensions and national politics was 
illustrated by the decision of an Aberdeenshire Free Church congregation at Rhynie 
not to build on a land plot provided by the Duke of Richmond. Richmond’s Factor 
thought that their change of heart in demanding a better site ‘must have arisen from 
Maule’s proposed measures’ to ‘enable Christian congregations in Scotland to obtain 
                                                          




sites for places of worship, manses, and school-houses’.63 Similarly, Conservative 
landowners were deeply unnerved by the evangelising efforts of the new Free 
Church, and their political implications. In the Dumfriesshire village of 
Wanlockhead, the Minister Lewis Irving ‘delivered from the tent an inflammatory 
harangue exhorting the people to “stand out” for what he called “their rights” … 
[which has] renewed the animosity of party spirit which had begun to subside’.64 
Buccleuch, who essentially owned the parish and had refused to grant a site to build 
a Free Church, thought that Irving’s ‘conduct in this matter has been a most 
impertinent interference when he had no concern and in a most impudent manner’.65 
The negative attitude of many Conservatives towards the Free Church, let alone 
Nonconformists, decisively precluded any efforts to appeal to these substantial 
groups.  
Free Church adherence, combined with strong anti-landlord sentiments, was 
particularly damaging to the party in the Highlands, as an evangelical Presbyterian 
ethos unique to that region and integral to its culture evolved.66 The monopoly of the 
landowers’ power in the Highlands was particularly visible. Popular dislike for them, 
and by extension the party which represented their interests, was widespread. The 
Free Church vote throughout Scotland was, however, not strong enough to 
conclusively affect electoral outcomes on its own. Nevertheless, it did negatively 
affect the party’s fortunes in conjunction with other factors. Church influence in 
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politics was common, such as in 1868 in Perthshire, when the Weem District alone 
was thought to be ‘Priest ridden by the Free Kirk clergy’, as ‘The parson from Killin 
drove thirty-five of … [Stirling’s] pledged voters into the polling booth like a flock 
of sheep’.67 The Conservative Sir William Stirling lost the county by 279 votes. The 
Free Church vote, especially as the electorate gradually expanded, prevented 
Conservative victories and influenced internal Liberal politics.68  
The continuing adherence of many Conservative aristocrats to the Scottish 
Episcopal Church was also a running sore-point, though there were challenges to the 
predominance of the aristocracy even within this institution.69 Some of the more 
romantic and/or anglicised Scottish Conservatives were more problematic, however. 
One of these, Alexander Baillie-Cochrane, lost his Lanarkshire seat in the election of 
1857 despite having gained it at a by-election only three months before. Though he 
provoked local disapproval for his vote against Palmerston on the China question, his 
links to the Church of England, Young England, and Puseyism had also damaged his 
prospects.70 Indeed, local Conservative Lord Home referred to Cochrane as an 
‘Impudent Dog’, and observed that ‘the Ministers in the county are persuading their 
flocks that Mr. Baillie Cochrane is a Romanist in disguise; and … this alone would 
destroy all chance of his re-election’.71 Similarly, George Hope was advised not to 
contest Linlithgowshire in 1852 because there was a general feeling among the 
gentry that he was ‘a great deal of a Catholic’, and that he was ‘turned out of 
Southampton for being suspected of being so’.72 As late as 1865, Liberal candidates 
                                                          
67 (?) Menzies to Stirling, 23 Nov. 1868, Stirling of Keir MSS, T-SK 29/80/152. 
68 Pentland, ‘By-Elections’, 281; Millar, ‘Conservative Split’, 225. 
69 Strong, Episcopalianism in Nineteenth-Century Scotland, 287. 
70 Millar, ‘Conservative Split’, 243. 
71 Home to Buccleuch, 7 Jul. 1857, Buccleuch MSS, GD224/1031/18/11. 




could refer in their election literature to the ‘powerfully organised High Tory 
opposition, which, in its zeal for the Episcopal Establishment (although inclined to 
court the Roman Catholics,)…’.73 
To be associated with anything approaching Catholicism was anathema to 
many Scots, and part of a wider British situation – anti-Catholicism was pervasive in 
mid-Victorian Britain.74 Though Scotland’s Presbyterians were now more divided, 
the country was still deeply religious, especially members of the middle-class 
electorate. Even a professed ‘Liberal Conservative’ of Scottish extraction scolded 
Lord Aberdeen for considering the inclusion of Sir James Graham in his government, 
as in his opinion ‘a more reckless and ungodly man does not exist’, because in the 
past ‘he was in the habit of going to the Home Office on a Sunday morning … and 
tempting the subalterns to be there in attendance upon him’.75  
Continuing religiosity was amply demonstrated by the pronounced effect 
which support for (or opposition to) the Maynooth grant played in Scottish politics 
up to the mid-1850s, though Derby quickly sought to distance the party from anti-
Catholicism. Uniquely in Scotland, the Free Church could negatively compare the 
treatment of Roman Catholics to their own unhappy experience in dealing with Peel. 
Conservatives initially made use of their opposition to the measure, which was a 
significant test of candidates’ religious integrity. Crucially, it also set them above 
many Peelites who had supported Maynooth and then compounded this by 
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supporting Russell’s 1851 Ecclesiastical Titles bill.76 Yet, the opposition to 
Maynooth held by Free Church members could not be transformed into electoral 
support for the Conservative party, given its staunch support of the Established 
Church. Similarly, though some United Presbyterians opposed Maynooth due to anti-
Catholicism, others did so out of opposition to state support of religion in general. It 
thus became yet another issue which was fought over most fiercely within the bounds 
of the Liberal party.77  
As Maynooth was pushed into the background, religious sensibilities 
continued to play a major role in Scottish political issues as the 1850s progressed. 
The force of politicised religiosity increasingly came to be expressed in the area of 
educational reform.78 This chiefly involved inter-denominational disagreements over 
the extent to which (or, indeed, if at all) religious education and the Established 
Church should play a role in any new system.79 No fewer than three Scottish 
education bills foundered in parliament between 1854 and 1856 because of this, 
despite a clear majority of Scottish MPs voting in favour.80 Though Fox-Maule’s 
non-sectarian proposals in the early 1850s were opposed by both the Established and 
Free Churches, Lord Advocate Moncrieff’s subsequent bills were mainly objected to 
by the Established Church and its Conservative political allies. They did so on the 
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grounds that they interfered with that church’s role in running its parochial schools, 
and were too favourable to the Free Church.81 Throughout the 1850s, Scottish 
Conservative MPs and their English allies contrived to block these efforts.82 When 
the Conservative MP Sir James Fergusson broke ranks, he was attacked by a fellow 
party-member C.L. Cumming Bruce, illustrating how closely the party identified 
with the position.83  
In 1859, Punch accused Derby of ‘inflicting another outrage upon the north’, 
because of his refusal to tackle the issue on the grounds of religious divisions.84 
Much of this division emanated from senior Scottish Conservatives. Buccleuch wrote 
a strongly worded letter to Aberdeen asserting that there was significant feeling in 
Scotland at ‘present in favour of our present Parochial System of schools’, and that 
the Free Churchers’ and Voluntaries’ motivation was ‘not education but political 
power, which under that guise many of them seek to obtain … not caring one 
farthing about education’.85 Buccleuch’s hard-line views on educational reform were 
a significant factor in his slow movement towards Derby after the fall of the 
Aberdeen ministry.86 The issue continued to affect Scottish politics up to 1868 and 
beyond. When yet another of Moncrieff’s measures was withdrawn in 1862, Punch 
highlighted that this may have been due to a ‘dread of the upper house’, containing 
as it did ‘the influence of the landocracy in Scotland’.87 Apart from continuing to 
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generate conflict between the party and voters of Nonconformist denominations, it 
also reinforced the perception that the Scottish Conservatives were an aristocratic 
‘country party’.  
Nevertheless, even after the Disruption, it was never a monolithically 
‘establishment’ party. Though the Free Church was predominantly Liberal in 
inclination, there were prominent Free Church ministers who openly professed 
Conservative allegiance. One, the Minister Dr James Begg of Newington, combined 
his Free Church ministry with prominent membership of the Scottish 
Conservatives.88 Archibald Campbell of Monzie had left the party and resigned his 
Argyllshire seat as a result of the Disruption. However, he continued to run as a 
candidate in the Free Church interest as a Liberal Conservative. The majority of 
Conservative votes in the 1852 Edinburgh election went to the Establishment 
Conservative, T.C. Bruce (and tactically to the radical Free Churchman Charles 
Cowan). Nevertheless, Campbell did manage to garner 626 votes, suggesting that, in 
Edinburgh at least, there was a significant minority who were Free Church and 
conservative in inclination (or, at least, liberal conservative).89 Campbell did not drift 
towards liberalism. Instead, he once again stood as a Conservative in the later 
1850s.90  
Below the parliamentary level, the Edinburgh party boasted a number of 
prominent Free Churchmen, including the Chairman of the Edinburgh Conservative 
committee in 1856, Alexander Pringle. Though there was occasional party infighting, 
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it nevertheless managed to contain religious diversity within its confines.91 
Moreover, Established Church Conservatives were not all staid Moderates. Many 
Conservative members of the Church of Scotland combined their denominational 
allegiance with deep piety, and, in some cases, strong evangelical fervour. The most 
zealous of these was perhaps Hay McDowall Grant, an Aberdeenshire landowner and 
former West Indian merchant who had unsuccessfully contested Banffshire as a 
Derbyite in 1852. His defeat prompted one Free Church-inclined newspaper to 
suggest that his defeat was a blessing, as Grant supported an administration which 
had been ‘patronising Antichrist’ through its grant to Maynooth.92 Yet, during the 
latter part of 1859 Grant proved himself to be a deeply pious lay preacher, and was a 
prominent instigator and promoter of the famous Ferryden revival in Forfarshire. 
During this, he made strenuous efforts to complete a widespread evangelical 
conversion of the local populace. Grant was, in addition to his conservatism, a 
radical evangelical whose beliefs were driven to a significant extent by the advance 
of romanticism in this sphere. While it is notable that Grant did not speak at either of 
the local Free Churches, he did speak at two United Presbyterian Churches, and 
though the most prominent Free Church minister privately disapproved of the way in 
which Grant preached, he did give him public praise.93  
Even the party’s traditionalist base was showing showed tentative signs of 
change by the 1860s. One former Conservative Constituency Agent was convinced 
by 1865 that the time had come for the party to embrace lay patronage, in order to 
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prevent a closer alliance between the Free Church and United Presbyterians. 
However, he also supported it because it constituted ‘the great and leading ground of 
opposition to the Established Church’, and because patronage had by this time ‘been 
reduced almost to a mere name and is not worth retaining, and to patrons must be a 
source of anxiety, not to say annoyance’.94 Moreover, Admiral Hay informed 
Disraeli that while he thought that ‘popular election of a parson has degenerated and 
always will degenerate into the nomination of a priest, by priests’, patronage was of 
actual benefit to no-one, and if abolished by the party it would ‘unite the Free Church 
to the Established Church [and] they will hold the majority of Scotchmen, 
conservative in Church and State’.95 It is notable that when patronage was abolished 
in 1874, it was done by Disraeli’s Conservative administration.96 Though this slow 
shift in party attitudes was driven more by practicality than conviction, this illustrates 
that Scottish conservatism was far from static in terms of religious attitudes.  
Despite the still-strong religiosity present in Scottish society, there is also 
significant evidence that popular attitudes were not static either. Though some have 
claimed that the Enlightenment had petered out in the 1820s, it continued to have 
ever-wider effects on Scottish society, resulting in a Scotland where ‘science and 
practical theology suited the national spirit’.97 In a broader British political context, 
the mid-Victorian period witnessed a conscious effort by Palmerston and Derby to 
partially insulate religion from the intensity of partisan politics. This was done by 
reframing issues with religious significance through the use of more secular 
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terminology, thus presenting it as social policy.98 Though Disraeli would not manage 
to transform ‘social reform’ into a popular element of the party agenda until after 
1868, it was a significant feature present in the first two Derby ministries.99  
The fractured, noisy, and chaotic religious landscape might give the 
impression that Scotland’s religiosity was increasing in the mid-Victorian period. In 
fact, much of the bustle constituted a reaction by some religious figures to 
perceptions that their influence was on the wane. The Disruption ended a specific 
type of Church influence on Scotland’s politics.100 Moreover, the fractured nature of 
Presbyterianism meant that no one church could now plausibly claim to speak for the 
nation, as was illustrated very clearly by the 1851 census.101 The different viewpoints 
of the various denominations were now reduced to mere competing interests, 
arguably on the same level as, rather than above, others such as the manufacturing 
and agricultural interests. This was not absolute; governments still ‘respected the 
churches as sources of social advice, the Lord Advocate for example consulting them 
over educational reform’.102 Nevertheless, even the idea that education constituted a 
‘social’ issue, rather than one that was unquestionably and primarily religious, is 
indicative of a wider shift. The broader fact was that, despite the great and diverse 
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efforts of a wide variety of individuals, there had been no great increase in church 
attendance. By the late 1840s and early 1850s, this had resulted in ‘hints in the 
published sermons and other pamphlets that their writers are questioning, however 
gently, some of the basic assumptions of the earlier era’.103 
However, within the bounds of Scottish conservativism, this questioning of 
assumptions occurred much earlier, suggesting that the party was at least partly 
responsible for furthering these wider changes. The elements of the party most 
receptive to evangelicalism were the liberal conservatives who had largely deserted 
the party long before 1846.104 The party’s abandonment of a commitment to 
evangelical-inspired notions paralleled the decline in its opinion of Chalmers, 
between 1839 and 1843. His worldview, after all, epitomised the confluence of 
moderate liberal conservatism and evangelicalism. The course of this disengagement 
can best be charted by examining the divergence of Chalmers and the party on the 
topic of the Scottish Poor Law.  
The main intellectual challenge to Chalmers’s preferences came from Dr 
William Pulteney Alison, a physician, social reformer, and brother of Archibald 
Alison.105 Both Alison brothers, in contrast to Chalmers, were profoundly sceptical 
of Malthusian theory.106 This theory suggested that population growth would 
eventually outstrip growth in food supply, necessitating population control.107 Some 
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advocates of Malthusianism therefore pressed for a harsher Poor Law which would 
discourage population growth. W.P. Alison’s immensely popular pamphlet employed 
a critique of Malthusianism as part of his proposals to extend the English Poor Law 
to Scotland.108 He proposed a system which was similar, but not identical to 
England’s. Though in favour of workhouses, he favoured keeping families intact and 
providing assistance to the able-bodied in certain circumstances.109 The issue held 
the interest of the Scottish party; Henry Home Drummond noted that ‘there is … 
agitation at present about the Scotch Poor Laws’, and advised William Stirling to 
‘read Dr Alison’s tract’.110  
Crucially, these proposals rested on framing the Condition of England 
question (in Scotland) as a social issue. The new Scottish Poor Law would eventually 
remove the management of poverty from the local parish, its ministers, and the 
Established Church more broadly, placing it into the hands of ostensibly disinterested 
‘professionals’. Interestingly, Archibald Alison, despite his country tory leanings, 
supported this on the basis that the aristocracy had been every bit as ineffectual in 
handling poverty as the Church had been.111 This attitude stood in stark contrast to 
Chalmers, who wished to establish a ‘Godly Commonwealth’ in response to 
increasing urbanisation and industrialisation.112 This ideal Christian society would be 
one in which the Established Church played a central role in the management of 
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poverty. Indeed, he put his voluntary ideals into practice in the Glasgow parish of St 
John between 1819 and 1823.113 There was, however, a rapidly growing public 
scepticism of Chalmers’s vision. In 1840, Archibald Alison supplemented this, and 
his brother’s arguments, by publishing a large two-volume work.114 This labelled the 
St John’s experiment an abject failure, and made a renewed attack on its Malthusian 
underpinnings.  
This direct challenge resulted in the arrangement of a debate between 
Chalmers and Alison. Held in September 1840, this wide-ranging discussion, during 
the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, lasted 
for four days. It attracted an enormous crowd, and its proceedings were widely 
reported in Scottish newspapers. At its core, the argument was a competition 
between moral and environmentalist views of society. Chalmers asserted that moral 
reform of individuals would lead to an improvement in the social environment, 
whereas Alison asserted the opposite, that reform of the wider social environment 
would in turn lead to moral improvement.115 Though reports indicate that Chalmers’s 
masterful oratory won over the audience in the room, Alison’s viewpoint (or at least 
parts of it) won the wider argument taking place in Scottish society. As Drummond 
and Bulloch put it, ‘all Scotland knew that the scope of the problem had long passed 
beyond hope of solution through voluntary efforts’.116  
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Michael Michie has observed that Archibald Alison’s fundamental social 
vision was in many ways similar to that of Disraeli’s public platform later in the 
period. However, Alison did not need to temper his opinions as a politician seeking 
to win power and build party alliances. He was therefore free to attack the more 
uncompromising extremes of political economy and alienate the liberal 
conservatives, conservative liberals, and christian economists who shared his 
essentially agrarian outlook. Both Alison brothers, alongside Sir James Graham, 
convinced Peel to establish a Commission of Inquiry into the Scottish Poor Law in 
1843–4.117  
Indeed, the Commission would have been convened in the immediate wake 
of the debate, if it had not been for the objections of Lord Advocate Rae.118 Religious 
interests were represented on the Commission, but it was publicly bipartisan in 
nature, intended to encompass as many societal ‘interests’ as possible. This reflected 
its purpose in dealing with what was by then considered an avowedly ‘social’ 
issue.119 The new Scottish Poor Law adhered to principles of political economy more 
than the Alisons might have liked. Nevertheless, it is notable that the aristocrats who 
generally ran the central Board of Supervision, as established by the 1845 Act which 
followed the Commission, followed a pattern of ‘benevolent collectivism’.120 This 
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was tellingly similar to the Alisons’ paternalist and environmentalist ethos.121 Peter 
Mandler has suggested that the English Poor Law represented not a revival of 
paternalism, but instead reflected a new ethos prevalent among the English gentry. 
Some of the Scottish gentry on a local level may possibly fit into this mould, but the 
primary motive in the drafting and subsequent national operation of the Scottish Poor 
Law was (at least among the Scottish party figures who counted) paternalist.  
The decline of religion in the political sphere from the 1840s onwards must 
not be overemphasised; the churches continued to hold an overwhelming moral 
influence, and social and political power at a local level. On a purely electoral level, 
this was particularly true outside of the central belt. Moreover, the churches adapted 
to the times, and theological disagreements did not prevent them from working 
together in arenas such as the Poor Law Boards, which were now somewhat more 
secular in character.122 Nevertheless, though they constituted important elements of 
these boards, they no longer aspired to entirely supplant them.  
This context is crucial to understanding the role played by religious issues in 
mid-Victorian Scottish party politics; the Established Church opposed educational 
reform so vehemently at least in part because it had already lost control of the Poor 
Law, only two years after losing so many of its adherents and ministers to the Free 
Church. They were fearful of further encroachments, especially as the Disruption had 
resulted in the loss of over 500 schools from the parochial sector.123 More broadly, 
the wider shifts taking place within Scottish society can also be seen in the gradual 
evolution of the vexed Sunday question in Scottish and British politics. Non-Scots 
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frequently illustrated (and lampooned) the country’s religiosity, as expressed through 
the staunch sabbatarianism of many churchgoers.124 However, the evolution of this 
issue also reveals the increasing relaxation of some religious strictures. There was, 
after all, significant and increasing opposition to sabbatarianism within Scotland 
itself.125  
Overall, the Scottish Conservative party was primarily perceived to be the 
party of the Moderate Established Church and Scottish Episcopal Church, and 
operated in a much more fractured religious landscape. These strong links reflected 
and reinforced its essentially aristocratic character. Nevertheless, it played a notable 
role in promoting the evolution of ‘social’ policy in certain areas, and in fashioning 
the implementation of such policies. More broadly, it also played an influential role 
in shaping the sectarian landscape of mid-Victorian Scotland. Given that it contained 
hitherto underemphasised evangelical and dissenting elements, this role was more 
far-reaching than might be expected.  
 
 
III. Scotland and Britain 
 
Though efforts to translate Scottish romantic conservatism into political support were 
unsuccessful in the 1830s and 1840s, this did not deter party figures. If anything, a 
hard core of stalwarts increased and diversified their exertions. After the Corn Law 
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split, the party found itself deprived of many of the great magnates who had 
dominated it, many of whom had been only lukewarm supporters of romantic 
conservative Scottishness. Certainly, they had been sceptical of efforts to promote 
this in a more popular sense, as had many of the more cosmopolitan liberal 
conservatives. Lord Eglinton was the leading Scottish Conservative after 1846, 
however, and was one of the most romantically inclined figures in the entire party. 
The party made efforts to promote itself through monuments and commemorations, 
and through the advocacy of Scottish rights. These efforts were, for a wide variety of 
reasons, unsuccessful. It thus found itself operating in a political landscape 
characterised by a jumble of ‘British’, international, and local issues during 
Palmerston’s ascendancy. Caught between this and its continued exclusion from 
urban Scotland, the party declined further.  
Eglinton and the party’s increasingly active efforts to promote a romantic and 
country tory version of Scottish cultural identity was in tune with the changing times 
in some ways, and discordant in others. On one hand, the distinctiveness of Scottish 
identity within the Union was increasingly bolstered by confident cultural 
expressions, including monuments, and by an increasing popular interest in the 
Scottish past. On the other hand, that distinctiveness was increasingly perceived in 
modern and Whiggish terms. Macaulay’s History of England, the first two volumes 
of which were published in 1848, epitomised and reinforced this trend.126 This 
rendering of the past, written by a historian who was also an active Scottish Whig 
politician, went out of its way to condemn past Tories and their motivations.127 By 
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extension, it sought to discredit the version of history which Eglinton and his ilk 
were promoting.128 The implicit intellectual assumptions engendered by such works 
occasionally revealed themselves in the somewhat less rarefied arena of electoral 
politics. The Liberal candidate for Wigtown Burghs in 1865, for instance, stated that 
he was an ‘adherent of that great Historic party’, and that he did not suppose that 
‘any true sons of the Covenanters wish for a return to Tory policy’.129  
Archibald Alison, in addition to his other varied pursuits, also indirectly 
combated Macaulay’s version of history. Alison’s ten-volume History of Europe was 
published before Macaulay’s, between 1833 and 1843, but had been an extremely 
popular bestseller. Despite his generally elitist outlook, Alison consented to the 
publication of a People’s Edition in the early 1850s, intended for a mass audience. 
Alison sanctioned this ‘novel experiment’ partly because his publisher ‘calculate[d] 
upon an enormous sale’.130 It was also explicitly intended to popularise his belief, 
implicitly evident throughout the book, that excessive democratic reform would lead 
to war, chaos, and revolution.131  
The Conservatives also made continued efforts to propagate their distinctive 
view of society in the area of commemoration. They were, however, increasingly 
unsuccessful in doing so because of wider cultural changes. The memory of Sir 
Walter Scott, for instance, had become increasingly de-politicised since his death in 
1832, in spite of party efforts. Despite (or perhaps because of) this, party members 
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were able to carve out a niche for themselves in popular celebrations of Scottishness. 
During the nationwide Burns centenary celebrations in 1859, for instance, senior 
Conservatives were prominent contributors and even directors of proceedings.132 The 
Burns festival at Glasgow was chaired by Alison – but it is nevertheless interesting to 
note that Baillie-Cochrane thought that this was only because the Duke of Montrose 
had declined to preside.133 Though its more active elements had pushed the Scottish 
Conservative party in an increasingly cultural and romantic direction, the unobtrusive 
and aristocratic base of the Scottish party contained many who disdained such 
activity.  
This internal dissonance was most evident in the preparations and planning 
for the National Wallace Monument at Stirling.134 Alison reluctantly accepted the 
chairmanship of a related meeting, ‘on the ground that some nobleman of high rank 
would be more suitable’, but found that ‘they all held back’.135 Prominent 
Conservatives were increasingly troubled by the debates surrounding the proposed 
character of the monument, expressing this both publicly and in private.136 As Alison 
observed, ‘The management had got into Radical hands, so far as the local committee 
was concerned, and the Tory landed proprietors in consequence stood aloof’.137 This 
narrative was by then a familiar one to such party stalwarts – having acted to 
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stimulate such expressions of Scottishness, they found that their efforts were moving 
in unwelcome directions.  
This was very true of the short-lived National Association for the Vindication 
of Scottish Rights, an extra-parliamentary organisation which existed between 1853 
and 1856, and sought to redress various immediate and longstanding Scottish 
grievances. The movement for the erection of the National Wallace monument had in 
fact followed on from its dissolution.138 The Association essentially sought to 
promote Scotland’s national interests within the Union. The UK Conservative party, 
at least, did pay more attention to Scotland and its affairs than was popularly 
perceived.139 Nevertheless, there was a persistent (and not entirely unjustified) public 
perception that there was, in the words of even a dedicated Whig like Henry 
Cockburn, an ‘occasional disregard, if not contempt, by England, of things dear to 
us, merely because they are not English’.140 Scottish business was often side-lined in 
parliament, and many legislators had little knowledge of or interest in Scottish 
affairs. There was sporadic agitation from various quarters advocating the recreation 
of the post of Scottish Secretary – figures as disparate as Henry Cockburn and Lord 
Melville both thought the idea to be a sound one.141  
The Association’s main contemporary impact on Scottish public life was 
through its organisation of large meetings. Several of these were held – in late 1853 
alone, its first meeting in Edinburgh was attended by 2,000, while a follow-up event 
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in Glasgow drew 5,000 listeners and supporters.142 Though it attracted a mishmash of 
people from across the political spectrum, the actual leadership of the movement was 
strongly dominated by Conservatives. These included Eglinton, Alison, and Aytoun. 
They were romantically inclined and notably intellectual Conservatives, and this 
strongly influenced the way in which the Association’s platform was formulated and 
propagated. As Alex Tyrrell has put it, ‘Eglinton and his Blackwood’s friends 
assumed the right to define policy at the Association’s public meetings and in 
parliament’.143 Eglinton’s past efforts, which included his medieval tournament and 
the 1844 Burns festival, had failed to bring political advantage to his party. They had, 
however, made him the most obvious choice to lead such a movement. He became 
the Association’s spokesman in parliament, and it was publicly suggested that by 
doing so, he had sacrificed both his position in the Conservative party and his hopes 
of office.144 In fact, he had done nothing of the sort – as Chapter Two has illustrated, 
he was the leading Scottish Conservative throughout the 1850s, and would go on to 
hold the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland after the organisation was wound up.  
Scottish Conservatives had been flirting with such ideas long before the 
official establishment of the NAVSR; Aytoun, for instance, had publicly criticised 
centralising tendencies since the early 1850s at least, and alongside Alison, had 
opposed Peel’s assimilationist Scottish banking legislation in the 1840s.145 Other 
prominent Conservatives were also present in the Association’s ranks – the Bairds of 
Gartsherrie were supporters, and the Duke of Montrose chaired the Glasgow public 
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meeting. Most tellingly, with the exception of Charles Cowan and Duncan McLaren, 
there were no really prominent Liberals among its membership.146  
Nevertheless, the Association was not perceived (initially at least) to be 
merely a Conservative proxy, as there were other prominent backers. These including 
figures such as Glasgow solicitor William Burns and the historical novelist James 
Grant.147 Before Eglinton and the Blackwood’s friends took a leading role, the initial 
impetus had come from them. They were not party members, but did have 
longstanding reputations as opponents of centralisation. The party had sought for 
years to utilise broader romantic currents present in Scottish civil society. Eglinton 
and his ilk managed – briefly and partly – to reach out and co-opt an ostensibly 
nonpartisan vehicle to advance their agenda. 
Initially, they were successful in their object of attracting a broad base – those 
who signed the Association’s petition to English and Irish MPs included Peelites, 
Derbyites, radicals, and whigs.148 Moreover, it also attracted a broad spectrum of 
religious figures, including the Free Church Minister James Begg, and Hugh Miller, 
editor of the Free Church organ the Witness.149 Fourteen peers, a host of municipal 
leaders from across Scotland, and many local magistrates were signatories, and its 
large committee included newspaper editors, leaders in the major professions, and 
captains of industry.150 These were the leaders of the liberally minded civil society 
which had largely evicted the Conservative party from urban Scotland twenty years 
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before. The Conservatives involved must have thought that all their wishes had been 
granted; if they could shape and direct opinion in such a broadly based group, they 
might finally be able to successfully (re)introduce romantic, paternalist, and 
hierarchical notions of Scottish identity into the political sphere. This would also, 
incidentally, do much to detoxify conservatism in Scotland. It might even eventually 
lead to the rehabilitation of the party, as a vehicle through which this politicised 
identity could be expressed.  
The NAVSR’s platform was largely formulated with this romantic and 
hierarchical worldview in mind. It focused on promoting Scotland’s interests, but 
with a strong emphasis on the primacy of the Union: ‘Lord Eglinton and I were 
perfectly united in our views, which were to abide firmly by the Union, and utter 
nothing which could shake the general attachment to it’.151 However, the 
Association’s platform did contain elements which were considered, at the time and 
subsequently, to have been frivolous. There was, for instance, adverse reaction to 
complaints by William Burns that the word ‘England’ was being increasingly and 
incorrectly conflated with that of ‘Britain’. This type of complaint was ridiculed in 
the Scottish and English press, especially (and tellingly) by whiggish organs.152 The 
conservative press, and Blackwood’s, however, generally displayed a positive 
attitude towards the Association.153  
The subsequent (and abundant) historiography on the NAVSR has likewise 
tended to focus on these more frivolous aspects.154 Though the Association appealed 
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to a romanticised and idealised past in order to justify its defence of Scotland’s 
ancient institutions, the whole movement cannot be summarily dismissed as merely 
the result of emotional outpourings and antiquarianism. Beneath the surface, it 
represented an attempt by Conservative figures to promote a version of Scottish 
identity which was hierarchical and paternalist. Alison had some romantic 
sympathies, but these were by no means excessive, and Eglinton’s industrial interests 
and refusal (as a Lowlander) to be swept along by the prevailing currents of 
Highlandism are indicative.155 Romanticism was of secondary importance to the 
Conservative leaders of the movement, being a shell surrounding a core of more 
practical political objectives.  
A more romantic Scotland would also be a country that did not wholly 
embrace the more excessive strictures of political economy. There were echoes of 
vaguely tory-radical and Young England-esque themes in the ideas of its principal 
adherents. Aytoun, for instance, wrote a novel which (like Baillie Cochrane’s and 
Disraeli’s before him) criticised the essential inhumanity of many aspects of modern 
society.156 Yet, more so than the conservative romantics who preceded him, he 
emphasised that much of this stemmed from excessive centralisation. Advocacy of 
anti-centralisation could be interpreted in a convenient number of ways. For urban 
Scots, it could be seen as an assertion of confidence in the new bourgeois dominance 
of municipal affairs, while the country tories could see it as an implicit advocacy of 
localist and paternalist dominance in the counties. Though convenient, these 
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interpretations were so incompatible that any alliance built on such a foundation was 
bound to be short-lived.  
Despite its brief existence, the NAVSR did sow the seeds for the eventual 
introduction of administrative devolution in Scotland, both in terms of public opinion 
and internal Conservative party opinion. After its dissolution, Eglinton picked up 
right where he left off as a senior and trusted member of the party. He strongly 
lobbied Derby for administrative devolution – interestingly, not on the model of a 
Commons-based Irish Chief Secretary. Instead, he advocated turning the sinecure 
office of Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland into a Minister for Scotland.157 Having been Irish Lord Lieutenant, Eglinton 
sought to create a Scottish equivalent of this post, which would obviate the need for 
the post-holder to find a Scottish Commons seat.158  
Moreover, it would have bolstered the influence of the Scottish aristocracy, 
and provided an additional inroad for the peerage into urban Scotland. When the 
party was in power in London, a Scottish Minister would be able to curry favour in 
Scotland through the judicious dispensation of patronage. It is notable that Disraeli’s 
Press was not unfavourable towards the NAVSR, and that the first attempt to re-
establish the post of Scottish Secretary was during Disraeli’s second ministry in 
1878.159 The most important consequence of the NAVSR was therefore internal to 
the Conservative party, as the principle of administrative devolution was 
significantly advanced within it. While the eventual establishment of the post of 
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Scottish Secretary was the result of cross-party efforts, it did come to pass during the 
Conservative ministry of 1885–6.160  
Derby appears to have been keen on the idea, though in keeping with his view 
that parliament was the ‘authoritative arena of national politics’, it seems unlikely 
that he would have supported it if the popular and extra-parliamentary NAVSR had 
not been wound up by this time.161 He even went so far as to consult Buccleuch on 
the proposal, but his many objections killed the scheme. Principally, as the 
sovereign’s representative to the Kirk, the Lord High Commissioner’s post was a 
sinecure, but was nevertheless an informal ‘means of communication between the 
Government and the Church’.162 The party had already borne the brunt of public 
anger for its perceived role in the Disruption. As such, attempting to give an office so 
closely associated with the Established Church such wide-ranging temporal powers 
would have provoked apoplectic fury among the increasingly strident Nonconformist 
denominations, especially the United Presbyterians, who advocated the separation of 
Church and State, and elements of the Free Church.  
This was also one of the main reasons why the NAVSR could never have 
constituted a broad and robust base on which to build an urban Scottish 
conservatism. Though the Association attracted a wide range of religious adherents, 
it could only achieve this by excluding religious issues from its platform. Moreover, 
the Conservatives who drove the movement were largely Episcopalians. Though 
there was a great deal of fractious infighting between different forms of 
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Presbyterianism, it was nevertheless an essential pillar of a distinctive Scottish 
bourgeois identity. Further, the public became increasingly aware of the overlap 
between the NAVSR’s leading lights and the Protectionist leadership, despite their 
attempts to downplay and conceal this.163 Once again, the party’s reputation as anti-
Reformers came into play, as Cockburn observed that it was curious that though the 
NAVSR might want Scotland to have more MPs than its then-current fifty-three, 
‘this complaint proceeded from those who did all they could to prevent us from 
getting even the fifty-three we have’.164 Further, significant elements of Scottish 
society were indifferent to centralisation, and some smaller commercial elements 
were actively in favour of integrationist measures.165  
The Association’s demise was deliberately engineered by the very 
Conservative leaders who had initially done so much to promote it. The broad 
spectrum of ideas which such a strident (but steadfastly pro-Union) platform 
attracted quickly began to worry Eglinton and his allies. Alison stated that ‘other 
more ardent and hot-headed patriots were not content with this object … the Irish 
Repealers were stretching out the hand of amity’, and therefore ‘accordingly Lord 
Eglinton and I agreed that it should be allowed to drop’.166 It is possible that its 
backers wished to encourage something not unlike Irish patriotic Toryism, but had 
instead found themselves attracting other Irish movements. The fact that such figures 
were willing to ally with, and even lead, such a populist and extra-parliamentary 
movement shows how far leading Conservatives had progressed since their 
reactionary response to Reform. Though Eglinton presented its giant and populist 
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petition to parliament as a ‘respectful’ appeal, the fact that he consented to present it 
in the first place is telling.167 Derby, for one, would not have become even 
peripherally involved in such an organisation, strongly believing as he did that 
parliament was the ‘authoritative arena of national politics’.168 Indeed, apart from the 
hustings, his only significant foray into extra-parliamentary public speaking had been 
his 1834 Glasgow Rectorial address.169  
Though some Scottish Conservatives were now more comfortable with new 
means of winning over the electorate, they still held fundamentally hierarchical 
outlooks. Such popular movements were now acceptable, but only if the ‘right 
people’ were leading them, and if their followers conformed to a moderate and 
deferential ideal. The Association thus ran into the same barriers as the Duke of 
Gordon had in the 1830s, when attempting to convert the Orange Order into a tool of 
the Scottish party. Members continued to hold their own ideas, and would not always 
defer. For instance, it seems very likely that Eglinton did not approve of the Grant 
brothers’ criticism of the romanticised Scottish aristocracy.170  
Viable nationalist movements needed to contain a ‘strong collective 
democratic component’.171 Given the outlook and leadership of such Conservative 
figures, this was never a possibility. The movement drew on significant support from 
Scottish urban leaders. However, it never made a sustained effort to reach further 
down the social scale, in order to build up a genuinely popular support base. Though 
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the enormous meetings indicate that a potentially popular support base might have 
existed, the movement was kept deliberately exclusive, and, as Graeme Morton has 
observed, ‘rank and file membership was more in the 100s than the 1,000s’.172 
Similarly, this potential popular base was by no means unanimous. In particular, 
Scottish participation in the Empire served to make such quasi-nationalistic 
complaints seem irrelevant – this did much to encourage a British identity which 
spanned Scotland, England, and Wales.173 It is significant that the Crimean War was 
the main public excuse which Eglinton and his allies used for winding up the 
Association, ‘upon the ground that England’s danger was not Scotland's 
opportunity’.174  
It is intriguing to note that the period immediately following the mid-1850s, 
the time in which the Scottish party was at its most distinctively ‘Scottish’, there 
followed a phase in which Scottish politics more broadly was at its most essentially 
‘British’, yet also simultaneously local. After the NAVSR’s attempt to appropriate 
Scottish patriotism for the Conservative party, Palmerston succeeded in capturing a 
near-monopoly on British patriotism in Scotland and England, through invoking an 
‘atavistic notion of “England” in defence of the Empire’.175 Though Disraeli would 
go on to appropriate this later in the century, Scottish elections during Palmerston’s 
ascendancy were fought on a mishmash of competing local and international issues, 
putting the Scottish party once again on the back foot.  
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Though it was by no means a primary factor, Scottish Conservative 
candidates tended to do better if they praised Palmerston during the 1857 election, 
and worse if they did not.176 The Palmerston factor, which included moderate 
conservatism in domestic affairs, endeared him to many otherwise conservatively 
inclined electors. This hindered the Conservatives in both Scotland and the UK until 
Palmerston’s death in 1865.177 Palmerston even managed to steer clear of Scottish 
controversy on perennially thorny religious issues, despite his widely acknowledged 
indifference to Scotland. In consciously making English ecclesiastical appointments 
which favoured low churchmen, Palmerston endeared himself to a variety of 
Presbyterians.178  
All of this had a cumulative effect on the fortunes of the Scottish party in the 
late 1850s and early 1860s. In the realm of foreign policy, moreover, Scottish 
Conservatives do not appear to have formulated distinct Scottish positions.179 
Scottish Conservative newspapers implied, for instance, that the outbreak of the 
American Civil War demonstrated the impracticality of democracy, but this was little 
different from broader UK currents of party opinion.180 Scottish conservatism may 
have contained variant attitudes on domestic affairs, be they Scottish or British, but 
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on imperial and foreign matters the party’s attitudes were essentially 
indistinguishable from those in the wider UK party.181  
Overall, the prominence of British and international issues put the Scottish 
Conservative party at the same disadvantage as the party more broadly. Before this, 
Eglinton and the newly ascendant Scottish Conservative intellectuals had made 
renewed and more inclusive efforts to win over urban and bourgeois Scotland. They 
had done so through a continued focus on monuments, commemorations, and related 
antiquarian pursuits. Primarily, they had sought to utilise the NAVSR and advocacy 
of ‘Scottish Rights’ to finally connect cultural and political expressions of 
Scottishness. This romantic, elitist, and paternal vision of an ideal Scottish society 
was, however, contrary to the spirit of the age.  
 
 
IV. Social Change and Political Reform  
 
From 1832 onwards, the Scottish Conservatives had always possessed a majority of 
the county seats, and at least one burgh constituency. The election of 1857, however, 
deprived the party of its sole remaining urban seat, and led to a roughly equal 
division in the counties between Conservatives and their opponents. Popular 
preferences and political issues played a role in both urban and rural seats, but 
changes in the influence- and registration-riddled counties were somewhat 
distinctive. In the 1850s, Eglinton and others had been busy attempting to make 
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inroads into urban and bourgeois Scotland. However, the majority of the country tory 
squires who had remained on the Protectionist side had continued to act (or not act) 
much as before. Ostensibly ‘local’ issues such as the Game Laws and Hypothec 
revealed the extent to which the social structure of the Scottish countryside was 
changing. The party, though not static, failed to adapt fully to this. By the eve of the 
Second Reform Acts, the party showed signs of tentative innovation on a deeper 
level. However, the primary impetus for this came from the central party.  
The deteriorating political situation after the 1840s did not stimulate any 
invigoration of activity. The close connection between local and national political 
issues declined, meaning that localism once again came to the fore in the counties. 
This, combined with party splits, meant that much of the formal party organisation 
had decayed or vanished. The political activity of the gentry had diminished or 
vanished along with it. As such, the issues which the rural party concerned itself with 
were more prominently local.182 Even by 1868, when William Stirling wrote a draft 
letter to one of his Perthshire constituents on his beliefs, he spent as much space 
discussing his position on a proposed Salmon Fishing bill as he did on parliamentary 
reform.183 These issues were not entirely traditional or concerned with parliament, 
however; Stirling was also advised to play on his potential investment in a local 
railway line from Meigle to Alyth as there were ‘a good many voters in Alyth’.184  
In many ways, this localist turn must have been a relief to the conservatively 
minded, as it enabled them to more securely view such issues in terms of local 
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‘interests’. Indeed, these could cross constituency lines, as in 1849 when Inverness-
shire MP Henry Baillie was expected to play a prominent role in shepherding a 
parliamentary bill. This would have authorized the construction of a new bridge at 
Inverness with fifty per cent government funding, provided the ‘the four northern 
counties would be willing to assess themselves to pay the remaining half’.185 It is 
such issues which best illustrate how the politics of registration and influence were 
no longer enough to maintain the party in the counties. The main ‘local’ issues which 
revealed this change were Hypothec and the Game Laws.  
The Game Laws allowed the gamekeepers of landlords to kill tenants’ 
animals, even their cats and dogs, if they interfered with game animals. They also 
prevented tenants from killing game animals which had trespassed on their holdings, 
even if these had damaged crops and other property.186 Landowners, mostly 
Conservatives, had long been dogged by complaints from their tenants regarding the 
iniquity of the laws. This had long played a prominent part in opposition 
campaigning.187 By the late 1850s, however, the issue had been brought into sharper 
relief by the more systematic exploitation of game, as the land-use pattern of Scottish 
estates increasingly favoured that pursuit.188 During by-elections in the dying days of 
the Palmerston administration, there was significant evidence that farmers were no 
longer willing to ignore the issue. By 1865, the single largest cause of Peter 
Blackburn’s defeat in Stirlingshire was his support for the Game Laws.189 His 
position as a local Justice of the Peace, ruling personally on poaching offences, and 
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his role in herding the Night Poaching Act through parliament cannot have helped 
matters.190 Kincardineshire was also lost by a large margin because of this, despite 
the seat having been held by the party since 1826.191 This year also saw activity in 
the northeast, as local anti-Game Law committees spontaneously formed in five 
counties. Blackburn’s case, though, was somewhat exceptional; though farmers were 
willing to punish pro-Game Law candidates at the polls, the overall tone of relations 
in the northeast was fairly cordial. Local squires recognised that good relations with 
their agricultural tenants was at least as important as their game income. Though the 
laws would continue to be a running sore-point until after 1868, at this point the 
party appeared at least somewhat amenable to compromise on the issue.192 This 
conciliatory attitude illustrates that the authoritarian and strictly hierarchical 
worldview of the Conservative lairds had mellowed somewhat since the 1830s. The 
lack of any actual action, however, illustrates that this change was limited.  
The extent of their willingness to treat with farmers and tenants on more 
equal terms was more clearly revealed by their actions on Hypothec. Their attitudes 
toward reforming Scottish Hypothec laws was far less flexible. Hypothec, yet 
another long-running sore-point between landlord and tenant, enabled landlords to 
collect debts from defaulting tenants in the form of property or agricultural output. 
They could do so in preference to any other creditors, even where such property had 
already been sold on. This security allowed lairds to gamble when letting farms to 
poorer applicants, encouraging social mobility. However, it also encouraged them to 
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foreclose at the first sign of trouble. More damagingly, it irritated merchants and 
other elements of the rural economy who might lose grain and stock which they had 
already paid for. The stage was thus set for an unusual set of alliances, as landlords 
and upwardly mobile small farmers were united in support of Hypothec, whereas 
merchants, manufacturers, and larger capitalist farmers were united against it.193 It 
was the latter group, of course, which was far more likely to possess the franchise in 
significant numbers. English Conservatives were by this point attempting to make 
inroads into urban areas. Scottish Conservatives on the other hand, after the failure of 
the NAVSR, were fighting a defensive action to retain even their last remaining rural 
strongholds.194 
Both Hypothec and the Game Laws brought the party into conflict with the 
bedrock upon which it had built its rural edifice – the tenantry. Yet, it is also true that 
both issues were by no means novel when they flared up in the late 1850s. Rather, 
the controversy was more a symptom than a cause of the decline in Conservative 
support. The fact that the tenantry was now both willing and able to make an issue of 
it was symptomatic of a greater economic independence, and a less deferential 
attitude. Indicators of this change had been present for years; for instance, Lord 
Aberdeen would sit at the gate of Haddo House on Saturday afternoons to discuss his 
tenants’ problems and issues, but discontinued the practice after 1850 when he found 
that they were only attending for social reasons.195 The Conservative MP for 
Peeblesshire was right to assert that, with regard to the Game Laws, ‘liberals are 
quite as great transgressors in this matter as any of us’.196 Nevertheless, the 
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overwhelmingly Conservative makeup of the Scottish gentry (with a few notable 
exceptions) made it a disproportionately worrisome development for the party. As 
the holders of the majority of county seats, they also had more to lose. Even after the 
Second Reform Acts, one Scottish Conservative candidate thought that these issues 
had been the principal reason for their poor performance in 1868, and that it was ‘not 
the reduced franchise which has defeated us – very much the reverse’.197 Broadly 
speaking, the self-confident and independent attitudes which had led to the eviction 
of the party from urban Scotland had by now spread into the surrounding 
countryside. This, combined with the natural rise in voter numbers, created an 
increased electoral threat to the party.  
Though the Conservatives still considered themselves the bulwark of the 
agricultural interest, they increasingly recognised that the balance of power within 
this interest was shifting away from the landed class to further down the social scale. 
Some attempts were thus made to adapt to the changing times; many candidates, 
such as William Stirling, deliberately sought out tenant seconders and proposers for 
the nomination, with party workers recognising ‘that a change of men from those 
who proposed and seconded formerly is most desirable’.198 The party increasingly 
selected candidates who would be popular with farming voters, and by the late 1870s 
almost all Scottish candidates had publicly declared themselves in favour of Game 
Law reform.199  
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In the Highlands, similar (though not identical) conditions and trends were 
increasingly evident. The forthright expression of a strident Highland voice on a 
range of political issues was not to be heard properly until the 1870s and 1880s. 
Though conditions had improved, insecurity and poverty remained a constant feature 
of life for many. The twin calamities of the Disruption and Highland Famine had 
revealed the divergent interests of landlord and tenant even more so than in other 
parts of Scotland. As such, land reform was a more prominent issue, and the anti-
aristocratic ethos of the Free Church in the region both reflected and itself intensified 
such attitudes in wider society.200 Though many landlords had made vigorous efforts 
to mitigate the effects of famine, these were less visible than those who had not, 
souring relations over the long term.201  
As David Roberts has observed, ‘the paternalist mentality of the country 
squire was a curious mixture of prejudice, self-interest, local loyalties, and 
benevolence’.202 To an increasing number of Scots, it seemed that self-interest was 
their primary motivating factor. Buccleuch, for instance, had slowly gravitated back 
towards the Derbyite party partly because he feared the loss of constituencies which 
he controlled, should another Reform Act be passed. One of his overriding concerns 
for most of this period was to ensure that the small counties of Peeblesshire and 
Selkirkshire, both of which he dominated, would not be amalgamated.203  
The party continued to nurture a fundamental belief that the aristocracy were 
the natural leaders of society; Derby held this attitude to an extent, but many in the 
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Scottish party were effectively blinkered. 204 It was thus unwilling, or even unable to 
envisage, possible ways of winning over electors. Despite acknowledging their 
unpopularity on the Game question, Graham Graham-Montgomery frankly stated 
that ‘in regard to remedies I have really nothing to suggest. I know of no grievances 
to address’.205 Though they were willing to deal with electors on slightly more equal 
terms, there was a fundamental disconnect between what many voters wanted and 
what Scottish Conservatives were willing to conceivably do. As such, they 
concentrated on a narrow range of issues – and even in this area, they could not keep 
up with the tide of popular opinion. Archibald Alison showed evidence of this 
progressive-but-blinkered approach. He was willing to support the introduction of 
direct taxation in the 1850s, but only because Free Trade had made it necessary, and 
he decried ‘the Ten Pound Notables [who] like their aristocratic predecessors in 
France refused to submit to any direct taxation’.206 Thus, his underlying worldview 
remained unchanged. There was tentative evidence of a newer Scottish conservatism 
in its infancy, though this would not become influential until well after 1868. John 
Skelton, for instance, was a prominent Scottish supporter of Derbyite and Disraelian 
ideas, and made efforts to promote this in his articles for Blackwood’s. It was for this 
reason that Disraeli made him Secretary of the Scottish Board of Supervision after 
1868.207 Nevertheless, even this appointment illustrates that innovation and change 
was largely driven by party figures outside of Scotland. Indeed, Blackwood’s itself 
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was by then an Edinburgh magazine in name only, with an agenda largely dictated 
from London.208 
In a UK context, the broader Conservative party gradually reconciled itself to 
Derby’s intentions during the 1850s.209 Derby, like Disraeli, was convinced that the 
towns were full of conservatism disguised as moderate liberalism, but the party had 
made only limited progress in winning over this group.210 In Scotland, there had (it 
appeared) been no progress at all. As explored in Chapter Two, this was the one of 
the main reasons behind the organisation of Disraeli’s 1867 Edinburgh banquet. The 
fact that the Whigs agreed with local Conservatives to offer Disraeli the freedom of 
the city, while radicals insisted on giving it to John Bright also, suggests that there 
was scope for Whig-Conservative cooperation on both sides of the border.211  
By this point, the last active and innovative figures in Scottish conservatism, 
such as they were, had passed from the scene. Eglinton had died in 1861, Aytoun in 
1865, and Alison in the May of 1867.212 Younger Scottish thinkers such as Skelton 
were not yet influential or of sufficient standing. By the eve of the Second Reform 
Acts and Derby’s retirement, Disraeli was, essentially by default, the most influential 
remaining Conservative who supported and promoted innovation in that sphere. As 
Maurice Cowling has demonstrated, passing the new Reform Acts involved 
immensely complex manoeuvring and political compromise.213 As such, innovative 
Scottish measures were, quite understandably, secondary considerations. Derby and 
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Disraeli were not, however, entirely indifferent to Scotland. Its share of redistributed 
seats was often discussed in Reform proposals, and Disraeli was even willing to 
consider extending the Scottish (and Welsh) practice of grouping burghs into non-
contiguous district constituencies to England.214 Conversely, Reform proposals 
remained sensitive to Scottish precedents; because there was ‘no example in Scotland 
of a county returning two Members’, over-populous counties were split, rather than 
extra members added.215 Similarly, attention was paid to repeated warnings that 
Scottish urban electors were even more anti-Conservative than their English 
counterparts. Certainly, the first attempt to pass Scottish Reform in May 1867 redrew 
county constituencies in a way which excluded urban voters to a greater extent than 
the eventual English bill.216 Bowing to Scottish Liberal objections, a slightly 
modified bill, still somewhat favourable to the Conservatives, was agreed upon after 
an all-night cabinet session involving Disraeli and the Lord Advocate.217  
Disraeli was not able offer a significant increase in the number of Scottish 
seats. Despite knowing that ‘the Scotch public look with great interest to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s statement on the subject’ of reform and redistribution, 
he was advised that, during his banquet speech, that ‘It may be better not to advert to 
this matter’.218 Though there may have been a tentative private willingness to 
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consider innovation, the political considerations of the day meant that this was 
deferred.  
Widespread discussions about the definition of what constituted sufficient 
‘respectability’ to earn the franchise were not confined to England.219 Scottish party 
members participated in nationwide debates over the possible and desirable limits of 
constitutional change. Serious misgivings about an expansion of the franchise were 
by no means restricted to the Conservatives; Palmerston had been opposed to 
parliamentary reform, and the Liberal party’s long-serving Lord Advocate was a self-
professed ‘old Whig’.220 In keeping with the Scottish Conservative party’s slightly 
more country tory character, suggestions from north of the border disproportionately 
focused on separating town and country. Inverness-shire MP Henry Baillie proposed 
the creation of specific constituencies with ‘a franchise calculated to give a 
representation to the working classes … [giving] suffrage to all towns of more than 
100,000 inhabitants’, but commented (not entirely coincidentally) that though there 
were twenty-two of these in England, only two existed in Scotland.221 Other rank-
and-file party members suggested that, in Scotland, ‘members of some boroughs be 
elected by universal or by household suffrage, … [and] others by a £6 franchise’.222 
Similarly, the MP for Perthshire and a more junior party member both supported the 
creation of Scottish university seats because they thought that would constitute an 
acceptable ‘lateral extension of the franchise’.223 Two Scottish university seats were 
indeed created in 1868. 
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Notions of ‘respectability’, and who constituted the legitimate political nation 
were still limited, and the opinions of party members from 1866 onwards reflect this. 
This is neatly illustrated by a Glasgow party member, who thought that ‘The people 
of Scotland, that is fifteen out of every hundred, is perfectly satisfied that the present 
£10 rental is low enough’.224 Similarly, a member of the Greenock party thought that 
his town’s ‘wealth and intelligence would be completely swamped and the right of 
election placed in the power of the workingmen’, and that ‘with the exception of the 
magistrates, and a few leaders among the shopkeepers and working classes, the 
respectable portion of the community have given no countenance to the Reform 
movement’.225 In fact, an energetic and popular Reform movement had emerged 
throughout the UK, and across Scotland, by the mid-1860s, with a pragmatic 
convergence of opinion between working-class reformers and the middle classes 
occurring by early 1867.226 The urban Conservative party, still broadly sceptical 
about Reform, did not have much to lose in electoral terms. The county party 
members, however, had more to worry about: ‘until last election we could boast of a 
considerable number of Conservative county members. I am sorry to say that even as 
the franchise now is we are gradually losing ground there’ – the writer thought that if 
‘a £20 or even a £30 clause carried, Scotland would not send a single Conservative 
representative to parliament’.227  
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Their fears were, it turned out, ill-founded. Though Sir William Fraser was 
right to state that, after the 1868 election, ‘The Scotch counties are now very much 
like the Scotch burghs’, that election was the party’s low-point, with successive 
results showing a (modest and slow) improvement.228 Despite these almost 
apocalyptic missives from Scots party members, the fact remains that the Scottish 
party did not publicly challenge Derby and Disraeli’s attempts to push through 
parliamentary Reform. Derby and (to a lesser extent) Disraeli had succeeded in 
shifting party opinion towards accepting that some measure of parliamentary Reform 
was necessary. Though the Scottish party might have been somewhat more 
reactionary in character than the party more generally, this was trumped by loyalty 
towards the leadership. Alison again put his finger on the pulse of contemporary 
opinion when he suggested that many in the party (and in the opposition, for that 
matter), were deeply opposed to franchise extension. Despite his ever-more 
outspoken attitudes, he asserted that he did ‘not blame the Conservative leaders for 
adopting these tactics … directing, so far as it was possible, the dangerous tendency 
of a current which it was impossible openly to withstand’.229 Though many in the 
Scottish party did not actively embrace Reform, they nevertheless tolerated it as a 
rear-guard action. This constituted a shift in their attitudes – at least in terms of a 
willingness to acknowledge the increased power of public opinion in politics.  
The party’s tentative organisational revival was partly fuelled by the 
changing times. Their opponents continued to remind electors of the party’s links to 
the pre-1832 authoritarian Scottish Tory regime and their previously staunch 
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protectionism. These issues, however, were of less immediate importance to the 
electors of the 1860s.230 Similarly, while the party’s Scottish Reform proposals could 
not please everyone, the fact nevertheless remained that it was the Conservative party 
which was spearheading it. In Glasgow, the 1868 election brought them over twenty-
five per cent of the new electorate, of whom as many as 3,000 were working-class 
plumpers.231  
Disraeli’s message found receptive ears among many working-class Scots. 
Over 2,500 working-class Edinburgh residents, for instance, signed an address to him 
in which they told him of their ‘public approval of your parliamentary efforts’.232 
Similarly, in the run-up to his banquet, he received a ‘deputation of influential 
working men’.233 Nevertheless, this rapprochement was not caused by the evolution 
of Scottish conservatism; rather, the effect of wider British conservatism on Scotland 
was responsible for this. While some Scottish Conservatives, such as the MP for 
Perthshire, might irritate his opponents with his ‘handsome attentions to the working 
classes’, the main impetus for change came from the central party.234 The Scottish 
party’s eminent leaders and thinkers were, by this time, all deceased. It thus ended 
the period without any recognised leader, bereft of any coherent Scottish platform 
beyond the positions of its individual candidates, and without any intellectual figures 
who could go about formulating one. The Scottish countryside was changing, and 
Conservative squires found themselves increasingly out of step with the needs and 
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desires of an increasingly self-confident rural tenantry. The party’s organisational 
apparatus was, however, on the brink of a revival, and its electoral performance 
would improve somewhat after 1868, especially in the next election of 1874. 





In sum, the changes (or lack of changes) which took place within Scottish 
conservatism during the mid-Victorian period did not endear the party to an 
expanding and increasingly assertive electorate. Peelites and Protectionists quickly 
found that more united than divided them in terms of a shared conservatism, but 
neither were in harmony with much of the Scottish public. Urban and bourgeois 
voters would, by 1868, be even more wedded to liberalism than they had been during 
the immediate post-Reform period. This, however, owed as much to Conservative 
action (or inaction) as it did to Liberal efforts. Conservative attempts to promote a 
romantic and paternalist conservatism through more innovative means fell flat, and 
the more ‘British’ and localist period of Scottish politics which followed exposed the 
party’s lack of a distinctive platform beyond such traditionalist ideals. Similarly, 
changes taking place in rural Scotland increasingly chipped away at the relationship 
between the Scottish Conservatives and the ‘agricultural interest’, despite limited 
attempts to mitigate this. Issues such as the Game Laws and Hypothec illustrate that 




In religious terms, the transformed sectarian landscape of post-Disruption 
Scotland also worked to the party’s disadvantage. Though it was more religiously 
diverse than has been acknowledged, Scottish conservatism essentially appealed to 
adherents of the Moderate Established and Episcopalian Churches. It did, however, 
play a prominent role in hastening the decline of a particular type of evangelicalism 
in Scottish society, and in promoting the rise of ‘social’ issues. Moreover, by the 
later 1860s Scottish conservatism was showing tentative signs of revival. This 
revival was, however, the result of outside intervention by UK party figures, which 
essentially bypassed much of the remaining party establishment. As such, the 
Scottish Conservative party, and Scottish conservatism, was less autonomous and 
less distinctive than it had been in 1832. It would remain so for years to come. 
Nevertheless, the party was intimately involved in myriad facets of Scotland’s mid-
Victorian development. This involvement was not merely passive, constituting 
simple reactions to wider events. Scottish conservatives took an active and spirited 
role in shaping Scottish society, especially in its promotion of bodies such as the 
NAVSR. Scottish conservatism, while not dominant, was thus an important element 
in the overall character of society during the period. Though the wider populace did 

































After the party’s lacklustre performance in the Scottish elections of 1868, in which it 
won a mere six seats, its prospects improved. The new Scottish National 
Constitutional Association was the first national organisation to function since the 
ignominious collapse of the Conservative Association of Scotland in the late 1830s.1 
Though its candidate for Glasgow was defeated, the party’s overall performance was 
nevertheless auspicious. Despite conducting an uninspired campaign which promoted 
a tedious candidate, over a quarter of the newly expanded electorate in that city had 
voted for him to take up one of the three available seats. If the party could make 
significant inroads into Scotland’s largest city and industrial powerhouse, then the 
rest of Scotland might be even closer within reach. The further expansion of the 
franchise was not to be the unmitigated disaster that many in the Scottish party had 
feared. With longer to prepare and campaign, the party made significant gains in the 
election of 1874. It in fact managed to almost triple its number of MPs, having 
emerged victorious in twenty seats – including one for Glasgow. Villa toryism and 
the changes wrought by fresh Reform played a role in nurturing this broader trend. 
Though it remained an electorally unpopular entity for most of the later Victorian 
period, Scottish Conservatives (and later Scottish Unionists) became a force to be 
reckoned with. In the twentieth century, the party had a variable presence in 
Scotland. It has been periodically influential, and at times been the most powerful 
                                                          
1 Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 113–4. 
338 
 
party north of the border.2 The origins of this party lie in its formative phase, 
between 1832 and 1868. 
In addition to its subsequent importance, the Scottish Conservative party was 
a deeply influential force during the mid-nineteenth century. The Scottish 
Conservatives were the most aristocratically dominated constituent section of the UK 
party, and firmly ensconced within the wider British landowning classes. 
Nevertheless, while the party was closely associated with landownership and its 
attendant interests, it was not solely defined by this. The background, attributes, and 
characteristics of its MPs, candidates and peers reveals that the party was far more 
diverse than might be assumed. The Scottish party boasted representatives with 
diverse interests, facilitating numerous and intimate interactions with the everyday 
social life of rural Scotland. Given the issues raised, this original research suggests 
that further work is needed on the character and nature of the Scottish landowning 
classes during a period of transformative social change. With regard to politics, these 
connections and interactions played a significant part in the business of winning 
elections.  
The party’s deep embeddedness in social life enabled it to undertake a truly 
extraordinary range of electoral activities, making it a significant presence and 
influence in mid-nineteenth century Scottish society. Though it was by no means a 
wholly inclusive entity, the party’s complex and highly developed local organisations 
did contain diverse elements, and were extremely flexible, depending on local 
conditions. When the activities undertaken by rank-and file-party members and 
supporters (not to mention the vast majority of the Scottish aristocracy) are taken into 
                                                          




account, it becomes clear that the Scottish Conservative party was one of the most 
significant institutions existing in the Scottish countryside. Moreover, low-ranking 
party groups, especially the crucial multitude of professional agents, retained a 
significant degree of autonomy. These factors were, however, weakened after the 
1830s, and the party finished the period much as it had started – dominated by 
country gentlemen.  
This did not, however, inhibit its vigorous activities. Though the party lost 
much of its vigour after the events of 1843 and 1846, in its heyday it was at the 
vanguard of Conservative electoral activity. This was no mean feat for a party which, 
given the pre-Reform oligarchic Scottish electoral system, had never before needed 
to undertake such activity. The party treated and transported electors, engaged in 
extensive canvassing and hustings activity, and much else. Keeping the party at the 
forefront of local life in-between elections, it also engaged in regular registration and 
vote-making activities which both expanded electorates and politicised large swathes 
of the rural populace. Moreover, it exerted influence over electors in innumerable 
ways, ensuring that the economic, social, and cultural life of the localities was 
intimately connected to politics. Given the sparsity of scholarship on Scotland’s 
political culture in both cities and rural areas, this illustrates that there is much 
additional work to be done. Indeed, the party’s electoral activities also had a marked, 
though lesser, impact on urban Scotland, thus illustrating that Scotland’s cities were 
not exclusively liberal. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the party directly 
incubated a Scotland-wide (though ultimately subordinate) network of conservative 
newspapers. While these many activities were generally unsuccessful in the long run, 
they did firmly embed the party in Scotland’s society and culture.  
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On a national level, the party’s fortunes illustrated both its potential and its 
limits. Rancorous factionalism foiled efforts to create and operate an effective 
national organisational apparatus – the Conservative Association of Scotland. The 
embryonic club was even more ambitious in scope than the Carlton Club, this being 
yet another area in which the Scottish party was (in ambition at least) at the forefront 
of party developments. Significant elements within the Scottish party were notably 
willing to encourage complex and formidable extra-parliamentary organisations. 
These efforts also reveal how Scottish Conservatives themselves viewed their own 
party as a separate and coherent territorial entity (at least in electoral terms). More 
broadly, this suggests that British political parties and territoriality in the nineteenth 
century is a potentially fruitful area of further inquiry. Indeed, even within Scotland, 
the geographical centre of the party was a subject of contestation. In the late 1830s, 
Glasgow came close to replacing Edinburgh as the party’s primary city, as the failure 
of the Edinburgh-based Conservative Association of Scotland coincided with the 
positive aftermath of Peel’s Rectorial banquet in Glasgow. The close involvement of 
senior UK party figures in these efforts illustrate that the Scottish party, though in 
some ways separate, was nevertheless closely integrated into the broader British 
party.  
Neither Glasgow nor Edinburgh proved to be suitable party centres – as such, 
the party’s focus remained in the counties, under the leadership of the Duke of 
Buccleuch. Though this meant that urban conservatism was essentially abandoned to 
inadequate local exertions, Buccleuch proved himself to be an effective and 
dedicated national leader. This was thrown into sharp relief by the quality of his 




Corn Law split, the somewhat diminished Scottish party was largely overseen by the 
Earl of Eglinton. Though he did not (and, indeed, could not) match Buccleuch’s 
bustling activity in electoral terms, he made notably innovative efforts to promote the 
party’s interests north of the border. The continuing decline in the party’s electoral 
fortunes from the late 1850s onwards, however, went hand in hand with a want of 
effective (or, indeed, any) national leadership. After Eglinton’s death in 1861, the 
Scottish Conservative party no longer possessed a recognised leader. Disraeli’s 
tentative efforts to revive the party’s vigour were indicative of native apathy.  
These issues also affected the parliamentary side of the party – the number of 
Scottish Conservative MPs declined dramatically after the election of 1847. 
Throughout the period, the Scottish party was less distinctively ‘Scottish’ at 
Westminster than in Scotland itself, being (to an extent) subsumed within the broader 
UK parliamentary party. Nevertheless, Scottish MPs and peers did retain several 
informal characteristics and mechanisms which set them apart from their fellows. 
This suggests that a broader examination of territorial interests within a 
parliamentary context would advance our understanding of how the legislature 
operated. Given the overwhelmingly Conservative character of the Scottish peers in 
parliament, Scottish Conservative distinctiveness was even more pronounced in the 
upper house. Both MPs and peers had separate whipping arrangements, and many of 
these figures held private meetings to discuss and agree on collective action. Further, 
the periodical election of Scottish representative peers made that group perhaps the 
most politicised and organised body of peers in the Lords. Finally, successive 
Conservative ministries made sure to carefully consult Scots in Westminster before 
embarking on legislative activities which affected that country.  
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Successive Westminster leaders, from Peel to Disraeli, showed a marked 
interest in, and knowledge of, Scottish affairs. Despite (or perhaps because of) its 
relatively poor electoral performance, central party leaders tended to show a 
disproportionate interest in affairs north of the border. Concurrently, backbench 
Scottish MPs who went on to sit for English constituencies gave the overall UK party 
a more distinctively Scottish flavour than might have been expected. Moreover, these 
exiles exerted a limited but nonetheless notable influence over Scottish affairs. In 
terms of governance, Conservative Lords Advocate and Solicitors-General had a 
marked effect on Scotland before 1847. After this, successive Derby ministries 
experienced notable difficulties in finding effective Scottish administrators. This 
affected both internal party and external popular attitudes towards Scotland’s place in 
the Union. More unobtrusively, the party dominated Scotland’s legal profession, 
particularly the Faculty of Advocates and county Sheriffships. The party thus 
influenced the evolution of Scots law and the routine management of wider society in 
both the countryside and the cities. Conservatives also made their presence felt in the 
new bodies which increasingly supervised Scotland’s social welfare, despite these 
being largely controlled by Liberals. The party’s deep embeddedness in all levels of 
governance raises some fundamental questions about its influence over Scotland’s 
ostensibly ‘liberal’ civil society, in both urban and rural areas.  
Just as Scotland’s civil society was more complex than has been assumed, so 
was the party’s internal composition in terms of beliefs. After 1832, the party 
comprised country tories, ultra tories, romantic conservatives, tory radicals, and 
liberal conservatives. By a large margin, country tories were the predominant 




into country tories) by the late 1830s. Tory radicals were almost non-existent in 
Scotland, and romantic conservatives were a significant but subordinate element. 
Many of these, in fact, were most active outside of the Scottish party, giving a 
Scottish flavour to British romanticism. Liberal conservatives enjoyed a brief and 
rapid rise in influence and numbers. Their decline, however, was just as rapid, and 
they were never a significant internal party influence outside of western Scotland. 
The Scottish party was distinctly country tory in character throughout the entire 
period, possessing an enduring affinity for varieties of paternalist, authoritarian, and 
agrarian ideals.  
Country tories also tended to be Established Church Moderates or 
Episcopalians, harbouring increasingly deep suspicions about Thomas Chalmers and 
Evangelical Non-Intrusionists. They shared this attitude with Peel and the UK party 
leadership, though their underlying reasoning was somewhat different. An alliance 
between these two groups resulted in the party playing a prominent (and politically 
unpopular) role in the resultant Church crisis. Nevertheless, the party was in fact far 
more internally divided on the issue than has been assumed. Nascent liberal 
conservative sections of the party, themselves originally built up by Peel, genuinely 
advocated the Evangelical cause, while many peers and a great many Scottish 
Conservative MPs favoured greater compromise with the Evangelicals for more 
practical and political reasons. Nevertheless, the party was, after the 1843 Disruption, 
incapable of courting vast swathes of the deeply religious Scottish electorate. It was 
to remain, in the popular imagination, the Episcopal and Moderate country party 
which had sought to block Reform. This was despite the fact that, both before and 
after the Disruption, the party contained a far more diverse set of religious adherents 
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than might have been expected. The party thus became an influential but peripheral 
electoral force in a more sectarian Scotland. It did, however, play a prominent role in 
hastening the decline of a particular type of evangelicalism in Scottish society, and 
encouraged the increasing prominence of ‘social’ issues.  
From the early 1850s, both Peelites and Protectionists found that it was 
necessary to collaborate in Scotland, given their electorally vulnerable position. 
Innovative efforts, which included the promotion of the NAVSR, illustrated the 
party’s willingness to change, but also the limits to this. Though electorally 
unrewarding, such efforts had a marked impact on the evolution of Scotland’s society 
and romantic culture. However, by the 1860s, newly controversial issues in the 
countryside were telling indicators that change in rural Scotland was accelerating. 
The party, though it showed tentative signs of moving with the times, was not yet 
entirely able to accept the increasing independence of the tenantry. By the eve of the 
Second Reform Acts, the party was on the verge of a modest revival, but the impetus 
for this came from south of the border. The Scottish party, and Scottish conservatism 
more broadly, would eventually regain lost ground. At that moment, however, the 
party was in the doldrums. It was not more influential than the vast group of (often 
conflicting) factions which comprised the broad church of Scottish liberalism, but it 
was, nonetheless, a significant force throughout the entire period.  
Overall, this thesis has demonstrated that the Scottish Conservative party was 
a wide-ranging, multifaceted, and influential entity. It was an important conduit 
through which connections between high and popular politics were forged, in a 
variety of different contexts. Potential bridges between the internal world of 




built – this hampered the party’s ability to improve its fortunes. Its various 
autonomous (but largely interdependent) facets were not all equally authoritative or 
influential. However, they played interrelated (and occasionally conflicting) parts in 
seeking to achieve the party’s core objects. Care has been taken within and across 
chapters to highlight the extent of these interconnections (or, indeed, any noteworthy 
absence of these).  
For instance, Appendix G demonstrates that the Scottish Conservatives did, 
in fact, boast a number of candidates concerned with industrial and commercial 
interests. These figures, alongside rank-and-file party workers, were shown to have 
affected the party’s urban organisation and campaigning in Chapter One. 
Concurrently, the strict limits of these effects were also set out. As Chapter Two 
illustrates, urban activity (especially in Glasgow) was not stimulated by Buccleuch – 
rather, senior UK party figures, including Peel and Graham, played a prominent role 
in this. Further, as Chapter Four has revealed, they were instrumental in promoting 
liberal conservatism in ideological terms, appealing to a potential electorate that was 
concerned with industrial and commercial affairs – but was also, crucially, 
evangelically inclined. Their subsequent actions in relation to the Church crisis 
effectively destroyed liberal conservatism in Scotland. In Chapter Three, the Scottish 
MPs and peers are shown to be somewhat distinctive, but nevertheless highly 
integrated into the broader parliamentary party. The Scottish Conservative party was, 
after all, a bottom-heavy entity in terms of influence. This partly explains why these 
figures did not more strongly urge additional compromises with the Evangelicals, 
despite possessing deep misgivings about the wisdom of Peel’s position. The party 
leadership’s break with the Evangelicals, however, opened other avenues. As 
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Chapter Five explores, it left its leading Scottish intellectuals free to openly question 
the harsh theories on poor relief expounded by that faction’s leader, Thomas 
Chalmers. The resultant character and operation of the somewhat paternalist Scottish 
Poor Law after 1845 was thus heavily influenced by party figures. This complex 
strand, one of many running throughout the thesis, highlights the ways in which the 
party affected, and was affected, by the society in which it operated.  
Scottish conservatism, while not dominant, was thus an important element in 
the overall character of society during the period. Though a plurality of the limited 
electorate did not generally endorse it, the wider populace was at least partly shaped 
by conservatism (or, more likely, by their opposition to it). Liberal ascendency must 
not be mistaken for outright hegemony. Even in the supposedly liberal Scottish 
cities, Conservative candidates very rarely received less than one-third of the vote 
when they went to the polls. Indeed, the affinity of Scotland’s electors for more 
whiggish candidates might be partly ascribed to tactical voting by conservative 
electors. Beyond narrow electoral considerations, it is true that Scotland boasted far 
more liberal newspapers than it did conservative titles. Nonetheless, the existence of 
many conservative papers across the whole country indicates that there was a 
substantial readership which did not actively object to their contents. The party 
possessed a genuine popular constituency among the newly expanded electorate, and 
even (to a limited extent) among non-electors. Working-class conservative support 
did exist in Scotland – it cannot be dismissed as an out-and-out aberration. Just as the 
party-influenced Poor Law affected many non-electors, non-electors had a limited 
effect on the party. This thesis has sought to question the myth of liberal Victorian 




Scottish Conservative party occupied a subordinate but nevertheless noteworthy 
position. This indicates that significant elements of Scottish society were much more 
conservative than has been assumed. This conservatism was represented and nurtured 
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Scottish Conservative Candidates, 1832–18681 
 
A Note Regarding the Definition of a ‘Conservative’ candidate: 
 
Determining the exact number of Scottish Conservative MPs and candidates is 
difficult, given the fluid contemporary conceptions of party loyalty. This problem is 
particularly acute before 1835 and after 1846. During the 1850s, while parties 
(though not in the modern sense) did exist at Westminster, the complex mosaic of 
political identities then existing meant that party leaders were often unaware of their 
exact numerical strength until confirmed by post-election voting tallies in the 
division lobby.2 The Peelite group formed after the split in the Conservative party 
over Corn Law repeal. It consciously self-identified as a distinct and separate party – 
or, at least, its leaders did.3 However, parties were more than vote tallies in the 
House. Candidates used many different labels, including ‘Moderate Conservative’, 
‘Liberal Conservative’, ‘Protectionist’, and ‘Tory, but a Liberal one’.4  
These labels serve to conceal critical underlying similarities. The very term 
‘Liberal Conservative’, as opposed to ‘Independent’, may well indicate that these 
figures tacitly recognised the continuing relevance of broader party definitions.5 
Additionally, factors specific to Scotland suggest a greater unity among its cohort. 
The wide variety of factions contained within the Liberal party was most plainly 
noticeable in local electoral contests. Contested elections in Scotland between 1832 
and 1868 largely took place between Liberal candidates.6 Yet, it is still possible to 
speak in general terms of a Scottish Liberal party and a cohort of Scottish Liberal 
MPs. 
Conservatives displayed a greater sense of party unity than their Liberal 
counterparts – on only four occasions did Conservative candidates stand against each 
other on polling day.7 These were unrepresentative and isolated cases. Indeed, the 
majority of these incidents occurred before the 1846 party split. Despite the 
confusion caused by the Corn question, it was the Scottish Liberal party which was 
more perennially schismatic. Even after the Corn Law split, a shared Scottish 
Conservative culture enabled amicable negotiation, which largely succeeded in 
maintaining the peaceful coexistence of Conservative factions.8  
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise noted, all information is sourced from Craig, Election Results. Candidates listed 
are Conservative, unless otherwise stated. Elections highlighted in bold indicate that the defeated 
Conservative candidate failed to garner votes from more than one-third of those polled. This is not 
highlighted in contests for Edinburgh and Glasgow, Scotland’s only double-member seats.  
2 Conacher, ‘Age of Palmerston’, 170. 
3 Derek Beales, ‘Parliamentary Parties and the “Independent” Member, 1810–1860’, in Robson (ed.), 
Ideas and Institutions, 13. 
4 The party affiliations listed in Appendix F are taken from Stenton, Who's Who. Stenton’s data was 
collected from Dod’s Electoral Facts, whose descriptions were (in all possible cases) taken from the 
precise words of the member himself, supplemented by records of their votes on key questions such as 
Corn Law repeal and the Maynooth grant. 
5 Beales, ‘Parliamentary Parties’, 13. 
6 Hutchison, Political History of Scotland, 59. 
7 Inverness District of Burghs and Lanarkshire in 1832, Bute in 1841, and Edinburgh in 1852. 












Agnew, Lieut.-Col. Patrick 
Vans 
Wigtown District 
of Burghs (B) 
 
1841 
Agnew, Robert Vans Wigtown District 
of Burghs (B) 
 
1868 














Anstruther, Sir Ralph A.  St Andrews 











Baillie, Charles Linlithgowshire 
(C) 
1859  






























                                                          
9 Candidates often contested separate constituencies at different elections. As such, some are listed 
more than once. Similarly, some (such as Lord Elcho) are listed as contesting elections after they had 
explicitly moved away from conservatism. 
10 The only constituencies not contested by any Conservative candidate during this period were 
Hawick District of Burghs (created in 1868), Kirkcaldy District of Burghs, and Stirling District of 
Burghs.  
11 Protectionist in 1847 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
12 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
13 Protectionist in 1847 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 




Balfour, James Maitland Haddington 




Balfour, John15  Fife (C) 
 
1847 








Black, William Faichney  Perth (B) 
 
1841 
Blackburn, Peter Edinburgh (B) 
 
1847 
Blackburn, Peter16  Glasgow (B) 
 
1852 





Blair, Forbes Hunter Edinburgh (B) 
 
1832 
Blair, Col. James Hunter Ayrshire (C)  1852 
 
Blair, Col. William Ayrshire (C)  
 
1832 
Blair, James Wigtownshire (C) 1837 1835, 
1841 




Boyle, Hon. George Frederick Bute (C)  1865 (by-
election), 1865 
 















Brown Douglas, J.18 St Andrews 




Bruce, Hon. James Fife (C) 
 
1837 
Bruce, Hon. Thomas C. Edinburgh (B) 
 
1852 





Buchanan, Robert Carrick Lanarkshire (C) 
 
1832 
                                                          
15 Liberal-Conservative according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
16 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
17 Liberal-Conservative according to Cragoe, ‘Local Interests in Parliament’, 137. 
18 Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book. 
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Caird, James19  Wigtown District 
of Burghs (B) 
 
1852 




Campbell of Monzie, 
Alexander20  
Edinburgh (B)  1852 





Campbell of Inverawe, J.A. Kilmarnock 




Campbell Swinton, Alexander Haddington 








Campbell, Alexander Argyll (C)  1841 1837 
Campbell, Alexander Inverness District 




Campbell, Sir Archibald I.21 Argyll (C)  1851 (by-
election), 1852 
 
Campbell, Sir George Glasgow (B) 
 
1868 
Campbell, Sir George Inverness District 
of Burghs (B) 
1832 
 




Carr-Boyle, James (Viscount 
Kelburne) 
Ayrshire (C)  1839 (by-
election), 1841 
1837 




Charteris, Hon. Francis W. 


















Cochrane, Alexander Dundas 
Ross Wishart Baillie 
Lanarkshire (C) 1857 (by-
election) 
1857 
Cochrane, Sir Thomas J. Greenock (B) 
 
1841 
                                                          
19 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book. 
20 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
21 Protectionist according to Craig, Election Results. 




Colquhoun, John Campbell Kilmarnock 
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Cumming Bruce, Charles 
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Downie, Robert Kilmarnock 
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Ewing, James Glasgow (B) 
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Fairrie, John  Greenock (B) 
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Farquhar, Sir Arthur Aberdeen (B) 
 
1835 
Ferguson, Capt. George Banffshire (C)  1832, 1835 1837 





Forbes, William Stirlingshire (C) 1835, 1837 
(declared 
1832 
                                                          
23 Protectionist in 1847 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
24 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  





Fraser, John Inverness District 




Gladstone, John Dundee (B) 
 
1837 






































Grant of Arndilly, H. 
Macdowall27  
Banffshire (C)  
 
1852 




Grant, John Charles Ogilvy 
(Viscount Reidhaven) 
Banffshire (C)  
 
1841 




Hamilton, A.J. Lanarkshire (C) 
 
1832 
Hannay, James  Dumfries District 
of Burghs (B) 
 
1857 
Hay, Sir John Peeblesshire (C) 1832, 1835 
 




Hepburn, Sir Thomas Buchan Haddington 




                                                          
26 Protectionist in 1847, and Liberal-Conservative in 1852 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
27 Protectionist according to Craig, Election Results.  







































Horne, Maj. James Caithness (C) 
 
1868 
Houstoun, George Renfrewshire (C) 1837 (by-
election), 1837 
1835 
Howard, Hon. William Sutherland (C) 1837 
 
Hume Campbell, Sir Hugh 
Purves31 








Innes, William Aberdeen (B) 
 
1841 















                                                          
29 Liberal-Conservative in 1841 and 1847 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
30 Protectionist in 1845 and 1847, but not in 1852 according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book, and 
Gordon Pentland, ‘Edinburghshire’, in History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1832–1868. 
31 Protectionist according to Craig, Election Results.  
32 Liberal-Conservative from 1841 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
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Leslie, William Aberdeenshire (C)  1861 (by-
election), 1865 
 
Lindsay, Col. J. Fife (C) 
 
1835 





Lockhart, Alexander M. Lanarkshire (C) 1837 1835 






Lockhart, William34  Lanarkshire (C) 1841, 1847, 
1852 
 
Macdonald of Rossie and St 




of Burghs (B) 
 
1868 




Mackenzie, James J.R. Inverness District 
of Burghs (B) 
 
1837 















Maitland, Capt. Anthony Berwickshire (C)  
 
1832 
Makgill Crichton, D.M. St Andrews 




Makgill, George St Andrews 




Marjoribanks, Sir John Berwickshire (C)  
 
1859 




                                                          
33 Liberal-Conservative according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
34 Protectionist in 1847 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
35 Protectionist in 1841, 1845 and 1847 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 













McKerell, John Paisley (B) 
 
1832 
McNeill, Duncan37  Argyll (C)  1843 (by-
election), 1847 
 














Munro of Novar, Hugh 





Mure, David38 Bute (C)  1859 
 




Murray, Sir George Perthshire (C) 1834 1832, 
1835 
Murray, William David 
(Viscount Stormont) 
Perthshire (C) 1837 
 




Oswald of Ochincriuve, 
Alexander H.40  




Oswald, Alexander H.41 Ayrshire (C)  1843 (by-
election), 1847 
1854 
Pelham-Clinton, Henry (Earl 
of Lincoln)42  









Prinsep, Henry Thoby Kilmarnock 





                                                          
37 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
38 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
39 Liberal-Conservative in 1846, 1847 and 1852 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
40 Liberal-Conservative according to J. Vincent and M. Stenton (eds), McCalmont's Parliamentary 
Poll Book: British Election Results 1832–1918 (Brighton, 1971). 
41 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
42 Liberal-Conservative according to H.J. Hanham (ed.), Electoral facts. 
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Ross of Cromarty, George 





Ross, Capt. Horatio Paisley (B) 
 
1835 
Scott, Hon. Francis43  Berwickshire (C)  1847, 1852, 
1857 
 
Scott, Hon. Francis44 Roxburghshire (C) 1837 1841 
Scott, Lord Henry J.M.D. Selkirkshire (C) 1861 (by-
election), 1865 
 
Scott, Lord John  Roxburghshire (C) 1835 1832 
Scott, William Montagu 











Shaw Stewart, Sir Michael 
Robert46 




Sinclair, Sir George47  Caithness (C) 1837 
 
Smith, James Greenock (B) 
 
1837 












Stewart, Alan (Lord Garlies) Wigtownshire (C) 1868 1865 
Stirling, William Perthshire (C) 1852, 1857, 
1859, 1865 
1868 
Stuart, Capt. Charles Bute (C)  1832 
 





                                                          
43 Protectionist according to Craig, Election Results.  
44 Protectionist in 1841 according to Hanham, Electoral facts. 
45 Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
46 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book.  
47 Liberal until 1837. 
48 Liberal-Conservative in 1847 and 1852, but not in 1857 according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll 
Book.  




Walker, Capt. George 
Gustavus50  
Dumfries District 
of Burghs (B) 
 
1859 
Walker, Maj. George 
Gustavus 
Dumfriesshire (C) 1865 1868 
Wortley, James Alexander 
Stuart51  










                                                          
50 Liberal-Conservative according to Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book. Not listed as such in his 
candidacy for Dumfriesshire elections. 

































































Aberdeen (B) 2,024 3,996 8,132 None prevailing in 
1853 – formerly 
the Duke of 
Gordon and the 
Farquhar family. 







631 1,340 2,565 The Marquess of 
Bute and Earl of 
Eglinton possessed 
some, but little 
remained by 1853. 













Buccleuch, but this 
was restricted. 
Dundee (B) 1,622 3,039 14,798 Lord Panmure and 
the Earl of 
Breadalbane had 
some influence, but 
this was almost 
non-existent by 
1853. 
Edinburgh (B) 6,048 10,343 20,779 No influence 
remained – 
formerly possessed 
by the Duke of 
Buccleuch and the 
Dundases of 
Arniston. 
Elgin District of 
Burghs (B) 
 
776 1,059 2,962 Possessed by the 
Earl of Seafield, 
Earl of Fife, and to 
                                                          
1 Influence and the size of the electorate in 1832 are from Hanham Electoral facts. Electorate figures 







some extent by the 
Earl of Kintore. 






969 1,510 4,704 Influence mainly 
held by the Bairds 
of Gartsherrie, 
some possessed by 
the Earl of Zetland, 
additionally by the 
Duke of Hamilton 
and Lord Dunmore. 




Greenock (B) 985 1,871 6,223 None mentioned. 
Haddington District 







545 698 1,477 Chiefly possessed 
by the Earl of 
Lauderdale, some 
by the Earl of 
Hopetoun, Sir Hew 
Hamilton 
Dalrymple, and the 
Duke of Roxburgh. 






715 1,022 1,995 Held by Mr. 
Matheson, some 
possessed by the 
Cumming-Gordons 
of Altyre, Brodies 






















1,624 2,672 6,223 Little influence 
existed, but some 
was possessed by 
Sir John Gladstone 
in Leith, the Duke 




Sir John Hope in 
Musselburgh. 







1,494 1,806 6,337 Held by Lord 
Panmure and the 
Farquhar family. 
Paisley (B) 1,242 1,361 3,264 Influence 
possessed by the 
heads of the Silk 
and Cotton 
Factories. Some 
also by the 
Marquess of 
Abercorn. 
Perth (B) 780 982 2,801 None mentioned. 
St Andrews District 








621 839 1,847 None mentioned. 


















316 518 966 Formerly the Earl 
of Galloway, more 
by the Earl of Stair 
by 1853. Mrs. 
Gordon, widow of 
Lord Kenmure, Sir 
John McTaggart, 






Aberdeenshire (C) 2,271 4,384 N/A  Formerly the Duke 
of Gordon, then the 
Earl of Aberdeen, 
but little remained 
by 1853. 
Argyll (C) 995 1,914 2,870 The Duke of Argyll 
and various 
branches of the 
Campbells. 
Ayrshire (C)  3,150 4,642 N/A  Chiefly held by the 
Earl of Eglinton, 
Marquess of Ailsa, 




N/A N/A 3,219 N/A. 
Ayrshire, Southern 
(C) 
N/A N/A 2,558 N/A 
Banffshire (C)  498 1,062 2,291 Held by the Duke 
of Richmond, Earl 
of Fife, and Earl of 
Seafield. 
Berwickshire (C)  1,053 1,247 1,580 Possessed by the 
Earl of Lauderdale, 
Earl of Home, and 
the Hume-
Campbells. 
Bute (C)  279 513 1,073 The Marquess of 
Bute and the Duke 
of Hamilton had 
some influence. 
Caithness (C) 221 512 1,005 Held by the 
Sinclairs of 






879 1,162 1,802 Lord Abercromby, 
the Adams of Blair 
Adam, and the 
Bruces of Kennet 
had influence.  









Dunbartonshire (C) 927 1,597 2,156 Divided between 
many; chiefly the 
Colquhouns of 
Luss, some by the 
Dukes of Montrose 
and Argyll, and the 
Campbells of 
Succoth. 
Edinburghshire (C) 1,298 1,656 2,489 Chiefly held by the 
Earl of Stair, some 




642 863 1,580 Chiefly held by the 
Earl of Seafield, 
some by the Earl of 
Fife. 
Fife (C) 2,185 2,725 4,206 Partly possessed by 
Admiral Wemyss 
of Wemyss, but 
this was not 
predominant. 
Forfarshire (C) 1,241 2,108 3,379 Lord Panmure and 
the Hallyburtons of 
Pitcur had 
influence.  
Haddingtonshire (C) 617 666 895 Divided between 
many, including 
the Earls of 
Haddington, 
Lauderdale, and 
Wemyss, but none 
were predominant. 
Inverness-Shire (C) 669 878 1,661 Divided between 
many. 
Kincardineshire (C) 763 987 1,731 Chiefly possessed 
by Barclay 
Allardice of Ury 
and Allardice, Sir 





1,059 1,353 1,940 Possessed by some 
extent by the Earl 
of Galloway and 
Earl of Selkirk, but 




landowners were of 
opposite political 
affiliation. 
Lanarkshire (C) 2,705 5,183 N/A  The Duke of 
Hamilton and Lord 





N/A N/A 4,458 N/A 
Lanarkshire, 
Southern (C) 
N/A N/A 2,871 N/A. 
Linlithgowshire (C) 600 813 1,226 Held by the Earl of 
Hopetoun, Earl of 













partly shared with 
the Earl of Wemyss 




N/A N/A 889 N/A. 
Perthshire (C) 3,180 3,448 4,876 Chiefly possessed 
by the Duke of 
Atholl, also 
considerable 




d’Eresby, Earl of 
Kinnoull, and Earl 
of Mansfield. 
Renfrewshire (C) 1,347 2,276 3,571 Chiefly held by the 
Stewarts of 
Ardgowan, shared 




Caldwell and Earl 
of Glasgow. 
Ross and Cromarty 
(C) 
516 933 1,564 Held by various 
branches of the 
Mackenzies, heirs 
of the extinct 
Earldom of 
Seaforth. By 1853, 
much influence had 
been acquired by 
James Matheson, 
the Macleods of 
Cadboll, and the 
Baillies of 
Tarradale. 
Roxburghshire (C) 1,321 1,639 1,664 Chiefly possessed 
by the Duke of 
Buccleuch, but also 
considerably by the 
Marquess of 
Lothian, Duke of 
Roxburgh, Lord 
Douglas, Earl of 
Minto, and Lord 
Polwarth. 
Selkirkshire (C) 281 502 N/A Chiefly possessed 
by the Duke of 
Buccleuch. 
Stirlingshire (C) 1,787 1,943 2,751 Chiefly possessed 
by the Duke of 
Montrose, but also 
shared with Earl of 
Zetland and Lord 
Abercromby. 
Sutherland (C) 84 180 358 Almost wholly 




of the county. 
Wigtownshire (C) 845 1,087 1,517 Previously held by 
the Earl of 
Galloway, but 
chiefly the Earl of 






N/A N/A 4,368 N/A. 
Edinburgh and St 
Andrews 
Universities (U) 












Total +/- Percentage 
of Scottish 
Total3 
1832 10 N/A 10 N/A 19 
1835 15 N/A 15 +5 28 
1837 20 N/A 20 +5 38 
1841 22 N/A 22 +2 41 
1847 9 0 9 -13 17 
1852 11 0 11 +2 21 
1857 6 4 10 -1 19 
1859 5 3 8 -2 15 
1865 7 3 10 +2 19 
1868 6 0 6 -4 104 
 
                                                          
1 By-election wins or losses are not included in this Appendix. 
2 These were seats held by ‘Liberal Conservatives’, or candidates who used similar labels, but were 
nevertheless de facto Conservatives (or Independent Conservatives) from the mid-1850s onwards, 
who eventually returned to the Conservative fold. See the biographical sketches contained in 
Appendix F, and data contained in Appendix A. 
3 Percentage of fifty-three Scottish seats. 























































Scottish Representative Peers, 1832–1868 
 
Peer Service Notes 




Possessed some electoral 
influence in Berwickshire.1  
Alexander George Fraser, 17th Lord 
Saltoun 
1807–53  
Francis Gray, 14th Lord Gray 1812–41 
 
 
John Colville, 9th Lord Colville of 
Culross 
1818–49 An Admiral in the Royal Navy, 
who saw much active service.2 
George Hay, 8th Marquess of 
Tweeddale 
1818–76 A Field Marshal in the Army, 
who saw much active service.3 
Thomas Bruce, 7th Earl of Elgin 1820–41 Army officer and diplomat, 
collector of eponymous 
marbles.4 
John Arbuthnott, 8th Viscount 
Arbuthnott  
1821–47 Brother of Hugh Arbuthnott MP, 
also possessed influence in 
Kincardineshire.5 
James Andrew Drummond, 8th 
Viscount Strathallan 
1825–51  
George Sholto Douglas, 17th Earl of 
Morton 
1828–58  
David Leslie-Melville, 8th Earl of 
Leven and 7th of Melville 
1831–60  
Dunbar James Douglas, 6th Earl of 
Selkirk 
1831–85 Some influence in 
Kirkcudbrightshire.6 
David Ogilvy, 9th Earl of Airlie 1833–49  
John Elphinstone, 13th Lord 
Elphinstone 
1833–4 Long-serving Indian 
administrator, Governor of 
Bombay during Indian Mutiny.7 
Thomas John Hamilton 
Fitzmaurice, 5th Earl of Orkney 
1833–74  
Charles St Clair, 13th Lord Sinclair 1833–59 
 
 
Eric Mackay, 7th Lord Reay 1835–47  
                                                          
1 See Appendix B. 
2 W.R. O’Byrn, A Naval Biographical Dictionary, 3 vols (London, 1849), i, 220. 
3 H. G. Keene, ‘Hay, George, eighth marquess of Tweeddale (1787–1876)’, ODNB, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12721 [accessed 14 Apr. 2015]. 
4 William St Clair, ‘Bruce, Thomas, seventh earl of Elgin and eleventh earl of Kincardine (1766–
1841)’, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3759 [accessed 14 Apr. 2015]. 
5 See Appendices B and F. 
6 See Appendix B. 
7 H.M. Stephens, ‘Elphinstone, John, thirteenth Lord Elphinstone and first Baron Elphinstone (1807–
1860)’, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8750, [accessed 14 Apr. 2015]. 
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John Rollo, 8th Lord Rollo 1841–6  
Francis William Ogilvy-Grant, 6th 
Earl of Seafield 
1841–53 Political influence in Banffshire, 




Home, 11th Earl of Home 
1842–74 Some political influence in 
Berwickshire.9  
Henry Francis Hepburne-Scott, 7th 
Lord Polwarth 
1843–67 Some influence in 
Roxburghshire.10  
John Gray, 15th Lord Gray 1847–67  
John Elphinstone, 13th Lord 
Elphinstone11 
1847–59  
William Rollo, 9th Lord Rollo 1847–52 
 
 
David Graham Drummond Ogilvy, 
10th Earl of Airlie 
1850–81   
Charles Stuart, 12th Lord Blantyre 1850–92 
 
 
Charles John Colville, 10th Lord 
Colville of Culross12 
1851–85 Served as a Conservative whip. 
Thomas George Lyon-Bowes, 12th 
Earl of Strathmore and Kinghorne 
1852–65  
William Henry Drummond, 9th 
Viscount Strathallan  
1853–86  
John Charles Ogilvy-Grant, 7th Earl 
of Seafield 
1853–9  
James Sinclair, 14th Earl of 
Caithness 
1858–68 Scientist and inventor, including 
of a steam carriage.13 
George Baillie-Hamilton, 10th Earl 
of Haddington 
1859–70 Some influence in 
Haddingtonshire.14 
Sholto John Douglas, 18th Earl of 
Morton  
1859–84  
Alexander Fraser, 18th Lord Saltoun 1859–86 
 
 
John Rogerson Rollo, 10th Lord 
Rollo 
1860–8  
John Thornton Leslie-Melville, 9th 
Earl of Leven and 8th of Melville 
1865–76  
                                                          
8 See Appendix B.  
9 See Appendix B. 
10 See Appendix B.  
11 Served non-contiguous terms.  
12 Created Baron Colville of Culross, in the peerage of the United Kingdom, in 1885. Later created 
Viscount Colville of Culross, in 1902. 
13 T.F. Henderson, ‘Sinclair, James, fourteenth earl of Caithness (1821–1881)’, ODNB, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25623 [accessed 14 Apr. 2015]. 




Thomas Maitland, 11th Earl of 
Lauderdale 
1867–78 Naval officer, Rear-Admiral 
from 1857. Influence in 
Berwickshire, Haddingtonshire, 
and Haddington District of 
Burghs.15 
William Buller Fullerton 
Elphinstone, 15th Lord Elphinstone 
1867–85     
 
                                                          
15 J.K. Laughton, ‘Maitland, Thomas, eleventh earl of Lauderdale (1803–1878)’, ODNB, 























































Conservative Lords Advocate, 1832–18681 
 
Name Period in 
Office 











1833 – October 
18423 




– July 1846 
Argyllshire, 
September 1843 – 
June 1851 





None Appointed to the bench, 
with the judicial title Lord 
Anderson; appears to have 
been a caretaker figure. 
John Inglis May – 
December 
1852, March – 
July 1858 
Stamford, March – 
July 18584 
Appointed to the bench as 
Lord Justice Clerk, with 




July 1858 – 
April 1859 
Linlithgowshire, 
February 1859 – 
April 1859 
Appointed to the bench as 
a judge of the Court of 
Session, with the judicial 
title Lord Jerviswood. 
David Mure April – June 
1859 
Bute, May 1859 – 
February 1865 
End of Derby ministry. 
George 
Patton 




Appointed (by himself) to 
the as bench Lord Justice 
Clerk, with the judicial 
title Lord Glenalmond. 
E.S. Gordon February 1867 
– December 
1868 
Thetford6 End of Disraeli ministry. 
 
                                                          
1 Information sourced from Vincent and Stenton, Poll Book, and Omond, Lord Advocates of Scotland. 
Second series. 
2 Held between 1832 and 1868 
3 Rae also served as Lord Advocate between 1819 and 1830, sitting for Anstruther Burghs, Harwich, 
Bute, and Portarlington. 
4 Unsuccessfully contested Orkney and Shetland, July 1852, and Lisburn, December 1852. 
5 Unsuccessfully contested Bridgwater again in July 1866. 
6 Unsuccessfully contested Aberdeen and Glasgow Universities in the election of 1868, but won it at a 























































Biographical Sketches of Scottish Conservative MPs, 1832–18681  
 
 
Arbuthnott, Maj.-Gen. the Hon. Hugh (1780–1868) 
Service: Kincardineshire 1826–1865 
5H Albany, London. Hulton-Bervie, Kincardineshire. Athenaeum and Carlton Club. 
Second son of the 7th Viscount Arbuthnott (estates comprised 13,560 acres, valued at 
£13,036 in 1883). Entered the army, 1796, promoted to General, 1854. Was a 
Colonel of the 38th Foot 1843–1862, after which he was appointed Colonel of the 
79th Foot. Received a gold medal for service in the Battle of Busacco in 1810, and 
also served at the siege of Copenhagen and at Corunna. Deputy-Lieutenant of 
Kincardineshire.  
 
Baillie, Charles (1804–1879) 
Also known as: Lord Jerviswood 1859–1879  
Held offices: Solicitor-General of Scotland 1858, Lord Advocate 1858. 
Service: Linlithgowshire 1859–1865 
Brother of George, 10th Earl of Haddington (estates comprised 34,046 acres, valued 
at £46,616 in 1883). Carlton Club.2 Educated at St Andrews and the University of 
Edinburgh. Married Anne, daughter of the 4th Lord Polwarth. Described as the 
lawyer with the closest links to the Scottish aristocracy in his generation. Lord of 
Session 1859, Lord of Justiciary 1862–74, Sheriff of Stirlingshire. Convenor of the 
acting committee of the Wallace monument, and president of the Edinburgh Border 
Counties Association, involved in organising the centenary celebrations of Sir Walter 
Scott’s birth.3  
 
Baillie, Henry James (1804–1885) 
Held offices: Joint Secretary to the Board of Control 1852, Under-Secretary of State 
for India 1858–1859, Joint Secretary to the Board of Control 1858–1859  
Service: Inverness-shire 1840–1868 
Elsenham Hall, Bishop’s Stortford. Redcastle, Killearnan, Inverness-shire (estates 
comprised 11,959 acres, valued at £7,038 in 1883). Carlton, Brooks’ and Travellers’ 
Clubs. Only son of Colonel Hugh Baillie, of Redcastle and Tarradale, Ross-shire. 
Married, first, Hon. Phillipa, daughter of 6th Viscount Strangford; second, Clarissa, 
daughter of George Rush of Elsenham Hall, Essex, and Farthinghoe Lodge, 
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise noted, all sources are from Michael Stenton (ed.), Who's Who of British MPs, 4 
vols, (Hassocks, 1976). Acreage and value of annual income in 1883 are as stated in John Bateman, 
The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland (London, 1883). Some estates are likely to have 
fluctuated in terms of acreage and income before 1883. Members listed are Conservative, unless 
otherwise stated in Stenton. MPs who moved away from the party during the period (e.g. Lord Elcho) 
are included; however, those who can be subsequently classed as Conservative after 1868 but not 
before that year (e.g. Lord Haddo) are not included. 
2 Seth Alexander Thévoz, ‘Database of London Club Memberships of MPs, 1832–68’, compiled from 
over fifty archival and print sources, and used in the writing of Seth Alexander Thévoz, ‘The Political 
Impact of London Clubs, 1832–1868’, PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2014. 
3 Gordon F. Millar, ‘Baillie, Charles, Lord Jerviswoode (1804–1879)’, ODNB, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1059 [accessed 15 Apr. 2015]. 
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Northamptonshire. A Conservative, in favour of moderate Parliamentary Reform. 
Deputy-Lieutenant of Ross-shire. 
 
Baillie, Lieut.-Col. John (1772–1833) 
Service: Hedon 1820–1830, Inverness District of Burghs 1830–1831, Inverness 
District of Burghs 1832–1833 
Lieutenant-Colonel, Bengal Establishment, 1815, entered in 1790. Brooks’ and 
Carlton Clubs.4 Estates valued at £1397.1.6 in 1855–1856.5 A director of the East 
India Company, 1823–1833. Publications include A Course of Lectures on Arabic 
Grammar (1801).6 Professor of Arabic and Persian Languages and of Mahomedan 
Law in the College of Fort William, Political Agent at Bundlecund, 1803–1807, 
resident at Lucknow, 1807–1815. A moderate Whig before 1832.7  
 
Baillie, William (1816–1890) 
Service: Linlithgowshire 1845–1847 
Polkemmet, Linlithgowshire. Carlton Club, White’s, and New Club, Edinburgh.8 
First son of Sir William Baillie (estates comprised 4,320 acres, valued at £2,825 in 
1883). Educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. Voted for agricultural 
protection, 1846. Captain of the Royal Midlothian Yeoman Cavalry, 1852–1872.  
 
Baird, James (1802–1876) 
Service: Falkirk District of Burghs 1851–1857 
Gartsherrie House, Lanarkshire (estates comprised 19,599 acres, valued at £8,043 in 
1883). Carlton Club. Son of Alexander Baird of Lochwood, and brother of William 
Baird. Married, second, Isabella Agnes, daughter of Admiral James Hay. An 
Ironmaster at the Gartsherrie Works, near Airdrie. William Baird & Co. produced 
approximately twenty-five per cent of Scottish pig-iron by the mid-1860s, employing 
10,000. Succeeded to the estates of Auchmedden in 1857, having already bought 
Cambusdoon, Ayrshire in 1853.9 Founded the Baird Trust in connection with the 
Church of Scotland at a cost of nearly £500,000 in 1873. A Moderate Conservative, 
in favour of a revision of the excise laws.  
 
Baird, William (1796–1864) 
Service: Falkirk District of Burghs 1841–1846 
First son of Alexander Baird, of Lochwood. Carlton Club.10 Bought the Elie estate in 
1853, which comprised 3,575 acres, valued at £8,815 in 1883. Married Janet 
Johnstone, had six sons and five daughters. Was an Iron-Master. 
 
                                                          
4 Thévoz, ‘Database’. 
5 Inverness-shire 1855–6 Valuation Roll, VR103/2–3. 
6 Martin Casey, ‘Baillie, John (1772–1833), of Leys Castle, Inverness and Devonshire Place, Mdx.’, 
HoP, Commons 1820–1832, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1820-
1832/member/baillie-john-1772-1833 [accessed 22 Apr. 2015]. 
7 Stanley Lane-Poole, ‘Baillie, John (1772–1833)’, ODNB, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1064 [accessed 15 Apr. 2015]. 
8 Thévoz, ‘Database’. 
9 Arthur H. Grant, ‘Baird, James (1802–1876)’, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1100 
[accessed 15 Apr. 2015]. 




Balfour, James (c. 1775–1845) 
Service: Anstruther Easter Burghs 1826–1831, Haddingtonshire 1832–1835 
3 Grosvenor Square, London. Whittingham House, Dunbar. White’s and Carlton 
Club.11 Second son of John Balfour of Balbirnie. Purchased Whittingham estate 
(comprised 10,000 acres, valued at £11,000 in 1883). Married Eleanor, daughter of 
the Earl of Lauderdale. An East India Proprietor, and formerly civil servant to the 
East India Company at Madras, and Agent. Suspended and sent home for allegedly 
accepting gifts in 1800, returned to India in 1802. Made £300,000 as a victualing 
contractor for the Royal Navy. Grandfather of Arthur James Balfour, prime minister 
1902–1905.12 
 
Balfour, James Maitland (1820–1856) 
Service: Haddington District of Burghs 1841–1847 
Whittingham, Haddingtonshire. First son of James Balfour (see previous entry). 
White’s and Carlton Club.13 Married Lady Blanche, daughter of the 2nd Marquess of 
Salisbury. Deputy-Lieutenant of Haddington from 1846. Voted for agricultural 
protection, 1846. Father of Arthur James Balfour, Prime Minister 1902–1905.  
 
Balfour, Thomas (1810–1838) 
Service: Orkney and Shetland 1835–1837 
18 Curzon Street, Mayfair, London. 9 Doune Terrace, Edinburgh. Cliffdale, Orkney. 
First son of David Balfour, would have inherited estates valued at £1892/6/0 in 
1854–1855 (predeceased).14 Carlton Club.15 First son of Captain Balfour, RN, of 
Elwick, Orkney. F.R.S. A Scottish Advocate, Director of the Highland Society and 
Vice-Lieutenant of Orkney. 
 
Blackburn, Peter (1811–1870) 
Held offices: Junior Lord of Treasury 1859 
Service: Stirlingshire 1855–1865 
10 Prince’s Gardens, London. Killearn. Carlton. First son of John Blackburn, a 
Jamaica proprietor, who left £107,109 at his death in 1840. Estates in Killearn, 
Stirlingshire valued at £1739.3.0 in 1854–1855.16 Carlton Club.17 Educated at Eton. 
Senior brother of Sir Colin Blackburn (Lord Blackburn of Appeal from 1876), and 
Hugh Blackburn, Professor of Mathematics at Glasgow University.18 Married Jean, 
daughter of James Wedderburn, former Solicitor-General for Scotland. Entered the 
army as Cornet, 2nd Life Guards 1829, retiring 1836. Was the chairman of the 
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12 D.R. Fisher, ‘Balfour, James (c.1775–1845), of Whittinghame, Haddington; Balgonie, Fife, and 3 
Grosvenor Square, Mdx.’, HoP, Commons 1820–1832, 
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Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway from 1846. Unsuccessfully contested Edinburgh 
City, 1847, and Glasgow, 1852. Justice of the Peace and Deputy-Lieutenant of 
Stirlingshire. A Liberal-Conservative.  
 
Blair, James (1817–1841) 
Service: Saltash 1818–1820, Aldeburgh 1820–1826, Minehead 1826–1830, 
Wigtownshire 1837–1841 
3 Portman Square, London. Penninghame, Wigtownshire (estates comprised 37,268 
acres, valued at £9,035 in 1883). Carlton Club.19 Inherited estates in Berbice, 
Demerara and Surinam as coheir of Lambert Blair, his uncle.20 Married Elizabeth, 
youngest daughter of the Hon. Edward Stopford, uncle of the Earl of Courtown.  
 
Blair, Col. James Hunter (1817–1854) 
Service: Ayrshire 1852–1854 
3 St James’s Place, London. Blairquhain Park, Athenry (estate comprised 21,672 
acres, valued at £12,892 in 1883). Carlton, White’s, Guards’, and Coventry Clubs.21 
First son of Sir David Hunter Blair. Educated at Eton. Entered the Scots Fusilier 
Guards, 1835, became Lieutenant-Colonel in 1848. Appointed a Deputy-Lieutenant 
of Ayrshire, 1845. Killed leading a battalion at the Battle of Inkerman 1854.22 Was 
opposed to unreciprocated free trade, to the Maynooth Grant, and to any extension of 
the franchise.  
 
Boyle, Hon. George Frederick (1825–1890) 
Also known as: 6th Earl of Glasgow 1869–1890 
Service: Bute 1865–1865 
Second son of 4th Earl of Glasgow. Succeeded his half-brother as 6th Earl of Glasgow 
in 1869 (estates comprised 37,825 acres, valued at £34,558 in 1883). Carlton Club.23 
Educated at Christ Church, Oxford. Supporter of the Oxford Movement in the 
Scottish Episcopal Church.24 Deputy-Lieutenant of Bute and Ayrshire. 
 
Cameron, Donald (1835–1905) 
Also known as: Cameron of Lochiel 1835–1905  
Service: Inverness-shire 1868–1885 
Achnacarry, Fort William, Inverness-shire. Estates comprised 126,008 acres, valued 
at £10,721 in 1883. White’s and Carlton Club. First son of Donald Cameron of 
Lochiel. Married Lady Margaret Elizabeth, daughter of the 5th Duke of Buccleuch. 
Educated at Harrow. Entered the diplomatic service as attaché at Berne 1852; was 
attaché to the Earl of Elgin’s special mission to China, 1857–1858. Appointed paid 
attaché to Stockholm 1858, paid attaché to Berlin the same year, resigned in 1859. 
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Was a Groom in Waiting to the Queen, 1874–1880. Unsuccessfully contested 
Wycombe, 1862.  
 
Campbell, Alexander (1814–1869) 
Also known as: Alexander Campbell Cameron 1814–1869 
Service: Argyll 1841–1843 
Monzie Castle, Perthshire. Inveran, Argyllshire. Estates comprised 83,500 acres, 
valued at £5,658 in 1883. Carlton Club.25 Only son of General Campbell. 
Unsuccessfully contested Edinburgh, 1852, and Inverness, 1857 and 1859. Married 
Christina, only child of Sir Duncan Cameron of Fassifern. Assumed the additional 
surname of Cameron upon his marriage. A Conservative.  
 
Campbell, Sir Archibald I. (1825–1866) 
Service: Argyll 1851–1857 
34 Eaton Street, London. Succoth, Dunbartonshire. Estates comprised 10,601 acres, 
valued at £11,308 in 1883. Carlton Club.26 Only son of John Campbell, who 
represented Dunbartonshire, 1826–1830. Married Lady Agnes Grosvenor, seventh 
daughter of the Marquess of Westminster.27 Educated at Eton and Christ Church, 
Oxford, where he was awarded a second-class degree in Classics, 1847. Appointed 
Captain of the Glasgow Yeomanry, 1849. A Conservative, voted for an inquiry into 
Maynooth, 1853. Lieutenant-Colonel of the 1st Lanarkshire Rifle Corps, 1860.  
 
Carr Boyle, James (1792–1869) 
Also known as: Viscount Kelburne 1792–1849, 5th Earl of Glasgow 1843–1869, 
James Boyle 1792–1869  
Service: Ayrshire 1839–1843 
Kelburne House, Ayrshire. Eldest surviving son of the 4th Earl of Glasgow, whose 
estates comprised 37,825 acres, valued at £34,558 in 1883. White’s and Carlton 
Club.28 Married the daughter of Edward Hay Mackenzie of Newhall and Cromarty, a 
Lieutenant in the navy. Lord-Lieutenant and Sheriff Principal of Ayrshire from 1844. 
A Conservative.  
 
Charteris, Hon. Francis W. (1818–1914) 
Also known as: Lord Elcho 1818–1883, Earl of March and Wemyss 1883–1914  
Held offices: Junior Lord of Treasury 1852–1855  
Service: Gloucestershire Eastern 1841–1846, Haddingtonshire 1847–1883 
23 St James’s Place, London. Amisfield, Haddington. Gosford House, Longniddry, 
Edinburgh. White’s and Carlton Club.29 First son of the 8th Earl of Wemyss, whose 
estates comprised 62,028 acres, valued at £54,968 in 1883. Married Lady Anne 
Frederica, second daughter of the first Earl of Lichfield. Educated at Eton and Christ 
Church, Oxford, where he graduated B.A. in 1841. Appointed Deputy-Lieutenant of 
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Haddingtonshire, 1846, and Lieutenant-Colonel in the London Scottish Rifle 
Volunteers, 1860. A Liberal-Conservative, who voted for Lord Derby’s Reform Bill 
in 1859, and against Lord Russell’s Reform Bill in 1866; also for the 
disestablishment of the Irish Church, 1869 and in favour of a measure for ‘the 
simplification of the land laws’. 
 
Chisholm, Alexander (1810–1838) 
Also known as: ‘The Chisolm’ 
Service: Inverness-shire 1835–1838 
Erchless Castle, Inverness-shire. Estates comprised 113,256 acres, valued at £8,858 
in 1883. Carlton and United University Clubs.30 First son of ‘The Chisholm’ 
(William). University and Carlton Clubs.  
 
Clerk, Sir George (1787–1867) 
Held offices: Lord of the Admiralty, 1819–1830, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Treasury 1834–1835, Financial Secretary to the Treasury 1841–1845, Vice-President 
of the Board of Trade 1845–1846, Master of the Mint 1845–1846 
Service: Edinburghshire 1811–1832, Edinburgh 1835–1837, Stamford 1838–1847, 
Dover 1847–1852 
8 Park Street, Westminster, London. Penicuik, Edinburgh. Estates comprised 13,196 
acres, valued at £8,993 in 1883. Athenaeum, Carlton, and St James’s Clubs.31 
Married Maria Anne, daughter of Ewan Law and niece of the 1st Lord Ellenborough. 
An Advocate at the Scottish Bar. Honorary D.C.L. Oxon, 1810, Fellow of the Royal 
Society, 1819, and Chairman of the Royal Academy of Music.32 A Conservative, but 
in favour of Free Trade. Unsuccessfully contested Edinburgh, 1837, and Dover, 
1857.  
 
Cochrane, Alexander Dundas Ross Wishart Baillie (1816–1890) 
Also known as: Baron Lamington, 1880–1890, Alexander Cochrane, 1816–1890, 
Alexander Cochrane-Baillie, 1816–1890  
Service: Bridport 1841–1846, Lanarkshire 1857–1857, Honiton 1859–1868, Isle of 
Wight 1870–1880 
26 Wilton Crescent, London. Lamington, Biggar, Lanarkshire. Estates comprised 
12,078 acres, valued at £10,463 in 1883. Carlton Club. First son of Admiral Sir 
Thomas John Cochrane, K.C.B. Educated at Eton College and Trinity College, 
Cambridge. Married Annabella Mary Elizabeth, first daughter of Andrew Robert 
Drummond of Cadlands, Hampshire, and granddaughter of the 5th Duke of Rutland. 
Appointed Captain of the 1st Lanark Rifle Volunteers, 1860. Author of The Morea, 
and many other novels, poems, and articles. Prominent member of the Young 
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Colquhoun, John Campbell (1802–1870) 
Service: Kilmarnock District of Burghs 1837–1841, Newcastle-under-Lyme 1842–
1847 
8 Chesham Street, Belgrave Square, London, Garscadden, and Killermont, 
Dunbartonshire. Estates comprising 3,879 acres, valued at £6,960 in 1883. 
Athenaeum, Carlton, and National Clubs.34 First son of Archibald Campbell 
Colquhoun, Lord Register of Scotland. Author of a number of tracts and pamphlets.35 
Married Henrietta Maria Powys, daughter of Thomas, 2nd Lord Lilford.36 Educated at 
Edinburgh High School and Oriel College, Oxford. Episcopalian and Evangelical. 
Voted against the abolition of the Corn Laws, 1846. Originally a Radical, but sat as a 
Conservative for Kilmarnock Burghs.37  
 
Cumming Bruce, Charles L. (1790–1875) 
Held offices: Joint Secretary to the Board of Control 1852 
Service: Inverness District of Burghs 1831–1832, Elginshire and Nairnshire 1840–
1868 
Dunphail, Forres, Morayshire. Kinnaird House, Falkirk, Stirlingshire.38 Carlton and 
United Service Clubs. Second son of Sir Alexander P. Gordon Cumming. Succeeded 
to the Elginshire estates of Roseisle and Dunphail in 1806, valued at £2467.16.39 
Married Mary, the granddaughter of James Bruce, the Abyssinian traveller, and 
assumed the additional surname of Bruce.40 Voted for an inquiry into Maynooth, 
1853, and in favour of national education on a religious basis. One of five members 
of the Conservative Scottish elections committee in 1832. A Protectionist.41 Deputy-
Lieutenant of Elginshire.  
 
Dalrymple, Charles (1839–1916) 
Held offices: Junior Lord of Treasury 1885–1886  
Service: Bute 1868–1880, Ipswich 1886–1906 
20 Onslow Gardens, London. Newhailes, and Musselburgh. The Athenaeum and 
Carlton Club.42 Second son of Sir Charles Dalrymple Fergusson of Kilkerran, 
                                                          
34 Thévoz, ‘Database’. 
35 When asked to very briefly summarise his political affiliation and beliefs in a form sent by Charles 
Dod, he instead enclosed a full speech and further mentioned his published works on issues including 
Ireland and Reform. See Flysheet from The Parliamentary Pocket Companion, 1834, in 
‘Autobiography of Five Hundred Members of Parliament, Being a Collection of Letters and Returned 
Schedules Received by Charles R Dodd, during the First Four Reformed Parliaments, viz. from 1832 
to December 1842 and Constituting Materials for Compiling the Successive Editions of The 
Parliamentary Pocket Companion, London, December 1842, Collected by RPD [Robert Phipps Dod, 
the son of Charles], Osborn Collection (hereafter Dod MSS), d 50, (3 vols), i, f. 283. 
36 Foster, Members of Parliament, 78. 
37 John Wolffe, ‘Colquhoun, John Campbell (1803–1870)’, ODNB, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5991 [accessed 3 May 2015]. 
38 Dod MSS, i, f. 164. 
39 Elginshire 1854–5 Valuation Roll, VR109/1/40, 64–5. 
40 Foster, Members of Parliament, 84. 
41 D.R. Fisher, ‘Cumming Bruce, Charles Lennox (1790–1875), of Roseisle, Elgin and Kinnaird, 
Stirling’, HoP, Commons 1820–1832, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1820-
1832/member/cumming-bruce-charles-1790-1875 [accessed 14 Apr. 2015]. 
42 Foster, Members of Parliament, 90.  
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Ayrshire, whose estates comprised 22,630 acres, valued at £13,334 in 1883. Married 
Alice Mary, daughter of Sir Edward Hunter Blair of Blairquhan. Educated at Harrow 
and Trinity College, Cambridge. Assumed the name of Dalrymple in succeeding to 
the estates of his great-grandfather, Sir David Dalrymple (Lord Hailes), 1849. Called 
to the Bar at Lincoln’s Inn, 1865. Justice of the Peace for Midlothian, Deputy-
Lieutenant for Haddingtonshire, and Honorary Major of the 3rd Battalion Royal Scots 
Fusiliers. Became the chairman of the Select Committee for Public Petitions, 1893, 
and served on the Royal Commissions on Cathedral Establishments, Reformatories, 
Vaccination, and Universities (Scotland). A Conservative.  
 
Douglas, Archibald William (1818–1858) 
Also known as: Viscount Drumlanrig 1837–1856, 8th Marquess of Queensbury, 
1856–1858 
Held offices: Comptroller of the Royal Household 1853–1856 
Service: Dumfriesshire 1847–1856 
Kinmount and Glen Stenart, Dumfriesshire. Carlton, Arthur’s and St James’s 
Clubs.43 Only son of the Marquess of Queensbury, whose estates comprise 13,243 
acres, valued at £13,384 in 1883. Married Caroline, the daughter of Sir William 
Robert Clayton. Educated at Eton. Was a Cornet in the 2nd Life Guards, retired 1844. 
Lord-Lieutenant of Dumfriesshire and Colonel in the Dumfries Militia. ‘A Tory, but 
a Liberal one’, who supported any well-considered measure for the extension of the 
franchise. Voted against the ballot in 1853, and opposed any endowment of the 
Roman Catholic clergy, but was an advocate of religious liberty.  
 
Dundas, George (1819–1880) 
Service: Linlithgowshire 1847–1859 
26 Pall Mall, London. Dundas Castle, South Queensferry. Carlton and Conservative 
Clubs.44 First son of James Dundas of Dundas, Linlithgowshire, whose estates 
comprised 2,094 acres, valued at £4,783 in 1883. His father was chief of the Dundas 
family. Deputy-Lieutenant of Linlithgowshire. Officer in the Rifle Brigade, served in 
Bermuda, Nova Scotia, and the Mediterranean. Retired from the army, 1844. 
Lieutenant-Governor of St Vincent, 1874–1878, and Windward Islands, 1878–
1879.45 A Conservative, opposed to the admission of Jews to Parliament. Favoured 
an ‘extended system of national education’.  
 
Ferguson, Captain George (1788–1867) 
Service: Banffshire 1832–1837 
37 Charles Street, Berkeley Square, London. Pitfour, Aberdeenshire. Estates 
comprised 23,150 acres, valued at £19,938 in 1883. Carlton Club. Son of Rear-
Admiral George Ferguson.46 Married, second, Elizabeth, daughter of Lord Langford. 
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Fergusson, Sir James (1832–1907) 
Held offices: Under-Secretary of State for India 1866–1868, Under-Secretary of 
State for the Home Department 1867–1868, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs 1886–1892, Postmaster-General 1891–1892 
Service: Ayrshire 1854–1857, Manchester North East 1885–1906 
80 Cornwall Gardens, London. Kilkerran, Ayrshire. White’s, Carlton, and Junior 
Carlton Clubs.47 Estates comprised 22,630 acres, valued at £13,334 in 1883. 
Educated at Rugby and University College, Oxford. Married Lady Edith Ramsay, 
daughter of the Marquess of Dalhousie. Served in the Grenadier Guards, 1851–55, 
including the Crimean War. Was wounded at the Battle of Inkerman, on the same 
day as his friend and Scottish MP James Hunter Blair was killed. Fergusson was 
nominated to succeed him as MP at Blair’s suggestion, before he succumbed to his 
wounds.48 Served as Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant of the Royal Ayr and Wigton 
Militia, 1858–1873. Governor of New Zealand, 1873–1875, and Governor of 
Bombay, 1880–1885. A Magistrate and Deputy-Lieutenant of Ayrshire. A 
Conservative.  
 
Forbes, William (1806–1854) 
Service: Stirlingshire 1835–1837, 1841–1855 
Callendar House, Stirlingshire. Purchased estate which comprised 56,704 acres, 
valued at £25,442 in 1883. Carlton Club.49 First son of William Forbes of London, 
merchant.50 Married Lady Louisa Antoinetta, daughter of the 7th Earl of Wemyss. 
Vice-Lieutenant of Stirlingshire. A Conservative, who voted for agricultural 
protection in 1846, and favoured ‘relief’ to the agricultural and commercial classes. 
Also wanted a withdrawal of the Maynooth Grant. 
 
Gordon, Captain Hon. William (1784–1858) 
Held offices: Lord of the Admiralty 1841–1846  
Service: Aberdeenshire 1820–1854 
Argyll House, Argyll Street, London. Haddo House, Aberdeenshire. Carlton Club. 
Second son of Lord Haddo (who was the first son of the 3rd Earl of Aberdeen). 
Brother of the 4th Earl of Aberdeen, whose estates comprised 62,422 acres, valued at 
£44,112 in 1883. Educated at Harrow school.51 Became Rear-Admiral of the Red, 
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Graham-Montgomery, Sir Graham (1823–1901) 
Held offices: Junior Lord of the Treasury 1866–1868  
Service: Peeblesshire 1852–1868, Peeblesshire and Selkirkshire 1868–1880 
45 Grosvenor Place, London. Stobo Castle, Peebles. Kinross House, Kinross-shire. 
Estate comprised 20,634 acres, valued at £11,904 in 1883. Carlton and Conservative 
Clubs. First son of Sir James Montgomery. Married the daughter of John James 
Hope-Johnstone of Annandale. Educated at Christ Church, Oxford, where he 
graduated B.A. in 1845. Appointed Deputy-Lieutenant of Peebleshire, 1844, and 
Lord-Lieutenant of Kinross, 1854. Lieutenant in the Midlothian Yeomanry Cavalry, 
1850–1854. Brigadier-General of the Royal Company of Archers.52 The patron of 
five livings. A Conservative, who voted against the disestablishment of the Irish 
Church, 1869, a supporter generally of Lord Beaconsfield’s policy. 
 
Grant, Colonel Hon. Francis William (1778–1853) 
Also known as: 6th Earl of Seafield 1840–1853, Francis William Ogilvie-Grant 
Service: Elgin District of Burghs 1802–1806, Inverness District of Burghs 1806–
1807, Elginshire 1807–1832, Elginshire and Nairnshire 1832–1840 
42 Belgrave Square, London. Cullen House, Inverness-shire. The Athenaeum and 
Carlton Clubs. Brother of the 5th Earl of Seafield, whose estates comprised 305,930 
acres, valued at £78,227 in 1883. Second son of Sir James Grant. Married Mary 
Anne, only daughter of J.C. Dunn, Lord-Lieutenant of Inverness-shire. Acting chief 
of his family estates and electoral interests from 1811.53 A Conservative. A 
Representative Peer, 1841–1853.  
 
Grant, Francis William (1814–1840) 
Service: Inverness-shire 1838–1840 
Cullen House, Inverness-shire. Carlton Club.54 Eldest son of the 6th Earl of Seafield 
and nephew to the 5th Earl, whose estates comprised 305,930 acres, valued at 
£78,227 in 1883. A Conservative.  
 
Grant, Hon. James Ogilvie (1817–1888) 
Also known as: 9th Earl of Seafield 1884–1888, Baron Strathspey 1884–1888  
Service: Elginshire and Nairnshire 1868–1874 
Invererne, Forres, Scotland. Carlton Club. Fourth son of the 6th Earl of Seafield, 
whose estates comprised 305,930 acres, valued at £78,227 in 1883. Married Caroline 
Louisa, 2nd daughter of Eyre Evans of Ashill Towers, Limerick. Married, second, 
Constance Helena, fourth daughter of Sir Robert Abercromby. Appointed Captain of 
the 42nd Foot, 1854 and retired, 1855. Became Major of the Inverness Militia, 1857, 
and was Lieutenant-Colonel of the Elginshire Volunteers. Vice-Lieutenant of 
Elginshire.55 A Conservative.  
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Hay, Sir John (1788–1838) 
Service: Peeblesshire 1832–1837 
103 Pall Mall, London. Smithfield and Hayston, Peebleshire. Estates comprised 
9,755 acres, valued at £4,514 in 1883. Carlton Club. First son of Sir John Hay. 
Married Anne Preston, niece and co-heiress of Sir Robert Preston, of Valleyfield. 
Brother of Adam Hay, formerly MP for Peebles. A partner in the firm of Forbes and 
Co., Bankers at Edinburgh. A Conservative.  
 
Hepburn, Sir Thomas Buchan (1804–1893) 
Service: Haddingtonshire 1838–1847 
Hepburn, Haddingtonshire. Estates comprised 2,772 acres, valued at £8,512 in 1883. 
Carlton and Smeaton Clubs. Married Helen, daughter of A. Little, of Shelden Park, 
Surrey. Unsuccessfully contested the Haddington District of Burghs, 1837. A 
Conservative.  
 
Home Drummond, Henry (1783–1867) 
Service: Stirlingshire 1821–1831, Perthshire 1840–1852 
Blair-Drummond, Perthshire. Estates comprised 40,668 acres, valued at £32,014 in 
1883. Carlton and Union Clubs. First son of George Home Drummond, and grandson 
Of Henry Home, Lord Kames. Director of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Appointed as 
one of the Board of Supervision for the Relief of the Poor in Scotland, 1835. Was 
called to the Scottish Bar. Vice-Lieutenant of Perthshire. Author of a work on the 
course of education pursued in the University of Oxford, in reply to an article in the 
Edinburgh Review. A Conservative, but in favour of free trade. 
 
Hope, Hon. Captain James (1807–1854) 
Also known as: James Wallace 1807–1854, James Hope-Wallace 1844–1854 
Service: Linlithgowshire 1835–1838 
Chelsea Hospital, Middlesex. Carlton Club. Second son of the 4th Earl of Hopetoun, 
whose estates comprised 42,507 acres, valued at £39,984 in 1883. Married Lady 
Mary Frances Nugent, daughter of the 7th Earl of Westmeath. Deputy-Lieutenant of 
Linlithgowshire.56 Lieutenant-Colonel in the Coldstream Guards. Succeeded his 
uncle, Sir Alexander Hope, as MP for Linlithgowshire. Assumed the additional final 
surname and arms of Wallace in compliance with the will of Lord Wallace, 1844. 
Thus, inherited estates comprising 6,591 acres, valued at 2,605 in 1883. A 
Conservative.  
 
Hope, Hon. Charles (1808–1893) 
Service: Linlithgowshire 1838–1845 
Greenwich Hospital, London. Carlton Club.57 Third son of the 4th Earl of Hopetoun. 
Brother of the 5th Earl of Hopetoun, whose estates comprised 42,507 acres, valued at 
£39,984 in 1883. Married Lady Isabella Helen, first daughter of the 5th Earl of 
Selkirk. Was called to the Scottish Bar, 1831. Was a commissioner of Greenwich 
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Hospital and was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Isle of Man 1845. A 
Conservative.  
 
Hope, Hon. Sir Alexander (1769–1837) 
Service: Linlithgowshire 1832–1835 
Chelsea College, London. Craighall, Farnham, Surrey. The Athenaeum and Carlton 
Club.58 Second son of the 2nd Earl of Hopetoun, whose estates comprised 42,507 
acres, valued at £39,984 in 1883. A Lieutenant-General in the Army, and Colonel of 
the 47th regiment. Lieutenant-Governor of Chelsea Hospital, enjoyed a pension for 
the loss of his arm at Buren, Holland, in 1795.59 A Conservative, in favour of the 
Corn Laws.  
 
Hope, Sir John (1781–1853) 
Service: Edinburghshire 1845–1853 
17 Fludyer Street, London. Pinkie House, Edinburgh. Carlton Club. First son of Sir 
Archibald Hope. Estate valued at £1945.11 in 1854–1855.60 Married Anne, youngest 
daughter of Sir John Wedderburn. Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant of the 
Midlothian Yeomanry Cavalry. Vice-Lieutenant and Convenor of Edinburghshire. 
Deputy-Governor of the Royal Bank of Scotland.61 A Conservative and in favour of 
protection to agriculture. 
 
Howard, Hon. William (1781–1843) 
Service: Morpeth 1806–1826, Sutherland 1837–1840 
16 Grosvenor Street, London. Second son of the Earl of Carlisle, whose estates 
comprised 78,540 acres, valued at £49,601 in 1883. Elected for Sutherland without 
opposition. A Conservative, said that he did “not much care who was destined to be 
at the head of the government, so that whoever filled that high station would throw 
the shield of his ministerial protection over the vulnerable venerable institutions of 
this country”. Accepted Chiltern Hundreds in April 1840.  
 
Houstoun, George (1810–1843) 
Service: Renfrewshire 1837–1841 
Johnstone Castle, Renfrewshire. Oxford & Cambridge, and Carlton Clubs. Owner of 
Easter Cochrane estate. Only son of Ludovic Houstoun. Contested Renfrewshire 
unsuccessfully in 1835. Was ‘an enemy to every species of corruption, opposed to all 
useless expenditure, a supporter of the institutions of the country, civil and sacred, 
although friendly to every practicable reform by which their efficiency can be 
increased, or their permanency secured. Would firmly oppose any measure which 
can be considered even an indirect attack on the Protestant interests of the country’. 
 
Hume Campbell, Sir Hugh Purves (1812–1894) 
Service: Berwickshire 1834–1847 
72 Portland Place, London. Purves Hall, and Marchmont House, Berwickshire. 
Estates comprised 20,180 acres, valued at £17,976 in 1883. Carlton Club. Married 
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Margaret Penelope, youngest daughter of John Spottiswoode of Spottiswoode. His 
father changed his name from Purves to Hume-Campbell on succeeding to the estates 
of his maternal ancestors, the Earls of Marchmont. A Conservative, voted for 
agricultural protection in 1846.  
 
Johnstone, John James Hope (1796–1876) 
Also known as: Earl of Annandale and Hartfell 1818–1876, Lord Johnstone 1818–
1876  
Service: Dumfriesshire 1832–1847, 1857–1865 
Raehills, Lockerbie, Scotland. White’s, Brooks’, and Carlton Club.62 First son of 
Admiral Sir William Johnstone, whose estates comprised 65,336 acres, valued at 
£28,236 in 1883. Married Alicia, first daughter of George Gordon, Keeper of 
Lochmaben Castle, and niece of Sir David Baird. Formerly a Lieutenant in the navy, 
and claimant of the dormant Earldom of Annandale. A Liberal-Conservative, in 
favour of extension of the franchise, retrenchment of expenditure, and a national 
system of education.  
 
Leslie, William (1814–1880) 
Service: Aberdeenshire 1861–1866 
31 Eaton Square, London. Warthill, Aberdeenshire. Drumrossie, Aberdeenshire. 
Estates comprised 4,164 acres, valued at £4,560 in 1883. Carlton Club. First son of 
William Leslie of Warthill, Aberdeenshire (where the family had been established 
since 1518). Married Matilda Rose, second daughter of William Rose Robinson.63 
Educated at Marischal College, Aberdeen, where he graduated M.A. in 1832. Was 
for some years in China; a partner in the firm of Messrs Dent and Co. A Magistrate 
and Deputy-Lieutenant of Aberdeenshire. A Conservative, in favour of free 
commercial intercourse with other nations on principles of reciprocity and of non-
intervention in foreign politics, but of the maintenance of the highest state of 
efficiency in the army and navy, and of a ‘sound Scriptural education for the people, 
aided by government grants’. Opposed to the system of centralisation especially as 
applied to Scotland.  
 
Lockhart, Alan Elliot (1803–1878) 
Service: Selkirkshire 1846–1861 
Borthwick Brae, Selkirkshire. Cleghorn, Lanarkshire. Estates comprised 7,142 acres, 
valued at £4,642 in 1883. Carlton Club. First son of William Elliot Lockhart, who 
represented Selkirkshire for twenty-four years. Married Charlotte, fifth daughter of 
Sir Robert Dundas. Educated at the University of Edinburgh. Called to the Scottish 
Bar, 1821. A Deputy-Lieutenant of Selkirkshire and Roxburghshire. Lord Lieutenant 
of Selkirkshire, 1867–1878. A Liberal-Conservative, who said he would give Lord 
Derby a general support; in favour of inquiry respecting the Maynooth grant; 
opposed to the 40-shilling freehold movement in Scotland.  
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Lockhart, Alexander M. (1806–1861) 
Service: Lanarkshire 1837–1841 
Carnwath, Lanarkshire. Mount Pleasant, Berwickshire. Carlton Club.64 Third son of 
Sir Alexander Macdonald-Lockhart, whose estates comprised 32,274 acres, valued at 
£22,387 in 1883. A Deputy-Lieutenant of Lanarkshire. A Conservative.  
 
Lockhart, William (1787–1857) 
Service: Lanarkshire 1841–1857 
19 Grosvenor Street, London. Milton Lockhart, Lanarkshire. Junior United Service 
and Carlton Clubs. Estates comprised 1,059 acres, valued at £2,582 in 1865.65 First 
son of Revd Dr Lockhart (and grandson of William Lockhart of Kirkhill). Married 
Mary Jane, daughter of Sir Hugh Palliser. Was in the East India Company’s Bengal 
Army, and received a medal for services in Nepal. Dean of Faculties at the 
University of Glasgow. Deputy-Lieutenant of Lanarkshire, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Commandant of the Lanarkshire Regiment of Yeomanry Cavalry. Was ‘a decided 
Conservative’, who supported the repeal of the Maynooth Grant.  
 
Mackenzie, Thomas (1793–1856) 
Service: Ross and Cromarty 1837–1847 
17 Clarges Street, London. Applecross, Ross-shire. Estates comprised 63,000 acres, 
valued at £1,957 in 1883. Carlton Club.66 First son of Kenneth Mackenzie of 
Inverinate. A Writer to the Signet. A Conservative, who voted for agricultural 
protection, 1846.  
 
Mackenzie, William Forbes (1807–1860) 
Held offices: Junior Lord of the Treasury 1845–1846, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Treasury 1852 
Service: Peeblesshire 1837–1852, Liverpool 1852–1853 
38 Charles Street, Berkeley Square, London. Portmore, Peeblesshire. Estates 
comprised 9,685 acres, valued at £4,859 in 1883. Carlton Club. First son of Colin 
Mackenzie of Portmore. Married Helen Anne, first daughter of Sir James 
Montgomery.67 A Deputy-Lieutenant of Peeblesshire. A Conservative, who voted for 
agricultural protection, 1846. Contested Derby, 1857.  
 
McNeill, Duncan (1793–1874) 
Also known as: Baron Colonsay 1867–1874  
Held offices: Solicitor-General for Scotland 1834–1835, 1841–1842, Lord Advocate 
1842–1846  
Service in parliament: Argyll 1843–1851 
73 Great King Street, Edinburgh. Carlton Club. Second son of John McNeill of 
Colonsay, whose estates comprised 11,226 acres, valued at £2,305 in 1883. Educated 
at the University of St Andrews and University of Edinburgh. Called to the Scottish 
Bar, 1816, and was Dean of the Faculty of Advocates. Appointed Junior Counsel for 
the Crown, 1820. Sheriff of Perthshire, 1824–1834. Deputy-Lieutenant of Midlothian 
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and Argyllshire.68 A Conservative, but in favour of free trade. A Director of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Extraordinary Director of the Edinburgh Life Assurance 
Company, and of the Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Company.  
 
Mure, Colonel William (1799–1860) 
Also known as: ‘The Historian’ 
Service: Renfrewshire 1846–1855 
14 Jermyn Street, London. Caldwell, Beith, Ayrshire. Estates comprised 5,024 acres, 
valued at £6,248 in 1883. United Services Club. First son of Col. William Mure. 
Married Laura, second daughter of William Markham of Becca Hall, Yorkshire, and 
granddaughter of the Most Reverend William Markham, Archbishop of York. 
Educated at Westminster, Edinburgh University and in Germany. Author of a 
Journal of a Tour in Greece, etc. in 1838, Dissertation of the Calendar, etc. of 
Ancient Egypt, History of Grecian Literature. Vice-Lieutenant of Renfrewshire and 
Colonel of the Renfrew Militia. Lord Rector of Glasgow University, 1847–1848. A 
‘Liberal-Conservative’, opposed to protection, but supported other measures for the 
relief of agriculture. Voted against the Ecclesiastical Tithes Bill as being ineffective, 
and opposed to the Maynooth Grant. Unsuccessfully contested Renfrewshire, 1841.  
 
Mure, David (1810–1891) 
Held offices: Solicitor-General for Scotland 1858–1859, Lord Advocate 1859  
Service: Bute 1859–1865 
12 Ainslie Place, Edinburgh. Third son of Col. William Mure, whose estates 
comprised 5,024 acres, valued at £6,248 in 1883. Carlton Club.69 Brother of Col. 
William Mure (see entry above). Married Helen, first daughter of John Tod of 
Kirkhill. Educated at Westminster School and at the University of Edinburgh. Called 
to the Scottish Bar, 1831. Sheriff of Perthshire 1853–1858. Appointed a Senator of 
the College of Justice 1865. A Liberal-Conservative, but one who gave a general 
support to Lord Derby; opposed to the ballot and to the grant to Maynooth; in favour 
of the army and navy being maintained in a high state of efficiency, and of National 
Education being based on religion.  
 
Murray, Sir George (1772–1846) 
Held offices: Master-General of the Ordnance 1834–1835  
Service: Perthshire 1824–1832, Perthshire 1834–1835 
Second son of Sir William Murray, of Ochtertyre, whose estates comprised 17,876 
acres, valued at £11,051 in 1883. White’s.70 Educated at Edinburgh High School and 
the University of Edinburgh. Married Lady Louisa Erskine, widow of Sir James 
Erskine. Enjoyed a long and successful administrative career in the military, a trusted 
associate and ally of the Duke of Wellington.71 President of the Royal Geographical 
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Society, and Fellow of the Royal Society. A Conservative. Contested Westminster 
1837, and Manchester, 1839 and 1841.  
 
Murray, William David (1806–1898) 
Also known as: Viscount Stormont 1806–1840, Earl of Mansfield, 1840–1898 
Held offices: Junior Lord of Treasury 1834–1835  
Service: Aldborough 1830–1831, Woodstock 1831–1832, Norwich 1832–1837, 
Perthshire 1837–1840 
Scone Palace, Perthshire. Carlton Club. First son of the Earl of Mansfield, whose 
estates comprised 49,074 acres, valued at £42,968 in 1883. Married Louisa, third 
daughter of Cuthbert Ellison, former MP for Newcastle. One of five members of the 
Conservative Scottish election committee in 1832. Largely withdrew from political 
life after the death of his wife in 1837.72 A Conservative. Lord-Lieutenant of 
Clackmannanshire. Lord High Commissioner to the Kirk of Scotland in 1852, 1858, 
1859.73 
 
Orr Ewing, Archibald (1818–1893) 
Also known as: Archibald Ewing, 1818–1893  
Service: Dunbartonshire 1868–1892 
Lennoxbank, Bonhill, Dunbartonshire. Ballikinrain, Balfron, Stirlingshire. 
Gollomfield, Fort William, Inverness-shire. Purchased estates which comprised 
6,041 acres, valued at £7,385 in 1883. Carlton Club, New Club, and University Club, 
Edinburgh. Western Club, and New Club, Glasgow. Seventh son of William Ewing 
of Ardvullan. Married the only daughter of James Reid of Caldercruix. Educated at 
the University of Glasgow. A Merchant in Glasgow, where he had been established 
since 1845. A Deputy–Lieutenant of Stirlingshire. Also, a County Councillor of 
Dunbarton and a Magistrate for the counties of Dunbarton, Stirling, Lanark, and 
Inverness. Created Baronet, 1886. A Conservative.  
 
Oswald, Alexander H. (1811–1868) 
Service: Ayrshire 1843–1852 
27 Eaton Place, London. Auchincruive, Ayrshire. Estates comprised 36,120 acres, 
valued at £41,874 in 1883. White’s, Brooks’, and Travellers’ Clubs.74 Eldest 
surviving son of Richard Alexander Oswald and nephew of James Oswald, former 
MP for Glasgow. Married Lady Louisa, only daughter of the 1st Earl Craven. 
Deputy-Lieutenant for Ayrshire, Kirkcudbrightshire, and Lanarkshire.75 A 
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Pelham-Clinton, Henry (1811–1864) 
Also known as: Henry Pelham-Clinton 1811–1864, Earl of Lincoln 1811–1851, 5th 
Duke of Newcastle 1851–1864  
Held offices: Lord of the Treasury 1834–1835, Commissioner of Woods and Forests 
1841–1846, Chief Secretary for Ireland 1846, Secretary of State for War and the 
Colonies 1852–1855, Secretary of State for the Colonies 1859–1864 
Service: Nottinghamshire Southern 1832–1846, Falkirk District of Burghs 1846–
1851 
16 Carlton House Terrace, London. Runby Hall, Nottinghamshire. Carlton Club. 
First son of the 4th Duke of Newcastle, whose estates comprised 35,547 acres, valued 
at £74,547 in 1883. Married Susan, only daughter of the 10th Duke of Hamilton. A 
Conservative, but in favour of free trade, and supported the endowment of the 
Roman Catholic clergy. One of the Council of the Duchy of Cornwall.  
 
Pringle, Alexander (1791–1857) 
Held offices: Junior Lord of Treasury 1841–1845  
Service: Selkirkshire 1830–1832, Selkirkshire 1835–1846 
43 Pall Mall, London. Yair, Selkirkshire. Estates at Yair comprised 3,397 acres, in 
addition to lands at Whytbank.76 White’s and Carlton Club.77 Was a representative of 
the Pringles of Whytebank, an ancient family in the county of Selkirk. Married 
Agnes Joanna, daughter of Sir William Dick. Not well-known in Westminster, but 
well-regarded by Scottish Conservatives.78 Advocate, and Vice-Lieutenant of 
Selkirkshire.  
 
Rae, Sir William (1769–1842) 
Held offices: Lord Advocate 1834–1835, 1841–1842  
Service: Anstruther Easter Burghs 1819–1826, Harwich 1827–1830, Buteshire & 
Caithness 1830–1831, Portarlington 1831–1832, Bute 1833–1842 
52 Upper Brook Street, London. Eskgrove, Midlothian. Lands valued at £175.9.3 in 
1854–1855.79 Carlton Club.80 Only surviving son of Sir David Rae, Lord Eskgrove. 
Educated at Edinburgh High School, Glasgow University, and the University of 
Edinburgh.81 Called to the Scottish Bar, 1791. A Conservative.  
 
Ramsay, Lord James Andrew Broun (1812–1860) 
Also known as: Earl of Dalhousie 1838–1860, Marquess of Dalhousie 1849–1860  
Held offices: President of the Board of Trade 1845–1846  
Service: Haddingtonshire 1837–1838 
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Only surviving son of the 9th Earl of Dalhousie (estates comprised 138,021 acres, 
valued at £58,603 in 1883). Carlton and Travellers’ Clubs.82 Stood as candidate for 
Edinburgh, 1835. Refused to stand for an English seat, preferring stay in Scotland. A 
Peelite after succeeding to the peerage, focussed on Scottish issues before travelling 
to India.83 Constable of Dover castle, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, Lord Clerk 
Register of Scotland. Governor-General of India, 1847–1856. Married Lady Susan 
Georgiana Hay, daughter of the 8th Marquess of Tweeddale.  
 
Ramsay, William Ramsay (1809–1850) 
Service: Stirlingshire 1831–1832, Edinburghshire 1841–1845 
Barnton House and Lauriston Castle, Midlothian. Sauchie House, Stirlingshire. 
Estates valued at £32,131.14 in 1854–1855.84 The Athenaeum and Carlton Club.85 
Only son of George Ramsay of Barnton. An infant when he inherited the estates of 
his father, leading to his becoming popularly known as ‘the richest commoner in 
Scotland’.86 Married Mary, the daughter of the 10th Lord Torpichen.87 A 
Conservative.  
 
Scott, Hon. Francis (1806–1884) 
Service: Roxburghshire 1841–1847, Berwickshire 1847–1859 
Mertoun House, Berwickshire. Carlton Club. Fifth son of the 4th Lord Polwarth, 
whose estates comprised 10,664 acres, valued at £15,243 in 1883. Educated at 
Trinity College, Cambridge. Graduated B.A. in 1827, M.A. in 1832. Called to the 
Bar at the Middle Temple, 1832, and joined the Northern Circuit. Appointed 
Parliamentary Agent for the District of Port Philip, New South Wales, 1845. A 
Conservative, who voted for inquiry into Maynooth. 
 
Scott, Lord Henry J.M.D. (1832–1905) 
Also known as: Henry Douglas-Scott-Montagu 1832–1905, Baron Montagu of 
Beaulieu 1885–1905  
Service: Selkirkshire 1861–1868, Hampshire Southern 1868–1884 
3 Tilney Street, London. Palace House, Beaulieu, Southampton. Estates comprised 
8,496 acres, valued at £7,386 in 1883. Carlton, Junior Carlton, and St Stephen’s 
Clubs.88 Second son of the 5th Duke of Buccleuch. Married the Hon. Cecily, 
youngest daughter of the 2nd Lord Wharncliffe. Educated at Eton. Appointed a 
Captain of the Midlothian Yeomanry Cavalry, 1856. A Conservative. Created Baron 
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Scott, Lord John (1809–1860) 
Also known as: John Montagu-Douglas-Scott, 1809–1860  
Service: Roxburghshire 1835–1837 
Montagu House, Whitehall, London. White’s.89 Second son of the 4th Duke of 
Buccleuch, and only brother of the 5th Duke of Buccleuch, whose estates comprised 
460,108 acres, valued at £217,163 in 1883. Married Alicia Anne, first daughter of 
John Spottiswoode of Spottiswoode. Captain in the Grenadier Guards. A 
Conservative. Patron of one living.  
 
Scott, William Montagu Douglas (1831–1914) 
Also known as: Earl of Dalkeith 1831–1884, 6th Duke of Buccleuch, 1884–1914  
Service: Edinburghshire 1853–1868, 1874–1880 
3 Hamilton Place, London. Dalkeith Palace, Dalkeith. White’s and Carlton Club.90 
First son of the 5th Duke of Buccleuch, whose estates comprised 460,108 acres, 
valued at £217,163 in 1883. Married Lady Louisa, third daughter of the 1st Duke of 
Abercorn. Lieutenant-Colonel of the Mid-Lothian Yeomanry Cavalry, Deputy-
Lieutenant of Selkirkshire, and Lord-Lieutenant of Dumfriesshire. Attached to a 
special mission to Russia, 1856. A Conservative; said he would uphold ‘the 
Protestant institutions of the country’. Sat for Edinburghshire until defeated in 1880 
by William Gladstone.  
 
Shaw Stewart, Sir Michael Robert (1826–1903) 
Service: Renfrewshire 1855–1865 
42 Belgrave Square, London. Ardgowan, Greenock, Scotland. Estates comprised 
26,468 acres, valued at £17,378 in 1883. Carlton, White’s, and Travellers’ Clubs. 
First son of Sir Michael Shaw Stewart, MP for Renfrewshire 1830–1836. Married 
Lady Octavia, daughter of the 2nd Marquess of Westminster. Educated at Eton and at 
Christ Church, Oxford. Appointed Cornet and Sub-Lieutenant of the 2nd Life Guards 
1845, retired 1846. Deputy-Lieutenant of Renfrewshire. Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
Renfrewshire Rifle Volunteers. A moderate Conservative, opposed to the Maynooth 
Grant.  
 
Sinclair, Sir George (1790–1868) 
Service: Buteshire & Caithness 1811–1812, Caithness 1832–1837, Caithness 1837–
1841 
5 Suffolk Street, London. Ulbster, Caithness. Arthur’s Club. First son of Sir John 
Sinclair, a celebrated agriculturalist whose estates comprised 78,053 acres, valued at 
£12,883 in 1883. Educated at Harrow School and Gottingen University. A noted 
Sabbatarian, and Pentecostal evangelical.91 Married Catherine Camilla, second 
daughter of Lord Huntingtower. Wrote The Debate and Division, an Epistle to a 
Friend in the Country, The Bore, and other poetical works. Of moderate 
Conservative principles.  
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Smollett, Alexander (1801–1881) 
Service in parliament: Dunbartonshire 1841–1859 
Cameron House, Dunbartonshire. Carlton and Union Clubs. First son of Rear-
Admiral John Rouett Smollett. Educated at the University of Edinburgh. Member of 
the Faculty of Advocates. A Conservative, in favour of national education on a 
religious basis; and opposed to the Maynooth grant. Contested Dunbartonshire, 1835 
and 1837. 
 
Smollett, Patrick Boyle (1804–1895) 
Service: Dunbartonshire 1859–1868, Cambridge 1874–1880 
13 Arlington Street, London. Cameron House, Bonhill, Dunbartonshire. Carlton and 
Conservative Clubs.92 Second son of Admiral John Rouett Smollett. Brother of 
Alexander Smollett (see above). Educated at Haileybury College and at the 
University of Edinburgh. Entered the service of the East India Company, 1826. Was 
for many years Political Agent at Vizagapatan, Madras Presidency, until 1858. A 
Liberal-Conservative.  
 
Stewart, Alan (1835–1901) 
Also known as: Baron Stewart of Garlies 1873–1901, Lord of Garlies 1873–1901, 
Earl of Galloway 1873–1901  
Service: Wigtownshire 1868–1873 
Galloway House, Wigtownshire. First son of the Earl of Galloway, whose estates 
comprised 79,184 acres, valued at £32,197 in 1883. Married Lady Mary Arabella, 
fourth daughter the 2nd Marquess of Salisbury.93 Entered the Army as a Cornet in the 
Royal Horse Guards, 1855; became Lieutenant, 1857, and Captain, 1861. Captain in 
the Galloway Militia. A Conservative, ‘but quite prepared to support measures for 
the progressive improvement of our institutions’. Lord High Commissioner to the 
Church of Scotland.  
 
Stirling, William (1818–1878) 
Also known as: William Stirling Maxwell 1866–1878  
Service: Perthshire 1852–1868 
10 Upper Grosvenor Street, London. Keir House, Dunblane. Pollock House, 
Pollockshaws, Glasgow. The Athenaeum, Carlton, Travellers’, and Oxford & 
Cambridge Clubs. Only son of Archibald Stirling. Educated at Trinity College, 
Cambridge. A noted book and art collector, and admirer of Sir Walter Scott.94 
Married Lady Anne Maria, the second daughter of the 9th Earl of Leven and Melville. 
Assumed the name of Maxwell in 1866 on inheriting the estates of his uncle, Sir 
John Maxwell, which comprised 20,184 acres, valued at £29,854 in 1883. Educated 
at Trinity College, Cambridge where he graduated B.A. in 1839, and M.A. in 1843. 
Elected Rector of St Andrews University, 1863, Lord Rector of Edinburgh 
University, 1872, and Chancellor of Glasgow University, 1875.95 Author of Annals 
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of the Artists of Spain, Cloister Life of the Emperor Charles V, etc. Patron of one 
living. A Conservative.  
 
Stuart, Captain Charles (1810–1892) 
Service: Bute 1832–1833 
Middle Scotland-Yard. Son of Captain John Stuart, RN, and nephew of Charles 
Stuart, Lord Rothesay. Married the Hon. Georgiana Stuart (maid of honour to Queen 
Adelaide), and daughter of Vice-Adm. Sir John Gore. Lieutenant of 1st Foot Guards, 
Buteshire, 1833, Lieutenant-Colonel, 1845, Major-General, 1860, Lieutenant-
General, 1868, and General, 1875. ADC to the Lord High Commissioner of the 
Ionian Islands, 1837–1838, Military Secretary to the Governor-General of India, 
1857–1859. Vice-Lieutenant of Buteshire.96 Of Conservative principles.  
 
Walker, Colonel George Gustavus (1830–1897) 
Service: Dumfriesshire 1865–1868, Dumfriesshire 1869–1874 
Crawfordton, Dumfries. Estates comprised 78,439 acres, valued at £6,883 in 1883. 
Carlton and Conservative Clubs.97 First son of John Walker of Crawfordton. Married 
Anne Murray, only daughter of Adm. George Lennock. Educated at Rugby and 
Balliol College, Oxford. Was a Major in the Scottish Borderers Militia, and 
Honorary Inspector of Musketry for Volunteers. A Magistrate for the Stewartry of 
Kirkcudbright. Patron of one living. A moderate Conservative who gave general 
support to the Conservative Party.  
 
Wortley, James Alexander Stuart (1805–1881) 
Held offices: Judge Advocate General 1846, Solicitor-General (England and Wales) 
1856–1857  
Service: Halifax 1835–1837, Bute 1842–1859 
Twysden Building, Temple, London. 3 Carlton Gardens, London. The Athenaeum, 
Carlton and Travellers’ Clubs.98 Third son of the 1st Lord Wharncliffe, whose estates 
comprised 33,449 acres, valued at £50,823 in 1883. Married Jane, only daughter of 
the 1st Baron Wenlock.99 Educated at Christ Church, Oxford, where he graduated 
B.A. in 1826, M.A. in 1831. Called to the Bar by the Inner Temple, 1831, joined the 
Northern Circuit, became a Queen’s Counsel, 1841. Was the Recorder of London, 
1850–1856. A Deputy-Lieutenant of London and Bute. Severe bouts of depression 
subsequently curtailed his political career.100 A Liberal, formerly classed as a 
Conservative, who voted for inquiry into Maynooth 1853.  
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A Survey of the Scottish Conservative Party, 1832–1868 
 
In a wider British parliamentary context, there is continuing disagreement over the 
extent to which the Victorian political system at the centre was dominated by 
aristocratic interests. Recent prosopographical research suggests, however, that 
whether or not their influence out of doors had declined, aristocratic elements 
continued to dominate the Commons.1 It has thus far been assumed that the Scottish 
Conservative party after 1832 was dominated and defined by landowners and the 
interests of landownership, and was firmly ensconced within the wider British 
aristocratic establishment.2 These assumptions have, however, never been examined 
on a systematic basis.  
This Appendix will assemble and comment upon selected data contained in 
Appendix F in order to test these assumptions. As will be demonstrated, Scottish 
Conservative MPs were indeed the most aristocratic section of the UK parliamentary 
party, with even fairly wealthy sections of the gentry proportionally 
underrepresented. Moreover, they did possess strong links to the wider British 
aristocracy. Nevertheless, they also possessed several attributes which set them apart 
from their colleagues elsewhere in the UK, and ensured that they were intimately 
associated with everyday society in their own Scottish localities. Most significantly, 
a hitherto-unsuspected set of connections to a wide variety of commercial and 
industrial interests are also evident.  
 
                                                          
1 See David F. Krein, ‘The Great Landowners in the House of Commons, 1833–85’, Parliamentary 
History, 32 (2013), 460–76. This article challenges the assertions of Ellis Wasson, who has suggested 
that the Reform Acts significantly changed the position of the landed classes in parliament. See Ellis 
Wasson, Born to Rule: British Political Elites (Stroud, 2000); Ellis Wasson, ‘The Crisis of the 
Aristocracy: Parliamentary Reform, the Peerage and the House of Commons 1750–1914’, 
Parliamentary History, 13 (1994), 297–311.  
2 The few scholars who have discussed the Scottish Conservatives tend to agree on this point, though 
they do acknowledge that other peripheral influences did exist. See Hutchison, Political History of 
Scotland, Chapter 1; Dyer, Property and Intelligence, Chapter 6; Fry, Patronage and Principle, 





Table 1: Scottish Conservative MPs elected between 1832 and 1868 and their 
relation to landownership  
Relationship to Land Number Percentage of MPs 
Landowners over £1,000 
valuation 
36 46.7 
Landowners over £1,000 
valuation acquired by 
purchase 
3 3.9 
Eldest or eldest surviving 
sons of landowners with 
lands over £1,000 valuation 
15 19.5 
Younger sons of landowners 
with lands over £1,000 
valuation1 
19 24.7 




Of the seventy-seven Scottish Conservative MPs in the period, only four (comprising 
5.2 per cent) had little or no identifiable relation to landownership. Two of those 
four, the Smolletts of Dunbartonshire, belonged to a family which had sold long-held 
family estates at Bonhill. This was done to repay the massive debts incurred by their 
uncle, Alexander Telfer Smollett.2 Moreover, those who originally came from other 
backgrounds also tended to have links to the landowning classes. Primogeniture had 
long served to create cadet branches of aristocratic families. These branch members 
moved into areas such as commerce, the armed forces, and the law, but still retained 
their essentially traditional outlook, and membership (or at least associate 
membership) of the Scottish elite.3 Many of those listed as possessing estates were 
returnees to the landowning fold, such as Archibald Orr-Ewing. His family had 
previously possessed estates dating from before 1685, but had lost them as 
punishment for their support of the Monmouth Rebellion against James VII.4 Orr-
Ewing purchased his estates using money acquired in mercantile pursuits.  
                                                          
1 Some of these were, however, expected to inherit estates through other familial connections. 
2 D.G. Henry, ‘Smollett, Alexander Telfer (c.1764–1799), of Bonhill, Dunbarton’, HoP, Commons 
1820–1832, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/member/smollett-
alexander-telfer-1764-1799 [accessed 28 Sep. 2015].  
3 Saunders, Scottish Democracy, 27. 
4 Bernard Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic History of Great Britain and Ireland, 2 vols (London, 




Table 2: Landholdings of landowning Scottish Conservative MPs elected between 
1832 and 1868 
Annual Income Number Percentage of Total 
Landholding MPs 
Landowners under £1,000 
valuation 
0 0 
Landowners over £1,000 
valuation 
11 28.2 
Landowners over £5,000 
valuation 
13 33.3 




The unique pattern of landownership in Scotland also influenced the extent of 
landowner dominance of the party. The average extent of estates in terms of acreage 
was much higher than in other parts of the UK, which is unsurprising given the 
existence of enormous but largely unproductive Highland holdings.1 These could 
range from the immense size and wealth of the lowland Buccleuch domains, 
comprising 460,108 acres and valued at £217,163 in 1883, to vast but unprofitable 
holdings like those of The Chisholm, making up 113,256 acres but valued at a mere 
£8,858. Of all the landowning MPs, 38.5 per cent held profitable estates worth over 
£10,000 per year, and if those with holdings worth over £5,000 are taken into 
account, then over seventy per cent can be labelled very wealthy landowners. The 
average value of these holdings was also much higher than in other parts of the UK; 
even in the landlord-dominated Irish Conservative party, 10.9 per cent of MPs’ 
estates were valued at under £1,000, whereas no small landowners whatsoever can be 
found among the Scottish cohort.2 Likewise, the similarly aristocratic Welsh 
Conservative party had a greater proportion of members with no connection to the 
titled aristocracy.3  
The Scottish and Irish Liberal parties were also more landlord-dominated 
than their English counterparts. Of the seventy-one Scottish Liberal MPs who served 
between 1859 and 1874, forty-three were landowners or the sons of landowners.4 
The Scottish Conservative party was unique in that the minor landholding gentry was 
entirely unrepresented at the parliamentary level after 1832, as no MPs owning land 
below a £1,000 valuation could be found. Moreover, while some Scottish Liberal 
MPs such as James and George Loch were involved in estate management, there 
were no Land Factors present in the Scottish Conservative cohort.5 This suggests 
that, in numerical terms, the party in England was the least dominated by landed 
interests (in numerical terms at least), and that Scotland was the most aristocratically 
dominated section of the Conservative party.  
                                                          
1 David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (London, 1996), 59.  
2 Shields, Irish Conservative Party, 3. 
3 Cragoe, National Identity in Wales, 244, 2. 
4 Vincent, Liberal Party, 48. 





Table 3: Occupations of Scottish Conservative MPs elected between 1832 and 1868, 
in addition to (or other than) a landowning capacity1 
Occupation Number Percentage of MPs 
Military 20 26 
Lawyer (Scottish) 12 15.6 
Lawyer (English) 3 3.9 
Imperial 8 10.4 





Aristocrats also often combined estate management with other professional pursuits. 
The most common occupation of Scottish Conservative MPs outside of, or in 
addition to, landowning, was military service. One MP, James Hunter Blair, was 
killed in the Crimean War at the Battle of Inkerman. This was not unique to 
Scotland; nine Irish Conservative MPs fought in the Crimean War, with one of their 
number also killed at the Battle of Inkerman.2 This military tendency crossed party 
lines, as a significant proportion of Scottish Liberal MPs who served between 1859 
and 1874 were also connected to the military.3 The second most common occupation 
among Scottish Conservative MPs was the legal profession. The training of twelve 
MPs in Scots law is significant, as it indicates that not all Conservatives conformed 
to the stereotype of the aristocratic part-time gentleman MP. Rather, several the 
cohort received a thorough and professional training in legal matters, giving them an 
advantage in dealing with Scottish legislative affairs at Westminster. Moreover, as 
the Scottish legal establishment was one of the principal separate institutions 
preserved by the Union of 1707, this also served to distinguish them from their 
English colleagues in the House. Of the seventy-seven Scottish Conservative MPs, 
three were trained in English law, including Charles Dalrymple and Francis Scott. 
This is a strong indication that many MPs were also firmly integrated into English 
and British professional worlds. 
Scottish Conservative MPs were also integrated into the wider imperial and 
international networks which lay beyond their constituency borders. Many MPs 
made their fortunes in the East India Company, including James Balfour and Patrick 
Smollett. Indeed, Lord Dalhousie served as Indian Viceroy after losing his Scottish 
seat. Military and imperial pursuits could overlap; both John Baillie and William 
Lockhart served in the Bengal Army. Outside of the Empire, members such as 
Donald Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Henry Scott were sent to far-flung diplomatic 
postings, including places such as China, Sweden, Germany and Russia.  
The Liberal party was not the exclusive champion of commercial interests; Scottish 
Conservative MPs and candidates were also heavily involved in the commercial 
                                                          
1 Some occupations pertain to multiple categories (e.g. an officer in the Bengal Army is both a 
military and an imperial occupation), and are included as such. 
2 Shields, Irish Conservative Party, 5. 




affairs of Victorian Britain.4 Many MPs, including Peter Blackburn and Henry Home 
Drummond, served as directors of commercial and financial concerns. Blackburn’s 
connection to railway companies is an example of the growth of the railway interest 
in parliament more generally.5 Duncan McNeill was particularly prolific, serving as a 
director of many firms. Commercial and industrial connections also highlight that, in 
many cases, landowning was not the principal financial base of many Scottish 
Conservatives. William Forbes, MP for Stirlingshire from 1835 to 1837, purchased 
additional lands to add to the estates inherited from his father, a self-made merchant 
wo had bought them before 1832. In addition to commercial connections, the 
Conservative party also had links to the rapidly expanding industrial sector through 
the Bairds of Gartsherrie – both William and James Baird served as MPs for the 
Falkirk Burgh District. By the 1840s, their pig-iron business accounted for seventeen 
per cent of all national production, making them almost £270,000 in profit between 
1833 and 1840.6 William and James Baird also held five chairmanships of 
companies, and directorships of twenty-nine railway companies. Many MPs who 
might have been mistakenly classed as traditionally aristocratic landowners were, in 
reality, the product of diverse origins.7  
Indeed, even a cursory examination of unsuccessful Scottish Conservative 
candidates in the burghs illustrates that this type of Conservative was far more 
numerous than has been assumed. The twice-unsuccessful Conservative candidate in 
Leith Burghs in 1834 and 1835 was William Aitchison, a local brewer.8 Similarly, 
Conservatives in the west of Scotland put forward many candidates with little or no 
connection to the land. In Glasgow alone, James Ewing in the 1835 election was a 
mercantile entrepreneur, Robert Monteith in the 1837 election was the heir to a 
textile fortune, and James Campbell in the 1837 and 1841 elections was a successful 
merchant.9 Moreover, James Smith, the unsuccessful candidate for nearby Greenock 
in 1837, made his fortune in the West Indian trade.10 Moreover, although generally 
unsuccessful in their efforts, in almost every contested burgh election Conservative 
candidates attracted more than one-third of the vote.11  
                                                          
4 The Scottish MPs discussed in other recent works on this topic tend to be Liberals. See Alex S. 
Rosser, ‘Businessmen in the Parliament of 1852–7: Players or Spectators?’, Parliamentary History, 32 
(2013), 477–505, David W. Gutzke, ‘Rhetoric and Reality: The Political Influence of British Brewers, 
1832–1914’, Parliamentary History, 9 (1990), 78–115. 
5 J.A. Thomas, The House of Commons, 1832–1901: A Study of its Economic and Functional 
Character (Cardiff, 1939), 8. 
6 John Butt, ‘Capital and enterprise in the Scottish iron industry, 1780–1840’, in Butt and Ward (eds), 
Scottish Themes, 73, 78. 
7 A. Slaven and S. Checkland, Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, 1860–1960, 2 vols 
(Aberdeen, 1990), ii. 301–2. This was also true of some Scottish Liberal MPs, such as James and 
Alexander Matheson. 
8 Lesley Richmond and Alison Turton (eds), The Brewing Industry: A Guide to Historical Records 
(Manchester, 1990), 39. 
9 M. Mackay, Memoir of James Ewing, Esq. of Strathlever (Glasgow, 1866), 21; Aspinwall, ‘Justice 
and Peace’, 58; James Maclehose, Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men (Glasgow, 
1886), 70. Campbell was also the father of future Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman 
10 Maclehose, One Hundred Glasgow Men, 285. 





Table 4: Scottish Conservative MPs in Local Government Positions, 1832–18681 
Office Number Percentage of MPs 




Sheriff 4 5.2 






County councillor 1 1.3 
 
A Scottish gentleman who owned land was not automatically a figure of political 
importance. Only when land was used as a ‘basis of public activity’, could it confer 
political influence.2 The many local offices held by Conservative landed gentlemen 
are too numerous and varied to fully uncover. However, the most prominent local 
positions which they held can be identified. The Lord Lieutenancy as an institution 
was admittedly not of great political importance, being largely peripheral to Scottish 
governance. After 1830, it constituted a ‘select club’.3 Nonetheless, membership of 
the lieutenancy was an indication of the local influence and connection of MPs.  
Though many were inactive, Deputy Lieutenants did most of the actual work of the 
Lieutenancy. The Lieutenancy-controlled Yeomanry was often used to quell 
disturbances in the 1830s. After 1832, instances of rioting decreased and policing 
became more effective, but they were still employed up to 1856 in Lanarkshire. 
Although a peripheral role, the 41.5 per cent of MPs who were Deputy- or Vice-
Lieutenants suggests at least a minor role in the maintenance of local order.  
Similarly, although the power of Justices of the Peace was also on the decline, they 
still had a marked effect on rural life.4 JPs mostly limited themselves to enforcing 
alcohol licensing regulations and violations of poaching laws.5 However, temperance 
and the Game Laws were hotly contested political issues in mid-Victorian Scotland. 
As such, MPs who also served as JPs were intimately connected to both local 
constituency affairs and national political questions.  
Although Sheriffs were minor officials in England, in Scotland it was one of 
the most important legal offices. The majority of these were Advocates who 
possessed extensive experience – in the 1840s and 1850s, the average previous 
experience of appointees was around twenty-five years.6 As such, MPs who also 
served as Sheriffs had extensive experience in legal practice and in managing local 
affairs.  
                                                          
1 Many of these roles were held concurrently.  
2 Eastwood, ‘Politics of Deference’, 42. 
3 Ann Whetstone, Scottish County Government in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
(Edinburgh, 1981), 114, 115, 111, 97. 
4 Saunders, Scottish Democracy, 19. 
5 Whetstone, Scottish County Government, 59. 




Educational Background and Marriages 
 
Table 5: Schools attended by Scottish Conservative MPs elected between 1832 and 
1868 
School Number Percentage of MPs 
Eton 9 11.7 
Harrow 4 5.2 
Edinburgh High School 3 3.9 
Rugby 2 2.6 
Westminster 1 1.3 
Haileybury College 1 1.3 
Total 20 26 
 
Although the educational background of only a quarter of the cohort could be traced, 
the data garnered does allow some limited conclusions to be reached. For one, the 
percentage of Scottish Conservative MPs who attended one of the ‘great’ public 
schools is fairly high, with over ten per cent alone having attended Eton. Many MPs 
thus spent many of their formative years in England. 
 
Table 6: Universities attended by Scottish Conservative MPs elected between 1832 
and 1868 
University Number Percentage of all MPs 
University of Edinburgh1 8 10.4 
Christ Church, Oxford 7 9.1 
Trinity College, Cambridge 4 5.2 
University of Glasgow 2 2.6 
University of St Andrews 2 2.6 
University College, Oxford 1 1.3 
Oriel College, Oxford 1 1.3 
Balliol College, Oxford 1 1.3 




Total 26 33.8 
 
A high proportion of MPs also attended Christ Church College, Oxford – then the 
most aristocratic of Oxbridge colleges.2 There was, however, a roughly equal split in 
terms of numbers attending Scottish and English universities. This suggests that, for 
some, British social integration took place alongside experiences acquired in a 
distinctive Scottish educational and intellectual milieu.  
Similarly, of those marriages which could be traced, forty-eight of the 
seventy-seven Scottish Conservative MPs married members of the aristocracy, or 
those who were related to the political elite. These marriages further bound them to a 
social and political nexus which promoted homogeneity and unity of cultural 
outlook. The case of William Forbes, who married a daughter of Lord Wemyss, is 
                                                          
1 Two of these also studied at St Andrews, and are thus counted twice. 
2 Judith Curthoys, The Cardinal’s College: Christ Church, Chapter and Verse (London, 2012), 8. 
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also indicative – even those who had purchased their estates and were relatively new 
additions to the landed elite also frequently married into this group. In an age 
preceding formal party communication and organisation, the link between political 
and social life remained strong. Given the importance of political hostesses in 
nineteenth-century political culture, it seems likely that some of these MPs’ wives 
exerted some influence. English hostesses did not host parties on their Irish estates, 
but both Scottish and English hostesses regularly held parties in Scotland. This is 
indicative of the greater extent to which the Scottish aristocracy (and Scotland in 
general) was integrated into ‘British’ political culture.3  
                                                          






Table 7: Club membership among Scottish Conservative MPs elected between 1832 
and 18681 
Club Number Percentage of MPs 
Carlton  63 81.8 
White’s 13 16.9 
Athenaeum 9 11.7 
Travellers’ 5 6.5 
Brooks’ 4 5.2 
Conservative 4 5.2 
Junior Carlton 2 2.6 
New Club, Edinburgh 2 2.6 
United Service Club 2 2.6 
Arthur’s 2 2.6 
Union 2 2.6 
Oxford and Cambridge 2 2.6 
University 2 2.6 
St James 2 2.6 
University Club, Edinburgh 1 1.3 
Guards’ 1 1.3 
Coventry 1 1.3 
Smeaton 1 1.3 
Junior United Service 1 1.3 
St Stephen’s 1 1.3 
National 1 1.3 
 
The link between party membership and club membership was never closer than in 
this period, as the Carlton Club, founded in 1832, served as an unofficial party 
headquarters.2 The club contained a party bureaucracy, though its apparatus was a 
quasi-amateur affair.3 In one instance, the ad hoc club committee formed in 
anticipation of the 1835 election included Frederick Shaw, MP for Dublin University 
and overseer of Irish party business, and Sir George Clerk, prominent Conservative 
whip and former member for Edinburgh.4 The party machinery, amateur though it 
was, acknowledged and catered to the differing circumstances in different parts of 
the UK. By 1859, roughly two-thirds of UK Conservative MPs were members of the 
Carlton Club.  
Over three quarters of Scottish MPs whose memberships could be traced 
were members of the Carlton (81.8 per cent), a very significant proportion. Given 
that the cohort examined includes MPs from a much broader time range, including 
those who served long before 1832 and long after 1868, this highlights the 
consistency of club membership across the period. Club membership also crossed 
social boundaries, with industrialists like James Baird and traditional landowners 
                                                          
1 Memberships were often held concurrently. 
2 Stewart, Foundation of the Conservative Party, 121. 
3 Hill, Toryism, 38.  
4 Salmon, Electoral Reform, 44. 
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sharing membership. The continuity of club memberships across the entire period 
also demonstrates that the party’s Corn Law split was not quite as acrimonious as 
some have suggested. Peelites and Protectionists retained their club memberships, 
with the exceptions of two English Peelites, and therefore presumably continued to 
mix with one another on a social basis.5  
Among the broad smattering of additional club memberships set out in Table 
7, another pattern (or, rather, a lack thereof) is evident: there was no single Scottish-
based gentlemen’s club in which membership was shared by a significant number of 
Conservative MPs. This stands in stark contrast to the Irish Conservative party, 
whose MPs were members of Dublin clubs. A great many Conservative MPs shared 
membership of the Sackville club in addition to membership of the Kildare Street 
club, which catered more generally to members of the landed interest.6 The failure of 
the Conservative Association of Scotland in 1835 deprived the Scottish party of a 
potential equivalent. In fact, a viable Scottish Conservative club was not formed in 
Edinburgh until 1877.7  
 
 
                                                          
5 Jones and Erickson, Peelites, 221. 
6 Shields, Irish Conservative Party, 7. 
7 Crapster, ‘Scotland and the Conservative Party’, 360. 
